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1
Introduction: Perspectives on Cultural
Integration of Immigrants
Yann Algan1, Alberto Bisin, and Thierry Verdier
1.1 Introduction
The concepts of cultural diversity and cultural identity are at the fore-
front of the political debate in many western societies. In Europe, the
discussion is stimulated by the political pressures associated with immi-
gration flows, which are increasing in many European countries, as
shown in Figure 1.1. Dealing with the ethnic and cultural heterogeneity
associated to such trends is one of the most important challenges that
European societies will face. The debate on the perceived costs and
benefits of cultural diversity is already intense. This is well illustrated,
for instance, in France, where discussions about the wearing of the
Islamic veil and the burqa stimulated, in turn, a public debate on
national identity. Similarly, the recent vote in Switzerland against the
construction of Muslim mosques clearly shows how heated and emo-
tional arguments on ethnic and religious identity have recently become.
Sociologists have been studying the cultural integration patterns of
immigrants at least since the late nineteenth century, especially in the
context of immigration into the United States. Economists have instead
been traditionally mainly interested in assessing the direct impact of
immigrationflows onmarket outcomes (especially on the labourmarket)
or on fiscal transfers and public goods provision. The basic question of
assimilation for economists has, then, been framed in terms of economic
1 The research leading to there results for Yann Algan has received funding from the
European Research Council under the European Community’s Sweath Framework
Programme (FP7/2007–2013)/ERC grant agreement number 240923.
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assimilation, namely in terms of the dynamics of immigrants’ earnings
and socio-economic positions relatively to natives. Recently, however,
economists have been recognizing that, beyond interactions directly
mediated throughmarkets, prices and incomes, other non-market social
and cultural interactions could also be important determinants of the
socio-economic integration of immigrants. Specific patterns of cultural
attitudes of immigrant groups can significantly affect their labourmarket
performances, for instance. The common social phenomenon of ‘oppo-
sitional’ identities, by which certain minority individuals actively reject
the dominant majority behavioural norms, can produce significant eco-
nomic and social conflicts as well as adverse labour-market outcomes.
More generally, social scientists have dedicated a lot of attention to the
fact that immigrants’ integrationpatterns can significantlyalter thedesign
and the political economy of public policies in the host society. An exam-
ple of this issue concerns the sustainability of welfare state institutions
in the context of multicultural societies. Cultural diversity may indeed
affect the sense of community and social solidarity which constitute
founding pillars of democratic welfare state systems. This could lead to
the erosion of the social consensus for redistribution and diminish the
political support for universal social programmes. Public policies aimed
at correcting for horizontal inequalities across cultural groups, might
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Figure 1.1 Immigration flows in European countries.
Source: United Nations Population Division
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For these reasons, several observers favour explicit public policies
promoting, or even requesting, the cultural assimilation of immigrants
to the cultural attitudes of natives. Other observers, however, argue that
welfare state institutions should be designed to accommodate cultural
diversity. These policies would facilitate contacts across communities,
promote tolerance, trust, and respect towards other groups and, in the
end, would help develop new national identities.
In either case, the study of cultural and socio-economic integration
patterns of immigrants seems of paramount importance, as such pat-
terns determine how the expression of cultural differences is translated
into individual behaviour and public policy. The imperatives that cur-
rent immigration trends impose on European democracies bring to light
a number of issues that need to be addressed. What are the patterns and
dynamics of cultural integration? How do they differ across immigrants
of different ethnic groups and religious faiths? How do they differ across
host societies? What are the implications and consequences for market
outcomes and public policy? Which kind of institutional contexts
are more or less likely to accommodate the cultural integration of im-
migrants? All these questions are crucial for policy makers and await
answers.
In this context, the purpose of this book is to provide a modest but
nevertheless essential contribution as a stepping stone to the debate.
Taking an economic perspective, the collection of essays in this book
presents the first descriptive and comparative picture of the process of
cultural integration of immigrants in Europe, as it is taking place. We
provide in the country chapters a detailed description of the cultural
and economic integration process in seven main European countries
and in the United States. The European countries include France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. We then
provide in the conclusion of the book a cross-country comparison of the
integration process using a unified database, the European Social Survey.
The conclusion concentrates on the interplay between the cultural and
economic integration process across European countries, and discusses
how those various dimensions of integration correlate with specific
national policies aimed at immigrants’ integration.
In this first chapter, building on the recent economics of cultural
transmission, we introduce the main conceptual issues which are of
relevance to the study of the cultural integration patterns of immigrants
and of their interaction with market and non-market outcomes. More
specifically, this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we discuss
briefly the different theories of cultural integration developed in the
social sciences. In Section 1.3 we introduce in more detail the economic
Introduction: Perspectives on Cultural Integration of Immigrants
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approach to the study of cultural integration. In Section 1.4 we provide a
short overview of the main conceptual issues associated with measuring
cultural integration processes. In Section 1.5 we discuss cultural integra-
tion in terms of its socio-economic impact on host countries. Finally, in
Section 1.6 we conclude with a brief overview of the subsequent chap-
ters included in this book.
1.2 Cultural integration theories in the social sciences
Three main perspectives on cultural integration confront themselves in
the social sciences: assimilation theory, multiculturalism, and structural-
ism. This section briefly discusses the main elements of each of these
conceptual views as well as those of a recent synthetic perspective, called
segmented assimilation.
1.2.1 Assimilation theory
In the literature on the cultural integration of immigrants, the perspec-
tive of assimilation theory has dominated much of the sociological
thinking for most of the twentieth century. This approach builds upon
three central features. First, diverse ethnic groups come to share a com-
mon culture through a natural process along which they have the same
access to socio-economic opportunities as natives of the host country.
Second, this process consists of the gradual disappearance of original
cultural and behavioural patterns in favour of new ones. Third, once
set in motion, the process moves inevitably and irreversibly towards
complete assimilation. Hence, diverse immigrant groups are expected
to ‘melt’ into the mainstream culture through an inter-generational
process of cultural, social, and economic integration.
This view is exemplified, for example, by Gordon (1964), who pro-
vides a typology of assimilation patterns to capture this process. In
Gordon’s view, immigrants begin their adaptation to their new country
through cultural assimilation, or acculturation. Though cultural assimila-
tion is a necessary first step, ethnic groups may remain distinguished
from one another because of spatial isolation and lack of contact. Their
full assimilation depends ultimately on the degree to which these groups
gain the acceptance of the dominant population. Socio-economic assimi-
lation inevitably leads to other stages of assimilation through which
ethnic groups eventually lose their distinctive characteristics.
Assimilation theory seemed to be rather corroborated by the experi-
ence of the various waves of European immigrants that arrived in the
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
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USA between the 1920s and the 1950s. As indicated by assimilation
theory, these groups of immigrants followed progressive trends of social
mobility across generations and increasing rates of intermarriage, as
determined by educational achievements, job market integration,
English proficiency, and levels of exposure to American culture (see for
instance Alba, 1985; Chiswick, 1978; Lieberson and Waters, 1988). In
the 1960s, the classical assimilation perspective was challenged in the
USA by the cultural integration patterns of more recent non-European
immigrant groups. Instead of converging into the mainstream culture,
these groups appeared to preserve their ethnic and religious identities,
making cultural differences more persistent than assimilation theory
would conventionally predict. Differential outcomes with respect to
natives seemed to prevail even after long-term residence in the USA
(Kao and Tienda, 1995; Rumbaut and Ima, 1988; Suarez-Orozco and
Suarez-Orozco, 1995; and Landale and Oropesa, 1995). Disadvantages
were reproduced, rather than diminished (Gans, 1992). Patterns of
mobility across generations were observed to have divergent rather
than convergent paths (Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963; and Perlmann,
1988). This evidence turned out to lead to the development of alterna-
tive approaches to the study of cultural integration.
1.2.2 Multiculturalism
One such alternative approach is multiculturalism, which rejects the
simple integration process proposed by assimilation theory. Scholars
from this perspective view multicultural societies as composed of a
heterogeneous collection of ethnic and racial minority groups, as well
as of a dominant majority group. This view has been forcefully illustrated
by Glazer and Moynihan (1970) and by Handlin (1973) in the context of
the American society. They argue that immigrants actively shape their
own identities rather than posing as passive subjects in front of the forces
of assimilation. These authors also emphasize that some aspects of the
cultural characteristics of immigrants may be preserved in a state of
uneasy co-existence with the attitudes of the host country. The multicul-
tural perspective offers, then, an alternative way of considering the host
society, presenting members of ethnic minority groups as active integral
segments of the whole society rather than just foreigners or outsiders.
1.2.3 Structuralism
Rather than focusing on the processes of assimilation or integration
per se, the structuralist approach emphasizes how differences in
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socio-economic opportunities relate to differences in social integration
of ethnic minority groups. Unequal access to wealth, jobs, housing,
education, power, and privilege are seen as structural constraints that
affect the ability of immigrants and ethnic minorities to socially inte-
grate. This leads to persistent ethnic disparities in levels of income,
educational attainment, and occupational achievement of immigrants
(Blau and Duncan, 1967; Portes and Borocz, 1989). Consequently, the
benefits of integration depend largely on what stratum of society ab-
sorbs the new immigrants. Contrary to the perspectives of assimilation
theory and of multiculturalism, structuralism emphasizes the inherent
conflicts that exist in the social hierarchy between dominant and
minority groups and therefore questions even the possibility of cultural
and socio-economic integration of immigrants.
To summarize, assimilation theory, multiculturalism, and structural-
ism provide different views of the same phenomenon. The focus of
assimilation theorists is on immigrants’ succeeding generations gradu-
ally moving away from their original culture. Multiculturalists acknowl-
edge that the cultural characteristics of immigrants are constantly
reshaped along the integration process and therefore may never
completely disappear. Structuralists emphasize the effects of the social
and economic structure of the host country on the ability of immigrants
to integrate into its cultural attitudes and to share its economic benefits.
While each of the previous perspectives insists on one specific dimen-
sion of the integration pattern of immigrants, segmented assimilation
theory provides a synthesis of these distinctive approaches.
1.2.4 Segmented assimilation synthesis
The main objective of this line of research is to provide a more complete
picture of the different patterns of integration among immigrants in
terms of convergent or divergent paths of cultural adaptation. More
precisely, this theory envisions the process of cultural integration
along three possible patterns: (1) an upward mobility pattern associated
with assimilation and economic integration into the normative struc-
tures of the majority group; (2) a downward mobility pattern, in the
opposite direction, associated to assimilation and parallel integration
into the underclass; (3) economic integration but lagged assimilation
and/or deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values
and identity (see Portes and Zhou, 1994). This theoretical perspective
attempts to explain the factors that determine which segment of the
host society a particular immigrant group may assimilate into. Its focus
is on how various socio-economic and demographic factors (education,
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native language proficiency, place of birth, age upon arrival, and length
of residence in the host country) interact with contextual variables
(such as racial status, family socio-economic backgrounds, and place of
residence) to produce specific cultural integration patterns of a given
cultural minority group.
1.3 Economic approach to cultural integration
While other social scientists tend to focus on the effects of the social
environment on cultural patterns across groups, the starting point of
the economic approach to cultural integration is the analysis of individ-
ual behaviour, extended to account for endogenous preferences and
identity formation. Economists, therefore, emphasize the importance
of individual incentives and of the opportunity costs associated with
different integration patterns.
1.3.1 Cultural adoption
A first simple model capturing the incentives for cultural integration is
provided by an analysis of adoption of a common language by Lazear
(1999). In this framework, individuals from two different cultural
groups (aminority and amajority) are matched to interact economically
and socially. Cultural integration facilitates trade across individuals.2
The incentives for an individual belonging to the minority cultural
group to assimilate and adopt the culture of the majority are then
directly related to the expected gains from trade that such a strategy
provides.
More specifically, consider a simple environment in which each indi-
vidual is randomly matched with one and only one other individual
each period. Let the two cultural groups be denoted A and B, and
let pA and pB denote the proportions of individuals who belong to
culture A and B, respectively. Finally, let A represent the majority
group: pA = 1– pB >1/2.
3 A minority individual may encounter another
individual of his own group and get an expected gain from trade VB.
Alternatively, he may interact with an individual from the majority
group A, in which case he receives an expected gain VA if he shares
2 Defined broadly to include non-market interactions as well.
3 In Lazear (1999), the fractions pA and pB reflect the proportions of people that speak,
respectively, language A and language B. Therefore, bilingual individuals belong to both
cultures and pA + pB >1.
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common cultural elements with that group (i.e. if he made a specific
effort at assimilating the majority culture), and a lower gain fVA
(with f <1) if he does not.
When individuals of group B acquire group A’s cultural values, they
become ‘assimilated’ into group A. They may still retain some or all of
their old culture, but they now have the ability to trade with the major-
ity group. For instance, in the specific case of language adoption, assimi-
lation can be thought of as becoming fluent in the majority language,
while possibly retaining the ability to speak the native tongue. It is
reasonable to assume that cultural assimilation is costly and resources
must be spent to acquire new cultural traits (e.g. to learn a new lan-
guage). Moreover, these costs may be individual specific. Denote, there-
fore, by ti the individual-specific cost parameter that measures
(inversely) the efficiency with which individual i acquires the new
culture. Formally, ti is distributed with density and distribution function
g(ti) and G(ti), respectively. Individuals make their cultural assimilation
choices with no coordinated group strategy. When an individual
belonging to group B does not assimilate to the culture of the majority,
his expected gain is pB VB + pA f VA. On the other hand, when he does
assimilate, his expected gain is pB VB + pA VA  ti. It follows that
an individual belonging to group B will culturally assimilate when
ti < pA(1f)VA; that is, if the individual cost ti of acquiring the cultural
trait of group A is smaller than the expected benefit pA(1f)VA of such
assimilation strategy. Aggregating over all individuals of group
B that find it profitable to acquire the cultural trait of group A, the
fraction of assimilated individuals in the minority is sBA = G(pA(1f)
VA) = G[(1 pB)(1f)VA].
Interestingly, this simple model produces three important implica-
tions. First, cultural assimilation is a decreasing function of the fraction
pB of minority group members in society. Hence the smaller and the
more dispersed the minority group, the more likely we should expect
cultural assimilation for that group. Second, sBA is also an increasing
function of the expected economic gain VA to be obtained by interacting
with individuals belonging to the majority. Hence, the larger the eco-
nomic benefits to be culturally integrated, the larger the incentives to
assimilate. Third, cultural integration is increasing with (1f), namely
the degree of inefficiency associated with interacting with individuals of
the majority without sharing their cultural traits. Hence, the more
important is the sharing of a common culture to enjoy social interac-
tions, the larger, again, are the incentives to assimilate for the minority
group. Two additional implications of Lazear’s model are also worth
emphasizing. From a normative perspective, there is a crucial externality
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
8
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
in the assimilation process. Indeed, the larger the fraction of minority
individuals which assimilate, the higher are the expected gains from
trade for the majority. Clearly, when deciding whether to assimilate,
individuals belonging to the cultural minority do not internalize these
gains. At least from the point of view of the majority group, this pro-
vides a rationale for integration policies which subsidize the assimila-
tion of minorities. Furthermore, this framework can be easily expanded
to allow for multiple minority groups. In this case, cultural assimilation
will be favoured in the presence of a relatively even distribution of
minority groups. The existence of relatively large minorities, in fact,
reduces the incentives of each minority group to adopt the culture
of the majority. Again, straightforward policy implications can be
obtained, favouring even distributions of immigrants by cultural
identity.
1.3.2 Identity formation
While the model of Lazear (1999) puts its emphasis on the potential
gains from trade associated with the interaction between members of
different communities, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) concentrate more
directly on cultural identity as an important source of the gains or losses
associated with social interactions between different groups. Building
on insights from social psychology and sociology, Akerlof and Kranton
introduce the concept of social identity in economic models and discuss
how it may interact with individuals’ incentives. More specifically,
identity is defined as a person’s self-image, based on given social cate-
gories and on prescriptions associated with these categories. Each per-
son has a perception of his own categories and that of all other people.
Prescriptions, in turn, indicate which behaviour is deemed appropriate
for people in different social categories and/or in different situations.
Prescriptions may also often describe ideals for each category in terms of
physical and material attributes.
In this conceptual context, Akerlof and Kranton emphasize two
dimensions of identity formation which are relevant to understand
cultural integration. First, categorizations and prescriptions are learned
and acquired by individuals through processes of internalization and
identification with respect to others who share these categories, that is,
who belong to the same cultural group. This implies in particular that
one’s self image depends on how one satisfies the prescriptions of the
category. Moreover, as identification is a crucial part of the internaliza-
tion process, a person’s self-image can be threatened by others’ violation
of the set of prescriptions he identifies with. Indeed, prescriptions
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associated with one group or category are often defined in contrast to
those of others. This dimension provides a source of potentially impor-
tant social externalities when individuals interact with each other. Sec-
ond, Akerlof and Kranton’s cultural identity is not given. Individuals
choose assignments to social categories (form their identity) by means
of actions corresponding to these categorizations. Hence, incentives can
affect the process of identity formation. As in Lazear (1999), the costs of
cultural assimilationmay relate to different factors such as the size of the
groups, the economic gains from trade and interactions, the role of
frictions in social interactions and matching.
An important application of this conceptual framework is to the study
of oppositional cultures, when minorities adopt cultural categorizations
and prescriptions defined in opposition to the categorizations and pre-
scriptions of the dominant majority. Oppositional cultures often corre-
spond to behaviour which requires significant economic costs for
members of the minority group adopting the culture. At the heart of
the emergence of oppositional cultures, according to Akerlof and Kran-
ton, lie two crucial factors: social exclusion and lack of economic
opportunities.4 Social exclusion derives from the well established socio-
logical fact that dominant groups define themselves by differentiation
and exclusion of others. This in turn creates a conflict for minority
members: how to work within the dominant culture without betraying
one’s own. Such social differences may then open the possibility for
adoption of oppositional identities by those in excluded groups. Lack of
economic opportunity may also contribute to the adoption of an oppo-
sitional identity. For instance, it has been noted that the decline in well-
paid, unskilled jobs could result in loss of self-respect by men who
cannot support their families, and the rise in inner city crime and drug
abuse (Wilson, 1996). Similarly, Liebow (1967) in a famous ethno-
graphic work on ‘corner street’ men (i.e. street beggars and idlers)
describes how the lack of decent-paying work leads these individuals
towards the adoption of identities which severely inhibit the value of
any labour market skill they may possess, in an attempt to avoid
suffering the guilt of failing to provide for themselves and their families.
Motivated by these and other ethnographic accounts of oppositional
identities in poor neighbourhoods in the USA and UK,5 Akerlof
and Kranton construct a model of identity formation where people
4 A rapidly emerging economic literature on oppositional cultures includes, for instance,
Ferguson (2001), Fryer (2004), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Fryer and Torelli (2005), Battu
et al. (2007), Battu and Zenou (2010), Darity et al. (2006), Pattacchini and Zenou (2006).
5 See for instance MacLeod (1987) and Willis (1977).
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belonging to poor and socially excluded communities can choose
between two identities: the dominant culture or an oppositional iden-
tity which rejects it. Each identity is defined by a set of prescriptions on
certain actions/decisions that ought to be taken. From the perspective of
the dominant identity, the oppositional identity is perceived as induc-
ing bad economic decisions, self-destructive behaviour (such as taking
drugs, joining a gang, and becoming pregnant at a young age) which
in turn can generate negative pecuniary externalities on the rest of
the community. Also, the model accounts for important identity-based
externalities: individuals adopting an oppositional identity may be
angered by those who assimilate, because of their complicity with the
dominant culture, while on the contrary those who assimilate may
be angered by those individuals who oppose the dominant culture by
breaking its prescriptions. Finally, social exclusion by the majority is
modeled as a loss in identity that individuals from the minority will
suffer if they choose to adopt the dominant culture. It represents the
extent to which someone from the minority is not accepted by the
dominant group in society. On the contrary, individuals who choose
to adopt the oppositional identity do not suffer such a loss.
The model generates societies which in equilibrium display a preva-
lence of oppositional identities and ‘anti-social’ behaviour. Typically, an
equilibrium with full assimilation of the dominant culture by the com-
munity is possible only when social exclusion from the dominant group
is small enough. On the contrary, a positive level of social exclusion will
always lead some people in the community to adopt an oppositional
identity and some ‘self-destructive’ and ‘anti-social’ behaviour. Impor-
tantly, the ‘self-destructive’ behaviour is not the result of the individual’s
lack of rationality, but instead derives from lack of economic opportu-
nity and a high degree of social exclusion. The model’s implications
lend themselves to suggest policies designed to reduce the effects of
social exclusion. In particular, training programmes which take trainees
out of their neighbourhoods may eliminate the negative effects of inter-
acting with individuals sharing oppositional identities and therefore
may reduce the likelihood of the emergence of such cultures. Moreover,
being in a different location may also reduce a trainee’s direct social
exclusion loss from assimilation to the dominant culture as this loss
may be both individual-specific and situational. Finally, the model also
highlights issues in the affirmative action debate. In particular, the
rhetoric and symbolism of affirmative action may affect the level of
social exclusion by the dominant group. On the one hand, affirmative
action may increase the perception of victimization of the minority
community, therefore reinforcing social differentiation and exclusion
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from the dominant group (Loury, 1995). On the other hand, affirmative
action may decrease social exclusion, to the extent it is seen as a form of
acceptance of the minority into the dominant culture.
1.3.3 Acculturation strategies
One important element of the previous analyses is the fact that cultural
identity formation is modeled as a simple binary choice: individuals
with foreign backgrounds either choose to identify with the dominant
culture or to their (e.g. ethnic) minority culture. Even when themodel is
extended to allow for oppositional identity, its scope and complexity is
limited by assuming that a stronger identification to the culture of the
majority necessarily implies a weaker identification to the ethnic minor-
ity. These views, however, have been criticized as too simplistic to
capture the different possible patterns of cultural integration of mino-
rities. Indeed, studies within cross-cultural psychology suggest a more
complex model of identity formation,6 treating the degree of identifica-
tion with the culture of the majority as separate and independent from
the degree of identification with the minority culture. Individuals may,
for example, simultaneously feel a strong affinity for the majority and
for a minority culture.
For instance, Berry (1997) actually considers four distinct accultura-
tion strategies regarding how individuals relate to an original ethnic
culture of the minority group and the dominant culture of the majority
(see Figure 1.2). The first strategy, integration, implies a strong sense of
identification to both the original and the majority culture. The second,
assimilation, requires a strong relationship with the majority culture but
a weak relationship with the original culture. The third, separation, is
associated to a weak connection with the majority culture but a strong
connection with the original culture. Finally, the fourth strategy, mar-
ginalization, involves a weak link with both themajority and the original
culture.
While such an identity formation structure has been discussed empir-
ically in several recent economic studies of migrants’ cultural integra-
tion (see Constant et al., 2006; Zimmermann et al., 2007; Nekby and
Rödin, 2007), little conceptual analysis has tried to disentangle the
incentives of minority individuals to adopt a particular acculturation
strategy in this framework. Consider, then, a specific minority or ethnic
group that is part of the larger society. Each individual member derives
6 See for instance (Berry, 1980, 1984, 1997; Phinney, 1990; Phinney et al., 2001).
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utility from a general aggregate consumption good as well as from a
group-specific good that effectively defines the identity of the group.
Consumers allocate their time between ethnic and general activities that
respectively enter as inputs in the household production function of the
ethnic and general goods.
Individuals may as well invest in human capital, increasing the pro-
ductivity of the household technology for the group-specific good and
for the general good. More specifically, human capital can be distin-
guished along two types: group-specific human capital, that enhances the
skills relevant for producing the group-specific good and general shared
human capital. Group-specific or ethnic human capital is associated with
skills and experiences that are useful only for members of that group, for
example language, religion, or customs affecting family relationships.
On the other hand, shared human capital develops skills that raise the
household’s productivity of the general good, like, for example, the
mastery of a common language, and general skills useful in the labour
market.
Group specific human capital accumulation, in the form, for example
of ‘ethnic education’, begins with ethnic-specific parenting styles, fam-
ily customs, cultural socialization, and group-specific training within
the ethnic community. The key parameter in Chiswick’s model is the
degree of complementarity or substitutability between the accumula-
tion processes for group-specific and general shared human capital. The
types of acculturation strategies that emerge for members of the minor-
ity depend crucially on these complementarity and substitutability
effects. The model is able, therefore, to successfully connect the pattern
of investments in group specific and general human capital to the accul-
turation strategies that minority individuals may choose. More specifi-
cally, it suggests that strong complementarities between group-specific
human capital and general human capital will favour the emergence







Figure 1.2 Two-dimensional identity model (Berry, 1997).
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accumulation of both types of human capital, and consequently develop
strong identification to both their original culture and the general domi-
nant culture of society. On the contrary, substitutability in human capi-
tal accumulation promotes the occurrence of cultural assimilation or
cultural separation, where individuals in the minority will only identify
with one culture at the cost of the other.Marginalizationwill finally occur
when substantial fixed costs dampen the accumulation of both types of
human capital.
1.3.4 Dynamic cultural adoption
Cultural integration has an essential dynamic character across time and
generations. Several recent economic approaches have tried to incorpo-
rate these features in their analyses. A dynamic approach to cultural
assimilation is described by Konya (2005), who extends the static frame-
work of Lazear (1999) to a dynamic context. Individual members of a
small minority group may decide to assimilate with the dominant
majority culture or not. Individuals live for one period and have exactly
one child each. They are dynastic altruists in the sense that they are
concerned with their own utility as well as the utility of their future
‘dynasty’. As in Lazear (1999), assimilation strategies have a single
dimension: minority individuals either assimilate completely into the
culture of the majority or they do not, remaining as members of the
minority group. Each child is born inheriting the culture adopted by his
parent. Any child born inheriting the culture of the minority chooses in
turn to either assimilate or not. Children of assimilated parents belong
instead irreversibly to the dominantmajority group. As in Lazear (1999),
individuals are matched randomly in society and gains from trade
obtain from the resulting social and economic interactions. A match
between members of the same group generates a larger gain than a
match between individuals of different groups. Belonging to the major-
ity group is therefore relatively desirable because of scale effects. But
assimilation is costly. Thus, when deciding about cultural assimilation,
minority members weight the benefits and the costs. In contrast to the
static approach, rational forward-looking altruistic individuals take into
account the future expected benefits of assimilation accruing to their
whole dynasty. An important feature of the dynamics is the fact that
incentives for assimilation change for successive generations, according
to changes in the population structure over time. The model highlights
the crucial role of the initial size of the minority group. When the
minority is initially small, the long-run outcome is full assimilation.
When the minority is instead initially large, the unique long-run
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equilibrium is the initial distribution, that is, full cultural separation.
Interestingly, for intermediate minority sizes, multiple long-run distri-
butions are possible, including the full and no-assimilation ones.
The subtle interactions between the initial structure of the population
and the role of expectations of population changes on the future gains
of assimilation explain the dynamics of the distribution of the popula-
tion across cultural groups. Suppose that the members of the minority
expect the population structure to remain the same as initially and that
in such an environment, assimilation is too costly for any individual.
Then clearly there will not be cultural assimilation and the population
distribution across cultural groups will replicate itself indefinitely, con-
firming the initial expectations of the members of the minority. On the
other hand, suppose that minority individuals anticipate a drastic
assimilation process of their own group with the majority and that,
under such changing circumstances, the gains to assimilation are largely
increased. Then, possibly, a fraction of minority individuals assimilate.
This in turn might validate the expectations of assimilation. Depending
on the initial beliefs shared inside the minority community, one may
end up in two very different situations in the long run, everything else
being equal.
From a normative perspective, the analysis points to two basic ineffi-
ciencies that characterize the dynamics of assimilation. First of all, the
speed of assimilation may be too small as there are positive external
effects of assimilation on the majority that are not internalized by
minority members. Indeed, when interacting with minority members,
majority members benefit from meeting an assimilated minority mem-
ber, but the latter do not take this into account. This suggests a rationale
for policies that tend to subsidize the assimilation strategy of minorities,
as in the static case. The second source of inefficiency relates to the
existence of multiple equilibrium paths of cultural assimilation. One
such path might Pareto dominate another, while expectations coordi-
nate on the second, along which society would end up converging to
the stationary state.
At the heart of Konya’s (2005) approach to cultural assimilation is the
dynastic altruism assumption: parents weigh the dynamic socio-eco-
nomic gains from cultural assimilation that they and their children
will enjoy against the direct costs of assimilating. However, parents’
decisions about cultural assimilation may also be motivated by a desire
to transmit to their children their own (the parents’) values, beliefs, and
norms per se. Parents may be altruistic toward their kids, but in ‘pater-
nalistic’ manner. Parents, in fact, are typically aware of the different
traits children will be choosing to adopt and of the socio-economic
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choices they (the children) will make in their lifetime. Parents might
then evaluate these choices through the filter of their own (the parents’)
subjective views, that is, they might not ‘perfectly empathize’ with their
children. As a consequence of imperfect empathy, parents, while altru-
istic, might prefer to have their children sharing their own cultural trait.
Imperfect empathy provides in fact a natural motivation for the obser-
vation that parents typically spend substantial time and resources to
socialize their children to their own values and cultures. This obviously
may have implications for the observed pattern of integration and
identity formation of cultural minority groups.
1.3.5 Cultural transmission
Building on evolutionary models of cultural transmission (Boyd and
Richerson, 1985), Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) incorporate parental
socialization choices under imperfect empathy in their study of the
dynamics of cultural transmission and integration patterns. In particu-
lar, Bisin and Verdier’s model has relevant implications regarding the
determinants of the persistence of different cultural traits in the popu-
lation. Cultural transmission is modelled as the result of the interaction
between purposeful socialization decisions inside the family (‘direct
vertical socialization’) and indirect socialization processes like social
imitation and learning (‘oblique and horizontal socialization’). The
persistence of cultural traits or, on the contrary, the cultural assimilation
of minorities, is determined by the costs and benefits of various family
decisions pertaining to the socialization of children in specific socio-
economic environments, which in turn determine the children’s oppor-
tunities for social imitation and learning.
More precisely, Bisin and Verdier (2001) consider the dynamics of a
population with two possible cultural traits (A and B). Let q denote the
fraction of the population with trait A, and (1q) the fraction with trait
B. Families are composed of one parent and one child. All children are
born without defined preferences or cultural traits, and are first exposed
to their parent’s trait, which they adopt with some probability di, for
i = A or B. If a child from a family with trait i is not directly socialized,
which occurs with probability 1di, he picks the trait of a role model
chosen randomly in the population (i.e. he/picks trait Awith probability
q and trait B with probability 1q). The probability that a child of a
parent of trait A also has trait A is thereforePAA = dA + (1dA)q; while the
probability that he has trait B is PAB = (1dA)(1q). The probabilities
PBB and PBA, by symmetry, are PBB = dB + (1dB)(1q) PBA = (1dB)q.
The probability of family socialization di can be affected by the parent
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through various forms of costly effort. The benefits of socialization are
instead due to imperfect empathy. For each parent, the chosen level of
socialization effort will balance out the marginal cost of that effort
against the marginal benefit of transmitting one’s own culture.
In such a context, Bisin and Verdier (2001) analyse the resulting
population dynamics of cultural traits, that is, the dynamics of the
distribution of the population across cultural traits, with the objective
of characterizing the conditions which give rise to persistence of cultural
diversity in the long run. They show that the crucial factor determining
the composition of the stationary distribution of the population con-
sists in whether the socio-economic environment (oblique socializa-
tion) acts as a substitute or as a complement to direct vertical family
socialization. More precisely, direct vertical socialization is viewed as a
cultural substitute to oblique transmission whenever parents choose to
socialize their children less when their cultural trait is more widely
dominant in the population. This would be the case, intuitively, if
parents belonging to the dominant majority tended to rely mostly on
indirect ‘oblique and horizontal’ mechanisms to socialize their children,
since such mechanisms are naturally more effective for cultural majo-
rities than minorities. This property of the socialization mechanism
promotes the persistence of cultural differences in the population. On
the contrary, direct vertical transmission is a cultural complement to
oblique transmission when parents socialize their children more
intensely the more widely dominant their cultural trait is in the popula-
tion. In such a case, the population dynamics converges to a culturally
homogeneous cultural population. The complementarity between fam-
ily and society in the process of intergenerational socialization gives a
size advantage to the larger group (the majority) both in terms of direct
vertical family socialization and in terms of indirect ‘oblique and hori-
zontal’ socialization. This promotes the assimilation of the minority
group and cultural homogeneity in the long run.
While Bisin and Verdier’s (2001) model is stated in terms of general
socialization mechanisms, specific choices contribute to direct family
socialization and hence to cultural transmission. Prominent examples
are, for example, education decision, family location decisions, and
marriage.7 The simple analytics of the model are obtained when the
7 For instance, education choices have been studied by Pattacchini and Zenou (2004);
marriage choices within ethnic and religious groups have been specifically discussed by
Bisin-Verdier (2000) and Bisin et al. (2004). Other applications incorporating identity forma-
tion and oppositional cultures include Sáez-Martı́ and Zenou (2005) and Bisin et al. (2009).
The role of horizontal socialization and peer effects is also discussed in Sáez-Martı́ and
Sjögren (2005).
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benefits of socialization are based on purely cultural motivations and are
in particular independent of the distribution of the population. Many
interesting analyses of cultural transmission require this assumption
to be relaxed. Indeed, in many instances the adoption of a dominant
cultural trait might provide a beneficial effect per se. An obvious exam-
ple is Lazear (1999), where the adoption of the dominant language has
beneficial effects in the labour market. In this case altruistic parents,
even if paternalistic, might favour (or discourage less intensely) the
cultural assimilation of their children. This trade-off between ethnic
preferences and the disadvantage of minority traits in terms of eco-
nomic opportunities may be central to the integration pattern of im-
migrants in the host country. Interestingly, when these elements are
incorporated in cultural transmission models (Bisin and Verdier, 2000),
they result in the existence of multiple equilibrium pattern of cultural
assimilation and issues of coordination of beliefs across and within
cultural groups.
In the previous sections, we reviewed some of the theoretical frame-
works developed in the literature for the study of integration patterns of
members of cultural minorities. These analyses stress three interesting
components: structural socio-economic opportunities, complementari-
ties and substitutabilities between the minority and the majority cul-
tures, externalities and the role of expectations and beliefs. We discuss
each of them in turn.
1.3.6 Socio-economic opportunities
As the structuralist approach in sociology, the economic analysis of
cultural integration emphasizes the role of economic incentives and
opportunities. Incentives and opportunities are in particular affected
by the size of the minority group. Indeed, assimilation to the dominant
culture is likely to provide scale benefits in terms of economic interac-
tions. Therefore we should generally expect smaller minorities to cultur-
ally assimilate faster and more easily than bigger minorities. Also, the
socio-economic gains of cultural assimilation depend importantly on
several host country institutional factors as well as on the reactions of
the dominant group to the pattern of integration of minorities. Specifi-
cally, supply factors such as forms of socio-economic exclusion by the
dominant group may significantly reduce the demand for cultural
assimilation by members of minorities and may stimulate, on the con-
trary, the adoption of strategies leading to cultural separation. In certain
circumstances, socio-economic exclusion by the dominant group could
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even create the conditions for the emergence of oppositional cultures, as
a sort of ‘negative demand’ for assimilation.
1.3.7 Complementarities and substitutabilities in human capital
and socialization processes
Two dimensions of the degree of complementarities and substitutabil-
ities between the minority culture and the majority culture appear
relevant to understanding and explaining different integration patterns.
First, as illustrated by Chiswick‘s human capital formation approach,
complementarities in skill learning processes tend to favour similar and
positively correlated patterns of human capital accumulation in differ-
ent cultures. This leads to integration when associated with high levels
of investments and marginalization when associated with low levels of
investments. On the other hand, substitutabilities lead to negatively
correlated human capital investments between minorities and the
majority. Second, as suggested by Bisin and Verdier’s cultural transmis-
sion framework, complementarities and substitutabilities between
direct vertical family socialization and indirect oblique mechanisms of
socialization may significantly affect the intensity with which minority
members engage in cultural transmission to their children. Again, group
size effects matter. When socialization mechanisms are characterized by
complementarities in imitation processes and exposure to role models,
minority parents tend to reduce their direct transmission efforts when
they expect their children to be less exposed to cultural role models of
their own group. On the contrary, when family and society are interact-
ing as cultural substitutes in socialization, minority members try to
compensate by their own socialization effort for the fact that their
group’s cultural influence is reduced.
Combining these two dimensions suggest conditions under which
the four acculturation strategies of Berry’s (1997) typology, as described
in Figure 1.2, are likely to emerge. This is summarized in Figure 1.3. The
horizontal dimension characterizes the degree of complementarity ver-
sus substitutability between group specific human capital and general
human capital. The vertical dimension describes the degree of cultural
complementarity versus substitutability between family and external
cultural influences. Box 1 in Figure 1.3 represents the socialization envi-
ronment characterized by substitutability along both dimensions. In
this case minority groups are likely to socialize their children intensively
with their own group specific values and skills. Because group specific
human capital is a substitute for general human capital, this is likely
to lead to cultural separation and significant cultural resilience of the
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minority group. Box 2 in Figure 1.3 represents an environment where
cultural transmission is characterized by cultural substitutability, while
the two types of human capital are complements. In this case, minority
group individuals again intensively transfer their values and traits to
their children. At the same time, the complementarity between group
specific skills and general skills implies also high levels of investments in
general human capital. Hence cultural integration, where second-genera-
tion individuals are integrated with themajority group and still preserve
many of their own distinctive characteristics, will tend to obtain. Alter-
natively, Box 3 in Figure 1.3 represents a socialization environment with
cultural complementarities in socialization and substitutabilities
between group specific and general skills. In this case, minority indivi-
duals weakly transmit their own cultural traits and, correspondingly,
there is more investment in general human capital. This is likely to lead
to a cultural assimilation across generations. Finally, the last configura-
tion, in Box 4 in Figure 1.3, corresponds to an environment with com-
plementarities along both dimensions. Minority group individuals
provide weak socialization effort and low investment in general
human capital. This induces marginalization, with little attachment to
the original minority culture and also low integration with the majority
group.
1.3.8 Externalities and expectations
All theoretical frameworks developed in the literature for the study
of integration patterns we have discussed previously, highlight the




















Figure 1.3 Multi-dimensional models: a synthesis.
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characterized by several externalities. First of all, positive external effects
of assimilation on the majority are by the choices of minority members,
specifically when assimilation involves more efficient communication
and coordination and therefore a larger surplus to be shared between
minority and majority groups. A consequence of this externality is that
cultural integration might proceed too slowly and would need subsidi-
zation. Second, individual socialization and assimilation choices are
formed under certain sets of beliefs about the aggregate process of
cultural dynamics itself. How such beliefs are formed and coordinated
uponmay affect the path of cultural integration. Again, this leaves scope
for the emergence of collective institutions allowing individuals to
coordinate their socialization and assimilation choices on a path that
is socially efficient.
1.4 Measuring cultural integration
The integration process of an individual of a specific immigrant group
into his host country is characterized by several dimensions, typically
aggregated into four distinct but not mutually exclusive general cate-
gories: economic, legal, political, and social integration. The first cate-
gory, economic integration, is associated with integration processes in
‘market’ relationships. These include integration in the labour market,
in residential location, in education and training in skills which are
valued in market interactions. The second category, legal integration,
relates to the evolution of an immigrant’s status and its implications for
his (or her) conditions of stay. The third category is political integration.
It connects to the public and political sphere, and to collective decision-
making processes in the host country. Typically it includes interest in
local political processes, participation in political organizations, voting,
etc. Finally, cultural integration is the fourth category. It is associated
with the social and cultural sphere and concerns cultural habits, values
and beliefs, religion, and language. It involves dimensions which are
not generally intermediated directly through markets or political
processes. Measuring the cultural integration of minority groups
implies, therefore, searching for indicators that essentially relate to all
these categories.
1.4.1 Behavioural data
A first approach in measurement of integration consists in collecting
empirical observations regarding the actual behaviour of minority
Introduction: Perspectives on Cultural Integration of Immigrants
21
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
individuals, and assessing how it differs from that of majority group
members. Typical indicators include language spoken at home, religious
practice, fertility patterns, educational achievement, gender gaps in
education or labour market participation, prevalence of female labour
supply, social participation, andmarriage behaviour (intermarriage rates,
marriage rates at age 25, cohabitation, divorce, partner age gaps, etc,).
One specific measure of objective behaviour that has attracted signifi-
cant attention is intermarriage. It is generally considered as evidence of
growing cultural ‘integration’. A high rate of intermarriage signals
reduced social distance between the groups involved and the fact that
individuals of different ethnic backgrounds no longer perceive social
and cultural differences significant enough to prevent mixing and mar-
riage (Gordon, 1964; Kalmijn, 1998). There are several reasons why
intermarriage may be an important indicator of integration. First, mar-
riage is an important mechanism for the transmission of ethnically
specific cultural values and practices to the next generation. Hence
intermarriage, by changing the scope for socialization, may fundamen-
tally affect the boundaries and distinctiveness of ethnic minority groups
(Bisin and Verdier, 2000). Also, intermarriage at significant and sus-
tained rates leads to major demographic changes in society, in particular
to the emergence of ‘mixed’ children. This has important implications
for the evolution of ethnic categorizations. Intermarriage is constrained
by a variety of factors, such as the size of groups, segregation, and socio-
economic and cultural barriers. Among the variables often discussed as
determinants, a major role is played by generational status (first versus
second generation), educational attainment and socio-economic
status, marriage pool structure of potential co-ethnic partners (group
size, sex ratios at given socio-economic status), gender, religion,
linguistic distances with majority group, residential integration, and
spatial segregation (see, for instance, Furtado, 2006; Chiswick and
Houseworth, 2008).
While it is generally assumed that intermarriage is a good indicator of
immigrants’ integration, a number of caveats should, however, be kept
in mind. First, intermarriages measured as such may not give an ade-
quate picture of interracial relationships as, for instance, they do not
include dating or cohabitation. Second, there are difficulties related to
the criteria by which a union is counted as intermarriage. The status of
certain minority groups is not always clear, and what constitutes inter-
marriage may often depend on the specific data. As noted by Song
(2009), for instance, the US Census Bureau does not regard a marriage
between a Japanese American and an Indian (South Asian) American as
intermarriage, but the same union would count as such in Britain. More
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generally, definitional questions on group boundaries (ethnic, racial,
religious) may significantly affect the final picture regarding how inter-
marriages are recorded. Collected data lack a standardization of methods
in recording and describing patterns of intermarriage across countries.
In particular, it is difficult to obtain comparable cross-national data
about intermarriage in Europe. Indeed in many cases in European
data, groups’ boundaries are identified by the nationality or country of
birth of marriage partners, rather than their ethnicity or race. More
fundamentally, even if there is an observed correlation between inter-
marriages and cultural integration, the nature of the relationship
between the two variables remains unclear. In most cases, analysts talk
of integration as the outcome of intermarriage. But in some cases,
intermarriage is also seen itself as an outcome of cultural integration,
as it may reflect social acceptance of mixed marriages. Taking another
perspective, some scholars (e.g. ethnic competition theorists) have
argued that while intermarriage may be associated with a form of inte-
gration or of inclusion in some dimensions of the majority group,
intermarried minority individuals are nonetheless not accepted in
many mainstream social environments (Olneck, 1993). In particular,
interracial partnerships do not automatically result in reduced prejudice
within the couple, the family network, or society at large (Song, 2005).
1.4.2 Survey data
Rather than focusing on actual socio-economic behaviour, an alterna-
tive approach to assess the pattern of integration of minority groups
considers subjective perceptions and attitudes on various socio-eco-
nomic dimensions, categorizations, and prescriptions, as collected in
survey data. Again, the basic question is to see how these variables differ
between minority members and the mainstream majority group and
what the determinants are of such differences. Attitudes on gender roles,
religious practices or political beliefs, and convictions are generally
included in these analyses. One dimension also often investigated con-
cerns the degree of cultural identification to some mainstream charac-
teristics such as national identity (see for instance Constant et al., 2006;
Zimmermann et al., 2007).
Subjective attitudes and perceptions are interesting as they directly
connect to an individual’s identification process. Some caveats, how-
ever, need to be mentioned. First, as is well known, survey data suffer
from problems with framing: the way survey questions are designed and
the responses are collected may significantly affect the answers of the
subjects investigated. More importantly, subjective attitudes are just
Introduction: Perspectives on Cultural Integration of Immigrants
23
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
expressive manifestations, reflecting what ‘one does or intends to do’
and one’s expectations of ‘what is socially acceptable to say in public’.
Hence, subjective attitudes may only be partially related to the actual
and objective behaviour of subjects, that is, immigrants in studies
about cultural integration. Constant et al. (2006), for instance, recognize
this problem in their analysis of immigrants’ identity formation in
Germany. Rather than limiting themselves only to subjective attitudes,
they construct the indicator along five key elements, some of which
include objective behaviour.8 Using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) on immigrants in the guest worker population,
they follow the two-dimensional acculturation logic of Berry (1997) and
present an ethnosizer indicator providing information on immigrants’
attachment to both their original culture and the German culture.
Looking at how individuals get classified across the four regimes of
acculturation (integration, assimilation, separation, and marginaliza-
tion), Constant et al. (2006) then find that the classification obtained
by the direct measure of ethnic self-identification correlates only weakly
with the one derived with their ethnosizer indicator. This suggests that
there are limitations in how actual behaviour can be inferred from
survey data on subjective perceptions.
As emphasized by the literature, a large part of the cultural integration
process of immigrants’ communities and minority groups goes through
intergenerational shifts in behaviour and values. In order to assess such
shifts, the literature focuses on how second-generation individuals com-
pare to first-generation in terms of differences or similarities with respect
tomembers of themajority group. For any given indicator, a convenient
way to illustrate such dynamics is described in Figure 1.4. The vertical
axis reflects the gap between first-generation immigrants and natives of
the host country. This gap can be positive or negative. The horizontal
axis reflects the gap between the second-generation immigrants and the
natives of that same generation. The origin at 0 therefore is the point of
perfect assimilation: immigrants do not show any difference with na-
tives across either generation. A given point in that space shows how the
first-generation gap compares with the second-generation gap. From
this, one may uncover four different regimes describing the relative
cultural dynamics between the immigrants or minority groups and
natives or majority individuals. Quadrant I, in which both generations
8 Those are: (1) language (speak German and/or the language of the origin country);
(2) visible cultural elements (type of preferred food, media, and music), (3) ethnic self-
identification; (4) ethnic networks structures (i.e. origins of closest friends); and (5) future
citizenship and residency plans.
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have positive gaps with respect to the host country, is divided into two
regions. Above the 45 line is a regime of cultural convergence, as the gap
with natives is smaller for second generation than for first generation.
Conversely, the region below the 45 line represents a regime of cultural
divergence between the two groups. Similarly, the 45 line divides quad-
rant III, with both generations having negative gaps compared to the
host culture. A cultural convergence region lies below the 45 line, as the
second generation shows a less negative gap than the first generation.
Conversely, there is a cultural divergence region above the line, with the
second generation having a more negative gap than the first generation.
Although they are presumably less likely to be observed, there are also
two other regimes represented respectively by quadrant II and quadrant
IV. In quadrant II, the first generation has a negative gap with the
natives while the second generation a positive one. This is therefore a
‘cultural leapfrogging’ regime, in which the immigrants overshoot the
natives with respect to the indicator considered. Conversely, points in
quadrant IV reflect the opposite situation of ‘cultural retraction’, in which
the first generation has a positive gap while the second generation a
negative one compared to the natives. This diagram captures in a
condensed way the intergenerational dynamics of cultural integration
of a given immigrant group compared to the natives. It can also be used












Figure 1.4 Intergenerational dynamics of cultural gaps between migrants/
natives.
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groups and may help to identify strategies of acculturation of specific
groups in Berry’s typology. For instance, regimes such as ‘cultural diver-
gence’ or ‘cultural retraction’ are more likely to be consistent with ‘separa-
tion’ or ‘marginalization’ processes across generations, while on the
contrary, regimes of ‘cultural convergence’ and ‘cultural leapfrogging’ may
reveal processes of ‘integration’ or ‘assimilation’ of the minority.
1.5 The socio-economic impact of cultural
integration and identity
Cultural integration phenomena interact in significant ways with how
resources are allocated and redistributed in society. Integration patterns
of immigrants may therefore have important implications for economic
and political outcomes in society.
1.5.1 Labour market
Traditionally, economists have focused on how immigrants and minor-
ity groups directly integrate in the host economy through market trans-
actions. For instance, a significant literature has investigated the impact
that immigration has on the labour market in the host country, in terms
of wages, employment, and income distribution for both natives and
immigrants (see Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2008, for a survey of the
literature). Typically, immigrants’ economic integration has been
viewed as the process by which the earnings of immigrants come closer
to those of natives (Chiswick, 1978). The observed cross-sectional pat-
tern generally indicates that initially immigrants have earnings which
are significantly below those of natives, conditional on education, skills,
and demographic factors. This is explained by the fact that upon arrival,
immigrants lack certain unobservable skills and information specific to
the host labour market, such as language, educational qualifications, or
general information about how to behave in the host country. With
time spent in the host country, however, immigrants will tend to
acquire the missing skills and information and catch up with the na-
tives. Eventually, because of positive selection bias in the immigration
process (i.e. the fact that individuals with stronger economic prospects
in the destination economy aremore likely tomigrate), immigrants may
even outperform the natives. While cross-sectional data prima facie
seem to support such view of economic integration, they may also
hide important cohort effects (Borjas, 1985), for example if more recent
immigrants have unobservable characteristics that make them less
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adapted to the labour market than the older cohorts. In this case, any
immigrant group earning gaps with respect to natives are not so much
because of slow economic integration but rather because of different
cohort characteristics which cannot be identified by the statistical ana-
lysis of cross-sectional data.
Cultural integration patterns and identity formation are typically
non-directly observable dimensions that may indeed interfere with the
process of economic integration. A clear example of how cultural in-
tegration practices interact with economic integration is the generally
observed labour market premium to intermarriage. A series of studies
have found that immigrants married with natives or with spouses of a
different ethnic group have higher earnings than immigrants in an
ethnically homogamous marriage, after conditioning on the relevant
earnings regressors (see Kantarevic, 2004; Meng and Gregory, 2005;
Meng and Meurs, 2006; and Gevrek, 2009). The direction of causality
is not always clear though. While Kantarevic (2004) fails to find a causal
effect of intermarriage on earnings for the USA, Meng and Gregory
(2005), Meng and Meurs (2006), and Gevrek (2009) suggest, on the
contrary, that intermarriage has a causal effect on immigrants’ earnings
in Australia, France, and the Netherlands, respectively. Controlling for
the endogeneity of the intermarriage decision more than doubles the
estimate of this marginal effect. Several studies have also uncovered
connections between subjective attitudes and identity and labour mar-
ket outcomes for individuals with a foreign background. For instance,
Constant et al. (2006) and Zimmermann et al. (2007) have studied the
connection between Berry’s categories of identity (integration, assimila-
tion, separation, and marginalization) and the probability of being
employed in Germany. While no systematic differences are found in
labour market outcomes of integrated and assimilated men, integrated
women seem to succeed better than assimilated ones. At the same time,
for men and women alike, separated and marginalized individuals have
a significantly lower probability of being employed than those who are
assimilated. In other words, a strong minority identity does not seem to
have any negative impact on labourmarket outcomes, provided that it is
combined with a strong majority identity. In Sweden, Nekby and Rödin
(2007) also find small differences in employment outcomes between
individuals with an integrated identity and those with an assimilated
identity. On the other hand, male individuals with a separated identity
have considerably lower chances of being employed than those who are
assimilated. There does not seem to be any systematic differences for
women across the different cultural identities. Studying the effect of
oppositional cultures on labour market outcomes, Battu and Zenou
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(2008) show that for the UK, non-whites who are strongly opposed to
the British identity have a significantly lower probability of being em-
ployed than non-whites who are not oppositional. Negative attitudes
with respect to ethnically mixed marriages are also associated with a
lower probability of being employed. There is, however, no ‘penalty’ in
the labour market for individuals strongly identifying with their own
cultural background per se.
In the end, the previous studies suggest that a strong identification
with the dominant majority culture is the key element to succeed in the
labour market. On the other hand, the degree of identification with the
original cultural background seems less important.
1.5.2 Education
The level of education and the amount of ethnic group-specific versus
general human capital of immigrants at arrival in a host country has
significant implications on the pattern of cultural integration they will
adopt. For instance, there is widespread evidence that more educated
migrants have a higher propensity to intermarry with natives (see Lie-
berson and Waters, 1988; Schoen and Wooldredge, 1989; Sandefur and
McKinnell, 1986; Meng and Gregory, 2005; Lichter and Qian, 2001; and
Chiswick and Houseworth, 2008). Indeed Furtado (2006) proposes three
mechanisms through which education could affect intermarriage: the
cultural adaptability effect, the enclave effect and the assortative match-
ing effect. The cultural adaptability effect captures the idea that
educated people are better able to adapt to different customs and cul-
tures. Therefore immigrants with higher human capital, having a better
‘technology’ for adapting, are more likely to marry natives. The enclave
effect refers to the fact that educated immigrants are more likely tomove
out of their ethnic enclaves because they have better economic oppor-
tunities outside their group. They are, therefore, less likely to meet
potential spouses of their own group and so, less likely to marry them.
Finally the assortative matching effect reflects the fact that the gains
from marriage are larger when the spouses’ education levels are similar.
Given a costly search process, educated immigrants will be more willing
to substitute the benefits of ethnic homogamy for assortativeness on the
education dimension. Using 1970 US Census data, Furtado (2006) finds
that controlling for the enclave effect, assortative matching is more
important than cultural adaptability in explaining marriage choices of
second-generation immigrants, though the empirical evidence supports
both the cultural adaptability and assortative matching effects.
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Related to this, there are studies that have discussed the effect of
education on identity formation. For instance, Zimmermann et al.
(2006) study how human capital levels affect the ethnic self-identifica-
tion of immigrants in Germany as well as their identification to the
dominant majority culture. The results show that education acquired
before immigration leads to a weaker identification with the dominant
culture. On the other hand, human capital acquired after immigration
does not affect the identification to the majority culture. Also, Constant
et al. (2006) find that immigrants with higher education acquired prior
to immigration are more likely to integrate than to assimilate, according
to Berry’s categorization. Cultural integration patterns may also in turn
affect the process of human capital accumulation of immigrant groups,
especially for second-generation immigrants. The economics literature
on oppositional cultures suggests, for instance, a negative relationship
between strong ethnic identity and school performance; more specifi-
cally a trade-off between ethnic, and often racial, cohesion and aca-
demic achievement (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Austen-Smith and
Fryer, 2005; Fryer and Torelli, 2005; Pattacchini and Zenou, 2006). It is
posited that social discrimination lowers the returns to education for
minority individuals, thereby triggering a response by which minority
students view educational achievement as an indication of acceptance
of the dominant culture, and hence reject it in order to be accepted by
their peers. The mechanism has been well illustrated in the USA with
respect to black student communities, in which at times those who
invest in education are reportedly harassed for ‘acting white’ and
rejected by their peer group (Fordham and Ogbu, 1986). As noticed by
Nekby et al. (2007), however, the US context of racial relationships that
motivated the ‘oppositional culture’ hypothesis may not replicate well
in other western societies. Different types of host country educational
systems may interact differently with the cultural identity formation
process of immigrants and minority groups. Several studies in cross-
cultural psychology indeed find that children from integrated immi-
grant families are more motivated and more successful at school than
those from assimilated families (Olneck, 1993). In their study of the
identity of students with foreign backgrounds in Sweden, Nekby et al.
(2007) also find that, controlling for early educational outcomes which
may influence both self-assessed identity and subsequent education
levels, cultural integration is associated with significantly higher levels
of education achievements than cultural assimilation. These results
hold for both first and second-generation immigrants. Cultural margin-
alization on the other hand is found to be associated with significantly
lower levels of education.
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These results are consistent with the observation that rapid cultural
assimilation of immigrants in certain dimensions serves to accelerate
the process of human capital accumulation of children, while in other
dimensions it may have the opposite effect. Indeed, for specificminority
communities, strong attachment to traditional family values may well
promote educational achievements. For instance, second-generation
children may be more likely to live in households with both parents
than their native counterparts (Jensen and Chitose, 1996) and a more
stable family environment may in turn contribute to better academic
achievements and to the economic success of the second generation.
There are various ethnographic studies which support attributing the
educational achievements of second-generation immigrants to close-
knit family values. Waters (1996) describes, for instance, how, in New
York City, the academic success of West-Indian teens differs from that of
their Black American counterparts because of the more stable family
structures of the former. Similar examples are reported for Vietnamese
immigrants (Zhou and Bankston, 1996) or Punjabi Sikh communities
(Portes and Zhou, 1994). On the other hand, it is also observed that
immigrant households often have, on average, a larger number of chil-
dren than do native households. This may delay the process of human
capital investment of the second generation. As a matter of fact, immi-
grant family resources have to be spread over a larger number of indivi-
duals, creating a disadvantage for second-generation immigrants with
respect to their native counterparts. In this respect, slower cultural
integration along the fertility dimension leads to lower human capital
accumulation of immigrant groups.
1.5.3 Social capital
Cultural integration patterns may also play an important role with
regards to integration in other domains of public life, for example social
relationships such as social networks, friendships, and local interactions
with neighbours, between immigrants and natives, which are typically
not mediated in markets. The socio-psychology literature on group
conflict theory (Tajfel,1982) points out that these integration patterns
might generate externality effects, typically negative. On the other
hand, contact theory (Allport, 1954) emphasizes that these externalities
may be positive, as repeated and multiple social interactions across
group boundaries favour cultural integration.
The social capital literature suggests a link between cultural diversity
and various measures of social capital. For instance, using individual-
level data from US localities, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002) argue
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that racial diversity and fractionalization leads to lower levels of trust
and participation in voluntary associations. Putnam (2007) also finds a
strong negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on generalized trust, as
well as on other indicators of social capital, in the United States. Issues
might be more complex though. As argued by Nannestad (2008) macro-
level studies of the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and
generalized trust have not yet turned out robust results: the studies by
Delhey and Newton (2005), Paxton (2002), and Bjrnskov (2007) dis-
play notable differences on the estimated relationship between ethnic
heterogeneity and trust levels. Consistently, empirical results from
within-country studies of ethnic heterogeneity and generalized trust
span the whole range of possible outcomes (Stolle et al., 2005; Pennant,
2005; and Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006).
Uslaner (2006) argues that the level of local residential segregation
across groupsmight be themost relevant dimension of cultural diversity
which is negatively correlated with social capital. Using data from the
Minorities at Risk (MAR) project of the Center for International Devel-
opment and Conflict Management at University of Maryland, his ana-
lysis suggests that countries where minorities are most geographically
isolated have the lowest levels of generalized trust.
From the point of view of immigrant integration patterns, however,
these studies do not directly address the dynamics of social integration
between groups which are initially culturally different. The study by De
Palo et al. (2006) provides an indication of the determinants of immi-
grant social integration into the host country. This study relies on the
European Community Household panel (ECHP), which provides data
on the extent of social relations for both immigrants and natives, with
particular information on the perceptions of immigrants regarding their
own integration pattern rather than—as is typically the case in most
opinion surveys—on natives’ attitudes toward migrants. The analysis
shows that immigrants from non-EU origin countries, even after
controlling for several individual characteristics, such as age, education,
family size, and employment status, tend to socialize less than natives.
Importantly, education has a significant impact on the type of social
activities that immigrants undertake. More educated immigrants tend to
relate somewhat less with individuals from their close neighbourhood
than with the broader community.
1.5.4 Political economy
Cultural integration of immigrants may also be important at the level of
the public policy sphere through, for instance, the way they identify
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and participate in the host country political process. The importance of
this issue is perhaps best illustrated by the recurrent debate on the
viability and sustainability of multicultural welfare states in western
societies (Banting, 1998; Banting and Kymlicka, 2003). In this respect,
the comparison between the degree of redistribution in the American
and the European political systems turns out to be central. While in the
USA social expenditures reflect only about 15 per cent of GDP, they are
about 25 per cent of GDP inmost European countries. It has been argued
that the lower redistributive character of the American political system
is partly related to the fact that the American society is more culturally
fragmented that the European ones (Alesina et al., 2001). The current
immigration flows into Europe might lead to a more intense cultural
fragmentation, which in turn might result in the reduction of social
redistribution in European countries.
At the heart of the debate on the dynamics of welfare state systems in
culturally diverse societies is a political economy equilibrium linking
cultural diversity with preferences for redistribution and for the provi-
sion of public goods. Several mechanisms may be at work. First, cultural
diversity may affect the sentiments towards national community, senti-
ments which underlie the social consensus for redistribution. It may
also divide coalitions rooted in socio-economic class that traditionally
sustained the welfare state and change the pattern of political alliances
and coalitions for social policies. More specifically, erosion of political
support for universal social programmes could derive from the fact that
cultural minorities prefer private or communal provision of public ser-
vices that better fit their cultural preferences. The focus on group specific
public goods may also divide pro-welfare coalitions. Support for affirma-
tive action, group rights, or greater autonomy for the expression of
cultural differences may weaken links with majority community mem-
bers and therefore undermine their support for welfare policies. Further-
more, divisions among different minority groups may hurt coalition
formation processes. Most importantly, cultural majorities might also
reduce their preferences for redistribution due to cultural diversity.
Indeed, in political environments in which minorities challenge the
mainstream culture, majorities might tend to oppose programmes that
channel resources to communities they do not recognize as their own.
This effect may be magnified when socio-economic differences and
cultural differences are highly correlated (i.e. when the poor are mostly
minorities and the minorities are mostly poor). In this case, in fact,
economic redistribution is closely associated with cultural redistribution
and the decisive voter (who is likely to be from the majority group) may
prefer a reduced size of the welfare state.
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Cultural diversity may also weaken the mobilization of the working
class and divide organized labour along ethnic and linguistic lines. This
would reduce the political effectiveness and the organizational strength
of trade unions, which, historically, have had a crucial role in the
political support for welfare state institutions (Esping-Andersen, 1985
and 1990). Corroborating such a view, Stephens (1979) found, indeed,
that during the expansion of the post-war welfare state, ethnic and
linguistic diversity was strongly and negatively correlated with the
effectiveness of labour organizations. Consistent with this discussion,
the economic literature provides empirical evidence that cultural diver-
sity (measured by ethnic or racial diversity) is associated with a reduced
provision of public goods or redistribution, at the regional, city, or
district level.9 The study by Poterba (1997) on the provision of public
education in USA states suggests that older citizens are less inclined to
spend on public education benefiting younger generations when these
generations belong disproportionately to a different race. Vigdor (2004)
also finds that the greater a community’s racial heterogeneity, the lower
its rate of response to the 2000 Census form (this response is interpreted
as a local public good, since the amount of federal funds allocated to the
community depend on its response rate). While the conclusions from
this literature cannot be applied directly to the question of support for
European welfare state institutions, in particular because they relate
mostly to racial rather than cultural diversity, they do suggest, however,
that this issue is potentially important.
Shayo (2009) provides an interesting formal model of the endogenous
interaction between social class or national identity formation and
redistributive policies. The analysis builds on social psychology in
exploiting the insight that an individual is more likely to identify with
a group the more similar he is to that group and the higher the relative
status of that group. The analysis highlights two interesting results: a
relationship between national identification and income (the poor are
more nationalist), and a link between preferences for redistribution and
national identification (nationalists are for less redistribution, at a given
income level). In turn themodel implies that amore widespread sense of
national identity is associated with less redistribution. Using data from
the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Program
(ISSP 1995) for a large number of democracies, the paper provides some
support for these implications and for the effect of within-class cultural
9 Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) provide a good survey of this literature.
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heterogeneity on the support for redistribution by the poor in European
democracies.
An interesting recent literature addresses the specific issue of the
preferences for redistribution of immigrants from the perspective of
the observed persistence of cultural traits (Bisin and Verdier, 2010;
Fernandez, 2010). For instance, using the separation and reunification
of Germany as a natural experiment, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln
(2007) find that those who lived in the former East Germany more
strongly prefer redistribution after reunification. Similarly, Guiso et al.
(2006) find that country-of-ancestry fixed effects are significant deter-
minants of preferences for redistribution in the General Social Survey in
the USA. Finally, Luttmer and Singhal (2008) use the three waves 2002/
2003, 2004/2005, and 2006/2007 of the European Social Survey (ESS) to
investigate how preferences for redistribution might have some purely
cultural determinant. They find that the average preference for redistri-
bution in an immigrant’s country of birth has a large and significant
effect on his own preference for redistribution. These analyses suggest
that immigrants tend to ‘export’ to the host country the preferences for
redistribution they formed in the origin country. Passed on to second
generations through cultural transmission, these inherited cultural va-
lues are likely to shape the political support for redistribution in the host
countries significantly, at least as long as they are effectively activated
through civic and political participation.
It is therefore natural in this respect to ask what do we know about
civic participation of immigrants and if there is a cultural component of
such behaviour? Using information from the European Social Survey
and the World Values Survey for immigrants from 54 origin countries,
Aleksynska (2007) investigates the factors that determine civic partici-
pation of immigrants and explicitly considers the issue of cultural trans-
mission and assimilation of migrants with respect to civic participation.
Active civic participation is defined as membership in trade unions and
political parties, unpaid work for a party or any other organization or
association, the signing of petitions and boycotting of certain products,
and participation in lawful demonstrations. Cultural transmission is
identified by relating participation rates of non-migrants in origin
countries to the participation rates of those who migrate in host
countries. At the same time, cultural assimilation is identified by com-
paring immigrant and native civic participation in the same country.10
10 The econometric issue with the possible selection of immigrants is somewhat ac-
counted for by a procedure which matches immigrants to otherwise similar natives and
compatriots who did not migrate.
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The paper documents several interesting empirical regularities. First
of all, limited evidence is found for the transmission of participation
across borders. Typically, migrants originating from industrialized
and culturally more homogeneous countries tend to participate more.
Second, the culture of the host country matters most: higher participa-
tion patterns among natives tend to induce immigrants to participate
more.
1.6 Conclusion: what this book does
This book compares the patterns of cultural and economic integration
across European countries and the USA. We document two main ques-
tions: (1) how do European countries differ in their cultural integration
process, between themselves and with respect to the USA? (2) how is the
cultural integration process related to economic integration?
1.6.1 Cultural and economic outcomes
Because we aim at providing a comprehensive picture of the cultural and
economic integration process in a cross-country perspective, we look at
the same set of cultural and economic outcomes, and compatibly with
available data. The list of indicators we construct is inspired by the
literature we have reviewed above.
Tomeasure cultural integration, we focus on both objective indicators
and self-reported attitudes and values. The main objective indicators of
cultural integration we look at in the country chapters are:
 Family arrangement: education gap between partners, age gap
between partners;
 Marital status: early marriage, cohabitation, marital status, divorce
rate;
 Interethnic marriage rate;
 Fertility rate.
The main self-reported attitudes and values we focus on are:
 Language spoken at home;
 Self-identity, measuring whether the immigrant self-identified
mainly with the host country or the country of origin;
 Religious intensity, measured by the frequency of praying.
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The main economic integration outcomes we report on include:
 Income;
 Educational attainment;
 Female labour force participation;
 Female and male employment rates.
1.6.2 Methodology to measure the integration process
In all country chapters, we propose two specifications to measure the
integration process of immigrants.
Evolution of integration evolution between first and second-generation im-
migrants. This first specification compares the economic and cultural











where bj and gj measures the impact of being a first-generation immi-
grant and a second-generation immigrant from country j relative to
natives.11 First-generation immigrant and second-generation immigrant are
dummies equal to 1 if the individual belongs to either group and zero
otherwise. First-generation immigrants are defined as individuals who
are foreign-born from country j and whose two parents are foreign-born.
Second-generation immigrants are defined as immigrants who are born
in the host country but whose parents are both foreign-born from
country j. The reference group is represented by the natives in the host
country, that is, individuals who are born in the country and whose
both parents are also born in the country. The natives are always con-
sidered as the omitted group.
The comparison between bj and gj thus measures whether the gaps in
cultural and economic outcomes of immigrants relative to natives have
evolved between first and second generation immigrants. This specifica-
tion allows us to capture the integration process simply, as we have
previously suggested in Figure 1.4. The origin at 0 represents the refer-
ence group of natives. The coefficient bj on the vertical axis would reflect
the gap between first generation immigrants and natives of the host
11 Note that this specification assumes that the birth cohorts and other regressors have the
same effect for all countries of origin.
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country. The coefficient gj on the horizontal axis would measure the gap
between second-generation immigrants and natives of the host country.
The country chapters report for each outcome the four potential
integration processes suggested above: ‘convergence’, ‘divergence’, ‘leap-
frogging’, and ‘retraction’.
Evolution of integration evolution between younger and older cohorts of
immigrants. This second specification allows us to explore further the
integration process among cohorts. We use the same strategy as before
but we distinguish the gap in cultural and economic outcomes between











where bj;k is the impact of being first-generation immigrant from coun-
try j and belonging to the birth cohort k, relative to the natives.
The country chapters distinguish mainly between two cohorts, those
younger or older than 30-year-olds, and focus on the cohort evolution
within the first-generation immigrants. This specification provides the
same simple illustration of the integration process as in Figure 1.4 above,
but where the horizontal axis represents gap between the natives and
the younger cohort, and the vertical axis represents the gap between the
natives and the older cohorts.
1.6.3 Control variables
The baseline controls are the dummies associated with the country of
origin of first and second generation, or the cohorts of foreign born,
with reference to the natives (omitted group). In addition, all the coun-
try chapters include a baseline vector X of controls, including gender,
age, and education. Those are the co-variates available in all the country
surveys. In addition to the baseline regressions, the country chapters
explore further the role of additional controls, whenever available, such
as the time spent in the host country or whether immigrants have been
educated in the host country.
1.7 Caveats
The first caveat relates to the choice of the countries covered by the
book. The selection of the European countries is based on two main
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criteria. The first is to gather European countries with sharp enough
differences in their integration models and for which the question of
cultural integration of immigration lies as the heart of the agenda. The
second criterion is the availability of representative national databases
combining information on both objective and subjective outcomes of
cultural and economic integration. This book thus does not cover all the
European countries. The conclusion will enlarge the cross-country com-
parison by using another database, the European Social Survey. We also
document the results for the USA.
The second issue relates to the econometric specification. In order
to gather descriptive data from heterogeneous national surveys, this
book has to propose a simple econometric specification that can be
replicated in all countries. This is a clear trade-off between providing
in-depth analysis of endogeneity and omitted variables, but for a small
set of countries, or enlarging the coverage of European countries with
replicable estimations.
This book does not identify causal links between cultural and eco-
nomic integration, and we are not aware of any research article that
provides such a link so far. Besides, it might well be the case that
identification is impossible due to the existence of potential multiple
equilibria, as stated above. For instance, an increase in the number of
immigrants can shift the preferences and shape institutions, say segre-
gation at schools, which in turn affect the educational achievement of
immigrants. But another equilibrium might appear. As the level of
education of the country improves, so the perception of immigrants
and institutions will change, with less segregation at schools, improving
the educational achievement of immigrants. In this context, it is hope-
less to identify a causality between institutions of cultural or economic
integration of immigrants.
Yet, in the concluding chapter, we use the European Social Survey to
check the robustness results of the country chapters. First, we can
control for country of residence fixed effects that could drive the cultural
and economic integration processes. Second, the information given by
the country of origin fixed effects allows us to control partly for the
sample composition of immigrants. Let’s say, for instance, that we are
interested in comparing the cultural integration of immigrants of Magh-
reb origin across European countries. This analysis is likely to be biased
by the fact that all Maghreb immigrants do not come from the same
country of origin, and the inherited specificities from the home country
could determine the economic and cultural integration process of
immigrants in their destination country. The cross-country dataset
allows mitigating such biases.
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1.8 Main results
We sum-up the main results of the different country chapters and of the
cross-country comparison based on the European Social Survey.
1.8.1 France
The chapter on France estimates the integration process by combing
three main surveys: the French Labour Force Survey 2005–2007, which
provides for the first time the country of origin of the parents, the
French Family Survey 1999, which report detailed data on the family
structure of immigrants, and Histoire de Vie 2003 that reports attitudes
and values of a representative sample of immigrants.
Those surveys provide a focus on the integration process of six main
groups of immigrants coming from: Maghreb, Sub-Saharian Africa,
Southern Europe, Northern and Eastern Europe, and Asia.
The chapter shows substantial heterogeneity in the cultural and eco-
nomic indicators across first-generation immigrants. In particular, first-
generation immigrants from Maghreb and Africa display significant
cultural and economic gaps with natives regarding marriage at first
age, age and education gap between spouses, or fertility rates. But we
find evidence that in almost all dimensions and for all groups, there is a
fast integration process between first and second-generation immi-
grants. The rate of cultural and economic integration is faster for some
variables than others. It is religion, family arrangements, and endogamy
that show the slowest rate of convergence, in particular among immi-
grants from Maghreb. Second-generation immigrants from Maghreb
also display a persistent penalty in terms of employment. This seems a
French particularity.
1.8.2 Germany
The analysis for Germany is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) 2005–2007. This survey cover a representative sample of
20,000 individuals, with a wealth of information on cultural, social,
and economic aspects of immigrants.
The main countries of origin of the immigrants covered in the survey
are: Turkey, Ex-Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Russia.
This chapter suggests an important heterogeneity in cultural out-
comes for first-generation immigrants, but a steady convergence process
among second-generation immigrants. For instance, fertility rates, age
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at first child and female labour force participation differ significantly
between natives and first-generation immigrants, but differences vanish
or at least diminish for later immigrant generations. Second-generation
immigrants also report higher levels of language proficiency and of iden-
tification with Germany than members of their parental generation.
Regarding the particular case of the Turks, this analysis shows that
comparison by generation is crucial when making statements about the
integration process of ethnic groups. Turks differ in various ways from
natives and also from other immigrant groups. They are more likely to
be married in general, more often married at young ages, and often have
more children than the average German person. They report the lowest
level of political interest and lower levels of life satisfaction than other
immigrant groups. But second-generation Turks show higher intermar-
riage rates, similar behaviour as natives in terms of age at first marriage,
age at first child and number of children, and report better German
language proficiency as well as greater identification with German
identity.
1.8.3 Italy
The analysis is based on the Italian Labour Force Survey 2005–2007,
which provided for the first time in 2005 onwards information on the
country of birth of the parents. The six main origins of the immigrants
are North Europe, South and East Europe, Africa, Asia, North and Cen-
tral America, and South America.
This chapter suggests a more pronounced heterogeneity in cultural
and economic integration among first-generation immigrants coming
from: North and Central America, and from South America. But inter-
estingly, second-generation immigrants from those countries no longer
display significant differences with natives.
1.8.4 Spain
The analysis for Spain is based on two main databases: the 2007 Labour
Force Survey (‘Encuesta sobre la Población Activa’ or LFS) and the 2007
National Immigration Survey (‘Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes’ or
NIS), both conducted by the Spanish Statistical institute. The new
National Immigration Survey sampled the foreign-born population
residing in Spain in 2007 with the specific aim of providing insights
on migrants’ experiences in Spain.
Those surveys distinguish four main origins of immigration: Latin
America, Morocco, other Maghrebian countries, and Eastern Europe.
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This chapter shows that Latinos—the group with the shortest cultural
distance to Spanish social norms—appear very similar to natives inmost
of the economic and cultural outcomes. In contrast, Moroccans and
individuals from other Muslim countries still display large gaps along
several dimensions. But the cultural and economic gaps for Moroccans
and individuals from other Muslim countries is shrinking fast with the
time spent in the host country.
1.8.5 Sweden
The data used for Sweden comes from the registered information at
Statistics Sweden (SCB) on the entire working age population (16–65
years of age) residing in Sweden in 2005. Included in the data is rich
individual information on personal and demographic characteristics,
education, employment, and income. In addition, detailed information
is available on country of birth and migration dates for the foreign-born
portion of the population as well as parents’ country of origin for the
entire sample.
The survey distinguishes the following origins of immigration: Nor-
dic, West Europe (non-Nordic), East Europe (non-Nordic,), South Amer-
ica, North/Central America, Asia, and Africa.
This chapter shows a large degree of social integration between na-
tives and immigrants in terms of cultural and economic outcomes. The
integration process is slower for the sample of second-generation im-
migrants with homogenous national backgrounds, in particular in
terms of partnership patterns, female employment rates, and female
education levels.
1.8.6 Switzerland
Data for Switzerland stems from the Swiss Census 2000 and the Swiss
Household Panel (SHP) 2004–2005. The main origins of immigrants are:
Western Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Turkey-Magh-
reb, Latin America, Asia, and South-Central Asia.
The chapter shows that cultural integration processes, which are at
work in various ways in the different groups, contribute to overall
convergence. The most striking and lasting differences we can observe
across groups do not relate to educational achievement, religious
or political attitudes, but to gender-related attitudes and even more
to gender-related behaviours. Differences are more pronounced in
endogamous couples in general, specifically for women from South
and Central Asia, from Turkey, the Middle East, and Maghreb.
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1.8.7 United Kingdom
The analysis of integration in United Kingdom is mainly based on the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the years 2000–2008 inclusive. The LFS
contains information on country of birth, but no information on coun-
try of parental birth for the UK born. This means that it is impossible to
identify second-generation immigrants. Instead, this chapter uses self-
defined ethnicity as a measure of being a second (or subsequent) gener-
ation immigrant. The analysis of the descendants of immigrants is
restricted to ethnic minorities.
The main immigrant groups in this chapter are: Indian, Pakistani,
Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African, and Chinese.
The chapter finds significant differences across ethnic minorities in
cultural and economic outcomes, but a striking common pattern that
emerges is the extent to which the behaviour of UK-born ethnic mino-
rities generally lies between that of white natives and the foreign-born
from that community. This indicates a general pattern of cultural assim-
ilation. The rate of cultural assimilation is faster for some variables than
others—it is perhaps religion that shows the slowest rate. But overall
there are very powerful forces that are acting to change the behaviour of
immigrant communities once they are in United Kingdom.
1.8.8 United States
The analysis of the integration process in the United States draws on
very detailed information from the Census, starting from 1900 onwards
and covering all the countries of origin. The Census allows a unique look
at the evolution of the integration process of different minorities since
the early twentieth century.
The chapter shows that overall there has been little change in cultural
immigration over the past century. But some important changes over
time, and differences across groups, emerge. Members of the largest
single immigrant group of the early twentieth century, those born in
Italy, in general were much less assimilated upon arrival than members
of the largest group of the early twenty-first century, those born in
Mexico. Whereas one-third of newly arrived Mexicans spoke no English
in recent years, nearly three-quarters of newly arrived Italians could not
speak English in 1910. The rate of cultural integration over time has
declined, however. The chapter shows that this decline in the rate of
immigration is largely associated with the rise of the status of ‘illegal
immigrant’ in the United States.
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2
Cultural Integration in France
Yann Algan, Camille Landais, and Claudia Senik1
2.1 Introduction
Immigration has a very long history in France since the late nineteenth
century (Noiriel, 1988). In the 1920s, France ranked second, just after
USA, as the country with the highest share of immigrants, reaching
seven per cent of total population. In the early 2000s, as many as 25
per cent of the population had some immigrant background, from the
first, the second or the third generation.
Table 2.1 reports on the composition of the immigration population
according to the most recent data set, the French Labour Force Survey,
for the period 2005–2007. It distinguishes the sample proportions
of native French, first-generation immigrants and second-generation
immigrants. Around 90.2 per cent of the sample consists of natives,
6.5 per cent are first-generation immigrants and around 3.3 per cent
are second-generation immigrants.
First-generation immigrants mostly come from Maghreb (44.1 per
cent), Southern Europe (24.8 per cent), and Africa (11.3 per cent).
These percentages are slightly modified for second-generation immi-
grants, the share of immigrants from Southern Europe is higher (37.4)
and those from Africa (5.0) and Maghreb (40.7) is lower.
Table 2.1 also shows an evolution over time in the composition of the
population of immigrants. During the first half of the twentieth century,
immigration in France was mainly driven by inflows from Southern
Europe, in particular from Italy and Spain, with some peaks, such as
the inflows of Spanish immigrants during the Spanish Civil War.
1 The authors would like to thank Vincent Tiberj (Sciences Po) for his helpful comments.
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A second wave of immigration from Southern Europe took place in the
1960s and the 1970s, with ongoing inflows from Portugal now.
Immigration from Maghreb dates back to as early as the First World
War, driven by the replacement of the labour force in farms and arms
industry. But the main wave of immigration from this region took place
after the SecondWorldWar. Immigration inflows come from three main
countries: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Immigration from Algeria
boomed after the Second World War until 1958 and the Algerian civil
war. Immigration fromMorocco and Tunisia took place later, during the
1970s.
Immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa is a more recent phenomenon.
The immigrants from this region are mainly from the French ex-
colonies: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Senegal. The most recent
wave of immigration is from Eastern Europe and Turkey, with ongoing
inflows from Turkey since the 1970s. The smallest group of immigrants
come from Asia. Most of those immigrants originate from the ex-French
colonies in South-East Asia: Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
French immigration policy is rather pragmatic and dictated by
the labour market conditions. First-generation immigrants are now
accorded permits of various tenures ranging from one to ten years.
Regarding citizenship, Weil (2002, 2005) documents that France is one
of the most open countries in Europe. For second-generation im-
migrants, naturalization comes from the right of birth. Any immigrant
born in France is granted French citizenship, but this right becomes
effective mostly when children are older than 18 years.
Despite France’s long immigration tradition, and the growing con-
cerns about persistent cultural differences with immigrants from
Table 2.1 Origins of immigrants in the French Labour Force Survey 2005–2007.
Country of origin First generation Second generation
Natives 90.2
Immigrants of which (%) 6.5 3.3
Maghreb 44.1 40.7
Southern Europe 24.8 37.4
Africa 11.3 5.0
Northern Europe 6.6 3.7
Eastern Europe 5.9 7.5
Turkey 4.1 3.6
Asia 3.2 2.2
Note: Data source is the French Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2005–2007. Proportions are computed using
individual sampling weights.
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Maghreb and Africa, very few studies have provided a quantitative
assessment on the cultural integration path. Most studies have rather
looked at economic outcomes. Silberman and Fournier (1999, 2007)
look at job outcomes and show the persistent employment penalty for
second-generation Maghrebis compared to French natives and other
immigrant groups. Aeberhardt and Pouget (2007) estimate national
wage origin differential by matching employer-employee data. They
typically find that earning differentials mostly reflect differences in the
type of jobs, suggesting the existence of occupational segregation rather
than mere wage discrimination. Besides, it has been well documented
that second-generation immigrants fromMaghreb face the highest pen-
alty on the French labour market among the different immigrant groups
(see Algan et al., 2010). Recent audit studies show that this labour
market penalty is partly driven by pure cultural discrimination (Adida
et al., 2010).
In other social sciences a strong debate opposes the supporters of
the Republican model, stressing that ethnic origin does not have to
interfere with the public sphere (Schnapper, 1991) and those who call
for a civil society are more open to multiculturalism (Wieviorka, 1996).
But few economic studies have tried to quantify the evolution process
of cultural attitudes by waves of immigration and birth cohorts. Yet,
there is growing evidence of a strong interplay between cultural and
economic integration in France. In particular, Algan et al. (2011) focus
on the transmission of Arabic name versus non-Arabic name in
the French society. They show that parents do take into account the
expected economic cost that they inflict on their child by choosing a
culturally distinctive name in order to maintain their cultural trait.
This chapter tries to fill this gap by providing a quantitative assess-
ment of the path of cultural and economic integration of immigrants
in France.
2.2 Data and methods
2.2.1 Data
We investigate the patterns of integration in France by using three main
surveys. We measure labour market and educational outcomes with the
French Labour Force Survey (FLFS), which cover the years 2005–2007.
In addition to the traditional information on country of birth of the
respondent, the FLFS has, since 2005, provided information on the
country of birth of the parents. The FLFS contains information on
country of birth for first-generation immigrants at a very detailed
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level. It distinguishes between 29 countries or regions.2 The FLFS also
reports the country of parental birth for the second generation but at
a more aggregate level. There are nine categories: France, Northern
Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Maghreb (Arab North
Africa), Turkey (Middle East), (Sub-Saharan) Africa, Asia, and other
countries. We exclude the last category as it comprises very hetero-
geneous populations. This leaves us with seven immigrant groups for
our analysis. To facilitate the comparison of the results between first-
generation and second-generation immigrants, we aggregate the more
detailed countries of birth of first-generation immigrants into the seven
broader immigrant categories. The native reference group consists of
individuals who have lived in France for at least two generations, that
is, those who are born in the country and whose two parents were also
born in France. First-generation immigrants are individuals born abroad
and whose parents were also born abroad and from the same country of
origin. Second-generation immigrants are individuals who are born in
France but whose parents were both born abroad. We exclude indivi-
duals born abroad with at least one parent born in France and indivi-
duals born in France with either one parent born in France and the other
born abroad or both parents born abroad but in different countries.
We measure fertility rates based on the 1999 French Family Survey
‘Enquete Histoire Familiale’ (1999). This survey was conducted in paral-
lel with the Population Census and aimed at analysing the evolution
of family structures. It consists of a sub-sample of 380,000 adults, and
the survey includes several questions about family status and family
relationships, country of birth of the respondent, of his/her relatives
(parents, husband/wife), language spoken at home, with children, with
parents, etc. In particular this survey is extensively used to compute
reliable completed fertility rates.
The French family survey displays three types of information
concerning the origins of the respondent. It provides information on
the respondent’s country of birth: the recorded countries are broken
down into 16 categories.3 The survey also records the country of birth
of the father, of the mother, and of the spouse. The countries that are
recorded are exactly the same as for the survey respondent. The survey
2 France, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, rest of Africa, Asia (including Vietnam, Laos, Cambo-
dia), Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark, Great Britain,
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Norway, Sweden,
Eastern Europe, United States or Canada, Latin America, and other countries.
3 France, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Africa, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal, other northern and eastern European countries, Turkey, other Asian countries, America,
all other countries.
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also gives information on the nationality (citizenship) of the respon-
dent (at the time the survey was conducted, and at birth). The list of
citizenship is exactly the same as the list of country of birth. To compute
homogenous regions of origins, we cluster the countries: (1) France:
France; (2) Northern and Eastern European Countries; (3) Southern
Europe: Italy, Spain, Portugal; (4) Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia;
(5) Africa: Sub-Saharian African countries; (6) Asia: Vietnam, Laos, Cam-
bodia, and other Asian countries; (7) Others: mainly African countries.
Contrary to the Labour Force Survey used for the analysis of economic
integration, we cannot make a distinction here between individuals
from Northern European countries and those from Eastern European
countries.
In order to explore subjective attitudes of immigrants, we also a survey
‘Histoires de Vies’, conducted in 2003 by the French national statistical
office (INSEE). The sample of the survey includes 8403 adults living in
France, with a deliberate over-sampling of immigrants of the first and
second generation. The survey includes many questions pertaining to
subjective identity, gender issues and work values. It contains informa-
tion about the country of birth of surveyed persons, their parents and
their living partner (if any). Due to the small size of the sample, we only
distinguish four main categories of ethnic origin, aggregating countries
into large regions as follows: (1) France; (2) Southern Europe: Italy,
Spain, Portugal; (3) North Africa or Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia;
and (4) rest of the World (foreign country, but not Southern Europe or
Maghreb). We chose to distinguish Maghreb and South Europe as these
are the most important sources of immigration in France. For instance,
in the 1999 French census, those two groups accounted for 62 per cent
of foreign immigrants.
2.2.2 Specification
We compare the economic and cultural outcomes between first and




bjCountry Origin j  Immigrant  First Generationþ
X
j




ykCohortk þ X0iaþ ɛi
where bj and gj measures the impact of being a first-generation immi-
grant and a second-generation immigrant from country j relative to
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natives.4 First-generation immigrant and second-generation immigrant
are dummies equal to 1 if the individual belongs to either group and
0 otherwise. First-generation immigrants are defined as individuals who
are foreign-born from country j and whose two parents are foreign-born.
Second-generation immigrants are defined as immigrants who are
born in the host country France, but whose parents are both foreign-
born from country j. The reference group is represented by the natives
in the host country, that is individuals who are born in France and
who have both parents also born in France. The natives are always
considered as the omitted group.
2.3 Fertility and marriage
2.3.1 Fertility and age at first child
We look at two different outcomes in terms of fertility: completed
fertility rates and age at first child.
To investigate the impact of ethnicity on completed fertility rates, we
restricted the sample to women older than 40 to avoid censoring issues
due to younger women not having completed their fertility. An alterna-
tive solution would have been to include all women regardless of their
age and to include a polynomial in the age of the woman as explanatory
variables.5
Table 2.2 reports the coefficient estimates associated with completed
fertility rates of immigrants relative to natives. Positive coefficients on
first-generation migrants in the first column of Table 2.2 mean that,
regardless of their region of origin, immigrants have a greater completed
fertility rate on average than native women. Among all immigrants,
immigrants from Maghreb, Asia, and Africa exhibit the highest fertility
rates. First-generation immigrant women from Maghreb have on aver-
age 0.56 more children than natives, and immigrants from Asia and
Africa have 0.32 more children than natives. However, this discrepancy
4 Note that this specification assumes that the birth cohorts and other regressors have the
same effect for all country of origins.
5 Each solution has its assets and its drawbacks. In the first case, we are compelled to look
at older generations of immigrants, but we have a perfect picture of completed fertility rates.
In the second case, we rely on functional form assumptions to control for the evolution of
fertility with respect to age, but one can investigate more recent trends because of the
inclusion of younger women. The reason we chose the first specification is that the EHF
survey is specifically made for giving an accurate picture of completed fertility, whereas the
use of Labour Force Surveys (such as in the UK study for instance) makes it difficult (not to
say impossible) to observe completed fertility accurately.
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seems to be greatly reduced for the second generation of immigrants.
Second-generation women fromMaghreb have only 0.16 more children
during their lives than natives. For second-generation women from
Asian origins, the difference with natives vanishes completely and is
not significantly different from 0. Women born from parents from
Southern Europe have 0.24 less children on average than French
natives.
To estimate age at first child, we use all women aged 40 or younger and
use a censored model to control for women without children at their
current age.6 Results are displayed in Table 2.3 and show that first-
generation immigrants from Africa, Southern Europe, and Maghreb
tend to have children earlier than natives. Median age at first birth is
one year earlier for first-generation immigrants from Africa, and 0.23
years and 0.35 years earlier for women from Southern Europe and
Maghreb, respectively. Note that these differences tend to persist
among second-generation women from Africa and Maghreb who still
have their first child 0.35 and 0.33 years earlier, respectively, than native
women.
Table 2.2 OLS estimates of completed fertility rates by country of origin and
immigration generation.












Controls Age, education, occupation
N 135,025
R2 0.090
Note: EHF 1999. The sample is for all women over 40. Specification is that of model (1). Standard errors
clustered at the country of origin level. * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level.
6 In our cross-sectional setting, the censoring point varies across observations. To deal
with this issue, we use a censored median regression described by Chernozukhov.
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2.3.2 Marriage and divorce rate
We next consider marriage patterns. We compare marriage rates at
age 257 for natives and first and second-generation of immigrants. We
restrict the sample to all men and women aged between 25 and 40.
Table 2.4 displays the results for men and women, and then breaks
down the results by gender. Marginal effects at the mean of a probability
model of being or having been married at age 25 are reported.
Results show that first-generation immigrants tend tomarrymore and
earlier than native individuals. This difference is especially large for
individuals coming from Europe and Southern Europe, and for indivi-
duals coming from Maghreb. The probability of being married at age
25 is 7.9 percentage points higher for European immigrants, 7.2 per-
centage points higher for immigrants from Southern Europe and 1 per-
centage point higher for immigrants from Maghreb. This can be
compared with an average probability of being married at age 25 of 27
per cent in our estimation sample. The difference between immigrants
and natives is greatly reduced for the second generation. It is even
reversed for second-generation immigrants from Maghreb, who have
Table 2.3 Estimates of the age of the mother at first birth by country of origin
and generation of immigration.












Controls Age, education, occupation
N 88,449
R2 0.039
Note: EHF 1999. Censored median regression estimates (Chernozukhov) to deal with censoring
of women not having children at their current age. * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
7 Marriage rate at age 25 is defined as the fraction of individuals being or having been
married at age 25.
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a slightly smaller probability of being married at age 25 than native
individuals (minus two percentage points). The next columns in
Table 2.4 investigate the same probability model for men and women
separately. The main result is that men and women from the same
region of origin do not seem to differ significantly in their marriage
behaviours. Bothmen and womenmigrating from Europe and Southern
Europe have a higher probability of being married at age 25 than native
French, but second-generation men and women from these same re-
gions do not have significantly different marriage behaviours from
native French.
Among immigrants from Maghreb, only women seem to be more
likely to be married when they are young (with a higher probability
of 2.6 percentage points), whereas men seem to marry later. This
may reflect the different nature of immigration between men and
women from Maghreb, men coming younger and for working purposes
and women coming for family reasons along the policy of ‘family
gathering’.
Table 2.4 Estimates of the probability of being married at age 25 by country of











Africa 0.038** 0.077*** 0.030 0.093*** 0.044** 0.063**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Asia 0.010 0.059** 0.055** 0.063** 0.038 0.054*
(0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.031)
Europe 0.079*** 0.005 0.086*** 0.008 0.070*** 0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Southern
Europe
0.072*** 0.009 0.084*** 0.009 0.058*** 0.011
(0.014) (0.007) (0.021) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010)
Maghreb 0.010 0.025*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.026* 0.010
(0.010) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008)
Controls Age, education, occupation
N 88,449 40,029 61,570
R2 0.095 0.059 0.086
Note: EHF 1999. Logit estimates: marginal effects at the mean. Sample: individuals under 40. * Denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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We then look at divorce patterns. We consider the fraction of indivi-
duals who got divorced.8 Table 2.5 shows that divorce rates among
first-generation immigrants are very close to that of natives. But inter-
estingly, it seems that among second-generation individuals, divorce
rates are greater than that of French natives. For second-generation
immigrants from Magrheb, for instance, men have a 4.9 percentage
point more probability of being divorced once married than native
French, and this probability is 4.2 higher for women. Along with the
evidence of high endogamy rates among second-generation immigrants
from Maghreb, this may suggest the existence of some cultural tension
in the marriage model of Maghrebian communities, with some conser-
vative elements (high marriage and endogamy rates) being challenged
by elements of high cultural integration (educational gap, etc.), which
may explain higher divorce rates.
Table 2.5 Estimates of the probability of being or having been divorced by











Africa 0.003 0.0307 0.064* 0.081*** 0.039** 0.000
(0.017) (0.021) (0.035) (0.009) (0.016) (0.031)
Asia 0.044*** 0.080** 0.033** 0.095 0.054*** 0.067
(0.014) (0.039) (0.024) (0.068) (0.017) (0.044)
Europe 0.009 0.042*** 0.001 0.032 0.015 0.0476**
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.020)
Southern
Europe
0.000 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.008) (0.022) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010)
Maghreb 0.001 0.045*** 0.005 0.049*** 0.010 0.041
(0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010)
Controls Age, education, occupation
N 51,087 17,628 33,459
R2 0.032 0.026 0.038
Note: EHF 1999. Logit estimates: marginal effects at the mean. Sample: all individuals being or having
been married. * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level.
8 Note that we therefore restrict the sample to individuals married or having beenmarried.
To control for possible censoring of younger individuals who may finally get divorced, we
include a polynomial in age.
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2.3.3 Inter-ethnic marriages
This section explores the frequency of inter-ethnic marriage. Table 2.6
reports the fraction of each community that is married to someone of
a different immigration backgrounds. We distinguish three categories:
a marriage with a native spouse, a marriage with a spouse who comes
from the same country of origin, grouping together spouses from first
and second generation, and marriages with non-native spouses coming
from a different country of origin. We distinguish the exogamy rates
among first and second-generation respondents.
The proportion of immigrants whose spouse or partner comes from
the same country of origin (either first or second generation) is naturally
higher for first-generation immigrants. The endogamy rates are equal
to 74 per cent for first-generation Maghrebin, 69 per cent for first-
generation African, 85 per cent for first-generation immigrants from
Turkey or Middle East, and 79 per cent for first-generation immigrants
from Asia. When we turn to immigrants from other European countries,
the endogamous marriage rate is also higher than marriage rates with
natives.
But as Table 2.6 shows, this endogamy is strongly reduced in the
second generation: 23.4 per cent for South Europeans, 39.3 per cent
Table 2.6 Inter-ethnic marriages.







Maghreb 21.67 74.29 4.05
Africa 26.83 69.16 4.01
Southern Europe 30.34 65.84 3.82
Northern Europe 45.21 44.25 10.54
Eastern Europe 38.89 53.88 77.23
Turkey 9.72 85.35 4.92
Asia 18.63 78.59 2.78
Second generation
Maghreb 41.06 53.40 5.54
Africa 52.40 39.35 8.24
Southern Europe 71.21 23.42 5.37
Northern Europe 85.27 6.16 8.57
Eastern Europe 72.48 16.16 11.36
Turkey 36.41 51.76 11.83
Note: Data source is the French Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2005–2007. Proportions are computed using
individual sampling weights.
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for Africans, 51 per cent for Turkish, and 53 per cent for Maghrebins.
Maghrebin immigrants of the first and second generation remain par-
ticularly endogamous, as compared to other groups. This is confirmed
by regression analysis controlling for the individual characteristics
aforementioned.
2.3.4 Spousal age gap
Table 2.7 reports estimates for the age gap between the spouse, which
could capture a gender inequality. Immigrant women of the first and
second generations do not seem to get married younger than French
natives. Their age at the first child is not significantly lower than that of
French natives, except for the first-generation immigrants from Magh-
reb, where the age gap is on average 2 years older than for native
couples; and up to 3.6 years higher when both spouses share the same
origin. The age difference between spouses is statistically different for
first-generation immigrants from Maghreb, but not for the second gen-
eration. However, when one distinguishes endogamous couples (where
both spouses come from the same country) from exogamous ones, the
difference is persistent and statistically significant, even for second-
generation immigrants (the age difference is about two years older
than for French native couples).
Table 2.7 OLS estimates of the age gap between husband and wife for all
individuals by ethnicity and place of birth.















Southern Europe 0.10 0.31 0.40 1.91 0.80 0.07
(0.28) (0.29) (0.37) (1.24) (0.54) (0.47)
Maghreb 1.88*** 0.07 3.55*** 1.81** 0.18 0.59
(0.22) (0.34) (0.31) (0.90) (0.47) (0.54)
Controls Age, education, occupation
N 5,905 4,212 1,690
R2 0.032 0.05 0.02
Note: Histoire de Vie, INSEE 2003. * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level,
and *** at the 1% level.
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2.4 Educational attainment and gender gap in education
Another way immigrants are thought to be different from the French
native is the level of education and the attitudes towards gender equality
in education. We document these education patterns, focusing on the
sample of individuals older than 26 years and who have left education.
Table 2.8 reports education distribution and the gender gap in education
for natives and immigrants.
2.4.1 Educational attainment
We first measure the gap in educational attainment of immigrants
relative to French natives.Wemeasure the evolution of this gap between
different birth cohorts of immigrants and waves of immigration. We
start by regressing the age they left full-time education on dummies for
the country of origin of first and second generations. Native French are
the reference group. The controls are a quadratic in year of birth, time
dummies for the different waves of the survey, and region dummies.
Table 2.9 reports the educational gap for immigrant men relative to
natives. The x-axis reports the coefficients for second-generation immi-
grants and the y-axis reports the coefficients for the first-generation
immigrants. First-generation immigrant men from Africa, Northern
Europe and Eastern Europe are one or two years older when leaving
full-time education than their native counterparts, who themselves
leave education when they are on average around 18.3 years old. First-
generation immigrant men from Southern Europe and Turkey are on
average three years and one year younger than native men, respectively,
when they leave education, while immigrants from the Maghreb and
Asia are of about the same age.
Table 2.8 Gender gap in age left full-time education.
Country of origin Whole First generation Second generation
Natives 0.13
Maghreb 0.73 1.2 0.3
Africa 2.46 2.3 2.0
Southern Europe 0.41 0.3 0.4
Northern Europe 0.95 0.8 0.6
Eastern Europe 0.82 1.30 0.9
Turkey 1.61 1.60 1.2
Asia 2.61 2.72 1.9
Note: Data source is the French Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2005–2007. Proportions are computed
using individual sampling weights. * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level.
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From the first to the second generation, the gap in educational attain-
ment relative to natives becomes negative for most immigrant groups.
For instance, second-generation immigrants from Maghreb and Africa
are 0.3 and 0.4 years younger when they leave the education system.
Note, however, that the negative gap for Southern European men
decreases from 2.9 years to 0.2 years from the first to the second
generation.
Table 2.9 shows that only first-generation women from Northern and
Eastern Europe are at least as old as native women when they complete
their full-time education. All other groups are significantly younger
than both native women and their male immigrant counterparts. Im-
migrants from Maghreb are almost one year younger, and immigrants
from Southern Europe are three years younger. But there is an important
improvement from the first to the second generation in terms of educa-
tional attainment, in particular among the groups which were the
most disadvantaged in the first generation. Second-generation Asian
women are performing outstandingly well, with an edge of 1.4 years of
education relative to native French women. Second-generation women










Maghreb 0.491*** 0.476*** 1.241*** 0.390***
(0.103) (0.161) (0.106) (0.145)
Southern Europe 3.285*** 0.733*** 3.084*** 0.731***
(0.128) (0.134) (0.119) (0.128)
Africa 2.441*** 3.252*** 0.443** 0.812
(0.207) (0.891) (0.195) (0.744)
Northern Europe 2.083*** 0.166 1.439*** 0.254***
(0.248) (0.454) (0.210) (0.380)
Eastern Europe 1.378*** 0.673** 0.066 0.582**
(0.299) (0.303) (0.224) (0.255)
Turkey 3.172*** 0.396 3.579*** 0.680
(0.311) (0.586) (0.325) (0.567)
Asia 0.296 0.750 0.905** 2.581*
(0.365) (1.016) (0.359) (1.052)
N 51,219 56,311 50,446 54,603
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2005–2007, the sample is all individuals aged 26 and
above. These are the coefficients on dummy variables in a censored linear regression. The outcome
variable is age left full-time education. The other covariates included are a polynomial in year of
birth, region dummies, and time dummies. Sample aged 16–64 including students for which the
dependent variable is top-coded at the current age. Reported standard errors are robust. * Denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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from Maghreb and Southern Europe also almost catch up their educa-
tional lag.
Table 2.10 provides a complementary picture of the evolution of the
educational gap by distinguishing immigrants by birth cohorts. We
focus on second-generation immigrants and compare the educational
gap relative to natives among the young generation, born after 1970,
and the old generation born before 1970. We run two separate regres-
sions for the two different cohorts, taking the native as the reference
group for each generation. Among natives, the average age they left full-
time education is 20.67 years for the young generation against 17.83
years for the old generation, which represents a significant increase of
almost three years between the two cohorts.
Relative to natives, the young second-generation immigrants are
sometimes performing worse than the older cohort. Take the case of
immigrants from Maghreb, who have an edge of 0.11 years among the
old generation, and trail back by 0.45 years among the young genera-
tion. Naturally, this evolution does not mean that the younger cohort is
less educated than the old one (in the particular case of immigrants from
Maghreb, the younger cohort is educated for one year more than than
the old one), but the gap relative to the natives has increased. The same
is true for immigrants from Turkey. The evolution of the pattern of
Table 2.10 OLS estimates of the gender gap in age left continuous full-time











0.24 2.27*** 0.20* 0.38 0.98*** 1.28
(0.18) (0.30) (0.11) (0.49) (0.24) (0.87)
Born after
1970
0.47*** 1.05*** 0.50*** 0.14 0.90** 0.27




0.72*** 0.06*** 1.19*** 0.54*** 0.76*
(0.099) (0.08) (0.21) (0.25) (0.40)
Born after
1970
0.47*** 0.64*** 0.82 1.81*** 0.72
(0.30) (0.24) (0.57) (0.83) (0.49)
R2 0.075 0.100 0.034 0.037 0.073
Observations 11,963 2,209 10,594 2,206 2,361 1,381
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2005–2007, the sample is all individuals aged 26 and
above. Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses. * Denotes statistical significance at
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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female education by birth cohort is slightly different to their male
counterparts. In general, the gap narrows among the young cohort, or
remains fairly similar.
2.5 Female employment
We now turn to the analysis of female employment rate. The sample
is made up of prime-age women between 25 years and 59 years old.
For almost all ethnic groups, the employment rate is much lower
relative to the native women, whose employment rate reaches 74.4
per cent. The employment gap is the most significant for foreign-born
women from Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey, whose employment rate
is 43.0 per cent, 53.9 per cent, and 20.0 per cent respectively. The
difference is greater among married women with children than with
single women.
The female employment rate increases significantly from the first to
the second generation of immigrants. The employment rate of second-
generation women immigrants from Maghreb increases by 16.6 points
relative to first-generation immigrants. With married women immi-
grants from Maghreb with dependent children, the employment rate
increases by 20 points from the first to the second generation.
Table 2.11 shows the estimates for the evolution of the employment
gap between first and second-generation immigrants, controlling for
age and education. The coefficients are the marginal effects from
probit estimates on employment. The regressions are run on the
whole female prime-age population between 25 and 59 years old,
where French-native women are taken as the reference group. Among
the first-generation immigrant, there is a statistically significant employ-
ment gap of female immigrants relative to natives. The gap reaches
around 23–24 percentage points for female immigrants from Africa
and Maghreb, and 41.5 for female immigrants from Turkey. The female
employment gap remains sizeable and statistically significant among
the second-generation female immigrants from those countries of
origin.
2.6 Values and beliefs
2.6.1 National identity
In the survey ‘Histoire de Vies’, a series of questions were asked
concerning the elements of the respondents’ identity. Table 2.12
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documents the result for national identity. If first-generation immi-
grants tend to have different attitudes and values, compared to French
natives, this difference is largely attenuated for in second-generation
immigrants. For example, the respondents are asked about their attach-
ment to a particular country or continent: ‘Overall, do you feel mostly:
from a French region, French, European, from another country, from
another continent?’ Second-generation immigrants are more likely to
declare that they feel French than the first generation. First-generation
immigrants from Southern Europe are 50 per cent less likely to
declare that they feel French than are French natives, controlling for
age, gender, and education. This is particularly true of those who were
born after 1970 (where the probability is reduced by 77 per cent).
In the second generation, immigrants from Southern Europe are still
16 per cent less likely to declare that they feel French than native
French. Those who were born after 1970 are three times less likely to
declare that they feel French. By contrast, if first generation-immigrants
fromMaghreb are 28 per cent less likely to ‘feel French’, this effect is not
statistically significant for second-generation immigrants from this
region.
Table 2.11 Estimates of the probability of being employed for women.






Southern Europe 0.026 0.023
(0.018) (0.022)
Northern Europe 0.164*** 0.047
(0.040) (0.091)








Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2005–2007. The sample is all female prime-age
population between 25 and 59 years old. The coefficients are the marginal probit estimate, relative to
native women. Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses. * Denotes statistical
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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2.6.2 Language and religion
Another key dimension of integration and identity is language. In
the survey, the following question is asked: What language(s) did
your parents usually speak when you were a child (around five
years old)? The possible answers are: only French, another language,
French and another language, two other languages. If the respondent
answers that his parents spoke another language (including
French), he is asked about this language, and whether he speaks in this
language with his spouse, his children (who live in France), other
adults living in the household and other adults living in the
neighbourhood.
Table 2.13 shows the probit estimates of speaking in one’s foreign
mother tongue with their relatives, controlling for age, gender, and
education. Even among the second-generation immigrants, around 30
per cent of immigrants declare that they speak in their foreign mother
tongue with their spouse, children, family, or their neighbours. The
differences shown in Table 2.12 remain statistically significant for all
migrants from South Europe and Maghreb, of the two considered
cohorts.
Immigrants attach a high importance to the transmission of religion
to their children. This religious attachment does not decrease from the
first to the second generation of Maghrebin immigrants. Surprisingly,
this attachment to religious transmission is more pronounced in the
younger cohort of Maghrebins born after 1970. The proportion of
Table 2.12 Estimates of the feeling of French identity.








Southern Europe 0.133*** 0.030 0.200 0.090** 0.127*** 0.010
(0.022) (0.017) (0.154) (0.044) (0.022) (0.018)
Maghreb 0.129*** 0.002 0.138*** 0.010 0.128*** 0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.056) (0.026) (0.018) (0.024)
Controls Age, education, occupation
N 8,403 1,626 6,777
Note: Data source is Histoire de Vie, INSEE 2003. Marginal probit effects. Clustered standard errors at the
individual level in parentheses. * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and
*** at the 1% level.
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immigrants of the first generation who declare that they have a religious
practice is higher than that of French natives. This difference almost
disappears for the second generation, except for Maghrebins, for whom
this attitude remains statisticallymore pronounced, even in the younger
generation of those born after 1970.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has compared a wide range of outcomes for immigrants
relative to the natives in France. We have looked at fertility, marriage
and divorce rates, inter-ethnic marriage, spousal age gaps, the gender
gap in education, employment rates, national identity, religiosity, and
language use. We find substantial heterogeneity across communities but
also evidence that in almost all dimensions and for all groups, there is a
fast integration process between first and second-generation immi-
grants. The rate of cultural and economic integration is faster for some
variables than others. Religion, family arrangements, and endogamy
show the slowest rate of convergence, in particular among immigrants
from Maghreb. Second-generation immigrants from Maghreb also dis-
play a persistent employment penalty. Yet this slower assimilation pro-
cess in religious and family arrangements does not go against a strong
Table 2.13 Estimates of the probability of speaking in one’s foreign mother
tongue with spouse, children, family or neighbours.








Southern Europe 0.672*** 0.282*** 0.485*** 0.1653*** 0.227***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.024) (0.020) (0.030)
Maghreb 0.431*** 0.250*** 0.846*** 0.413*** 0.364*** 0.117***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.024) (0.042) (0.023) (0.043)
Controls Age, education, occupation
N 8,403 1,626 6,777
Note: Data source is Histoire de Vie, INSEE 2003. Marginal probit effects. Clustered standard errors at the
individual level in parentheses. * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and
*** at the 1% level.
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feeling of French identity among the second-generation immigrants
from Maghreb.
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3
Cultural Integration in Germany
Amelie Constant, Olga Nottmeyer, and Klaus Zimmermann
3.1 Introduction
Immigration to Germany1 began after the Second World War, when
substantial inflows of Germans, refugees, and expellees from Eastern
European territories immigrated to Western Germany. Immigrant
labour was needed to rebuild a dilapidated Germany. In the late 1950s,
under the auspices of the Federal Labour Institute and in cooperation
with labour unions and local authorities, German employers actively
recruited foreign workers. The German immigration system was, there-
fore, demand-driven and project-tied. Employers determined the num-
ber and the origin of the immigrant flow so that their industries would
easily absorb them. Initially, it was Germans from East Germany who
were a big number of these labourers. In addition, bilateral treaties for
recruitment of blue collar workers were signed with Italy in 1955 and
with Spain and Greece in 1960. After the erection of the Berlin Wall in
1961 the inflow of East Germans ended. Germany’s massive shortage in
labour supply, especially in low-qualified sectors, and its extraordinarily
fast economic growth made the need for imported labour imperative.
Germany signed additional treaties for low-skilled workers with Turkey
in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and
Yugoslavia in 1968.
Recruited immigrant workers were called guest workers (Gastarbeiter),
implying that they were invited to work in Germany under temporary
1 Until 1990, when we say Germany we refer to the Federal Republic of Germany or FRG
which was West Germany. After the unification of 1989, Germany means both East and
West.
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contracts and expected to return to their home countries after a set
period of time. The largest inflow of immigrant workers was from Italy,
Greece, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. These immigrants fostered the
transformation of the southern regions, like Bavaria and Baden Wüert-
temburg, from mostly agrarian into modernized industrial states and
contributed to the well-known German economic miracle (Deutsches
Wirtschaftswunder). By the late 1960s the German economy depended
heavily on guest workers both economically and demographically.
Unskilled immigrant workers were complements to skilled native work-
ers. Complementarity of skills in the production process allowed for an
upward economic and occupational mobility of native Germans.
Besides native Germans, immigrants fared very well economically in
terms of employment and wages. It is worth noting that during this
era of the German economic miracle, West Germany had virtually no
unemployment.
The first oil crisis in 1973 prompted the German government to change
its immigration policy and stop the active recruitment of low-skilled
workers by firms. While the November 1973 ban reduced the number of
labour migrants, it led to an increase of the foreign population through
family reunification and high fertility rates of immigrants.2 Therefore, the
immigrant composition shifted from brawny youngmales to women and
children who arrived in Germany to join their husbands and fathers. As
guest workers prolonged their residence in Germany and along with their
families became permanent residents, the government offered them sev-
eral lucrative options to return to their homelands, but had minimal
success. Effectively, while Greek, Italian, and Spanish workers were fairly
immobile even though their countries were part of the European Union
labour market, immigration from countries with strong mobility con-
straints (Turkey, Yugoslavia) rose the strongest. This is a consequence of
family re-unification, family formation (fertility), and minimal return
migration to the homelands, caused by the impossibility or expected
difficulties of returning to Germany again.3
Various geopolitical trends in the 1980s and 1990s played a significant
part in bringing about a changing immigrant composition. During that
time, immigration inflows in Germany were mainly shaped by asylum
seekers4 and ‘ethnic’ Germans. The latter, also called Aussiedler, came to
2 This issue is further addressed in Zimmermann (1994).
3 For further information see Zimmermann (1994).
4 Mainly due to civil wars in Yugoslavia, conflicts in Kurdish territories of Turkey and
northern Iraq. Iranians as well as Vietnamese and Chinese constitute a large percentage of
asylum seekers.
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Germany in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain, taking advan-
tage of liberalized travel regulations.5 Immigrant waves from Poland,
Romania, and the former Soviet Union, ‘flooded’ Germany until a new
more restrictive law was enforced in 1993 (Constant et al., 2010a and
2010b). Most recently, during the process of EU East enlargement, it has
been labour migrants from Poland and other Eastern European
countries who constitute the dominant source of migration inflows to
Germany (Brenke et al., 2009).
In the 2000s, almost nine per cent of Germany’s population was
foreigners. Despite its long migration history, German policymakers
refused for a long time to accept the status of an immigration country.
However, taking a pioneering stance, the German government of Chan-
cellor Schröder introduced the Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) in
2001 to regulate immigration. Political compromise allowed only a
reduced version to come into effect on 1 January 2005. The Act officially
acknowledges Germany’s status as an immigration country and ad-
dresses integration issues. Until today, the question of how to obtain a
sufficient degree of economic and social coherence remains one of the
most pressing topics in the current political debate.
Economists have completed many studies on the economic adapta-
tion of migrants, either under the label of assimilation (or parity of
immigrant and native earnings) or under integration (or progress with-
out assimilation). Of less interest has been the issue of cultural or ethnic
identity adaptation. However, recently the role of ethnic identity has
come up as an important concept to study socio-economic integration
and explain earnings disparities. This allowsmigration scholars to tackle
the potential joint endogeneity of the processes of economic perfor-
mance and social and cultural activities. Dealing with the role of an
individual’s identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have provided a novel
theoretical framework whereby the individual’s self-identification is in-
corporated in the individual’s utility maximization function as a power-
ful motivation for economic behaviour. The authors show that while
achieving one’s ‘ideal self’ and being comfortable with one’s identity
increases utility, one may not necessarily reach the neoclassical maxi-
mum but may end up at a suboptimal level of economic activity. Béna-
bou and Tirole (2011) model a broad class of beliefs of individuals
including their identity, which people value and invest in. They also
study endogenously arising, self-serving beliefs linked to pride, dignity,
or wishful thinking. These emerging important contributions can also
5 Immigrants who can prove that they are of German descent are by law German and are
granted German citizenship almost immediately after arrival.
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explain labour market performance. Accordingly, while some indivi-
duals have the drive and human capital to adapt and succeed in the
labour market, they may not reach their goal because of behavioural
norms and unfulfilled or confused self-identity images.6
Constant and Zimmermann (2008) and Constant et al. (2006 and
2009a) were the first to introduce a quantifiable measure of the multi-
dimensional concept of ethnic identity in economics, employing litera-
ture from social psychology and other social sciences. They developed a
framework of ethnic identity, constructed the quantifiable index ‘eth-
nosizer’ and tested it empirically with German data.7 For the authors,
ethnic identity is how individuals perceive themselves within an envi-
ronment as they categorize and compare themselves to others of the
same or different ethnicity. It is the closeness or distance immigrants feel
from their own ethnicity or from other ethnicities, as they try to fit into
the host society. Most importantly, ethnic identity can differ among
migrants of the same origin and can be comparable among migrants of
different ethnic backgrounds. In stark distinction to ethnicity, which
indicates ethnic origin or home country and remains unaltered through
time, ethnic identity measures how people perceive themselves in the
new country rather than their ancestors. The authors allow for the
individuality, personality, distinctiveness, and character of a person in
an ethnic group to prevail, to differ from one person to another, and to
alter and evolve in different directions over time. They define ethnic
identity to be the balance between commitment to, affinity to, or self-
identification with the culture, as well as norms and society of origin
and commitment to or self-identification with the host culture and
society.
The ethnic identity is composed of five essential elements: language
ability, ethnic self-identification, visible cultural elements, ethnic inter-
action, and citizenship, as well as locational plans. That is, ethnic iden-
tity, whether it is with regards to the home or the host country, is formed
by these elements. When considering both ethnic identities, the two-
dimensional ethnosizer can be easily visualized in the positive Cartesian
quadrant; it is formed by the horizontal axis measuring ethnic identity
with regards to the home country and the vertical axis measuring ethnic
identity with regards to the host country. In this quadrant, we can easily
define four states or regimes of ethnic identity differentiated by the
6 For further information on the topic, see Constant and Zimmermann (2011) who
surveyed the literature and provided insights into the role of ethnic identity in economics.
7 Constant and Zimmermann (2008, 2009); Constant et al. (2006, 2009b, 2009c, 2012);
Zimmermann (2007a, 2007b); Zimmermann et al. (2007, 2008, 2009).
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strength of cultural and social commitment to the home or host coun-
try. These four states are: (1) Assimilation, a pronounced identification
with the host culture and society, coupled with a firm conformity to the
norms, values, and codes of conduct of the host country. Self-identifica-
tion with the country of origin is almost wiped out; (2) Integration, an
achieved amalgam of both dedication to and identification with the
origin and commitment and conformity to the host society. This is the
case of a perfect bi-cultural state; (3) Marginalization, a strong detach-
ment from both the host country culture and the culture of origin; and
(4) Separation, an exclusive commitment to the culture of origin even
after years of emigration, paired with weak involvement in the host
culture and country realities.
This chapter focuses on the cultural integration of immigrants in
Germany, which has the largest immigrant population in the EU and
is a powerful player in the western developed world. The aim of this
chapter is to study the current level of integration of immigrants in
Germany. This is achieved by looking at educational gaps between
partners, marriage and intermarriage rates, age at first marriage, age
gaps between spouses, the number of children per woman, age at
birth of first child; political interest, risk attitudes, overall life satisfac-
tion, and female labour force participation. Additionally, we use a varia-
tion of the ethnosizer to determine the current degree of cultural
integration of immigrant groups. We therefore compare immigrant
groups with respect to their self-reported language abilities, their ethnic
self-identification, and their religious beliefs. All these indicators are
defined as deviations from natives and differentiated by ethnic origin
and immigrant generation. Empirical findings are based on panel data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) allowing for statements
about development over time.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section introduces
the data and clarifies definitions, as well as remarking on the empirical
methods used in this study. Section 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics
and discusses the estimation results. The chapter concludes with a
summary of findings from the analysis.
3.2 Data and definitions
The analysis of the cultural integration of immigrants in Germany is
based on data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP). The
SOEP is a nationally representative longitudinal study that in 2007
contained information of roughly 20,000 individuals and 11,000
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private households in Germany.8 This unique data source provides a
wealth of information about various social, cultural, political, and eco-
nomic aspects of individuals living in Germany and allows the testing of
corresponding social and economic theories. Due to its panel design and
an over-sampling of immigrants it opens unique analytical possibilities,
especially with regards to integration over time based on the behaviour
of different immigrant generations. The descriptive statistics we present
here refer to the period 2005–2007, or the most recent year for which
information is available. The regressions are also estimated on data from
the same time period in order to exploit the richness of the data.
A well acknowledged problem related to immigrant populations’
research and international comparisons is the definition of who is an
immigrant. Different countries have different definitions of who is a
native and who is an immigrant. For example, in the US, the prevailing
law is the Law of Soil (jus soli) that makes all individuals born in the US
American citizens by default. Until recently, Germany recognized the jus
sanguinis or bloodlines as the only law in recognizing a German citizen.
With the new developments, Germany now allows, under certain ex-
ceptions in law, place of birth to determine citizenship as well. Accord-
ingly, we define an immigrant to be a person who either (1) is not born
in Germany or (2) is a person who is born in Germany but is not a
German citizen or whose mother or father are not German born or have
a non-German nationality. In those cases where both parents are not
born in Germany but are also not born in the same country, the country
of origin of the mother outweighs the country of origin of the father,
assuming that cultural habits and norms are more likely to be trans-
ferred from the mother to the child than from the father.9
Distinctions between first and second-generation immigrants are
based on the country of birth. By definition, individuals who are not
born in Germany belong to the first generation of immigrants regardless
of the age at which they immigrated to Germany. Individuals who were
born in Germany but fulfil at least one of the criteria mentioned above10
are considered second-generation immigrants. It is important to men-
tion that the idiosyncrasies of the German lawmay often treat second or
8 For further information about the survey see Wagner et al. (2007).
9 This definition of immigrants defines Aussiedler as belonging to the group of immi-
grants. Aussiedler are not born in Germany but are eligible for German citizenship immedi-
ately after immigration due to their German bloodlines. Aussiedler are mostly born and raised
in Eastern European countries, and will be treated as part of the immigrant population and
do not take on an exceptional role in this analysis.
10 Those that hold other than German citizenship, or one of the parents is not German
born, or has a foreign nationality.
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even third-generation immigrants as foreigners. Moreover, nationality
may change over time and be related to a feeling of belonging and
commitment to a specific country. Similar to ethnic identity,11 nation-
ality may be a dynamic feature expressing a certain degree of integra-
tion, assimilation, segregation or marginalization. In contrast, country
of origin or ethnicity remains unchanged even after naturalization.
Only in the case where there is no information available about the
country of birth of the immigrant or the parents is nationality taken as
the single criterion to determine immigrant status.
3.2.1 Immigrant population in Germany
According to the definition of immigrants given above, SOEP data show
that 12.18 per cent of Germany’s population have an immigration
background either personally or induced by their parents (Table 3.1).
Since the SOEP over-samples the foreign population in Germany there
may be discrepancies between SOEP statistics and official statistics by
the German Statistical Office. Since 2005, the German Statistical Office
not only reported immigrant status defined by nationality but also
introduced a new classification, which is supposed to account for migra-
tion background. Accordingly, individuals residing in Germany belong
to the group of persons either with or without migration background.
Previously, individuals holding other than German citizenship were
counted as Ausländer (foreigners), completely ignoring country of birth
and family background.
Depending on which definition is used, official data state that
8.8 per cent of Germany’s population is of foreign nationality in con-
trast to almost 19 per cent of people with a migration background.
Among these people with migration background, roughly 68 per cent
belong to the group of people with their own migration experience
(comparable to our definition of the first-generation immigrants) and





Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
11 See, for example, Phinney et al. (2001); Phinney (1992); Constant et al. (2009b).
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32 per cent to the group of persons without migration experience
(resembles the second-immigrant generation in this study).12 Also in
the SOEP data, the majority of the immigrants observed, namely 76.82
per cent, are classified as first-generation, whereas 23.18 per cent are
second-generation immigrants (Table 3.2). This bias from official data
might be related to the fact that the SOEP contains information mostly
about individuals who are older than 16 years of age. This restriction
possibly underestimates the share of younger immigrants in the total
population and thus the share of second-generation immigrants in the
sample. In total, the data used within this study include 11,078 observa-
tions for immigrants and 79,863 for Germans.13
Furthermore, immigrants are distinguished by country of origin. We
concentrate on immigrants coming from one of the five sending
countries during the guest worker period, namely Turkey, former Yugo-
slavia, Spain, Greece, and Italy.14 Additionally, we include Polish
and Russian immigrants since they are increasingly important ethnic
groups in Germany. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of these
ethnic groups living in Germany between 2005 and 2007. Turkish im-
migrants represent 21.13 per cent of the immigrant population and are
therefore the biggest single ethnic group present in Germany. Even
though Spanish immigrants made up a major part of the guest worker
population coming to Germany during the 1950s and 1960s, immi-
grants who originate from Spain are currently a negligible part of
the immigrant community, representing only 2.06 per cent of the
Table 3.2 Immigrant groups.










Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
12 See Statistisches Bundesamt (2009).
13 All numbers presented are not weighted.
14 The category ‘Former Yugoslavia’ includes immigrants from Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Kosovo-Albania.
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immigrant population. Hence, results regarding this group need to be
treated with caution. Findings reported in the tables might thus not be
representative of Spanish immigrants. They are stated, nonetheless,
mostly for reasons of completeness. The ethnic group labelled ‘Other’
refers to the immigrant population in Germany that originates from
other countries than those explicitly mentioned above.
Considering the generational distribution of immigrants, Table 3.3
shows that within each immigrant group the majority of individuals
belong to the first generation. This holds especially true for immigrants
from Poland and Russia, who represent the most recent trends of immi-
gration inflows to Germany. The share of first-generation immigrants
from these countries lies at 86.66 per cent for Poles and even 94.93 per
cent for Russians. Thus, statements regarding differences between first
and second generation of these two ethnic groups must be treated
carefully due to the small numbers of observations in the second gener-
ation. As a consequence, regressions that account for differences in
behaviour by generation occasionally do not include Russian second-
generation immigrants.
Comparing the ethnic distribution by generation, Table 3.4 shows
that the share of Turkish, Italian, Greek, and Spanish immigrants, is
greater in the second than in the first generation. First-generation Rus-
sians (8.58 per cent) and Poles (10.76 per cent) are also quite dominant
ethnic groups, whereas the share of Poles and Russians in the second
generation is relatively small. The share of immigrants from the
countries of former Yugoslavia is almost identical in both generations.15
Table 3.3 Generational distribution.










Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
15 The ethnic distribution by generation does not differ much by gender.
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3.3 Integration indicators
We now turn to the cultural indicators that can provide insight to the
integration process of immigrants in Germany. The estimationmethods
used to measure the effect of ethnic groups and generations on selected
indicators are based on simple pooled OLS and Logit techniques run on
data during the period 2005–2007.16 Explanatory variables used in each
model are dichotomous variables accounting for membership of one of
the ethnic groups interacted with a dummy variable capturing informa-
tion belonging to the first or second-generation immigrant. Addition-
ally, three different birth cohorts are distinguished and included in the
regression. The first cohort depicts immigrants born before 1942 who
are older than 65 in 2007. The second birth group includes immigrants
born between 1942 and 1967. In 2007 they are thus between 40 and 65.
This group is set to be the base category in all estimations. Conse-
quently, the last age group contains immigrants who are younger than
40 in 2007. The regression model includes years of schooling as an
additional explanatory variable.17 Native Germans are the ethnic refer-
ence group. Finally, each regression is run separately for men and
women to account for possible gender peculiarities. The regression re-
sults are presented as tables within the text, figures visualizing these
results are given in the Appendix at the end of the chapter.
3.3.1 Education
Table 3.5 shows the average years of schooling for each ethnic group,
additionally differentiated by generation and gender. Accordingly, both
Table 3.4 Ethnic distribution by generation.









Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
16 In the cases where there is no information available for 2005 to 2007, the most recent
year is considered instead.
17 Except in the regression on the individual gender gap in education.
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male and female second-generation immigrants tend to have better
education than first-generation immigrants.18 The increase in education
between generations is especially large (almost two additional years of
schooling) for Greek immigrants. Still, even for Greek immigrants, aver-
age years of education are lower for immigrants regardless of gender
compared to natives and this holds for the second generation as well.
Turkish immigrants in particular have very low education levels, usually
less than high school. That is, Turkish women have 9.29 years of school-
ing and men 9.93. In contrast, native women have, on average, 12.11
years of education and men 12.55 years. In general, immigrants from
one of the guest worker countries have less education than more recent
immigrant groups such as Poles or Russians, indicating different pat-
terns in the educational composition of more recent migration inflows.
Comparisons by gender show that in almost every ethnic group first-
generation men have more education than first-generation women.
Interestingly, the opposite is true for the second generation, at least for
Turks, ex-Yugoslavs, and Poles. Second-generation women from these
ethnic groups have more years of schooling than second-generation
men. For natives, gender differences in education can also be observed,
showing higher levels of education for German men than for German
women.
Next, we consider whether differences in education are not only
present among ethnic groups in group averages, but if they also exist
between spouses and thus on an individual level. Table 3.6 reports the
average gap in education between partners differentiated by ethnic
Table 3.5 Average years of schooling.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 11.83 11.93 12.22 12.36
Turkey 9.29 11.24 9.93 10.79
Ex-Yugoslavia 9.92 11.53 10.67 11.01
Greece 9.56 11.99 10.50 12.35
Italy 9.46 11.37 10.02 11.53
Spain 10.27 10.23 9.97 13.15
Poland 11.78 13.31 11.91 10.98
Russia 11.04 No obs. 10.85 13.07
Germany 12.11 12.55
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
18 With the exception of Poles and Spaniards, as these numbers might not be representa-
tive due to small sample sizes.
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group and immigrant generation. Here we consider only individuals
who report living with a partner in the same household. The question
is whether educational diversity is more common among immigrants
than among natives.
To that end we construct a variable of the difference of ‘own years of
education’ minus ‘years of education of the partner’. A negative differ-
ence, as is usually the case for most first-generation women, indicates
that, on average, this gender group has less education than their partner.
For first-generation immigrant men education differences are mainly
positive, indicating more education for the husband compared to his
wife.19 Accordingly, first-generation Turkish men have on average 0.31
more years of education than their partner. Turkish women, who also
belong to the first generation have an educational deficit of more than
0.63 years. In contrast, Turkish women who are born in Germany and
are part of the second generation, have even more education than their
partners (0.55 years). For their second-generation male counterparts the
partner difference decreases compared to the parental generation to
merely 0.13 more years of education, but it remains positive.20
In Table 3.7 we present the individual differences between spouses
regarding the explanatory variables mentioned above21 for men and
women separately. Accordingly, the average difference in the education
Table 3.6 Educational gaps between spouses by sex and generation.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.69
Turkey 0.63 0.55 0.31 0.13
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.90 1.36 0.76 1.22
Greece 0.76 0.86 0.38 0.30
Italy 0.73 0.25 0.20 0.78
Spain 0.98 0.00 0.97 1.77
Poland 0.03 0.18 0.05 2.70
Russia 0.42 No obs 0.16 3.00
Germany 0.48 0.48
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
19 The numbers presented in Table 3.6 need not be identically reverse due to mixed
marriages and different ethnic classifications for men and women.
20 Please note that there is no information available on the gender gap in education of
second-generation Russian immigrants. Please also keep in mind that results for Spanish
immigrants might be misleading due to small observation numbers.
21 Ethnic group dummies interacted with generation dummies and dichotomous vari-
ables accounting for three different birth cohorts, birth between 1942 and 1965 being the
reference category.
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of native women who were born between 1942 and 1965 is negative,
indicating that women of this generation have less schooling than their
partners. The difference decreases for younger birth cohorts (‘cohort 3’)
and increases for older generations (‘cohort 1’). For Turkish women who
were not born in Germany (‘Turkey (first gen.)’) the difference is greater
Table 3.7 Estimated educational gaps between spouses by ethnicity and sex.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) 0.0725 0.0001
(0.0825) (0.0888)
Other (second gen.) 0.1557 0.4518
(0.2950) (0.2648)
Turkey (first gen.) 0.3358** 0.0068
(0.1074) (0.1026)
Turkey (second gen.) 0.6130* 0.1766
(0.2616) (0.2668)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) 0.4806** 0.3445*
(0.1552) (0.1555)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) 1.5038*** 1.2416**
(0.3564) (0.4363)
Greece (first gen.) 0.2315 0.1730
(0.2396) (0.2293)
Greece (second gen.) 0.9074 0.2181
(0.4662) (0.5255)
Italy (first gen.) 0.2621 0.2156
(0.2080) (0.1689)
Italy (second gen.) 0.3495 0.6875
(0.2957) (0.3601)
Spain (first gen.) 0.4252 1.3976***
(0.4828) (0.3758)
Spain (second gen.) 0.2144 1.8926*
(0.9300) (0.7424)
Poland (first gen.) 0.4233** 0.3851*
(0.1467) (0.1640)
Poland (second gen.) 0.1262 2.6499*
(0.5976) (1.1012)
Russia (first gen.) 0.8640*** 0.5805**
(0.1712) (0.1790)
Russia (second gen.) No obs 2.5827
(1.4209)
Cohort 1 0.6578*** 0.5761***
(0.0453) (0.0415)





OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses; * p <0:05, ** p <0:01, *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007.
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and significantly different from native women, indicating greater dis-
parities between husbands and wives in this ethnic group. In contrast,
for second-generation Turkish women the difference becomes positive,
implying better schooling levels for them compared to their partner.
Similar patterns hold for female immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia. Polish
and Russian women are an exception in that they show better educa-
tional skills for the wives compared to their husbands for the first
generation; at least for immigrants born after 1942.22
For men the picture is slightly different. As expected, German men
between 40 and 65 have on average more years of schooling than their
partners. While this educational gap is even bigger for older birth co-
horts, it decreases and reverses for the youngest age group. Turkish,
Greek, and Italian men do not significantly differ from German men
when it comes to educational differences within the partnership,
whereas for the remaining immigrant groups the difference in educa-
tion decreases for both immigrant generations. First-generation
ex-Yugoslav men as well as second-generation Russian men are an
exception. The decrease in the educational gap is even bigger for sec-
ond-generation individuals, indicatingmore equality among partners in
later immigrant generations.
Summing up, the educational advantage of men over women is pres-
ent, and it is stronger for most first-generation immigrants compared to
Germans. However, it declines and even reverses for second-generation
immigrants. These findings indicate that second-generation women
have, on average, better education in terms of years of schooling
compared to their partners than women in their parental generation
and hence converge towards more equal education levels within the
partnership.
3.3.2 Marital behaviour
Table 3.8 shows that most first-generation immigrants are married
and live in the same household as their partner, whereas most second-
generation immigrants are single. This is not surprising, and is possibly
due to the different age structures in the two generations, as can be seen
from Table 3.9. On average, first-generation immigrants are slightly
older than native Germans. Second-generation immigrants, however,
are markedly younger.
22 There is no information available for second-generation Russian women.
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Table 3.8 Marital behaviour.
Women
Ethnic origin First gen. Second gen.
Single Married Single Married
Other 39.83 60.17 73.62 26.38
Turkey 24.39 75.61 65.08 34.92
Ex-Yugoslavia 36.87 63.13 63.41 36.59
Greece 28.30 71.70 65.31 34.69
Italy 38.55 61.45 63.95 36.05
Spain 51.72 48.28 74.36 25.64
Poland 40.49 59.51 74.03 25.97
Russia 39.02 60.98 100.00 0.00
Germany 51.68 48.32
Men
Ethnic origin First gen. Second gen.
Single Married Single Married
Other 37.74 62.26 71.62 28.38
Turkey 24.26 75.74 67.59 32.41
Ex-Yugoslavia 36.60 63.40 75.18 24.82
Greece 23.81 76.19 71.74 28.26
Italy 27.99 72.01 72.99 27.01
Spain 40.24 59.76 57.14 42.86
Poland 36.36 63.64 92.19 7.81
Russia 39.65 60.35 86.36 13.64
Germany 50.56 49.44
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
Table 3.9 Average age.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 45.47 28.20 46.51 29.77
Turkey 44.56 25.08 45.49 24.55
Ex-Yugoslavia 48.94 28.85 48.81 27.15
Greece 54.99 28.44 54.23 28.79
Italy 52.27 28.82 51.79 28.12
Spain 53.48 26.97 52.13 30.35
Poland 43.69 23.26 46.50 20.58
Russia 46.22 19.18 44.57 24.00
Germany 41.44 40.06
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007.
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Turning to themarital behaviour of the first generationwe observe that
it differs noticeably from that of the native population. Turkish immi-
grants, especially, show very high marriage rates. For example, among
first-generation Turkish men, the share of those living with a partner is
75.74 per cent compared to a marriage rate of only 49.44 per cent for
Germanmen. First-generationwomen exhibit a similarmarital behaviour
to men of the same ethnic group, with marriage rates mostly at or above
60 per cent. In contrast, second-generation women have marriage rates
only around 25 to 35 per cent. Differences are noticeably higher (between
34 and 37 per cent) for immigrants from the former guest worker
countries. For second-generation men marriage rates are somewhat smal-
ler especially for Poles and Russians. Only 32.41 per cent of Turkish men
have similar marriage rates to their female counterparts. For natives, there
are hardly any differences in the marital behaviour of men and women.
The share of married Germans is almost 50 per cent, indicating a higher
tendency of natives towards remaining single compared to immigrants.
In Table 3.10 we present the results of the multivariate regression.
Regardless of their gender, first-generation immigrants tend to be more
likely to be married than Germans, whereas second-generation immi-
grants seem to be less likely to be living with a partner. Polish women
and Spanish men are the only groups whose marital behaviour does not
differ from that of natives irrespective of generation. Second-generation
Turks show no significant deviations from Germans with respect to
marital behaviour.
3.3.3 Intermarriage
Analysing differences in marital behaviour even further, Table 3.11
shows that the type of marriage differs noticeably by immigrant genera-
tion and ethnic group. Intermarriage in this context is defined as the
living partnership of an immigrant with a native German. A marriage
between a Greek and a Turk, for example, is not considered intermar-
riage. This restrictive definition is based on the assumption that inter-
marriage is supposed to indicate integration to the German society. An
immigrant who is living with a native partner possibly signals greater
commitment to Germany than an immigrant who marries another
immigrant or even marries within his or her own ethnic community.23
23 For further research on intermarriage see, for example, Kalmijn (1998); Lievens (1998,
1999); Kantarevic (2004); Meng and Gregory (2005); Meng and Meurs (2006); Gonzáles-
Ferrer (2006); Chiswick and Housworth (2011); Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2011); Furtado
(2010).
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
84
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Among those who are married, intermarriage rates are especially
low for first-generation Turks, ranging between 1.94 per cent for first-
generation women and 5.79 per cent for men. In contrast, Italian im-
migrants show comparably high intermarriage rates of 17.28 per cent for
women and even 27.42 per cent for men already in the first generation,
Table 3.10 Marriage probability.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.0552*** 0.0831***
(0.0119) (0.0107)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.2490*** 0.1827***
(0.0348) (0.0331)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.2047*** 0.1888***
(0.0106) (0.0063)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.0375 0.0385
(0.0341) (0.0229)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.0643** 0.0893***
(0.0217) (0.0173)
Ex-Yugoslavia (Second gen.) (d) 0.1517*** 0.1282*
(0.0453) (0.0503)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.1575*** 0.0993***
(0.0273) (0.0281)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.1987** 0.1728**
(0.0617) (0.0627)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.0270 0.1268***
(0.0326) (0.0168)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.1158** 0.1082**
(0.0391) (0.0409)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.1850* 0.0388
(0.0746) (0.0551)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.1515 0.0286
(0.1132) (0.0586)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.0348 0.0559*
(0.0222) (0.0217)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 0.0733 0.3785**
(0.0761) (0.1168)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.0745** 0.0599**
(0.0233) (0.0213)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs 0.2500
(0.2119)
Cohort 1 (d) 0.2617*** 0.0069
(0.0076) (0.0072)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.2223*** 0.3162***
(0.0068) (0.0067)
Years of schooling 0.0089*** 0.0149***
(0.0011) (0.0010)
N 31,839 29,018
Logit regressions; marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1, * p <0:05, ** p <0:01, *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007.
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possibly indicating better integration of Italians compared to Turks.
However, one should note that low intermarriage rates need not auto-
matically indicate low integration ability, but are highly related to the
availability of a partner within their own ethnic group. Thus, immi-
grants who belong to a dominant immigrant group, as do Turks, might
Table 3.11 Intermarriage rates.
Ethnic origin Women
Intermarriage Intra-ethnic No class.
Other First gen. 45.39 51.41 3.20
Second gen. 80.00 12.22 7.78
Turkey First gen. 1.94 97.57 0.49
Second gen. 3.43 95.47 1.10
Ex-Yugoslavia First gen. 14.01 81.85 4.14
Second gen. 33.90 59.32 6.78
Greece First gen. 6.14 90.35 3.51
Second gen. 6.06 84.85 9.09
Italy First gen. 17.28 79.63 3.09
Second gen. 33.72 61.63 4.65
Spain First gen. 51.85 48.15 0.00
Second gen. 36.36 36.36 27.27
Poland First gen. 30.31 66.56 3.13
Second gen. 90.00 10.00 0.00
Russia First gen. 15.70 82.64 1.65
Second gen. 15.70 82.64 1.65
Germany 3.89 91.59 4.52
Ethnic origin Men
Intermarriage Intra-ethnic No class.
Other First gen. 37.89 59.78 2.33
Second gen. 74.77 16.82 8.41
Turkey First gen. 5.79 93.92 0.30
Second gen. 16.04 74.53 9.43
Ex-Yugoslavia First gen. 13.44 85.90 0.66
Second gen. 31.43 68.57 0.00
Greece First gen. 15.27 80.92 3.82
Second gen. 19.23 69.23 11.54
Italy First gen. 27.42 71.77 0.81
Second gen. 66.67 31.58 1.75
Spain First gen. 63.27 34.69 2.04
Second gen. 72.73 0.00 27.27
Poland First gen. 21.03 77.38 1.59
Second gen. 100.00 0.00 0.00
Russia First gen. 3.29 96.24 0.47
Second gen. 100.00 0.00 0.00
Germany 4.49 92.95 2.56
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007, only persons who
report a partner.
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simply face a bigger market of potential partners with the same ethnic
background, which decreases the probability to intermarry. This argu-
ment is supported by the intermarriage rates of Germans—as the biggest
ethnic group. German men only show intermarriage rates of 4.49 per
cent and those of German women are even lower (3.89 per cent).
Therefore, it is important to also look at differences by generation and
thus behaviour over time.
Second-generation immigrants whowere born inGermany and hence
had the opportunity to socialize with natives all their lives, are expected
to be more likely to intermarry than immigrants who migrated to
Germany perhaps even after they were married to another immigrant.
This assumption is supported by empirical findings for most immigrant
groups. Only second-generation Greeks and Spaniards show lower inter-
marriage rates compared to the parental generation. For all remaining
ethnic groups, second-generation immigrants are more likely to be
married to a native than immigrants from their parental generation,
indicating greater intermixing with the native population of the youn-
ger generations. Therefore, the increase of intermarriage rates between
generations is especially big for Turkish men. In contrast, second-
generation Greek women are as likely to intermarry as those in the
first generation.
In Table 3.12 we present estimation results from logistic regressions
on the probability of intermarrying. Comparing marital behaviour by
ethnic group and generation with that of natives, immigrant men show
a higher probability to intermarry than Germans. With the exception of
Turkish and Greek women of either generation, this also holds for
immigrant women. The likelihood of intermarrying is in general higher
for second-generation immigrants. This suggests that immigrants born
in the host country show more ability to integrate in the marriage
market than members of their parental generation. The only exception
is Turkish women, who behave just like Germans regardless of their
generation.
3.3.4 Age at first marriage
There are not only differences by immigrant group regarding partner
choice but also with respect to age at first marriage. Table 3.13 reports
the share of individuals who are older than 25 but were first married
before the age of 25. Our results show that first-generation immigrants
are more likely to be married before the age of 25, regardless of gender,
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compared to individuals of later generations. Marriage rates at age 25 for
that group are at or above 70 per cent for most immigrant groups and
even higher for Turks. Accordingly, almost 89 per cent of first-generation
Turkish womenweremarried before the age of 25. This sharply contrasts
with less than 57 per cent among native women. In general, the second
Table 3.12 Intermarriage probability.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.3285*** 0.3024***
(0.0138) (0.0153)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.3154*** 0.3195***
(0.0341) (0.0327)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.0029 0.0385**
(0.0084) (0.0123)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.0152 0.0995**
(0.0189) (0.0319)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.1199*** 0.0857***
(0.0212) (0.0208)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 0.1756*** 0.1316**
(0.0409) (0.0460)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.0476 0.1151***
(0.0287) (0.034)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.0042 0.0614
(0.0252) (0.0424)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.1465*** 0.2774***
(0.0319) (0.0316)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.1971*** 0.3182***
(0.0371) (0.0460)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.3356*** 0.5140***
(0.0747) (0.0618)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.2334* 0.4839***
(0.1094) (0.0883)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.2251*** 0.1404***
(0.0230) (0.0243)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 0.4929*** 0.1893*
(0.0833) (0.0862)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.1174*** 0.0024
(0.0230) (0.0138)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs 0.4410*
(0.1929)
Cohort 1 (d) 0.0105*** 0.0091***
(0.0022) (0.0025)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.0045* 0.0118***
(0.0019) (0.0023)
Years of schooling 0.0026*** 0.0028***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
N 31,839 29,018
Logit regressions; marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1, * p <0:05, ** p <0:01, *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007, only persons who report a partner.
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generation shows lower shares of individuals who marry prior to their
twenty-fifth birthday and a higher tendency towards marriage at later
ages. The exceptions here are Spanish and Italian immigrants.24
Table 3.13 Married before the age of 25.
Ethnic origin Share of women
Not married before 25 Married before 25
Other First gen. 37.47 62.53
Second gen. 58.79 41.21
Turkey First gen. 11.78 88.22
Second gen. 30.61 69.39
Ex-Yugoslavia First gen. 29.81 70.19
Second gen. 63.30 36.70
Greece First gen. 23.27 76.73
Second gen. 63.49 36.51
Italy First gen. 24.81 75.19
Second gen. 51.80 48.20
Spain First gen. 46.55 53.45
Second gen. 58.82 41.18
Poland First gen. 28.82 71.18
Second gen. 68.97 31.03
Russia First gen. 24.62 75.38
Second gen. 24.62 75.38
Germany 43.22 56.78
Ethnic origin Share of men
Not married before 25 Married before 25
Other First gen. 55.45 44.55
Second gen. 89.33 10.67
Turkey First gen. 28.76 71.24
Second gen. 54.88 45.12
Ex-Yugoslavia First gen. 41.98 58.02
Second gen. 87.91 12.09
Greece First gen. 59.52 40.48
Second gen. 78.18 21.82
Italy First gen. 57.18 42.82
Second gen. 76.42 23.58
Spain First gen. 50.00 50.00
Second gen. 75.68 24.32
Poland First gen. 40.65 59.35
Second gen. 100.00 00.00
Russia First gen. 29.89 70.11
Second gen. 30.63 69.37
Germany 61.78 38.22
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007, only persons older 25.
24 Please note that there is no information available about the marriage behaviour of
second-generation Polish immigrants.
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Compared to natives, estimates presented in Table 3.14 and the
corresponding figures show that for women there is no statistically
significant difference in the probability of being married before the age
of 25 between Germans and second-generation immigrants, Turkish
women being an exception. In contrast, first-generation immigrants
seem to be more likely to be married young compared to natives. We
Table 3.14 Probability of being first married before age of 25.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.0663*** 0.0631***
(0.0145) (0.0172)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.0241 0.2442***
(0.0473) (0.0339)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.2578*** 0.3288***
(0.0156) (0.0190)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.2677*** 0.3258***
(0.0252) (0.0376)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.0221 0.1578***
(0.0286) (0.0301)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 0.0431 0.2232***
(0.0556) (0.0637)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.1098* 0.0846*
(0.0450) (0.0380)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.0131 0.0729
(0.0720) (0.0904)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.0497 0.0568
(0.0398) (0.0295)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.0111 0.0115
(0.0491) (0.0622)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.2318** 0.0003
(0.0733) (0.0616)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.1338 0.0018
(0.1492) (0.1184)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.1185*** 0.1706***
(0.0244) (0.0316)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 0.0476 No obs
(0.1016)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.1736*** 0.3001***
(0.0262) (0.0328)
Cohort 1 (d) 0.0834*** 0.0132
(0.0079) (0.0074)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.3057*** 0.2924***
(0.0075) (0.0065)
Years of schooling 0.0489*** 0.0290***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
N 29,020 26,378
Logit regressions; marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1, * p <0:05, ** p <0:01, *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007, only persons older 25.
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find positive and significant effects for Turkish, Greek, Polish, and Rus-
sian women as well as for men from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia, Greece, and
Poland. While this confirms the different marriage behaviour of first-
generation immigrants, there is no difference in marriage behaviour
between Germans and the second generation.
3.3.5 Age gap between spouses
We now turn our attention to age disparities between partners, as part-
ner constellations might be different also with respect to the age of
the spouses. Immigrants living in a partnership where age differences
between partners are about the same as for Germans might reflect
greater adaption to German norms and marital habits and thus more
social integration. Table 3.15 shows that the age gap between spouses
differs moderately by generation and ethnic origin. For Germans, the
average age gap between partners is about 2.7 years. For most first-
generation immigrants from the guest worker countries the difference
is slightly bigger, with a maximum average difference of four years for
Greeks. Poles and Russians have a smaller marital age difference than
natives. For second-generation immigrants the age difference between
partners is smaller, except among Italian, Spanish, and Polish women.
Controlling for educational levels and birth cohorts, the estimation
coefficients presented in Table 3.16 indicate that among first-generation
Italian and Greek women the difference in the spouse’s age widens,
whereas it decreases for Spanish, Polish, and Russian women. This is
partly confirmed by findings for men. Here, the difference increases
for first-generation Turkish, ex-Yugoslav, Greek, and Italian men but
Table 3.15 Average age gap between spouses.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 3.61 2.65 2.68 1.57
Turkey 2.80 2.66 2.73 2.02
Ex-Yugoslavia 3.49 3.64 3.23 2.66
Greece 3.97 2.50 3.79 2.46
Italy 3.81 3.37 3.60 3.45
Spain 0.63 5.63 2.69 1.31
Poland 2.29 2.90 2.23 0.40
Russia 2.00 No obs 1.20 3.00
Germany 2.69 2.78
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007, only persons who
report a partner.
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Table 3.16 Age gap between spouses.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.6688*** 0.0511
(0.1481) (0.1586)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.5818 0.6182
(0.4969) (0.4574)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.2661 0.4047*
(0.1989) (0.1853)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 1.3275** 0.4781
(0.4645) (0.4609)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.4357 0.8790**
(0.2674) (0.2774)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 0.4982 0.8539
(0.6162) (0.7646)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 1.2288** 0.8434*
(0.4342) (0.4072)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.8562 0.4396
(0.8396) (0.9035)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 1.1146** 1.1838***
(0.3764) (0.3015)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.0572 1.3473*
(0.5168) (0.6157)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 1.9772* 0.0066
(0.8686) (0.6594)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 10.9491*** 0.9010
(1.7048) (1.1650)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.6539* 0.5186
(0.2627) (0.2962)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 0.5154 1.9631
(1.0102) (2.0179)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.8405** 1.4171***
(0.3007) (0.3212)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs 0.1440
(2.6037)
Cohort 1 (d) 1.0921*** 0.8310***
(0.0832) (0.0748)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.7485*** 1.1176***
(0.0739) (0.0806)





OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1;
* p <0:05, ** p <0:01, *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007, only persons who report a partner.
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diminishes for first-generation Russians. There is hardly any difference
between spousal age gaps of natives and second-generation individuals,
second-generation Turkish women being an exception.
3.3.6 Number of children
In addition, we find that differences exist in the family structure,
namely with respect to the number of children per woman. These
differences emerge not only between natives and immigrants but also
between different ethnic groups. As documented in Table 3.17, first-
generation Turkish women have, on average, more children than women
from any other country and in particular more children than natives.25
The average number of children for German women is less than two,
whereas for first-generation Turkish women it is more than three. The
number of children per woman in the second generation is, in general,
lower than in the first generation, and also often smaller than for
natives. However, Turkish women have higher birth rates than natives
even in the second generation. For Greek, Italian, and ex-Yugoslav the
average number of children per women in later immigrant generations
is noticeably smaller.
As can be seen from estimation results presented in Table 3.18 differ-
ences in the number of children are statistically significant for most first-
generation immigrant women who consistently have more children
than natives. This is especially true for first-generation Turkish
women, who have on average one more child than German women.
For second-generation Turkish women the effect is not significant.
Table 3.17 Average number of children per woman.







Poland 2.01 No obs
Russia 2.56 No obs
Germany 1.84
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007, only women older 40.
25 The numbers presented refer to women older than 40.
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Negative trends can be observed for second-generation immigrants from
the former Yugoslavia. In general, for Spaniards, Greeks, and the second
generation the number of children does not significantly differ from
that of natives. This indicates that later immigrant generations integrate
not only with respect to marriage behaviour, such as the age gap between
Table 3.18 Number of children.
Ethnic origin Women older than 40
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.3026***
(0.0437)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.2717
(0.2115)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 1.0065***
(0.0697)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.1759
(0.7114)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.2079**
(0.0747)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 1.2079**
(0.3901)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.0912
(0.1198)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.8480
(0.4660)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.5746***
(0.0963)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.5065
(0.2629)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.0874
(0.1820)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.7790
(0.5033)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.1686*
(0.0766)
Poland (second gen.) (d) No obs
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.6729***
(0.0899)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs
Cohort 1 (d) 0.1576***
(0.0189)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.0773
(0.0877)





OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1;
* p <0:05, ** p <0:01, *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007, only women older 40.
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spouses, age at marriage, and marriage probability, but also with regards
to family structure, reflected in the number of children.
3.3.7 Age at first child
Apart from marital behaviour and family composition, birth behaviour
might also give insight into the cultural adaptation and integration
process. Table 3.19 shows the age at the birth of the first child. First-
generation immigrant women seem to be only slightly younger when
they give birth to their first child compared to natives, while second-
generation women seem to be a little older. Again, Turkish women stand
out, with a comparably young age at first child birth: on average 22.74
for the first generation. Interestingly, the age at first child birth is much
higher for second-generation Turkish women (27 years of age). In com-
parison, German women give birth to their first child at the age of 25 on
average. Results from a simple regression support the first impression of
hardly any differences between immigrants and natives. The difference
in age at the birth of the first child almost vanishes for all second-
generation immigrants. It differs significantly from natives only for a
few immigrants groups such as Spaniards (Table 3.20).
3.3.8 Religion
We now turn to religious aspects of immigrant integration. Table 3.21
shows the distribution of religious beliefs within each ethnic group
differentiated by gender and generation. It is apparent from this table
that no religious differences can be observed between men and women
or between first and second-generation immigrants within a single
Table 3.19 Age at first child birth, ethnic origin compared with first and second
generation.







Poland 23.92 No obs
Russia 24.10 No obs
Germany 24.97
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005–2007, only women older
than 40.
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ethnic group. That is, regardless of gender or generation, the majority of
Turkish immigrants who report a religion are Muslims, most Italian,
Spanish, and Polish immigrants are Catholics and the majority of Rus-
sian immigrants are Christian Orthodox. Among Germans, Protestants
are a slight majority, closely followed by Catholics.
Table 3.20 Age at first child birth, ethnic origin for women over 40.
Ethnic origin Women older than 40
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.5174**
(0.1713)
Other (second gen.) (d) 1.5093
(0.8393)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.2487
(0.2712)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 2.6110
(2.6516)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.4985
(0.2938)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 1.5441
(1.8760)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.3218
(0.4666)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.0025
(2.2979)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.4211
(0.3613)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 1.6586
(1.1492)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 1.6142*
(0.7372)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 1.9351
(1.8762)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.4798
(0.2917)
Poland (second gen.) (d) No obs
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.2744
(0.3482)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs
Cohort 1 (d) 1.0951***
(0.0746)
Cohort 3 (d) 1.4746***
(0.3544)





OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1;
* p <0:05, ** p <0:01, *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007, only women older than 40.
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Others (first gen.) 32.75 35.81 9.17 3.28 2.18 16.81
(second gen.) 33.71 41.57 2.25 3.37 0.00 19.10
Turkey (first gen.) 0.47 0.00 2.37 87.20 1.42 8.53
(second gen.) 0.00 1.37 2.74 84.93 1.37 9.59
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) 43.09 4.07 24.39 20.33 0.00 8.13
(second gen.) 36.36 4.55 20.45 20.45 0.00 18.18
Greece (first gen.) 0.00 0.00 92.31 5.13 0.00 2.56
(second gen.) 8.33 12.50 75.00 0.00 0.00 4.17
Italy (first gen.) 83.08 3.08 6.15 0.00 0.00 7.69
(second gen.) 80.70 10.53 8.77 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain (first gen.) 93.33 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(second gen.) 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poland (first gen.) 81.95 8.27 1.50 0.75 0.00 7.52
(second gen.) 50.00 16.67 0.00 5.56 0.00 27.78
Russia (first gen.) 19.23 51.92 17.31 0.00 2.88 8.65
(second gen.) 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00







Others (first gen.) 28.29 34.45 7.84 5.60 1.96 21.85
(second gen.) 38.46 28.57 0.00 4.40 0.00 28.57
Turkey (first gen.) 0.93 0.00 0.93 88.43 1.39 8.33
(second gen.) 0.00 0.00 7.14 81.43 4.29 7.14
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) 29.36 1.83 25.69 32.11 0.00 11.01
(second gen.) 43.75 9.38 18.75 21.88 0.00 6.25
Greece (first gen.) 0.00 0.00 88.64 4.55 0.00 6.82
(second gen.) 4.00 8.00 68.00 4.00 0.00 16.00
Italy (first gen.) 90.24 2.44 2.44 0.00 0.00 4.88
(second gen.) 81.25 8.33 4.17 0.00 0.00 6.25
Spain (first gen.) 89.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.53
(second gen.) 41.67 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33
Poland (first gen.) 75.26 6.19 3.09 0.00 0.00 15.46
(second gen.) 53.85 15.38 0.00 7.69 0.00 23.08
Russia (first gen.) 23.33 51.11 10.00 0.00 2.22 13.33
(second gen.) 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
German 27.46 34.86 0.95 0.1 0.15 36.47
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample. 2005–2007.
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3.3.9 Language proficiency
Proficiency in the language of the host country has been proven to be of
paramount importance for social and economic integration. Using
SOEP’s subjective answers on language skills (both oral and written),
we measure linguistic abilities on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes
‘very good’ language ability and 5 ‘very poor’ skills. In general, reported
written skills are worse than speaking abilities regardless of ethnic group
and immigrant generation. These statistics are presented in Table 3.22.
They are based on the 2005 wave, the most recent year for which
information on language proficiency is available.
Table 3.22 Language proficiency.
Ethnic origin German language Language of home country


















Other 1.77 1.14 1.82 1.15 1.68 2.20 1.80 2.35
Turkey 2.84 1.45 2.39 1.50 1.69 2.10 1.63 2.20
Ex-Yugoslavia 2.13 1.18 2.05 1.27 1.57 2.09 1.56 2.27
Greece 2.40 1.22 2.34 1.33 1.54 1.65 1.36 1.89
Italy 2.29 1.33 2.26 1.32 1.57 2.05 1.53 2.19
Spain 1.75 1.00 2.07 1.10 1.30 2.67 1.52 2.00
Poland 1.68 No obs 1.88 No obs 1.74 No obs 1.75 No obs
Russia 1.89 No obs 2.08 1.00 1.81 No obs 1.78 1.00
Ethnic origin German language Language of home country


















Other 2.01 1.33 2.11 1.23 1.91 2.60 2.11 2.50
Turkey 3.38 1.64 3.04 1.74 2.15 2.47 1.94 2.71
Ex-Yugoslavia 2.86 1.31 2.57 1.39 1.83 2.73 1.77 3.12
Greece 3.05 1.39 2.85 1.41 1.89 2.22 1.66 2.41
Italy 3.23 1.55 3.12 1.62 2.05 2.56 1.90 2.94
Spain 2.75 1.33 3.07 1.20 1.65 2.67 1.83 3.10
Poland 1.91 No obs 2.20 No obs 2.10 No obs 2.19 No obs
Russia 2.21 No obs 2.45 1.00 1.99 No obs 2.05 1.00
Scale from 1 (‘very good’) to 5 (‘none at all’).
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005.
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Second-generation immigrants should have better languages skills
than first-generation immigrants since by definition immigrants who
belong to the second generation were born in Germany and therefore
mostly attended school and further education in Germany. As expected,
their reported language abilities are higher in both the spoken and the
written use of German, regardless of ethnic group. This implies a posi-
tive linguistic integration of second-generation immigrants.
Linguistic comparisons by ethnic groups show that Turks have the
lowest German language proficiency among all ethnic groups. They
seem to be the least integrated with respect to language. A possible
explanation is related to the fact that language proficiency is self-re-
ported, which might impose measurement errors and signal group spe-
cific characteristics. Some immigrant groups might overstate their
abilities while other groups might continuously understate their skills.
This might bias the results. Another explanation for the low language
abilities of Turks might be by group size and enclave effects. Since Turks
represent the largest single ethnic group in Germany, they are more
likely to socialize predominantly within their ethnic community and
do not need to put much effort into learning the German language in
order to manage everyday life situations. Thus, poor language abilities
might indeed signal less integration andmore ethnic segregation among
Turks.
Differencing by gender within each ethnic group indicates that, in
particular, first-generationwomen of Spanish, Polish, and Russian origin
have better German language skills than men from the same origin. In
the other immigrant groups first-generation women report, on average,
worse skills than men. For members of the second generation German
language abilities seem to be mostly better for women regardless of
ethnic group in both spoken and written use of language.
Examining the language of the country of origin we obtain opposite
results. Here it is the first generation that reports better language abil-
ities. This can be explained by a greater attachment of this generation
to their home country, the fact that they were raised using this lan-
guage, or the possibility that even though some of them are only a little
bit literate in German, they still know how to speak their country
of origin’s language since it is much more difficult to learn a foreign
language.26
26 For further research on the impact of language on earnings see, for example, Chiswick
and Miller (1995, 1998); Dustmann and van Soest (2002).
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3.3.10 Political interest
The degree of political interest of a country’s population can be
extremely informative when we look at integration processes.
Table 3.23 illustrates the immigrants’ and Germans’ political interest
in 2005. It is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 refers to ‘very
interested’ and 4 to ‘completely uninterested’. Most immigrants show
less interest in politics than natives. Turks, in particular, show a compa-
rably low interest in politics regardless of immigrant generation,
whereas Poles seem to be most interested in politics. Comparison across
generations shows that the second generation tends to be more politi-
cally interested than the first, indicating again the greater commitment
to Germany of later generations.
Running a simple regression on the degree of political interest
(Table 3.24) confirms the picture given by the descriptive statistics.
Accordingly, the index increases for almost all immigrant groups regard-
less of gender, implying lower political interest for most immigrant
groups compared to natives. But since the increase is stronger for
the first compared to the second generation within each ethnic group
the assumption that second-generation immigrants are more inter-
ested in politics is supported by these results. Indeed, later generations
exhibit greater concern in political and social processes in Germany, and
immigrants born in Germany are thus better politically integrated.
Table 3.23 Political interest, ethnic origin for women andmen, first and second
generation.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 3.00 3.11 2.64 2.59
Turkey 3.51 3.25 2.97 3.03
Ex-Yugoslavia 3.24 3.17 2.91 2.88
Greece 3.47 3.21 3.01 3.13
Italy 3.34 3.23 2.94 2.95
Spain 3.00 2.86 3.03 2.69
Poland 3.09 2.91 2.58 2.61
Russia 3.23 3.63 2.92 2.56
Germany 2.78 2.44
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005. Scale from 1 (‘very
interested’) to 4 (‘not at all interested’)
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Table 3.24 Political interest, ethnic origin for women and men.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.1665*** 0.1574***
(0.0200) (0.0244)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.1477** 0.0143
(0.0482) (0.0493)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.3902*** 0.2395***
(0.0293) (0.0302)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.1691** 0.1645**
(0.0555) (0.0592)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.2439*** 0.2884***
(0.0368) (0.0428)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 0.1038 0.1059
(0.0654) (0.0796)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.4988*** 0.4061***
(0.0623) (0.0655)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.2796** 0.4980***
(0.0867) (0.0946)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.3296*** 0.2803***
(0.0514) (0.0480)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.1791** 0.2597***
(0.0577) (0.0676)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.1210 0.3480***
(0.1030) (0.0953)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.1284 0.2645
(0.1636) (0.1366)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.2323*** 0.0787
(0.0357) (0.0455)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 0.0090 0.0467
(0.1174) (0.1412)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.3487*** 0.3276***
(0.0415) (0.0482)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs 0.1803
(0.2918)
Cohort 1 (d) 0.1771*** 0.1603***
(0.0105) (0.0118)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.2400*** 0.1926***
(0.0095) (0.0108)





OLS Regressions; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1;
* p <0:05. ** p <0:01. *** p <0:001. Scale from 1 (‘very interested’) to 4 (‘not at all interested’).
Source: SOEP (2005).
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3.3.11 Self-identification with Germany
The fact that the second generation is more integrated also becomes
visible from Tables 3.25 and 3.26, which report self-identification with
Germany and with the country of origin. Identification is measured on a
scale from 1 to 5, where 1 refers to ‘complete identification’ with either
Germany or the country of ancestry and 5 refers to ‘no identification’
with the respective country. As depicted in these two tables the second
generation has a clear tendency toward more identification with Ger-
many and less identification with the country of the parents’ origin.
This tendency is noticeable for all immigrant groups. Considering eth-
nic groups separately, one can see that Poles and Russians, especially,
Table 3.25 Identification with Germany.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 2.29 1.90 2.13 2.33
Turkey 3.89 3.25 3.60 2.97
Ex-Yugoslavia 3.29 2.76 3.32 2.67
Greece 3.85 3.04 3.72 2.70
Italy 3.54 2.81 3.59 2.84
Spain 3.38 3.13 3.42 2.54
Poland 2.03 No obs 1.93 No obs
Russia 1.65 No obs 1.60 No obs
Scale from 1 (‘complete identification’) to 5 (‘no identification’).
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 1999.
Table 3.26 Identification with country of origin.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 3.15 3.20 3.36 3.67
Turkey 2.18 2.90 2.26 2.76
Ex-Yugoslavia 2.33 2.59 2.29 3.03
Greece 1.84 2.29 1.82 2.82
Italy 2.02 2.54 1.95 2.47
Spain 1.77 3.13 1.68 2.38
Poland 3.15 No obs 3.22 No obs
Russia 3.16 No obs 3.53 No obs
Scale from 1 (‘complete identification’) to 5 (‘no identification’).
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 1999.
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show a great commitment to Germany, whereas Turks and Greeks still
feel closely bound to their country of origin.27
3.3.12 Risk behaviour
Turning now to more general differences in characteristics between
immigrants and Germans, Table 3.27 shows self-reported information
about risk attitudes. Studies have shown that adaptation to the attitudes
of the majority population closes the immigrant-native gap in risk
proclivity, while stronger commitment to the home country preserves
it (Bonin et al., 2006, 2009). As risk attitudes are behaviourally relevant
and vary by ethnic origin, these findings could help to explain differ-
ences in the socio-economic assimilation of immigrants. The risk-loving
tendencies of people are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 refers
to ‘complete risk aversion’ and 10 to ‘complete risk affinity’. We find
that second-generation immigrants seem to be more risk loving than
their first-generation counterparts. This generational difference is espe-
cially pronounced for Turkish women. The average risk level of first-
generation Turks is 2.57 and thus on the lower level of the scale, whereas
the average value for second-generation Turkish women is 4.15 and
therefore very close to the average value of native women (4.07). In
general, first-generation immigrants seem to be more risk averse than
Table 3.27 Risk attitude, ethnic origin for women and men, first and second
generation.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 3.56 4.81 4.63 5.71
Turkey 2.57 4.15 4.01 5.21
Ex-Yugoslavia 3.03 5.55 4.29 5.50
Greece 2.28 3.92 3.20 4.97
Italy 3.13 4.14 4.32 5.65
Spain 3.57 4.26 4.17 5.17
Poland 3.95 4.31 4.82 6.09
Russia 3.23 5.33 3.94 3.50
Germany 4.07 4.98
Scale from 0 (‘completely risk averse’) to 10 (‘completely risk loving’).
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample, 2005.
27 The greater commitment of Poles and Russiansmight be due to the fact thatmost Polish
and Russian immigrants belong to the group of Aussiedler and hence feel especially close to
Germany.
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Table 3.28 Risk attitude, ethnic origin for women and men.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.5979*** 0.4748***
(0.0658) (0.0741)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.4696** 0.1367
(0.1558) (0.1454)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 1.2518*** 0.7447***
(0.0936) (0.0893)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.3704* 0.2663
(0.1816) (0.1849)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.7370*** 0.5969***
(0.1177) (0.1267)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 0.8736*** 0.2534
(0.2124) (0.2417)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 1.2250*** 1.2120***
(0.1955) (0.1946)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.3524 0.3650
(0.2730) (0.2847)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.5345** 0.2017
(0.1635) (0.1425)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.1927 0.1156
(0.1915) (0.2072)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.3151 0.5418
(0.3204) (0.2800)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.1074 0.4959
(0.1154) (0.4052)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.3753** 0.1191
(0.1154) (0.1367)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 1.0322‘** 0.8118
(0.3885) (0.4440)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.8887*** 1.0461***
(0.1371) (0.1498)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs 2.2127*
(0.9911)
Cohort 1 (d) 0.8838*** 0.8800***
(0.0340) (0.0355)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.4113*** 0.5992***
(0.0315) (0.0334)





OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1;
* p <0:05. ** p <0:01. *** p <0:001. Scale from 0 (‘completely risk averse’) to 10 (‘completely risk loving’).
Source: SOEP (2005).
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Germans, whereas second-generation immigrants tend to be as risk
loving as natives or even more risk taking.
These raw statistics are supported by the estimation results presented in
Table 3.28. The risk index is smaller for most first-generation women—
except Spaniards—compared to natives, indicating more risk aversion.
Among second-generation women only Turkish, Polish, and ex-Yugoslav
women differ from natives. For men the picture is slightly different.
Second-generation men seem not to differ at all from natives, while
first-generation Turks, Greeks, ex-Yugoslav, and Russians tend to be
more risk averse than German men. Men and women who belong to
the first-generation Turks, Greeks, and Russians show especially high
levels of risk aversion compared to natives. These results may clash with
what was previously believed or with what intuition would predict, but
are in line with previous studies. Bonin et al. (2009) confirm that first-
generation immigrants have lower risk attitudes than natives, which only
equalize in the second generation. One explanation could be related to
the first-generation’s insecurities in their social and economic situation in
Germany. Yet, first-generation immigrantsmay have beenmorewilling to
take risks than their co-ethnics who never left their home county, but this
risk level could subside once they arrived in the host country.
3.3.13 Overall life satisfaction
With respect to overall life satisfaction Table 3.29 shows that there is not
much difference between immigrants and natives. Life satisfaction is
also measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 denotes ‘complete
dissatisfaction’ and 10 ‘complete satisfaction’. Second-generation
Table 3.29 Overall life satisfaction, ethnic origin for women and men, first and
second generation.
Ethnic origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
Other 7.07 7.20 7.03 7.00
Turkey 6.32 7.04 6.28 6.86
Ex-Yugoslavia 6.56 7.17 6.59 6.94
Greece 6.50 7.13 6.76 7.10
Italy 6.47 7.28 6.70 7.37
Spain 6.48 6.95 6.90 7.40
Poland 6.86 7.45 6.85 7.54
Russia 7.03 7.50 7.09 7.78
Germany 6.95 6.95
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample (2005–2007). Scale from
0 (‘completely dissatisfied’) to 10 (‘completely satisfied’).
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Table 3.30 Overall life satisfaction, ethnic origin for women and men.
Ethnic origin Women Men
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.1333** 0.1504**
(0.0502) (0.0559)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.0116 0.0549
(0.1208) (0.1126)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.3624*** 0.4075***
(0.0735) (0.0690)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.2061 0.2548
(0.1393) (0.1355)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.1542 0.1946*
(0.0923) (0.0979)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 0.0545 0.0343
(0.1642) (0.1823)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.1553 0.1371
(0.1569) (0.1495)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.0574 0.1069
(0.2191) (0.2166)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.1519 0.0545
(0.1293) (0.1100)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.3305* 0.2553
(0.1442) (0.1548)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.2142 0.3408
(0.2584) (0.2181)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.1430 0.3804
(0.4104) (0.3128)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.0644 0.0159
(0.0894) (0.1044)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 0.1510 0.3197
(0.2945) (0.3233)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.1478 0.3188**
(0.1042) (0.1106)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs 0.3994
(0.6680)
Cohort 1 (d) 0.0906*** 0.2384***
(0.0264) (0.0270)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.2873*** 0.3204***
(0.0239) (0.0247)





OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from
0 to 1; * p <0:05. ** p <0:01. *** p <0:001 Scale from 0 (‘completely dissatisfied’) to 10 (‘completely
satisfied’).
Source: SOEP, 2005–2007.
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immigrants score, on average, greater values on that index (at or even
above 7). Evidently, they tend to be more satisfied in life than their
parents who were foreign-born. The life satisfaction values of natives
lie between the values of first and second-generation immigrants.
Estimation outputs in Table 3.30 imply hardly any significant devia-
tion between immigrants and natives. Only for some groups, such as
first-generation Turks and first-generation ex-Yugoslav men, does the
index decrease, indicating a lower life satisfaction for these immigrants
than for Germans. The deviation from natives is especially big for first-
generation Turks of either gender. In contrast, second-generation Italian
women and first-generation Russians seem to be more satisfied than
natives. Overall, we find that immigrants integrate perfectly in terms
of self-reported life satisfaction.
3.3.14 Female labour force participation
Finally, in Table 3.31 we consider one aspect of economic integration,
namely female labour force participation by ethnic group and genera-
tion. The variable of interest equals 1 if the woman is working full or
part-time and 0 if she is unemployed or irregularly working. Schooling
and no information are coded as missing. The underlying sample is
Table 3.31 Female labour force participation, ethnic origin compared with
unemployment, employment, and schooling.






Other First gen. 45.00 39.21 15.79
Second gen. 34.43 40.57 25.00
Turkey First gen. 65.00 21.11 13.89
Second gen. 42.73 30.40 26.87
Ex-Yugoslavia First gen. 44.52 37.53 17.95
Second gen. 37.86 47.14 15.00
Greece First gen. 31.45 54.03 14.52
Second gen. 37.97 50.63 11.39
Italy First gen. 37.38 45.33 17.29
Second gen. 34.92 43.92 21.16
Spain First gen. 46.94 32.65 20.41
Second gen. 35.71 21.43 42.86
Poland First gen. 31.40 50.78 17.82
Second gen. 39.58 35.42 25.00
Russia First gen. 38.64 43.05 18.31
Second gen. 28.57 0.00 71.43
Germany 37.23 49.38 13.39
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), unweighted sample (2005–2007), women aged 20–65.
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restricted to women older than 20 and younger than 65. The share of
women working full or part-time differs noticeably by immigrant group
and generation. Only 21.11 per cent of first-generation Turkish women
work full or part-time, whereas in later generations the share is about 10
percentage points higher, namely 30.40 per cent. Similar differences can
be observed for ex-Yugoslav women. Here the difference between first
Table 3.32 Female labour force participation.
Ethnic origin Women
Other (first gen.) (d) 0.0922***
(0.0160)
Other (second gen.) (d) 0.0025
(0.0384)
Turkey (first gen.) (d) 0.2088***
(0.0229)
Turkey (second gen.) (d) 0.1194**
(0.0430)
Ex-Yugoslavia (first gen.) (d) 0.0056
(0.0282)
Ex-Yugoslavia (second gen.) (d) 0.0561
(0.0479)
Greece (first gen.) (d) 0.2223***
(0.0397)
Greece (second gen.) (d) 0.0024
(0.0650)
Italy (first gen.) (d) 0.0847*
(0.0372)
Italy (second gen.) (d) 0.0367
(0.0421)
Spain (first gen.) (d) 0.0517
(0.0851)
Spain (second gen.) (d) 0.0977
(0.1318)
Poland (first gen.) (d) 0.0757**
(0.0265)
Poland (second gen.) (d) 0.1090
(0.0894)
Russia (first gen.) (d) 0.0126
(0.0335)
Russia (second gen.) (d) No obs
Cohort 1 (d) 0.5108***
(0.0105)
Cohort 3 (d) 0.0490***
(0.0070)
Years of schooling 0.0421***
(0.0014)
N 24,244
Logit regression; marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy
variable from 0 to 1; * p <0:05. ** p <0:01. *** p <0:001.
Source: SOEP (2005–2007), women aged 20–65.
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and second generation also amounts to about 10 percentage points—
even though on a higher level it is 37.53 and 47.14 per cent, respec-
tively. Clearly, labour market participation is higher for second-genera-
tion immigrants from these groups. However, it is still much lower than
the share of labour force participation of native women (about 50 per
cent). The exception is Greek women, who have higher labour market
participation than German women in both generations. Interestingly,
first-generation Greek women participate more often in the labour mar-
ket than later generations. Similarly, first-generation Italian women
show very high participation rates of over 45 per cent.
Estimation results presented in Table 3.32 corroborate these raw sta-
tistics. Accordingly, first-generation Italian, Greek, and Polish women
are more likely to work compared to native women. In contrast, Turkish
women are less likely to work compared to Germans, regardless of
generation. This indicates lower economic integration by some immi-
grant groups, but also very good labour market integration by others. In
general, there are hardly any differences between second-generation
immigrants and natives with respect to full or part-time work for those
who are not enrolled in school and for whom information about their
labour market status is available.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter studies the cultural integration of immigrants in Germany.
To gauge integration, we use natives as the ‘gold standard’ and refer to
them every time we look at the cultural and general socio-economic and
political progress of immigrants. We cover various social and economic
aspects of the life of immigrants in Germany using data from the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the period 2005–2007. Specifi-
cally, we study marital behaviour, family structure, soft skills such as risk
attitudes and overall life satisfaction, German language proficiency, and
self-identification, as well as economic characteristics such as female
labour force participation. In order to capture trends and developments
over time we analyse and study these indicators of socio-cultural and
economic aspects for first and second-immigrant generations. Addition-
ally, emphasis is put on differences between certain immigrant groups,
in particular immigrants who originate from one of the former guest
worker countries as well as immigrants from Poland and Russia, who
represent more recent influences in immigrant inflows to Germany. We
examine and present both raw statistics and estimation results on the
above-mentioned indicators.
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Considering marriage patterns is crucial in the integration process of
immigrants since marriage and partner choice express individual com-
mitment and attachment to the members of a host society at a very
intimate level.28 Convergence between immigrants and natives with
respect to family behaviour signals to what extent immigrants adapt to
German specific norms and embrace German habits.
Empirical results imply trends towards more remaining single among
native Germans. This trend seems to be adopted by the second genera-
tion. Similar findings are observed regarding age at first marriage and age
and educational gap between spouses. Accordingly, first-generation im-
migrants tend to get married more often and at younger ages than
natives and the second generation. Clearly, they seem to cling to differ-
ent role allocations and traditions from Germans and their offspring
generation.29 Age gaps and educational differences between partners are
greater for older generations and mostly not different from natives for
younger cohorts. Intermarriage rates depict an intimate link between
immigrants and the native population. This can be seen as a special
integration measure possibly even fostering economic integration. In
general, the bigger the single ethnic group the less likely their members
are to intermarry. This holds especially for Turks and members of the
native population who show the lowest rate of intermarriage among all
ethnic groups.
Furthermore, fertility rates, age at first child, and female labour force
participation differ significantly between natives and first-generation
immigrants, indicating different conceptions of gender roles and divi-
sion of labour within the family between those groups. Differences
vanish or, at least, diminish for later immigrant generations, implying
greater adaption to German norms and perceptions for immigrants born
in Germany. Comparing language and identification indexes among
different ethnic groups, we observe noticeable discrepancies between
generations. Accordingly, second-generation immigrants report higher
levels of language proficiency than members of their parental genera-
tion, indicating better linguistic integration. Additionally, self-reported
identification with Germany is stronger for immigrants born in Ger-
many, expressing greater commitment to Germany and its society. All
these findings fit the assumption that second-generation immigrants
can enjoy a successful integration.
28 For further research on the effect of marriage on economic success see, for example,
Korenmann and Neumark (1991); Angrist (2002).
29 See, for example, Baker and Benjamin (1997) for differences in the human capital
accumulation of immigrants.
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
110
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Finally, the underlying data provide information about soft character-
istics, such as risk aversion, overall life satisfaction, and political interest,
which also opens unique opportunities to compare immigrants and
natives in the field of behavioural economics. Accordingly, immigrants
and natives do not differ much with respect to life satisfaction. They do
differ, though, regarding risk attitudes. Immigrants seem to be slightly
less risk loving than natives. However, differences mainly disappear for
later immigrant cohorts, indicating that, also from that perspective,
younger immigrants converge towards native attitudes. Regarding polit-
ical involvement, immigrants are in general less politically concerned
than natives, but again the second-generation’s political interest is more
in line with that of natives, expressing better integration also in this
dimension.
As a final remark, and referring to Turks as one immigrant group with
pronounced differences, this analysis shows that comparison by gener-
ation is crucial when making statements about the integration process
of ethnic groups in Germany. Turks differ in various ways from natives
and also from other immigrant groups. They are more likely to be
married in general, more often marry at young ages and often have
more children than the average German woman. Their language abil-
ities are worse compared to other immigrants, they report a lower iden-
tification with Germany and more commitment to their home country,
and their religious beliefs are diverse from that of natives and co-im-
migrants. They report the lowest level of political interest and lower
levels of life satisfaction than other immigrant groups. Finally, their
labour force participation rates are comparably low.
All these findings indicate that Turks are the least integrated immi-
grant group with respect to the integration indicators considered in this
study. But when studying Turkish immigrants by generation, it becomes
clear that the second generation shows a tendency toward parity with
native Germans. Second-generation Turks show higher intermarriage
rates, similar behaviour to natives in terms of age at first marriage, age
at first child, and number of children. They report better German lan-
guage proficiency both regarding speaking and writing skills as well as
greater identification with Germany and simultaneously less commit-
ment to the country of ancestry. Hence, even if this group of immigrants
often seems to be poorly integrated, trends over time need to be hon-
oured and encouraged.
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Figure 3.2 Individual gap in education between spouses—women.
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Figure 3.4 Marriage probability—women.
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Figure 3.6 Intermarriage probability—women.
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Figure 3.8 Probability of being first married before 25—women.
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Figure 3.10 Age gap between spouses—women.
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Figure 3.12 Age at first child birth.
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Figure 3.14 Political interest—women.
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Figure 3.16 Risk attitude—women.
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Figure 3.18 Overall life satisfaction—women.
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4
Cultural Integration in Italy
Alberto Bisin and Eleonora Patacchini
4.1 Introduction
While immigration is a recent issue for Italy, flows have been steadily
increasing over time, with a significant increase during the last ten years.
This has induced general concerns regarding, for example, increased
ethnic and religious diversity. The integration pattern of immigrants is
in fact often perceived by natives to be excessively slow and the persis-
tence of ethnic identities is viewed as a threat. Such a perception is
evident in the recent debate in the press and in the results of national
elections, which have seen the success of anti-immigration platforms.
To ground this debate, it is important to have a better understanding
of the economic and cultural integration patterns for different immi-
grant groups in Italy. The study of integration patterns in Italy, however,
is severely limited by the availability of data. The existing studies have
exploited dedicated data, for example those collected by Fondazione
ISMU (Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicitá) and those collected by
Caritas. Using ISMU data, Blangiardo and Baio (2010), for instance,
have been able to construct an index of integration for specific groups
of immigrants, with respect, for example, to education and religion; see
also Golini et al. (2004). Finally, a government committee (Commis-
sione per le politiche di integrazione degli immigrati) has produced two
descriptive studies, the first and second reports ‘Sull’integrazione degli
immigrati in Italia’ by Zincone (2001, 2005). They contain a thorough
review of the various immigration policies in the last ten years in Italy
and a discussion of their effects on legalization practices and procedures.
In this chapter we exploit available information from the revision of
the Italian Labour Force Survey (ILFS) questionnaire in 2005. This data
125
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
allows us to provide a first evaluation of the integration of immigrants in
Italy. Specifically, we study immigrants by wave of immigration, gender,
and cohort, in terms of education, employment, and female participa-
tion rates, and to a lesser extent in terms of marriage, divorce, inter-
ethnic marriage, and completed fertility rates. Appropriate data onmore
detailed indicators of cultural integration of immigrants, such as attach-
ment to ethnic and religious customs and traditions, political prefer-
ences, and attitudes towards natives are yet to be collected in Italy.
Our empirical analysis does not show evidence of slow integration
patterns for immigrants into Italy, though inter-marriage rates between
immigrants and natives are very low. For instance, while Asian and
Africans immigrants have little education on average at immigration,
the level of education increases substantially in their second genera-
tions, and particularly so for the younger cohort of African women.
Similarly, second-generation immigrants do not seem to have female
participation rates significantly different from Italians and they do not
seem to show more traditional attitudes towards family formation nor
appreciably higher fertility rates. First-generation immigrants show a
probability to be employed which is only slightly lower than natives,
while second-generation immigrants do not show a significantly differ-
ent probability of finding a job compared to natives. We tentatively
interpret these results as evidence that economic and cultural integra-
tion of immigrants does not seem to represent a particular issue in Italy.
Our results, however, need to be taken with more than some caution.
First of all, as will be discussed below, an important peculiarity of
the Italian immigration experience is the pervasive presence of illegal
immigrants. The immigrants that we observe, the legal immigrants,
are possibly the more integrated ones. In particular, legal immigrants
are those who have ‘emerged’ from statistical obscurity because they are
working. A recent survey of both legal and illegal immigrants, which
was carried out between October and November 2009 in eight cities in
Northern Italy documents the presence of a sizeable and non-random
portion of illegal immigrants (see Boeri et al., 2011).
Second, immigration being a relatively new phenomenon for Italy,
most of our second-generation immigrant sample (72 per cent) are
children (below 15 years old). An analysis of marriage and divorce
rates, as well as about trends of inter-ethnic marriages can thus only be
performed for first-generation immigrants. Finally, the ILFS does not
directly report the country of origin of the respondent’s partner
(nor his or her citizenship) and the number of children is confidential
(the answer is not reported in ILFS data files). We therefore impute
this information from the household roster, merging data for the
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respondent and other family members. As a consequence, we cannot
capture information on children or partners that live outside the
household.
Our results are therefore far from being conclusive about patterns of
integration of the immigrants in Italy. We interpret them as preliminary
evidence, conditionally on data availability.
This study is organized as follows. We will first highlight some pecu-
liar aspects of the immigration phenomenon in Italy, in Section 4.2. In
Section 4.3 we introduce our data and describe our sample. The empiri-
cal model and the target outcome variables are detailed in Section 4.4,
while in Section 4.5 we collect our main descriptive evidence and esti-
mation results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Italian immigration in the European context
Immigration began relatively late in Italy, after the oil crisis of
1973–1984, when England, Germany, and especially the neighbouring
France closed their frontiers to immigration. Since then, the flows have
been steadily increasing over time, with amassive increase of the foreign
population during the last ten years; see Calavita (2006) for more details
on demographic trends. Notwithstanding the recent growth, the stock
of immigrants remains relatively limited in Italy compared to the other
European countries. As reported by the Italian Office of National Statis-
tics (ISTAT), in 2007 immigrants scarcely reached 5 per cent of the
resident population in Italy, compared to 8.8 per cent for Germany,
6.2 per cent for Spain, and 5.2 per cent for Great Britain. In France
immigrants accounted for 5.9 per cent of the population in the 1999
Census. Such a national average in Italy hides, however, marked geo-
graphical differences. While in the centre-south the fraction of immi-
grants in the population is 1.6 per cent, in the north it reaches 6.8 per
cent, making the north of Italy more similar to the European average
(for further details see ISTAT, 2007).
The fraction of immigrants in the population reported by ISTAT,
however, refers necessarily to registered immigrants, a subset of all the
immigrants living in the territory, because of the pervasiveness of illegal
immigration in Italy, which in turn is due to the difficulty of controlling
the country’s extensive borders and to its sizable informal economy.
Immigrants seem to be particularly sought after in the markets for
private care and domestic services as well as in the small family enter-
prises where unregistered labour can be easily employed. The pro-
nounced territorial disparities in registered immigration shares might
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be due to the uneven distribution of the share of illegal immigrants by
region, as the informal (underground) economy is particularly wide-
spread in the south of Italy. Finally, the Italian immigration laws have
exacerbated rather than contained illegal immigration. They have been
mainly aimed at regularizing the status of those already illegally residing
in Italy, rather than at regulating new legal entries. As a consequence,
illegal immigration represents possibly the main viable form of immi-
gration into Italy.
Figure 4.1 shows the pattern of Italian immigration since 1993, when
the immigration flows started to be significant. The large increase after
2003 is only apparent, and it is due to a specific legislation allowing
immigrants to regularize their status in 2002 (L.189/2002 and L.222/
2002). More than 650,000 immigrants did so. Between 1995 and 2005,
the increase in the immigrant population in Italy was about 300 per
cent, doubling between 2001 and 2005. In 2007 the registered immi-
grants in Italy were 2,938,922 (ISTAT, 2007).
4.3 Description of data
We pooled data from the Italian Labour Force Survey (ILFS) for the
years 2005–2007. Since 2005, such a survey contains information on
each surveyed respondent’s country of birth and citizenship. However,









































Figure 4.1 Immigration flows 1993–2007.
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marrying an Italian citizen or after ten years of legal residence in Italy.
We thus do not use citizenship to identify first and second-generation
immigrants as well as natives. More specifically, we define first-
generation immigrants on the basis of the country of birth, that is, as
individuals born outside Italy. Consistently, we define second-genera-
tion immigrants using the country of birth of the parents, that is, as
individuals with at least one parent born abroad. The native reference
group consists of Italian citizens born in Italy whose parents were born
in Italy. The ILFS contains information on country of birth of immi-
grants at a very detailed level, distinguishing between 162 countries. We
adopt a categorization into six regions: Northern Europe, Southern and
Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, North and Central America, and South
America. We do not include immigrants from Oceania due to small
sample size, as well as immigrants from an unknown country of origin.
Second-generation immigrants are assigned to a given area if at least one
parent is from that specific area.
Table 4.1 reports the sample proportions for native Italians and for
immigrants by generation and country of origin (in parentheses is the
share of females in each group).
Around 94 per cent of our sample consists of natives, slightly more
than 4 per cent are first-generation immigrants, and less than 2 per cent
are second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants mainly
come from Southern and Eastern Europe (33 per cent), Northern Europe
(27 per cent), and Africa (17.50 per cent), this last group is predomi-
nantly from Maghreb. Female are slightly more numerous among
first-generation immigrants, with the only exception of immigrants
from Africa. As we noted, the low percentage of second-generation
immigrants is due to the fact that immigration is a relatively new
Table 4.1 Immigrants by country of origin, generation, and gender.
Sample proportions in %
Natives 94.03 (52.01)
Immigrants 5.97 (53.54)
First gen. Second gen.
of which 4.19 (55.79) 1.78 (48.32)
Northern Europe 26.99 (58.89) 45.75 (48.80)
Southern and Eastern Europe 32.66 (58.72) 16.48 (48.08)
North and Central America 3.84 (67.06) 5.51 (47.45)
South America 9.84 (59.47) 10.07 (50.35)
Asia 9.26 (49.24) 6.63 (45.54)
Africa 17.41 (44.45) 16.54 (47.32)
We report in parentheses the share of females in each group.
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phenomenon for Italy. In fact, looking at Table 4.2, which reports
the distribution of immigrants by age, it appears that most of our
second-generation sample (roughly 72 per cent) are children below
15 years of age.
The inspection of our sample of immigrants by years since arrival in
Italy (Table 4.3) reveals that most of them have stayed in Italy for either
more than 11 years (53.21 per cent) or less than four years (22.21 per
cent). Given the pervasive illegal nature of the Italian immigration, one
possibility is that the question of the ILFS questionnaire on years of
residence in Italy is perceived as asking the years of ‘legal’ permanence
in Italy rather than the years of effective stay on the Italian territory.
Under such hypothesis, our data are by and large capturing the share of
the regularized immigration after the new laws in 2002 and the older
wave of immigration after the oil crisis, in the 1990s. This is consistent
with the fact that the largest share of first-generation immigrants
that report a permanence in Italy of more than 11 years comes from
Northern Europe (roughly 33 per cent).
Table 4.2 Immigrants by age and generation.
Sample proportions in %









Table 4.3 Immigrants by years since arrival and country of origin.
Sample proportions in %
Years





Southern and Eastern Europe 20.33
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4.4 Empirical set-up
The differences of immigrants with respect to natives along various
economic and cultural characteristics are estimated using a regression
analysis on two model specifications. For each dependent variable
representing a relevant economic or cultural characteristic, the first
specification estimates differences with respect to natives for first and
second-generation immigrants from different regions of origin. The
second specification compares differences with respect to natives for
two age cohorts (born before 1970 and after) for each immigrant gener-
ation and region of origin. Both specifications include as controls, when
relevant, the level of education, and a quadratic function of age and
time dummies. Each model is estimated separately for males and fe-
males, thus giving an evaluation of the immigrant to native gender
gap for each of the economic and cultural indicators considered.
The economic and cultural indicators considered in the empirical
analysis (dependent variables) are defined as follows:
 Education rates. The ILFS does not report at which age respondents
left full-time education, but the level of qualification achieved. We
then select respondents older than 19 and define a dummy variable,
taking value 1 if the respondent has at least an high school diploma
(i.e. a five-year secondary school degree) and 0 otherwise.
 Employment rates. We select respondents between 16 and 64 years
of age and define a dummy variable taking value 1 if the respondent
is employed and 0 otherwise.
 Female participation rates. We select female respondents between
16 and 64 years of age and define a dummy variable, taking value
1 if the female is employed or unemployed (i.e. searching a job) and
0 otherwise.
 Marriage rates. We select respondents older than 25 and define a
dummy variable taking value 1 if the respondent is or has been
married and 0 otherwise.
 Divorce rates. We keep the selection of respondents older than 25
that are or have been married and define a dummy variable taking
value 1 if the respondent is no longer married (i.e. divorced) and
0 otherwise.
 Inter-ethnic marriage rates. The ILFS does not directly ask the re-
spondents about the country of origin (nor the citizenship) of his or
her partner. We obtain this information from the household roster,
merging the information on the respondent and of the individual
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registered as wife/husband or partner of the respondent. Maintain-
ing the selection of respondents older than 25 that are or have been
married, we define a dummy variable taking value 1 if the respon-
dent is or has been married to someone from the same country of
origin and 0 otherwise.
 Completed fertility rates. The direct question on the number of
children is confidential and the answer is not reported in ILFS
data files. We once again obtain the information from the house-
hold roster, counting for each family the number of individuals
registered as children. We then assign those children to the female
which is registered as wife or partner in the same household roster.
We consider only females older than 40 years. We exclude children
from previous relationships so that we are sure to assign children to
the correct mother, but we do not clearly capture children that live
outside the household. Our results on completed fertility rates are
thus only indicative and need to be taken with caution. Measure-
ment errors can be large.
Table 4.4 shows the various rates for our sample of natives, first and
second-generation immigrants. Such rates are further disaggregated (by
gender and immigrant country of origin) and analysed in more detail in
the following section.
4.5 Results
We summarize here the main results of our empirical analysis.
4.5.1 Education rates
Table 4.5 reports the level of education of natives, and of first and
second-generation immigrants, by gender and region of origin. It reveals
Table 4.4 Summary data description (%).
Natives First gen. Second gen.
Education rates 34.89 44.42 70.86
Employment rates 93.43 91.00 85.74
Female participation rates 48.22 55.31 33.16
Marriage rates 81.33 77.76 5.45
Divorce rates 1.78 3.64 —
Inter-ethnic marriage rates 19.76 61.88 —
Completed fertility rates 0.73 0.65 —
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a rather high education level of first-generation immigrants and a
remarkably higher education level of second-generation immigrants.
As far as natives are concerned, about 37 per cent of men and 33 per
cent of women have at least completed high school education. Looking
at first-generation immigrants, three groups (Northern Europe, North
and Central America, South America) show a higher degree of education
compared to their native counterparts. Only immigrants from Asia and
Africa seem to be significantly less educated than Italians. This evidence
is true for both males and females. Immigrant women have on average a
higher degree of education than immigrant men. They also appear to be
more educated than their native counterparts, with the proportion with
a high school diploma of roughly 60 and 55 per cent for those coming
from North and Central America and South America, respectively. Also,
the number with high school education is above 50 per cent for females
from Southern and Eastern Europe. Second-generation immigrants are
not only on average more educated than first-generation immigrants,
but they are also more educated than natives, regardless of the region of
origin. The difference in education between first and second generations
is particularly marked for immigrants from Asia and Africa, that is, for
immigrants with relatively low first-generation levels of education. For
both males and females, the education rate of Asian immigrants in Italy
roughly doubles between first and second generation and it more than
doubles for African immigrants.
This descriptive evidence, however, is partly due to age differences
between groups, as is revealed by our regression estimation results
contained in Table 4.6. This table reports the estimation results of a
probit regression analysis where the dependent variable is the probability
of having a high school diploma, using the two model specifications
Table 4.5 Education—descriptive statistics.





First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
of which 40.55 64.05 47.32 79.57
Northern Europe 46.82 63.25 48.81 78.15
Southern and Eastern Europe 40.32 66.03 51.25 78.21
North and Central America 61.03 81.58 59.66 75.00
South America 51.99 60.31 54.88 82.06
Asia 31.60 64.71 37.44 79.03
Africa 31.16 62.33 30.35 83.85
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described in Section 4.4. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 collect the evidence for males
and females separately. We show the marginal effects for each country of
origin separately by males and females and generation of immigrants,
with respect to their native counterparts, once the influence of (a qua-
dratic function of) age and time effects is controlled for. Looking at
Table 4.6, regarding first-generation immigrants, we find that not only
those coming from Asia and Africa have a lower probability of being
educated than natives, but also those coming from Southern and Eastern
Europe. This latter result, however, is due to an age-cohort effect, which
reveals that it is the younger first generation of immigrants for this area
which has a substantially lower level of education than Italians. This
tendency is true for all groups, with the exception of the younger first-
generation immigrants from North America for whom the difference
with Italians is not statistically significant. Interestingly, we also find a
similar tendency for second-generation immigrants. Indeed, we find that
it is the older second-generation immigrants that tend to have a much
higher probability of having a high level of education than Italians.
However, this is true for immigrants coming from Northern Europe,
America, and Asia, whereas for those coming from Africa and Southern
and Eastern Europe it is the younger second-generation cohort of immi-
grants that seems to be more educated than Italians.














Northern Europe 0.0435*** 0.0669*** 0.0815*** 0.1150*** 0.0496*** 0.0493***
(0.0036) (0.0106) (0.0044) (0.0287) (0.0061) (0.0113)
Southern and 0.0098*** 0.1150*** 0.0951*** 0.0566 0.1416*** 0.1217***
Eastern Europe (0.0033) (0.0188) (0.0046) (0.0412) (0.0039) (0.0211)
North and 0.1474*** 0.2227*** 0.2068*** 0.2670*** 0.0255 0.1952***
Central America (0.0105) (0.0400) (0.0127) (0.0738) (0.0168) (0.0472)
South America 0.0777*** 0.0490** 0.1315*** 0.2325*** 0.0430*** 0.0270
(0.0065) (0.0209) (0.0079) (0.0855) (0.0103) (0.0212)
Asia 0.1286*** 0.0684 0.0416*** 0.5308*** 0.2350*** 0.0146
(0.0049) (0.0423) (0.0074) (0.0987) (0.0049) (0.0418)
Africa 0.1285*** 0.1045*** 0.0589*** 0.0237 0.2413*** 0.1233***
(0.0035) (0.0189) (0.0049) (0.0415) (0.0038) (0.0212)
Observations 1,433,892 Observations 1,433,892
Pseudo-R2 0.136 Pseudo-R2 0.138
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: quadratic in age, time dummies.
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The results by gender (Tables 4.7 and 4.8) reveal notable peculiarities.
In particular, we find that, on average, first-generation women from
Southern and Eastern Europe have an higher level of education than
their Italian counterparts, whereas men from these regions exhibit a
lower level of education, and this is due to the much lower level of
education of younger first-generation men. We also find that the higher
probability of second-generation immigrants from South America being
highly educated with respect of natives depends entirely on women.
While second-generation South American men do not show any signifi-
cant difference with respect to Italians, second-generation women are
much more educated, especially those from the first (older) cohort.
Taking the results as a whole, we can distinguish the first-generation
immigrant from North and Central America as a particularly highly
skilled immigrant group, followed by immigrants from Northern Europe;
whereas Asian and Africans are the least educated, although their edu-
cation increases substantially in their second generations and in partic-
ular for the younger cohort of African women (with 24 per cent higher
probability of being more educated than Italians).
Table 4.7 Immigrants’ education gap with respect to natives. Probit estimation
results—males.













Northern Europe 0.0169*** 0.0449*** 0.0482*** 0.0379 0.0496*** 0.0387***
(0.0057) (0.0138) (0.0070) (0.0365) (0.0093) (0.0148)
Southern and 0.0670*** 0.1071*** 0.0331*** 0.0617 0.1877*** 0.1152***
Eastern Europe (0.0051) (0.0240) (0.0073) (0.0495) (0.0059) (0.0274)
North and 0.1482*** 0.2937*** 0.2202*** 0.1540 0.0245 0.3237***
Central America (0.0188) (0.0525) (0.0233) (0.1225) (0.0290) (0.0589)
South America 0.0584***0.0025 0.1181*** 0.0236 0.0644***0.0084
(0.0105) (0.0265) (0.0129) (0.1139) (0.0163) (0.0270)
Asia 0.1451*** 0.0540 0.0684*** 0.3134 0.2494*** 0.0303
(0.0071) (0.0544) (0.0104) (0.2077) (0.0079) (0.0551)
Africa 0.1222*** 0.0468** 0.0701*** 0.0648 0.2451*** 0.0655**
(0.0051) (0.0238) (0.0065) (0.0512) (0.0066) (0.0267)
Observations 675,451 Observations 675,451
Pseudo-R2 0.0870 Pseudo-R2 0.0883
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: quadratic in age, time dummies.
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4.5.2 Employment rates
Table 4.9 reports the employment rates of natives, and first and second-
generation immigrants, by gender and region of origin. There are two
notable facts here. First, first-generation immigrants show employment
rates quite similar to Italians. Immigrant men from Southern and
Eastern Europe and from Asia have higher employment rates than
their native counterparts. Second, second-generation immigrants do
not seem to enjoy higher rates of employment than first-generation
immigrants.
The results of our regression analysis, controlling for education, (a
quadratic of) age and time dummies, are contained in Table 4.10. In
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 we report the evidence disaggregated by gender.
Marginal effects for each region of origin are reported. First-generation
immigrants show a probability of being employed which is only slightly
lower than natives. First-generation Asians have even an higher proba-
bility of being employed than Italians, and this is due to the perfor-
mance of the younger cohort, with roughly a two per cent higher
probability for females and three per cent for males. Such evidence is
in line with our descriptive statistics (Table 4.9). Second-generation im-
migrants do not seem to have a significantly different probability of















Northern Europe 0.0651*** 0.1158*** 0.1106*** 0.2345*** 0.0580*** 0.0822***
(0.0048) (0.0174) (0.0057) (0.0457) (0.0077) (0.0183)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0239*** 0.1414*** 0.1409*** 0.0496 0.1253*** 0.1464***
(0.0043) (0.0309) (0.0060) (0.0752) (0.0049) (0.0339)
North and
Central America
0.1434*** 0.1489*** 0.2072*** 0.3397*** 0.0027 0.0327
(0.0126) (0.0575) (0.0153) (0.0919) (0.0197) (0.0634)
South America 0.0882*** 0.1486*** 0.1447*** 0.5042*** 0.0450*** 0.0997***
(0.0083) (0.0364) (0.0100) (0.0931) (0.0128) (0.0366)
Asia 0.1136*** 0.1137 0.0120  0.2241*** 0.0117
(0.0067) (0.0705) (0.0106)  (0.0060) (0.0667)
Africa 0.1379*** 0.2170*** 0.0402*** 0.0560 0.2381*** 0.2408***
(0.0048) (0.0328) (0.0078) (0.0731) (0.0041) (0.0370)
Observations 758,441 Observations 758,434
Pseudo-R2 0.190 Pseudo-R2 0.192
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Controls: quadratic in age, time dummies.
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being employed compared to natives. A slightly higher probability ap-
pears only for second-generation immigrants from Northern Europe,
and such result is entirely due to the younger second-generation cohort
of women which has a 2 per cent higher probability than their native
counterparts of being employed. The distinction by gender shows






First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
of which 94.12 86.53 87.15 84.51
Northern Europe 93.37 86.82 88.59 86.79
Southern and Eastern Europe 95.14 89.08 86.84 87.39
North and Central America 93.84 73.81 88.93 88.00
South America 93.72 89.82 88.23 70.37
Asia 96.02 90.91 91.04 80.00
Africa 92.87 83.28 80.14 83.19















Northern Europe 0.0204*** 0.0089** 0.0134*** 0.0067 0.0297*** 0.0099**
(0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0163) (0.0041) (0.0039)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0136*** 0.0047 0.0484*** 0.0511 0.0101*** 0.0017
(0.0021) (0.0083) (0.0038) (0.0319) (0.0021) (0.0083)
North and
Central America
0.0186*** 0.0403* 0.0256** 0.0060 0.0122 0.0427*
(0.0066) (0.0215) (0.0100) (0.0553) (0.0087) (0.0229)
South America 0.0284*** 0.0058 0.0512*** 0.1326 0.0019 0.0011
(0.0043) (0.0097) (0.0065) (0.0925) (0.0052) (0.0093)
Asia 0.0134*** 0.0144 0.0048 — 0.0279*** 0.0143
(0.0029) (0.0140) (0.0051) — (0.0031) (0.0141)
Africa 0.0339*** 0.0222** 0.0446*** 0.0138 0.0193*** 0.0219**
(0.0032) (0.0095) (0.0044) (0.0321) (0.0045) (0.0098)
Observations 675,942 Observations 675,933
Pseudo-R2 0.0751 Pseudo-R2 0.0760
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
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another exception in the younger cohort of second-generation immi-
grants from South America: while males seem to have higher probability
of being employed than their parents and their native counterparts,
females show the opposite evidence, with more than a 6 per cent
decrease in the probability of being employed.
Such results are quite interesting if compared to our evidence in
Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 report on the education
level of the immigrants in Italy, whereas Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12
analyse their performance in the labour market, keeping constant the
level of education. Immigrants from the two regions of origin with
higher levels of education than natives, North and Central America
and Northern Europe, do not perform equally well in terms of employ-
ment prospects, always showing a lower probability of being employed
than Italians. Some improvement can be found only for the younger
cohort of second-generation women from Northern Europe which
shows approximately a 2 per cent higher probability of being employed
with respect to its native counterpart. Also, the remarkably high skill
level of second-generation women from South America does not seem to
be correlated with employment prospects. Table 4.12 shows, respec-
tively, a non-significant and a significantly negative difference (6 per
cent) in the probability of being employed with respect to native














Northern Europe 0.0102*** 0.0007 0.0027 0.0026 0.0246*** 0.0014
(0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0193) (0.0048) (0.0047)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0119*** 0.0173 0.0167*** 0.0433 0.0263*** 0.0127
(0.0020) (0.0110) (0.0044) (0.0348) (0.0017) (0.0113)
North and
Central America
0.0015 0.0769** 0.0149 — 0.0078 0.0834**
(0.0080) (0.0305) (0.0139) — (0.0091) (0.0324)
South America 0.0107** 0.0180*** 0.0287*** 0.0625 0.0076 0.0201***
(0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0081) (0.0961) (0.0058) (0.0066)
Asia 0.0166*** 0.0233** 0.0022 — 0.0291*** 0.0236**
(0.0029) (0.0110) (0.0057) — (0.0026) (0.0108)
Africa 0.0168*** 0.0286** 0.0326*** 0.0098 0.0043 0.0305**
(0.0032) (0.0116) (0.0046) (0.0308) (0.0039) (0.0122)
Observations 398,445 Observations 398,433
Pseudo-R2 0.0807 Pseudo-R2 0.0820
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01,** p <0.05,* p <0.1.
Controls: education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
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women. On the contrary, the only immigrant group with a higher
probability of being employed than native Italians is Asians, which is
one of the two least educated immigrant groups. Asians thus seem to
have a higher probability of being employed than Italians, and this is
true in particular for the younger first generation of immigrants which
also show the highest education gap with respect to Italians.
4.5.3 Female participation rates
Table 4.13 reports the female participation rates of natives, first and
second-generation immigrants, by gender and region of origin. It ap-
pears that first-generation immigrant women participate more in the
labour market than their native counterparts (with the only exception
being African women), whereas second-generation women participate
less than their native counterparts. This picture, however, changes and
acquires more nuances in our regression analysis.
Once differences in education, age, and time dummies are accounted
for (Table 4.14), we find that second-generation immigrants do not seem
to have female participation rates significantly different from those of
their native counterparts. Only South American females seem to















Northern Europe 0.0302*** 0.0217*** 0.0274*** 0.0060 0.0347*** 0.0237***
(0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0055) (0.0308) (0.0069) (0.0066)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0361*** 0.0109 0.0736*** 0.0972 0.0059 0.0201*
(0.0036) (0.0129) (0.0061) (0.0736) (0.0041) (0.0122)
North and
Central America
0.0215** 0.0209 0.0225* 0.0355 0.0203 0.0305
(0.0096) (0.0249) (0.0136) (0.0920) (0.0136) (0.0234)
South America 0.0375*** 0.0733*** 0.0654*** 0.2635 0.0032 0.0634**
(0.0067) (0.0267) (0.0098) (0.1736) (0.0083) (0.0261)
Asia 0.0040 0.0168 0.0119 — 0.0195*** 0.0209
(0.0061) (0.0376) (0.0095) — (0.0074) (0.0397)
Africa 0.0869*** 0.0147 0.0954*** 0.0456 0.0763*** 0.0108
(0.0077) (0.0161) (0.0106) (0.0624) (0.0112) (0.0163)
Observations 277,497 Observations 277,490
Pseudo-R2 0.0782 Pseudo-R2 0.0789
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
Cultural Integration in Italy
139
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
participate less, and this evidence is mainly due to the younger cohort
(that has an approximately 12 per cent lower probability of participating
in the labour market than native females). It is worthwhile noting that
South American females are a particularly highly skilled immigrant
group. The remainder of the immigrants groups do not show any
marked peculiarity by age cohort, signalling that this tendency might
represent mainly a specific cultural attitude. First-generation immigrant
females tend to participate less in the labour market when coming from
Northern Europe, North and Central America, and Africa. They show a
non-significant difference with respect to the native rate when coming
from South America and Asia, whereas first-generation females from
Southern and Eastern Europe tend to participate more than their native
counterpart. This latter result is due to the higher probability of part-
icipation of the younger cohort. Also, the younger cohort of first-
generation women from South America seems to be more active in the
labour market than their Italian counterpart. The negative difference for
women from North and Central America is due to the particularly lower
probability of participation of the older first-generation cohort. The
results for Northern Europe, Africa, and Asia (lower participation proba-
bility in the first two cases and a non-significant difference in the third
one) remain qualitatively unchanged by age cohort, pointing also in
this case towards cultural differences by wave of immigration and region
of origin rather than by age cohort. Such cultural attitudes do not seem
to attenuate in younger cohorts of women coming from these regions,
given that their probability of participating decreases further with
respect to their native counterpart.







of which 55.31 33.16
Northern Europe 53.57 30.82
Southern and Eastern Europe 59.10 46.75
North and Central America 57.62 26.60
South America 59.79 25.29
Asia 53.22 25.64
Africa 46.16 41.70
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4.5.4 Marriage and divorce rates
As described in Section 4.1, second-generation immigrants in Italy are
very young. Only 8.18 per cent of the sample is older than 25; not even
six per cent of which is or has been married (less than 150 individuals).
Our analysis on marriage and divorce rates will thus concentrate on
first-generation immigrants only. First, we collect in Table 4.15 some
descriptive statistics. They seem to suggest that immigrants do not
show amore traditional attitude towards family formation than Italians.















Northern Europe 0.0586*** 0.0020 0.0564*** 0.0534 0.0635*** 0.0014
(0.0051) (0.0126) (0.0062) (0.0494) (0.0091) (0.0130)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0176*** 0.0380 0.0016 0.0782 0.0408*** 0.0349
(0.0048) (0.0246) (0.0065) (0.0907) (0.0072) (0.0256)
North and
Central America
0.0603*** 0.0451 0.0835*** 0.0041 0.0215 0.0544
(0.0124) (0.0412) (0.0154) (0.0962) (0.0207) (0.0458)
South America 0.0138 0.1176*** 0.0005 0.0748 0.0406*** 0.1188***
(0.0086) (0.0249) (0.0106) (0.1410) (0.0146) (0.0253)
Asia 0.0099 0.0326 0.0188 — 0.0020 0.0658
(0.0095) (0.0473) (0.0126) — (0.0146) (0.0487)
Africa 0.0830*** 0.0170 0.0540*** 0.0115 0.1229*** 0.0196
(0.0072) (0.0237) (0.0097) (0.0776) (0.0108) (0.0249)
Observations 571,770 Observations 571,763
Pseudo-R2 0.150 Pseudo-R2 0.150
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
Table 4.15 Marriage and divorce—descriptive statistics.
Marriage rates Divorce rates
Male Female Male Female
Natives 78.26 84.05 1.58 1.93
Immigrants (first gen.)
of which
74.41 80.25 1.88 4.90
Northern Europe 68.16 80.51 0.76 4.01
Southern and Eastern Europe 79.84 78.90 2.45 6.83
North and Central America 69.56 79.04 3.27 2.90
South America 68.15 75.85 2.66 4.57
Asia 79.03 85.09 0.38 2.37
Africa 75.93 83.91 1.38 3.52
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Indeed, for both males and females, and for most immigrant groups
marriage rates are lower than their native counterpart, whereas divorce
rates are much higher, the only exceptions being Northern European
and Asian men.
When controlling for age, education, (a quadratic in) age, and time
dummies, however, we find that the immigrants have a higher proba-
bility of getting married. This evidence is contained in Tables 4.16, 4.17,
and 4.18. They show the regression analysis results when using the
probability to be married or the probability to be divorced as dependent
variables, for all immigrants and for males and females separately.
Only Northern Europeans and South Americans marry less than Ita-
lians. All the other groups show a higher probability to get married,
and the tendency to marry more is particularly pronounced in the
younger cohort. Turning our attention to divorce patterns, our estima-
tion results confirm the suggestive evidence in Table 4.15. All immigrant
groups have a higher propensity to divorce than Italians. Asians are the
only exception in this regard, and their lower probability to divorce is
entirely due to males. Interestingly we do not find any marked differ-
ence between age cohorts.
Table 4.16 Immigrants’ marriage and divorce gap with respect to natives. Probit
estimation results—first-generation immigrants.
Marriage Divorce
All Pre-1970 Post-1970 All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Northern Europe 0.0153*** 0.0078 0.0300*** 0.0039** 0.0042** 0.0002
(0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0065)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0927*** 0.0481*** 0.1257*** 0.0092*** 0.0084*** 0.0136**
(0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0054)
North and
Central America
0.0242** 0.0079 0.0473*** 0.0142* 0.0130* 0.0235
(0.0121) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0241)
South America 0.0213** 0.0321*** 0.0010 0.0064* 0.0064* 0.0065
(0.0084) (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0133)
Asia 0.0960*** 0.0801*** 0.1121*** 0.0111*** 0.0108*** —
(0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0052) (0.0012) (0.0014) —
Africa 0.0321*** 0.0203*** 0.0582*** 0.0023 0.0016 —
(0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0066) (0.0015) (0.0016) —
Observations 630,523 630,523 Observations 499,346 498,256
Pseudo-R2 0.267 0.267 Pseudo-R2 0.0216 0.0213
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: occupation, education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
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4.5.5 Inter-ethnic marriage rates
We start by presenting the endogamy rates of natives and immigrants by
country of origin in Table 4.19. The proportion of respondents whose
spouse or partner comes from the same country of origin is naturally
highest for Italian natives, reaching more than 80 per cent. But is also
almost 70 per cent for Asians. Endogamy rates are also high for immi-
grants coming from Southern and Eastern Europe and from Africa.
As explained above, we cannot appreciate the existence and extent of
a process of cultural integration of immigrants on the basis of differ-
ences in endogamy rates between first and second generation because of
the small sample size of married second-generation immigrant indivi-
duals. Nevertheless, we can estimate difference between age-cohorts in
our sample of first-generation immigrants, distinguishing between
region of origin and also gender. Our regression results are contained
in Table 4.20. While Northern European immigrants and those coming
fromNorth and Central America seem to bemore open towardmarrying
a spouse from a different country in the younger cohorts, none of the
other groups show any tendency toward cultural integration in this
respect. The evidence is not different by gender. The only notable
Table 4.17 Immigrants’ marriage and divorce gap with respect to natives. Probit
estimation results—males.
Marriage Divorce
All Pre-1970 Post-1970 All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Northern Europe 0.0153*** 0.0078 0.0300*** 0.0039** 0.0042** 0.0002
(0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0065)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0927*** 0.0481*** 0.1257*** 0.0092*** 0.0084*** 0.0136**
(0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0054)
North and
Central America
0.0242** 0.0079 0.0473*** 0.0142* 0.0130* 0.0235
(0.0121) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0241)
South America 0.0213** 0.0321*** 0.0010 0.0064* 0.0064* 0.0065
(0.0084) (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0133)
Asia 0.0960*** 0.0801*** 0.1121*** 0.0111*** 0.0108*** —
(0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0052) (0.0012) (0.0014) —
Africa 0.0321*** 0.0203*** 0.0582*** 0.0023 0.0016 —
(0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0066) (0.0015) (0.0016) —
Observations 630,523 630,523 Observations 499,346 498,256
Pseudo-R2 0.267 0.267 Pseudo-R2 0.0216 0.0213
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: occupation, education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
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exception are the immigrants from South America, who seem to be
more inclined towards exogamy, if females, and highly reluctant if
males.
4.5.6 Completed fertility rates
Because of the young age of second-generation immigrants in Italy,
second-generation women older than 40 years of age with children are
almost non-existent in our sample (less than 0.2 per cent). Therefore
also in this case we concentrate on first-generation immigrants only.
Table 4.18 Immigrants’ marriage and divorce gap with respect to natives. Probit
estimation results—females.
Marriage Divorce
All Pre-1970 Post-1970 All Pre-1970 Post-1970
Northern Europe 0.0022 0.0000 0.0047 0.0157*** 0.0169*** 0.0012
(0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0054) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0047)
Southern and
Eastern Europe
0.0246*** 0.0266*** 0.0733*** 0.0399*** 0.0399*** 0.0404***
(0.0026) (0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0055)
North and
Central America
0.0189*** 0.0094 0.0599*** 0.0075* 0.0050 0.0235*
(0.0068) (0.0097) (0.0081) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0138)
South America 0.0166*** 0.0349*** 0.0175** 0.0145*** 0.0156*** 0.0045
(0.0056) (0.0072) (0.0081) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0079)
Asia 0.0587*** 0.0174** 0.0967*** 0.0037 0.0036 0.0037
(0.0043) (0.0074) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0073)
Africa 0.0212*** 0.0432*** 0.0824*** 0.0195*** 0.0217*** 0.0073
(0.0041) (0.0069) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0063)
Observations 715,498 715,498 Observations 611,963 611,963
Pseudo-R2 0.162 0.164 Pseudo-R2 0.0701 0.0702
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: occupation, education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
Table 4.19 Proportion of marriages where the






Southern and Eastern Europe 54.70




Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
144
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
The results of our analysis are collected in Tables 4.21 and 4.22. Starting
with some descriptive statistics (Table 4.21), it appears that immigrants
in Italy have lower completed fertility rates than Italians. Only Northern
Europeans show a higher fertility rate. When controlling for education,
occupation, age, and time dummies, we find that all groups tend to have
less children than Italians, with the exception of African women, whose
fertility rate is not statistically different from that of Italian women.
Such results, however, need to be taken with caution because of possibly
large measurement errors in this variable due to the limitations of the
ILFS data, as explained in this section.




Northern Europe 0.3359*** 0.4100*** 0.2742***
(0.0057) (0.0149) (0.0052)
Southern and Eastern Europe 0.1926*** 0.3584*** 0.0881***
(0.0154) (0.0178) (0.0195)
North and Central America 0.3356*** 0.4096*** 0.2661***
(0.0073) (0.0284) (0.0051)
South America 0.0115 0.2314*** 0.0603***
(0.0226) (0.0385) (0.0219)
Asia 0.2869*** 0.2467*** 0.2853***
(0.0199) (0.0270) (0.0286)
Africa 0.2618*** 0.0322 0.3636***
(0.0178) (0.0287) (0.0246)
Observations 45,588 18,464 27,124
Pseudo-R2 0.148 0.114 0.204
Marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Controls: occupation, education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
Table 4.21 Completed fertility rates—descriptive statistics.
Fertility rates






Southern and Eastern Europe 0.42
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4.6 Conclusion
Our empirical analysis of the cultural and economic patterns of integra-
tion of immigrants in Italy does not reveal a solid grounding in the data
of the perception that integration is occurring at particularly slow rates.
Severe data limitations suggest caution in the interpretation of these
results.
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Southern and Eastern Europe 0.4365***
(0.0105)
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Controls: occupation, education, quadratic in age, time dummies.
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5
Cultural Integration in Spain
Sara de la Rica1 and Francesc Ortega2
5.1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s immigration flows into Spain have been on the
rise. In particular, the decade between 1998 and 2008 has been char-
acterized by one of the largest immigration episodes in recent history
among OECD countries. Over this period, the foreign born share among
the working age population in Spain has increased from below 3 per
cent to almost 15 per cent.
Aside from the large size of the inflows, Spain’s immigration experi-
ence is characterized by the large heterogeneity of these inflows, in
terms of origin. In 2008 the largest ethnic groups among the foreign-
born population are Latinos, Eastern Europeans, and Moroccans.3 Inter-
estingly, these groups differ substantially in their ‘cultural distance’
vis-à-vis the Spanish society. Presumably, Latino immigrants face the
smallest cultural gap since Spanish is the mother tongue for the large
majority of the population. Arguably, Eastern Europeans are the second
1 The author acknowledges financial aid from the Spanish Ministry of Education and
Science (ECO2009-10818).
2 The author acknowledges financial aid from the Spanish Ministry of Science and In-
novation (ECO2008-02779). Both authors are grateful to Javier Polavieja (IMDEA) for very
helpful discussions.
3 The next section provides a detailed description of the sizes of these groups and their
composition in terms of countries of origin. See Sandell (2008) for a detailed description of
the ethnic composition of Spain’s foreign-born population, as well as their geographical
distribution within Spain. Several recent papers have analysed the economic effects of
immigration in Spain, such as Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2011, 2012), Farre et al.
(2011), and Gonzalez and Ortega (2010), among many others. Bertoli et al. (2011) argue that
for Ecuador, one of the main origin countries, Spain’s immigration policy played a big role in
determining the sizeable inflows from this country.
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group regarding cultural distance vis-à-vis Spain. As shown later, the vast
majority of Spain’s immigrants from Eastern Europe are from Romania,
a country with a Latin-based language (Romanian) and a traditionally
Christian population (Eastern orthodox). Moreover, their education
levels are high, roughly at Spanish levels. Finally, Moroccans face the
largest cultural gap with today’s Spanish society among the three large
minority groups. Morocco is an eminently Muslim country with low
average education levels relative to Spain.
Our goal is to examine the cultural and economic gaps of ethnic
foreign-born minorities that differ in the cultural distance to the
norms in their host society. In particular, we address the question of
whether these gaps are increasing (or decreasing) in the cultural distance
between natives and each minority ethnic group. Second, we examine
the evolution of these gaps across cohorts, for each group.
We focus on the three main foreign-born ethnic groups: Latinos,
Eastern Europeans, and Moroccans. Specifically, we study the following
dimensions of cultural gaps: the gender gap in educational attainment,
fertility rates, early marriage, inter-ethnic marriage, female employ-
ment, command of Spanish, and social participation. Methodologically,
we use regression analysis to provide a comparison across ethnic groups
that accounts for differences in observables. We also provide an analysis
of the similarity between natives and immigrants along several socio-
economic dimensions, following Vigdor (2008).
Overall our results suggest that Latinos—the group with the shortest
cultural distance to Spanish social norms, have assimilated the most.
Moroccans have assimilated the least, although the main differences
seem to reflect differences in education levels. Our results also suggest
that years since migration and education are important determinants of
economic and cultural gaps. Hence, it is important to control for differ-
ences in these two dimensions when comparing across ethnic groups.
Furthermore, we find that education levels have risen rapidly for the
younger cohorts ofMorocco-born immigrants, which suggests a narrow-
ing of the gaps over time.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 introduces
our datasets. Section 5.3 provides an overview of Spain’s recent im-
migration experience and a descriptive summary by ethnic group.
Section 5.4 analyses gender gaps in educational attainment. Section 5.5
is devoted to marriage and Section 5.6 to fertility. Section 5.7 studies
female employment. Sections 5.8 and 5.9 explore the command of
Spanish and social participation, respectively. Section 5.10 provides a
measure of similarity between natives and immigrants and Section 5.11
concludes.
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5.2 The data
Our two main data sources are the 2007 Labour Force Survey (‘Encuesta
sobre la Población Activa’ or LFS) and the 2007 National Immigration
Survey (‘Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes’ or NIS), both conducted by
the Spanish Institute of Statistics.
The Spanish Labour Force Survey is well-known and standardized
across all European countries. The new National Immigration Survey
deserves some comments. This survey sampled the foreign-born popu-
lation residing in Spain in 2007, with the goal of providing insights on
migrants’ experiences in transitioning from their home country into
Spain, on their job history after arrival, and on their ties with the home
country. The object of study was individuals born outside Spain, who
were at least 16-years-old at the time of the survey, and had either been
living in Spain for at least one year or intented to do so. The total size of
completed questionnaires is around 15,000. Correspondingly, our defi-
nition of immigrant is a foreign born, adult individual who at the time
of the interview (2007), had been living in Spain for at least one year.
In most of our analysis we look at individuals age 16–60. When we
report data on the native population we use the same age criterion.
The next section provides a detailed overview of the foreign-born
population in Spain.
5.3 Descriptive statistics
This section describes the main ethnic groups in terms of their size,
demographics, years since migration, and educational attainment.
5.3.1 Country of origin and ethnicity
According to Registry data, in 1998 the foreign-born population in
Spain was small (2.9 per cent of the total population) and originated
mainly in Morocco (16 per cent), France (12 per cent), and Germany (10
per cent). However, during the period 1998–2008, the foreign-born
population has increased sharply and there has been a dramatic change
in the composition of the inflows by country of origin. By 2008, the
foreign born share reached 13 per cent of the total population and the
share of the immigrant population originating in Morocco, France, and
Germany fell to 11 per cent, 2 per cent, and 3 per cent, respectively
(2008 Registry). Let us now describe in a bit more detail the geographical
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origin of the foreign-born population in Spain by 2008 and its ethnic
composition.
We start by examining the size of the immigrant population by geo-
graphical origin. Specifically, we use the 2007 NIS to classify the foreign-
born population by country of birth. We also provide a comparison of
this sample with the 2008 Registry data. The figures from the two
sources are highly consistent. As Table 5.1 shows, according to the NIS
almost 40 per cent of the foreign-born population originated in the
American continent, with Ecuador, Colombia, and Argentina being
the top three origin countries. Europe was the origin of 38 per cent of
the foreign-born population, with Romania being the main country of
origin, followed by the UK and France. According to the NIS, Romania
accounted for 9.5 per cent of the foreign-born population in Spain in
2007. As the 2008 Registry shows, the number of Romanians residing in
Spain increased sharply during 2007, reaching almost 14 per cent of the
foreign-born population in 2008, and becoming the single main source
country. Among the remaining immigrants, 17 per cent were born in
African countries and slightly less than 5 per cent in Asia. The top three
Table 5.1 Foreign-born population in Spain, by origin.
Continent NIS 2007 NIS 2007 Registry 2008 Registry 2008
Freq. thousands Rel. freq. Freq. thousands Rel. freq.
America 1,779 39.5 1,703 36.0
Ecuador 370 8.2 383 8.1
Colombia 299 6.6 268 5.7
Argentina 232 5.1 180 3.8
Europe 1,718 38.1 2,018 42.7
Romania 429 9.5 656 13.9
UK 269 6.0 315 6.7
France 203 4.5 88 1.9
Germany 160 3.5 158 3.3
Bulgaria 100 2.2 140 3.0
Africa 761 16.9 772 16.3
Morocco 534 11.8 539 11.4
Algeria 53 1.2 47 1.0
Senegal 30 0.7 42 0.9
Asia 207 4.6 230 4.9
China 54 1.2 107 2.3
Philippines 47 1.0 21 0.4
Pakistan 39 0.9 44 0.9
Total foreign born 4,508 100 4,725 100
Total Spain 46,064
Source: NIS 2007, reference individuals. All Ages Registry 2008 (1 January).
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African countries of origin were Morocco (11.8 per cent of the foreign-
born population), Algeria (1.2 per cent), and Senegal (0.7 per cent). The
top three Asian countries of origin were China (1.2 per cent), the Phi-
lippines (1 per cent), and Pakistan (0.9 per cent).
Next, we turn to the definition of the ethnic groups that we shall use
throughout our analysis: Latinos, Eastern Europeans, and Moroccans.
Respectively, these groups account for 38.7 per cent, 16 per cent, and
11.9 per cent of the foreign-born population in 2007 (Table 5.2). We use
these groups for the following reasons: Latinos and Eastern Europeans
account for the lion’s share of the immigration flows into Spain over the
last decade. Traditionally, Morocco has been the main source immigra-
tion country for Spain, and still represents a very large share of the
foreign-born population. In addition, the vast majority of Moroccans
are Muslim, which makes it a very interesting group to study the immi-
gration and integration experience of Muslim immigrants into Western
societies.
Table 5.2 reports the largest three countries of origin in each ethnic
category and the share of each of those countries in the respective
ethnic group. Latinos mainly originate from Ecuador (21 per cent),
Colombia (17 per cent), and Argentina (13 per cent). By far, the main
country of origin for Eastern Europe is Romania (60 per cent of the
group), followed at a large distance by Bulgaria (14 per cent), and the
Ukraine (9 per cent).
Table 5.2 Main ethnic groups in Spain in 2007.












Note 1: Source is NIS 2007, reference individuals. All ages.
Note 2: Relative frequency for ethnic groups is over total foreign-born
population.
For each individual country, relative frequency is over the respective
ethnic group.
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5.3.2 Years since arrival
Table 5.3 reports the distribution of individuals in each ethnic group by
years since migration. On average, Moroccans arrived in Spain 14 years
ago. Latinos and, particularly, Eastern Europeans arrived in Spain much
more recently: 8.8 and 5.0 years ago on average, respectively.
5.3.3 Age and gender
This section describes the distribution of immigrants by age and gender
for each ethnic group. Clearly, differences across groups in these distri-
butions are likely to affect the rates of overall and inter-ethnic marriage,
which we shall analyse later. Table 5.4 reports the age distributions,
separately for men and women. We also include the analogous data for
the native population to provide a basis for comparison.
Two features stand out. First, the age distribution is roughly similar
across all groups. For instance, the share of individuals below age 30
is roughly 30 per cent and the average age is 36 for immigrant males.
Eastern Europeans are on average younger and Moroccans tend to be
older. More dramatic differences appear when we look at the relative
number of females in each age group, as illustrated by the third panel
in Table 5.3. Consider women in the 16–29 and 30–49 age groups.
Among Latinos and Eastern Europeans, the share of women is
roughly 50 per cent. However, it is only 35 per cent for Moroccans,
Table 5.3 Years since migration, by ethnic group (2007).
YSM Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco
1 8.5 10.9 3.7
2 7.8 9.3 5.4
3 7.8 15.1 6.4
4 10.0 14.5 7.6
5 11.3 16.2 6.0
6 14.2 12.1 8.9
7 11.3 8.4 7.4
8 6.8 5.1 5.0
9 2.6 1.4 6.4
10 1.5 0.5 2.7
11–15 4.8 3.8 12.0
Over 15 13.6 2.8 28.5
All 100 100 100
Mean 8.8 5.1 14.0
Source: NIS 2007, main sample (reference individuals age 16–60).
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indicating that the supply of marriage-age women is shorter for the
latter group.4
5.3.4 Educational attainment
We now turn to the distribution by schooling of each ethnic group. We
define three groups: individuals that at most completed primary educa-
tion, individuals that completed secondary education, and individuals
with completed tertiary education.
Table 5.4 Age-gender distribution, by ethnic groups.
Only men
Age Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
16–29 31.9 32.0 30.0 20.9
30–49 53.4 59.0 51.9 35.5
5–64 10.8 8.2 13.1 22.9
65–74 2.3 0.7 3.3 12.5
over 75 1.6 0.2 1.8 8.26
All 100 100 100 100
Mean 36.7 34.5 37.9 46.77
Only women
Age Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
16–29 29.9 39.7 30.3 18.6
30–49 53.1 49.7 48.1 33.9
50–64 12.5 10.1 12.3 22.3
65–74 2.6 0.5 5.9 13.5
Over 75 2.0 0.1 3.3 11.7
All 100 100 100 100
Mean 37.7 34.1 39.1 48.94
Fraction of women
Age Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
16–29 52.6 54.0 36.5 49.1
30–49 54.2 44.3 34.5 51.1
50–64 57.7 53.9 34.8 51.6
65–74 57.9 39.1 50.5 54.1
Over 75 58.9 29.2 51.9 60
Source : NIS 2007, main sample.
4 Cortina et al. (2008) report differences in sex ratios by country, within ethnic group. For
instance, the female share among Ecuadorians is particularly high.
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
154
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Table 5.5 reports the results, together with the education distribution
of the native population. We restrict our sample to individuals aged
25–50 to make the comparisons across groups more informative. First,
note that Moroccans have the lowest educational attainment. Average
years of education are 7.4 for Moroccan men and 6.1 for Moroccan
women. In contrast, Latinos and Eastern Europeans have on average
10–11 years of schooling, only slightly below natives. Next, we note that
except for Moroccans, women are slightly more educated than men in
all ethnic groups, including natives. The next section provides a more
formal analysis of the gender gap in educational attainment.
5.4 Gender gaps in education
Inmany European countries, including Spain, there is public perception
that Muslim minorities have markedly different attitudes regarding
women’s role in society. In this section, we provide a comparison of
the gender gaps in education across ethnic groups and by birth cohort,
whichwill be informative about the intensity of cultural assimilation for
the different ethnic minorities.
Table 5.6 reports our estimates of the average gender gaps in years of
education for different ethnic groups and birth cohorts using regression
analysis. The dependent variable is years of education. The table reports
the coefficient associated with a female dummy, which can be inter-
preted as the difference between the average years of education of
women relative to men. We estimate a separate regression for each
Table 5.5 Educational attainment of natives and immigrants.
Men Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
Primary or less 33.3 41.2 63.0 18.01
Secondary 45.2 48.5 26.6 56.35
Tertiary 21.5 10.4 10.4 25.64
Average years 11.1 10.6 7.6 11.42
Women Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
Primary or less 31.0 30.9 77.5 18.72
Secondary 43.2 45.5 15.0 52.83
Tertiary 25.8 23.6 7.5 28.45
Average years 11.1 11.2 5.7 11.61
Source : NIS for foreign born and LFS for natives. Ages 25–50. Completed education.
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ethnic group and cohort. Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 5.6
reveals important differences in gender gaps in education across ethnic
groups, as well as across birth cohorts. Consider first individuals in age
bracket 31–40. Point estimates are positive—that is, women have higher
education than men—for all groups except for Morocco. The values
range from –2.46 years (Morocco) to 0.49 (Eastern Europe). For earlier
(older) cohorts, point estimates are negative—women have lower edu-
cation—for all groups. Morocco displays the largest gender gap. Finally,
among individuals younger than 30 we do not find a statistically signifi-
cant gender gap for any group. Only Morocco displays a gender gap,
although it is not statistically significant.
In sum, for the largest cohort (age 31–40), we find evidence of a
sizeable gender gap only for Morocco. However, even for Moroccans,
we find rapidly diminishing gender gaps across cohorts, possibly con-




This section explores another interesting dimension along which beha-
viour may vary across ethnic groups. We quantify cultural differences in
marriage habits. Specifically, we focus on differences in the frequency of
early marriage and inter-ethnic marriage.
We focus on females and state that a woman ‘married early’ if she got
married by age 25. Table 5.7 reports the distribution of early marriages
Table 5.6 Gender gaps in years of education for different birth cohorts.
Age Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
Less than 30 0.194 0.558** 0.593 0.821**
(0.127) (0.202) (0.416) (0.032)
31–40 years 0.191 0.490** 2.466** 0.543**
(0.142) (0.186) (0.459) (0.045)
41–60 years 0.315** 0.155 0.821* 0.353**
(0.165) (0.316) (0.455) (0.038)
Note: The dependent variable is years of completed education; the coefficient reported is the impact of
female on years of education from a linear probability model. There is a separate estimation for each
ethnic group and for each birth cohort.
Source : NIS (2007) for foreign born and LFS (2007) for natives. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
All regressions control for age and for years since migration (ysm). Standard errors are in parentheses.
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by ethnicity, as well as predicted probabilities obtained from estimating
linear probability models.5 Predicted probabilities are evaluated for each
group’s average characteristics. The first row of Table 5.7 reveals that
16 per cent of Latino women married early. The figure is higher for
Eastern European women (29 per cent), and much higher (62 per cent)
among Moroccans. In comparison, only 2.9 per cent of native women
married early.
The second and third rows report the predicted probability of an early
marriage with and without controlling for schooling, while controlling
for age in both cases. The comparison is interesting because it is often
argued that differences in the probability of early marriage simply reflect
differences in education. As seen in the third row of Table 5.7, signifi-
cant differences across ethnic groups still remain. Moroccan females are
much more likely to marry by age 25 than females from South and
Central America (Latinos) or from Eastern Europe. Moreover, the result
is not simply driven by lower educational attainment. We note
that, relative to natives, early marriage is high for Latinas and Eastern
European women as well.
Table 5.7 Early marriage. Distribution and predicted probabilities by ethnicity,
females ages 16–25.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
Proportion married 0.16 0.29 0.62 0.03
(0.37) (0.45) (0.48) (0.17)
Pred. prob. married, controls for
age and years since migr. (ysm)
0.165 0.291 0.624 0.03
(0.133) (0.175) (0.271) (0.03)
Pred. prob. married, controls
age, ysm and education
0.165 0.291 0.624 0.03
(0.136) (0.178) (0.293) (0.04)
No. observations 442 237 125 8,892
Note: The first row computes the proportion of marriages. Standard deviation in parentheses. In the
second row, we compute the predicted probability of marriage evaluated at each ethnic group’s average
age, controlling for years since migration. For this prediction, the dependent variable is an indicator of
marriage among all females between 16 and 25 years of age. A linear probability model is estimated, and
there is a separate estimation for each ethnic group. The third row computes the predicted probability of
an early marriage, as before, but controlling not only for years since migration but also for years of
education. In rows 2 and 3, robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: NIS (2007) for immigrants and LFS (2007) for natives. Sample consists of all females between 16
and 25 years of age.
5 Our results do not vary much when we examine the distribution of early marriages for
men, although males get married a bit older. We do not report the results for the sake of
brevity.
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5.5.2 Inter-ethnic marriage
This section explores the performance of the different ethnic groups
along another important dimension of cultural integration, namely, the
frequency of inter-ethnic marriages (Bisin and Verdier, 2000). We focus
on foreign-born individuals who are married and classify them accord-
ing to the country of birth of their spouse. We define three categories:
the two spouses were born in the same country, the spouse was born
in Spain, or the spouse was born in a third country (that is, neither
Spain nor one’s own country). For comparison we also report on inter-
marriage rates for natives, defined as marriage with a foreign-born
individual.6
Table 5.8 reports our findings for each ethnic group and birth cohort.
Table 5.8a reports the distribution over the three types of marriage.
Consider first, age bracket 31–40, the largest cohort. We note first that
marrying someone from a third country is very rare (below 5 per cent for
all foreign-born minorities). Interestingly, we only detect this behaviour
in our data among Moroccans (1.82 per cent). Second, the fraction of
inter-ethnic marriages with Spanish natives is highest among Latinos
(33 per cent of all marriages), Moroccans (17 per cent), and Eastern
Europeans (11 per cent). A proper interpretation of these figures requires
accounting for differences in observables, such as years since migration,
as well as taking into account differences in the age-gender distribution.
Table 5.8b estimates the probability of an inter-ethnic marriage for
each group, defined as the probability of marrying a Spanish native or
an individual from a third country of origin on the sample of married
individuals. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual
is married either to a Spanish native or to someone from a third country
(not Spain and not the individual’s own country of birth). The reference
group is married individuals younger than 31. A linear probability
model is estimated, separately for each group. The coefficient reported
under age <31 is the constant of the estimation and the rest of the
coefficients must be understood as the change in the probability of an
inter-ethnic marriage with respect to the reference group.We control for
years sincemigration and age. First, our results show that the probability
of an inter-ethnic marriage increases with time since migration for all
6 Cortina et al. (2008) study how inter-marriage affects the probability of employment for
married women, using Spanish data. They find that foreign-born womenmarried to Spanish-
born natives have lower employment rates than those with foreign-born husbands. They
also report that the type of partner does not have any effect on the probability of employ-
ment of native women.
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Table 5.8b Probability of inter-ethnic marriage. Linear probability models.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
Aged <31 years 0.182** 0.081** 0.027** 0.217**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.012)
Aged 31–40 0.027 0.109** 0.009 0.113**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.010)
Aged 41–60 0.094** 0.150** 0.067** 0.169**
(0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.012)
Years since mig. 0.023** 0.025** 0.021** —
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 2,624 1,181 1,064 48,707
Note: For foreign born, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual is married either to a
Spanish native or to someone from a third country (not Spain and not the individual’s own country of
birth). For natives, the dependent variable equals 1 if married to a foreign born. The reference group is
married individuals younger than 31. A linear probability model is estimated, and there is a separate
regression for each ethnic group. The coefficient reported under age <31 is the constant of the
estimation and the rest of the coefficients must be understood as the increase or decrease in the
probability of an inter-ethnic marriage with respect to the reference group. ** significant at 5%,
* significant at 10%.
Source : NIS (2007). The sample is composed of all married individuals between 16 and 60 years.
Table 5.8 Inter-ethnic marriage.
Table 5.8a Conditional means by ethnic group and birth cohort.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
Aged less than 30
% married 28 38 49 8.9
spouse from
same country 68.6 80.6 90.9 79.3
Spain 31.0 19.1 9.1
Third country 0.0 0.3 0.0 21.9
Aged 31–40 years
% married 54 65 76 63.7
spouse from
same country 66.7 88.6 80.9 89.6
Spain 32.9 11.4 17.3
Third country 0.0 0.0 1.8 10.4
Aged 41–60 years
% married 60 66 77 79.6
spouse from
same country 55.0 87.9 61.7 95.3
Spain 45.0 12.2 38.0
Third country 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.7
Note: The sample is composed of all married individuals between 16 and 60 years. Third country means a
country different from one’s birth country and from Spain. For natives, we have computed the percent-
age of all married individuals between 16 and 60 years married to a Spaniard (same country) or married
to a foreign born.
Source : NIS (2007) for foreign born and LFS (2007) for natives.
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groups. When we focus on individuals aged 30 or younger, we find that
21 per cent of married Latinos are in an inter-ethnic marriage. The
comparable figures for Eastern Europeans and Moroccans are, respec-
tively, 19 per cent and 16 per cent. In comparison, 22 per cent of married
natives age 30 or younger had a foreign-born spouse.
It is worth pointing out a striking feature that appeared in Table 5.4.
Namely, the fraction of women of marriageable age is much lower
among Moroccans (roughly, by 20–30 percentage points for ages
16–29 and 30–49). As a result, there is a large excess of demand for
women in the ‘marriage market’ for this group. Thus, while it may be
the case that Moroccans have a stronger preference for intra-group
marriage, feasibility constraints in the marriage market push Moroccan
men to marry outside their group. However, we find a probability of
inter-ethnic marriage among Moroccans that lies only slightly below
that of Latinos and Eastern Europeans, suggesting that there are a signif-
icant number of unmarried Moroccan women.
5.6 Fertility
This section examines fertility rates for each ethnic group. Following
Georgiadis andManning (2011), we focus on the sample of foreign-born
women aged 18–45. For each of them we compute the total number of
children alive. Unlike usual household surveys, our data include both
children who are present in the household and children residing else-
where (e.g. in the country of origin).
Table 5.9a reports the average number of children per woman for each
of the ethnic groups considered in the study. Clearly, Moroccans have
relatively more children on average, respectively, 1.72 and 1.95 children
per woman. In comparison, Latino and Eastern European women have
Table 5.9a Average number of children by ethnic group.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Average Spain*
Number of children 1.27 0.97 1.72 1.38
(1.19) (0.90) (1.60)
Average age Female 32.9 31.28 32.29
(6.86) (6.72) (7.18)
Observations 2,628 1,063 548
Source : NIS. The sample includes all females aged between 18 and 45 years of age. Standard deviations
in parentheses. Data for average number of children in Spain is taken from the Spanish Institute of
Statistics (Basic Demographic Indicators—2006, includes all native and immigrant women).
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on average 1.27 and 0.97 children, respectively. The table also shows
that the average age of women in the four ethnic groups is very similar.
We next provide a slightly more rigorous analysis in Table 5.9b. Spe-
cifically, we estimate a linear regression where the dependent variable is
the total number of children on the sample of all foreign-born women
in the age range 18–45. On the right-hand side we include ethnic group
dummies (with Latinos being our reference group) and a quadratic
polynomial in age. We present two sets of estimates. In the first estima-
tion we do not control for years of education but we do so in the second
set of estimates. In the former case, the results confirm the findings
suggested by the descriptive statistics. Namely, Moroccan women have
a significantly higher number of children than women from the other
ethnic groups. Interestingly, the picture changes when we control for
education levels. Now, Moroccan women have the same fertility as
Latino women. In sum, controlling for age and education, Eastern
European women have 0.2 fewer children than Latino and Moroccan
women.
5.7 Female employment
We now turn to assimilation in the labour market. In particular, we are
interested in comparing the employment rates of women across ethnic
groups. It is traditionally believed that women from traditional Muslim
societies are restricted in their ability to participate in the labour market.
Let us start by examining some descriptive statistics. Table 5.10a re-
ports the average employment rates among females in the age bracket
Table 5.9b Determinants of the average number of children.
Controls Not controlling for education Controlling for education




Years of education — –0.09**
(0.005)
No. observations 4,239 4,239
Source : NIS. The sample includes all females aged between 18 and 45 years of age. The dependent
variable is number of children and there is a joint regression for all ethnic groups. Reference is Latinos.
A linear regression is estimated. Each reported coefficient measures the difference in the average number
of children between Latinos and the other ethnic origins. Age and age squared, and years sincemigration
and its square are also included in both regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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25–59 for each ethnic group. Each row represents a different set of
women. We consider all women, single women, married women, and
married women with children. When we compare the unconditional
employment rates, we find striking differences. While almost 70 per
cent of Latino and Eastern European women work, only 35 per cent of
Moroccans do. In comparison, 50 per cent of native women work.
Interestingly, when we focus on being single, the employment rates
of all four groups are very similar (and larger than for natives).
However, when Moroccan women get married or have children, their
employment-population rates drop dramatically (30–40 percentage
points). In contrast, the ‘penalty’ of getting married or having children
Table 5.10a Female employment rates by ethnic group and for different
demographic characteristics.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco Natives
All women 0.70 0.69 0.35 0.499
(0.45) (0.46) (0.47) (0.50)
Single women 0.76 0.71 0.65 0.527
(0.43) (0.45) (0.48) (0.499)
Married women 0.65 0.67 0.26 0.478
(0.47) (0.47) (0.44) (0.498)
Married women with children 0.65 0.66 0.24 0.438
(0.48) (0.47) (0.43) (0.499)
Source : NIS for foreign born and LFS for natives. The sample includes all females between aged 25 and
59 years.
Table 5.10b Conditional probability of employment—all women and for
different demographic characteristics.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco
All women 0.67** 0.58** 0.21**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Single women 0.675** 0.61** 0.74**
(0.04) (0.10) (0.13)
Married women 0.63** 0.64** 0.12**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Married women with children 0.64** 0.62** 0.11**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Note: A linear probability model is estimated separately for each ethnic group and for each group of
women. All regressions control for age (three age categories (less 35, 36–45 and older than 45—less than
35 as reference), for years since migration and its square and for education (no education, primary,
secondary and tertiary—reference: primary). Hence, the reported coefficients are the average employ-
ment rates for the reference female (<35 with primary education) for each ethnic group and for each
family situation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Source : NIS. The sample includes all females between aged 25 and 59 years.
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is much smaller for native women as well as for Latino and Eastern
European women. Respectively, their employment-population rates
only decrease by 5, 10, and 4 percentage points.
Next, we estimate the conditional probability of being employed for
each of the different ethnic groups and for each group of women,
controlling for age and education. Table 5.10b displays the results. The
estimates here confirm the findings suggested by the descriptive statis-
tics above. Overall, Latino and Eastern European women are more likely
to be employed. However, the marriage/children penalty is small for
Latino and Eastern European women, while very large for women born
in Morocco.7
5.8 Command of Spanish
The purpose of this section is to examine the knowledge of Spanish of
the different ethnic groups. Language difficulties may clearly prevent
immigrants from an adequate integration in the host country. Given
that among our ethnic groups there is a wide disparity in the distance
between their original languages and Spanish, it is interesting to exam-
ine the outcomes for each group.
We classify the foreign-born population in three levels of fluency. The
highest level corresponds to individuals that report Spanish as their first
language. The second level contains individuals that report understand-
ing and speaking Spanish. Finally, the lowest level of fluency corre-
sponds to individuals that declare that they understand Spanish but
do not speak it.
Table 5.11a reports our results. First, we consider all individuals,
regardless of their year of arrival. Naturally, the vast majority of Latinos
appear as native Spanish speakers (95 per cent). The other group with a
significant proportion of native Spanish speakers is Morocco (9.55 per
cent), reflecting the fact that some individuals were brought by their
parents when they were very young and report Spanish as their mother
tongue. Eastern Europeans appear as the relatively less fluent group.
However, even among this group the vast majority reports speaking
and understanding the language.8
7 It is worth noting that single Moroccan women have the highest employment-population
rate.
8 The high level of command of Spanish across all groups is a bit surprising, and may
partly reflect the design of the NIS. Recall that only individuals living in Spain for at least one
year (or that intend to stay) were interviewed.
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The second part of the table reports on the command of Spanish of
recent immigrants, defined as individuals that arrived one or two years
prior to the survey. Clearly, the fraction of individuals that only under-
stands Spanish increases for all groups, except for Latinos. The figures
are 9.72 per cent for Eastern Europeans, and 7.32 per cent for Moroc-
cans. Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that immigrants learn
Spanish very quickly after arrival.
Next, we turn to a regression analysis to investigate the determinants
of language fluency and to provide a more rigorous comparison across
Table 5.11 Fluency in Spanish by ethnic group.
Table 5.11a Means, main sample NIS.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco
All individuals
Native-speaker 94.9 0.5 9.6
Speaks and understands 4.9 96.7 87.3
Only understands 0.2 2.9 3.1
100.0 100.0 100.0
Recent (ysm <3)
Native-speaker 90.8 0.0 0.0
Speaks and understands 8.2 90.3 92.6
Only understands 0.9 9.7 7.3
100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 5.11b Probability of speaking and understanding Spanish.
Sample: non-Latino, non-native speakers, linear probability model.















Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%.
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groups. In our analysis, we drop Latinos and individuals that report
Spanish as their mother tongue. Our dependent variable is an indicator
for whether an individual speaks and understands Spanish. The right-
hand side variables include dummy variables for being Eastern Euro-
pean. Thus, Morocco is the reference group in the regression. We also
control for years since migration, age, and gender. We estimate a linear
probability model.
Table 5.11b reports the results. The intercept of the regression takes
the value 0.79, reflecting the very high proportion of individuals that
speak and understand Spanish. Note that Eastern Europeans are signifi-
cantly more likely to speak and understand Spanish than Moroccans
(2.7 percentage points) when we control for age, years since migration,
and years of education. Turning to the controls, we find the expected
signs. The level of command of Spanish increases with education levels.
Age and years since migration do not contribute to explain difference in
the command of Spanish when comparing Moroccans and individuals
from Eastern Europe. On the contrary, an extra year of education has a
large effect on fluency for these individuals. Finally, our estimates sug-
gest that women are less likely to be able to speak and understand
Spanish.
In conclusion, the average level of Spanish is very high among all
ethnic groups in our study, suggesting fast learning rates. However,
we find significant differences across groups. Obviously, most Latinos
are native Spanish speakers. More interestingly, we find that, after
controlling for differences in observables, Eastern Europeans have better
command of Spanish than Moroccans. Our results seem very reason-
able, once we recall that the vast majority of Eastern Europeans in Spain
are from Romania. Thus, their mother tongue is also Latin-based, which
makes learning Spanish relatively easy.
5.9 Social participation
This section explores another dimension of integration, namely, the
degree of participation in social activities. To address this issue we use
two sets of questions posed to foreign-born individuals surveyed in
the NIS. The first set asks about participation in clubs and associations
specifically targeted to foreigners. More interesting for our purposes, the
second set of questions is about participation in social activities that are
not directly targeted to foreigners. In both cases, individuals are asked
about participation in religious, cultural/educational activities, and
sports clubs.
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Table 5.12a presents some descriptive statistics. The first observation
is that take-up rates are relatively low (below 5 per cent for all groups and
activities). Sports clubs feature the highest participation, while religious
associations display the lowest. Second, Latinos seem to participate
in activities not targeted to foreigners more often than other ethnic
groups. Table 5.12b provides a regression analysis. The dependent
variable is an indicator for whether the individual participated in any
Table 5.12 Social participation in associations and clubs.
Table 5.12a Descriptive statistics.
Latinos Eastern Europe Morocco
Targeted to foreigners
Religious (1) 1.31 1.94 1.65
Cultural and educational 1.38 1.32 1.87
Sports 1.83 0.57 0.82
Non-targeted
Religious (2) 3.03 1.63 1.32
Cultural and educational 3.57 1.54 2.31
Sports 4.88 2.07 2.86
Religious (1 + 2) 4.34 3.57 2.97
Source: NIS, main sample.
Table 5.12b Linear probability model.



















Omitted category is Latinos. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10%
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type of association not directly targeted to foreigners. The rest of the
specification is very similar to the one used in the previous section. On
the right-hand side we include dummies for ethnic groups Eastern
Europe, and Morocco. The excluded category is Latinos. We control for
age, gender, years since migration, and years of education.
Clearly, Latinos are the ethnic group that is more likely to participate
in social activities not directly targeted to foreigners. Moroccans are the
least likely group to participate, after controlling for observables. Age
and education levels are conducive to larger social involvement, and
women are less likely to participate.
5.10 Similarity between natives and immigrants
This section compares natives and immigrants along several socio-eco-
nomic dimensions. Mainly, we focus on labour-market and family-for-
mation outcomes. Our exercise follows Vigdor (2008),9 who proposes
the following thought experiment. Consider drawing an individual
randomly from the population and asking what the probability is that
he or she is foreign born. Clearly, if we do not control for any character-
istics this is just the foreign-born share in the population. More interest-
ingly, we can ask the question by focusing on relevant socio-economic
outcomes after controlling for demographic characteristics.10
Specifically, we estimate a series of probit models for the probability of
being foreign born. The outcomes of interest are employment, log mean
wage in the current occupation (among natives), a dummy for being
married or in cohabitation, the number of children, and an indicator for
being married/cohabitating with a Spain-born (native) individual. We
control for age, education, and gender.11
Table 5.13 presents the estimated marginal effects. The first column
includes only the demographic controls and a dummy for being em-
ployed. Column 2 adds the average wage in the current occupation.
Column 3 includes the variables concerning family formation (married,
9 These estimates can be used to build ‘assimilation’ indices as in Vigdor (2008).
10 To gain precision in our estimates, in this section we do not distinguish by
ethnic origin.
11 The data for the analysis in this section is from the 2007 Spanish Labour Force Survey.
This dataset does not contain wage data. We compute median monthly wages by occupation
for natives using the Wage Structure Survey and merge it into our dataset. We assign a zero
wage to the non-employed. For a recent study showing that the task content of occupations
affects natives’ views over immigration see Ortega and Polavieja (2012).
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number of children, inter-ethnic marriage). Finally, column 4 allows for
different effects by gender of the respondent.
Several results stand out. First, compared to natives, immigrants are
younger, less educated, and slightly more likely to be female. Among
these, relatively lower education is the main predictor for being foreign
born. Turning to economic differences, we note that foreign-born
individuals are more likely to be employed than natives. However,
immigrants are employed in lower quality occupations, as measured
by mean wages. Based on the estimates in column 2, being employed
Table 5.13 Similarity between native and foreign-born individuals. Dependent
variable: probability of being foreign born. Probit model, marginal effects
reported.
Variables (1) FB = 1 (2) FB = 1 (3) FB = 1 (4) FB = 1
Employed 0.026** 0.050** 0.024** 0.019**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Emp. *female 0.010**
(0.004)
















Edu2 –0.037** –0.034** –0.017** –0.017**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Edu3 –0.047** –0.035** –0.021** –0.021**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.013** 0.010** 0.010** 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Age –0.002** –0.002** –0.001** –0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 101,530 101,530 101,530 101,530
Pseudo-R2 0.019 0.023 0.290 0.290
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for foreign born. We report marginal effects from a
probit. Average monthly wages by occupation in thousands of euros. Standard errors in parentheses,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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increases the probability of being foreign born by five percentage points.
Likewise, being employed in an occupation that pays, on average, one
thousand euros more monthly, reduces the probability of being foreign
born by 1.9 percentage points.
We now turn to the outcomes concerning family formation
(column 3). Note that being married is a signal for being foreign born.
However, as the number of children in the household increases the
probability of being foreign born falls. This reflects the substantial num-
ber of recent immigrants that chose to leave their children in their
respective origin countries. We also note that the marginal effects asso-
ciated with these variables are substantially larger than the effects of
differences in the labour-market characteristics. Not surprisingly, the
largest predictor for being foreign born is being married (or cohabiting)
with a Spain-born partner. It reduces the probability of being an immi-
grant by 35.3 percentage points. Finally, we note that most effects are
very similar for men and women. Even though the interactions with the
female dummy included in column 4 are often significant, the magni-
tudes are usually rather small. We find it interesting that being em-
ployed has a substantially larger effect on the probability of being
foreign born for women (2.9 percentage points) than for men (1.9
percentage points).
Overall, these estimates suggest the following conclusions. First,
young and low-educated individuals are much more likely to be foreign
born. Second, high employment rates in low-paying occupations are an
important distinction between the labour-market outcomes of natives
and immigrants. However, the largest differences between natives and
immigrants arise in their family organization. Controlling for age and
education, immigrants are much more likely to be married (or in cohab-
itation) but much less likely to have a Spain-born partner or several
children (in the household).
5.11 Conclusion
Our aim in this paper is to examine the cultural and economic gaps of
ethnic foreign-born minorities that differ in the cultural distance to the
norms in their host society. In particular, we address the question of
whether these gaps are increasing (or decreasing) in the cultural distance
between natives and each minority ethnic group living in Spain.
Second, we examine the evolution of these gaps across cohorts, for
each group.
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Our results reveal large differences across ethnic groups in educational
attainment, and in years since migration. Both variables are well known
to be important determinants of integration. Moroccans arrived in
Spain earlier and have substantially lower education levels. Eastern
Europeans are the most recent arrivals and, together with Latinos,
have schooling levels that are similar to those of natives. Second, we
find that women are on average equally or more educated than men in
all ethnic groups, except for Moroccans. Third, we also find large differ-
ences in marriage patterns across ethnic groups. Our results suggest that
Latinos have the lowest rates of early marriage (and overall marriage)
while Moroccans have the highest.
With respect to interethnic marriages, we find that the Latino group is
the one with a higher fraction of marriages to Spanish natives (33 per
cent), relative to the total number of marriages. This group is followed
by Morocco, with a rate of 17 per cent of their married population
having a Spanish-born spouse. At the other end, only 11 per cent of
the married Eastern Europeans are married to Spanish natives. Our
interpretation of these results is driven partly by cultural distance
(which accounts for the high inter-ethnic marriage of Latinos) and
partly by the imbalance in sex ratios faced by immigrants fromMorocco.
We also find that Moroccans have the highest fertility rates, while
Eastern Europeans have the lowest. Our regression results show that
low levels of education are largely responsible for the highest fertility
of Moroccans.
Fifth, we find that among single women (without children), employ-
ment rates are high and very similar for all ethnic groups. However,
while marriage and children impose only a small employment penalty
on Latino and Eastern European women, Moroccan women’s employ-
ment rates drop precipitously. The welfare implications are not obvious
given that fertility rates are higher among women in these groups,
which reduces the potential economic benefits of participating in the
labour market.
Sixth, the command of Spanish is very high across all groups,
although naturally the highest among Latinos. Among non-Latinos,
our regression analysis reveals that Eastern Europeans are around three
percentage points more likely to be fluent in Spanish than Moroccans,
controlling for education and years since migration. Our analysis of
social participation reveals that Latinos are more likely to participate
in clubs and associations non-targeted to foreigners, compared to all
other groups. Finally, we find substantial dissimilarity in the labour-
market outcomes and family organization of natives and immigrants,
after controlling for demographics and educational attainment.
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Overall these results suggest that Latinos—the group with the shortest
cultural distance to Spanish social norms—appear very similar to natives
in most economic and cultural outcomes. Moroccans still display large
gaps along several dimensions, which are largely explained by differ-
ences in educational attainment. Our results also show that these gaps
shrink rapidly as time in Spain (since migration) rises and that native-
immigrant gaps appear to be shrinking fast for the younger cohorts.
References
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and De la Rica, S. (2011) Complements or substitutes? Task
specialization by gender and nativity in Spain. Labour Economics, 18, doi:
10.1016/j.labeco.2011.02.002.
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and De la Rica, S. (2012) Substitutability of Immigrant and
Native Labor: Evidence from Spain. Forthcoming in Empirical Economics.
Bertoli, S., Fernandez-Huertas, J., and Ortega, F. (2011) Immigration Policies and
the Ecuadorian Exodus. The World Bank Economic Review, doi: 10.1093/wber/
lhr004.
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2000) Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission,
Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, CXV(3), 955–988.
Cortina, C., Esteve, A., and Domingo, A. (2008) Marriage Patterns of the Foreign-
Born Population in a New Country of Immigration: The Case of Spain. The
International Migration Review, 42(4), 877–902.
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6
Cultural Integration in Sweden
Lena Nekby
6.1 Introduction
Negative attitudes towards immigration may stem less from the
economic implications of immigration and more from the perceived
threats of immigration to social and cultural institutions (Card et al.,
2005; Dustmann and Preston, 2007). In Sweden, as in many other
European countries, there is an ongoing public debate that immigrants
are not adapting to the social and cultural norms of the host country.
The empirical evidence is, however, scant. In this chapter the process of
cultural (or social) integration is studied in Sweden by comparing differ-
ences between immigrants and natives on a number of indicators, as
well as across two generations of immigrants stemming from the same
region of origin.
While economic integration is easily quantified by a number of
commonly accepted measures, such as the development of wage,
income, and employment gaps between natives and immigrants over
time and/or across generations, cultural integration is not as readily
definable. One reason for this is that what constitutes a social or cultural
norm is inherently subjective and likely to be defined in relative terms.
The cross-cultural psychology literature stresses the acculturation pro-
cess, that is, the changes in social norms defined by attitudes, customs
and values in both the majority and minority populations due to the
contact brought about by immigration (Berry, 1997; Berry and Sam,
1997, 2006, Phinney 1989, 1990; Phinney et al., 2001). The fluid nature
of cultural norms implies that the choice of cultural indicators used to
exemplify host country norms is likely to be, at least partially, defined
relative to the predominant immigrant groups of the time. Religion is a
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case in point; if the dominant migrant groups have a similar religious
affiliation to the majority population then religion is unlikely to be
stressed as a defining cultural characteristic of the majority population.
If, however, newly-arrived immigrant groups differ in terms of religious
belonging or religiosity, then religion is more likely to be seen as a
defining cultural characteristic.1 Initial gaps in cultural indicators
between various natives and immigrants are likely to be large precisely
because it is this difference that defines the cultural norm of the major-
ity population.
Although cultural integration is a process of adaptation in both the
majority and minority groups, due to the asymmetry in size between
the groups, the bulk of adaptation is likely to be on the side of immi-
grants. Themajority population can, however, aid or inhibit this process
through their attitudes and actions. If, for example, access to jobs is
limited due to ethnic discrimination, some immigrant groups may
never enter the social arenas necessary to forge contacts with natives
which would in turn influence cultural indicators such as intermarriage
propensities. Likewise, a preference for or against certain characteristics
in partners implies that the likelihood of intermarriage is heavily influ-
enced by the behaviour and attitudes of the much larger in size majority
population.2
In order to examine the process of cultural integration between
immigrants and natives it is therefore important to follow immigrant
groups over time and preferably over several generations to see how a
defined cultural gap at one time point develops due to changes in both
the majority population and minority groups.3 As data restrictions pre-
vent an analysis of the intergenerational transmission of defined mea-
sures, this study instead analyses two generations of immigrants from
the same region of origin at a given point in time, comparing natives
and immigrants across these generations. For ease of interpretation,
focus in this study is on immigrant groups defined broadly by region
of origin (or, for second-generation immigrants, by parents’ region of
1 Recent focus on the cultural integration of Muslims in Europe in both the popular and
academic debate is a case in point. Recent studies (and critiques) in economics on social or
cultural integration with at least a partial focus on religion include Arai et al. (2009), Bisin
et al. (2004, 2008), Bisin and Verdier (2000), Constant et al. (2006), de la Rica and Ortega
(2009), Georgiadis and Manning (2008), and Manning and Roy (2009).
2 Studies on inter-marriage patterns among immigrants include Angrist (2002), Chiswick
and Houseworth (2011), Furtado (2006), Gilbertson et al. (1996), Kalmijn (1991a, 1991b,
1993, 1998), Kantarevic (2004), Lievens (1999), and Nielsen et al. (2009).
3 Recent measures used to analyse social integration within the economics literature
include marriage patterns, fertility norms, residential segregation, religious affiliation and
religiosity, attitudes towards gender equality, and ethnic/national identity.
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origin), although we recognize that there may be considerable hetero-
geneity within these broadly-defined groups in the process of cultural
integration.
Using Swedish register data from 2005, nine cultural measures are
defined and analysed; within region gender gaps in education, marriage
to a foreign born, marriage to a co-national, marriage rates at age 25,
cohabitation, divorce, partner age gaps, as well as female employment
rates and female education levels. In addition, survey data on identity
(self-assessed affiliation to home and host cultures) is provided for a
cohort of students with immigrant backgrounds. Throughout the ana-
lysis, natives are defined as those born in Swedenwith two Swedish born
parents, first-generation immigrants as the foreign born (categorized by
country of birth into seven regional groups), and second-generation
immigrants as those born in Sweden with at least one foreign born
parent. Region of origin for second-generation immigrants is categor-
ized according to parents’ region of birth. For comparative purposes, two
samples of second-generation immigrants are used in estimation. Initi-
ally, estimations are based on the minority of second-generation immi-
grants with two parents born in the same non-Swedish country of
origin. Thereafter, a second round of estimations is carried out based
on all second-generation immigrants, including the majority with
mixed backgrounds. Region of origin for those with mixed backgrounds
is based on the mother’s country of birth or, when the mother is born in
Sweden, on the father’s country of birth.
Results indicate the following. Within region gender gaps in educa-
tion are positive or insignificant for all groups, implying that females
have more years of education or insignificant differences to men from
the same region of origin. Positive (or insignificant) gender gaps in
education are found for both first and second-generation immigrants.
In terms of the propensity to marry a foreign-born person, first-genera-
tion immigrants indicate a larger likelihood than natives of partnering
with a foreign born but differences are reduced in the second generation
for all groups except for those with Asian and African backgrounds,
when both parents stem from the same country of origin. When esti-
mation is based on all second-generation immigrants, differences in this
type of marriage are significantly and considerably reduced for all
groups. Similar results are found when marriage to a co-national is
considered; first-generation immigrants are less likely than natives to
marry co-nationals and this difference increases for second-generation
immigrants, implying a higher likelihood of marrying outside the
national group across immigrant generations. This is true for all sec-
ond-generation immigrants except those with North/Central American
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or African backgrounds when both parents stem from the same country
of origin. Again, when estimation is based on the full sample of second-
generation immigrants, including those with mixed backgrounds, the
likelihood of marrying co-nationals is reduced in the second generation
for all groups.
Indeed, when estimation is based on the full sample of second-
generation immigrants, all cultural measures including cohabitation,
divorce, partner age gaps, and female employment rates, suggest a
clear pattern of increased cultural integration in the second generation
in comparison to the first generation, regardless of region of origin.
When female levels of education are considered, first-generation immi-
grants are found to have greater years of education than natives. This
difference is smaller, insignificant, or negative for second-generation
immigrants (full sample), implying a convergence across immigrant
generations to native levels of education. Taken together results in this
study suggest that a process of cultural integration between immigrants
and natives is occurring as initial differences between first-generation
immigrants and natives on all cultural indicators are, with few excep-
tions, smaller or non-existent for second-generation immigrants.
This chapter continues in Section 6.2 with a short history ofmigration
to Sweden and an overview of previous Swedish studies on cultural
integration. This is followed in Section 6.3 with a description of the
data. Results are presented in Section 6.4 and concluding remarks in
Section 6.5.
6.2 Migration to Sweden and previous studies
Sweden has a large immigrant population as approximately 15 per cent
of the working age population (16–64) today is foreign-born. In addi-
tion, another 12 per cent of the population has a foreign background,
defined as being born in Sweden with at least one foreign-born parent.
Since the end of the Second World War, Sweden has been characterized
by net immigration, with three main sources of immigration. First,
many immigrants come from other Nordic countries, primarily Finland,
due to the common Nordic labour market established in 1954. A second
source of migration was labour migration stemming from Southern and
Eastern European countries during the 1950s and 1960s, when migra-
tion legislation was non-restrictive and aimed at attracting foreign
labour to the then expanding manufacturing sector. Refugee migration
is the third source of post Second World War migration, and, together
with immigration due to family reunification, the largest source of
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migration to Sweden today. Refugee migration to Sweden stemmed
from Hungary in the late 1950s, former Czechoslovakia in the late
1960s, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa in the 1970s, former
Yugoslavia (mainly Bosnia-Herzegovina) in the 1990s, and Iraq in the
early 2000s. In 2005, the five largest immigrant groups in Sweden
originated from Finland (15 per cent of the foreign-born population),
Iraq (7 per cent), Yugoslavia (6 per cent), Iran (5 per cent), and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (5 per cent). Today there is an increasing inflow from other
EU countries due to the EU enlargement of 2004, during which Sweden
was one of few countries that did not impose temporary restrictions
on labour mobility. This has led to a large inflow of especially Polish
immigrants in the last few years.
Before the mid-1970s, the foreign born in Sweden had slightly higher
average employment levels than natives and similar income levels. This
was especially true for female immigrants who had considerably higher
labour force participation rates than female natives at the time. Since
the mid-1970s, relative employment rates have dropped and a widening
immigrant-native employment and income gap have developed over
time. Numerous explanations have been forwarded for this shift in
relative employment rates. Among these are structural changes in the
industrial sector, with a shift away frommanufacturing jobs, the chang-
ing composition of immigrants, the changing underlying motivation
for migration, skill-based technological change promoting soft skills
such as language and communication, and discrimination of increas-
ingly ‘visible’ immigrants from predominantly non-European countries.
It is important to note, however, that the shift in immigration in the
mid-1970s from predominately labour migration to predominately ref-
ugee migration also lead to a shift in the skill composition of the foreign
born, from relatively unskilled labour migration to relatively skilled
refugee migration. Today, the proportion with tertiary educations is
approximately the same in the native and foreign-born population, at
roughly 30 per cent.4
Although labour market gaps between immigrants and natives have
been studied intensively within economics, fewer studies have analysed
cultural integration. Swedish studies include Åslund et al. (2008) on the
impact of age at migration for cultural integration as measured by
exposure to the foreign born. Immigration at an older age is found to
increase the probability of living among, marrying, and working with
other foreign born individuals. Studies on the intermarriage patterns of
4 See Schröder (2007) for an overview of immigrant-native labour market gaps and inte-
gration policy in Sweden.
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immigrants find that intermarriage to natives is lower among groups
with non-Western origin (Behtoui, 2009) and that assortative mating
in terms of national background is lower among second-generation
immigrants in comparison to first-generation immigrants (Çelikaksoy
et al., 2009). Andersson (2004) and Andersson and Scott (2005) studied
the fertility patterns of foreign born females in Sweden and found that
most immigrant groups display higher levels of childbearing after immi-
gration but that the determinants of first births are similar to that of
natives, with one exception. Foreign-born women, unlike their native
counterparts, are less likely to have a child while on welfare. A recent
study on second-generation immigrants finds even smaller differences
from the majority population in fertility patterns (Scott and Stanfors,
2009). Finally, two studies examine how identity (to home and host
cultures) influences subsequent investment in higher education and,
respectively, employment rates (Nekby and Rödin 2007; Nekby et al.,
2009). Results from these studies show that integrated men, that is, men
that identify with both home and host cultures, are associated with
higher probabilities of completed tertiary educations and have similar
employment levels to men that identify only with the majority culture
(assimilated).
6.3 Data and empirical set-up
6.3.1 Data
The data used in estimation stems from registered information at
Statistics Sweden (SCB) on the entire working age population (16–65
years of age) residing in Sweden in 2005.5 Included in the data is rich
individual information on personal and demographic characteristics,
education, employment, and income. In addition, detailed information
is available on country of birth and migration dates for the foreign-born
portion of the population, as well as parents’ country of origin for the
entire sample. Due to partner identification numbers, it is also possible
to link individuals in partnerships. As such, detailed information is
available not only on themain individual but also on partners, provided
that partners fall within the given age restrictions.6 Partnership is
5 The data (Statistics on Immigrants—STATIV) was initially created by the Swedish Inte-
gration Board.
6 Due to the age restrictions of the data, information on partners above the age of 65 is not
available. It is possible, however, to identify the civil status of those with older spouses due to
registered information on civil status.
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defined as marriage, registered partnership for same sex couples, or
cohabitation in a household with common children. Data on partner-
ships stems from information on households. To date, Statistics Sweden
does not track cohabitants without children.
The original data from 2005 consist of 5,880,793 individuals. After
dropping observations due to missing information on variables of
interest, the sample used in estimation consists of 4,221,597 natives
(Swedish born with two Swedish born parents) and 818,148 first gen-
eration-immigrants (foreign born).7 Two samples of second-generation
immigrants are defined and used in estimation, both departing from a
basic definition of second-generation immigrant status as someone
born in Sweden with at least one foreign born parent. The first sample
is restricted to the 128,808 second-generation immigrants with
homogenous national backgrounds, that is, second-generation immi-
grants with two parents stemming from the same (foreign) country of
origin (23 per cent of all second-generation immigrants). The second
sample consists of all second-generation immigrants including those
with mixed backgrounds, in total 549,156 individuals. The majority
of second-generation immigrants in Sweden therefore have mixed
backgrounds with either one foreign born and one Swedish born
parent (68 per cent of all second-generation immigrants) or two for-
eign born parents stemming from different non-Swedish countries of
origin (8 per cent of all second-generation immigrants).8
Region of origin is classified according to a Statistics Sweden categori-
zation into eight regions: Sweden, (other) Nordic countries, Western
Europe (non-Nordic EU15), Eastern Europe (non-Nordic, Non-EU15),
North/Central America, South America, Asia, and Africa. Table 6.1
shows the distribution of region of origin (own or parents) for first
and second-generation immigrants in Sweden. In parentheses is the
average duration of residence, measured in years, for the foreign born
population.9
7 In the data 186,839 observations are dropped due to missing values on variables of
interest such as country of origin. This includes 134,961 individuals classified as second-
generation immigrants with one Swedish born parent and one foreign-born parent but
where information on the country of origin of the foreign-born parent is missing (20 per
cent of the originally defined population of second-generation immigrants). In addition,
2816 persons stemming from Oceania are dropped from estimation due to the small size of
this immigrant group.
8 Included in the group with mixed backgrounds are individuals with one foreign-born
parent and missing information on the other parent (1.8 per cent of all second-generation
immigrants).
9 Duration of residence is measured based on latest year of immigration and may be
underestimated for frequent (registered) migrants.
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6.3.2 Empirical set-up
Differences in various measures of cultural integration (described fur-
ther below) between natives and first or second-generation immigrants
are estimated using two basic specifications. The first specification esti-
mates differences between natives and first or second-generation immi-
grants from different regions of origin controlling, where relevant, for
gender, level of education (six levels), and age (quadratic). The second
specification, used in estimation of female employment rates and
female education levels, compares differences between natives and two
age cohorts of immigrants (younger than thirty and thirty plus) for each
immigrant generation and region.
As the analysis is based on cross-section data for 2005, estimations
provide a static picture of differences between natives and two genera-
tions of immigrants from the same region of origin. Note that first-
generation immigrants today are likely to differ in many respects to
the parents of second-generation immigrants today, for example
concerning reasons for migration, the distribution of source countries,
and the economic conditions in the host country at immigration, all of
whichmay influence cultural integration. To fully capture the process of
integration, it is necessary to study the intergenerational transmission
of cultural measures or follow individuals over time. Such data is not
available at present. Nonetheless, estimated differences between natives
and immigrants can give an indication of the degree to which cultural
integration has occurred today across immigrant generations in Sweden.
Themeasures used to exemplify social integration in this study are the
following:
Table 6.1 Region of origin (and duration of residence)—second-generation
immigrants with parents from the same country of origin.











Sweden 100 — —
Nordic — 22.3 (28.5) 51.9 55.1
West Europe (EU15) — 8.1 (20.8) 8.2 16.3
East Europe — 24.0 (16.2) 20.0 14.3
North/Central America — 2.1 (16.0) 0.1 2.8
South America — 6.0 (18.2) 2.7 1.9
Asia — 31.1 (14.6) 15.0 7.6
Africa — 6.5 (13.6) 2.0 1.9
No. of observations 4,221,597 818,148 128,808 549,156
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1. Within-region gender gaps in education—education is regressed on
a female dummy variable for each region of origin and separately
for natives, first-generation and second-generation immigrants.
Two measures of education are used; ‘age left full time education’
and ‘university graduate’. ‘Age left full time education’ is a proxy
for years of education and is defined as the age at which individuals
graduate from their highest registered level of education. There
are two potential drawbacks with this measure. Information on
year of graduation is missing for 29 per cent of the sample, partially
due to fact that among first-generation immigrants educations
may have been acquired prior to immigration.10 The foreign born
may also be forced to validate foreign degrees or comply with
Swedish-specific educational requirements for certain occupations,
implying more years of education but not necessarily higher levels
of education. As such, the probability of being university educated
is also estimated based on register information on highest com-
pleted level of education. University educated is defined as a
dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is registered as having
completed a university education, and 0 otherwise.
2. Marriage to a foreign born—this type of marriage is defined as a
dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is partnered with, that
is, married, in a registered partnership, or cohabitant with children
in common, to a partner that is born abroad, and 0 otherwise.
3. Marriage to a co-national—this type of marriage is defined as
a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is in a partnership
with a co-national or a second-generation immigrant with the
same national background, and 0 otherwise. For natives, this
implies a partnership with someone born in Sweden with two
Swedish-born parents. For the foreign born, marriage to a co-
national is a partnership with a foreign-born individual from the
same country of origin or to a second-generation immigrant with a
parent from the same country of origin. For second-generation
immigrants, this type of marriage is defined as a partnership with
someone born in the same country of origin as a foreign born
parent or a partnership with another second-generation immigrant
with a similar (foreign) national background.
10 Broken down by immigrant status, year of graduation is missing for 26 per cent of
natives, 50 per cent of first-generation immigrants, and 15 per cent of second-generation
immigrants (full sample).
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4. Young marriage—young marriage is defined as a dummy variable
equal to 1 if age at first marriage is less than or equal to 25, and
0 otherwise. Note that marriage dates are registered only for those
who change their civil status in Sweden. This implies that there
is no information on date of marriage for the foreign born
who married prior to immigration. For these individuals, only
subsequent changes of civil status, after immigration, are
registered. As such, native-immigrant gaps in young marriage
rates are considered only for natives and second-generation
immigrants.
5. Cohabitation rates—cohabitation is defined as a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a non-married individual is registered as living in the
same household with a partner where there are children in com-
mon, that is, both partners are legal parents to at least one child in
the household, and 0 otherwise. No information is available on
cohabiting couples without children.
6. Divorce rates—divorce is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the individual is registered as divorced in the year 2005, and
0 otherwise.
7. Partner age gaps—partner age gaps are defined as the absolute value
of the age difference between partners (current unions).
8. Female employment rates—employment is defined as a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if individuals are registered as employed during a
measurement week in November, and 0 otherwise.
9. Female education levels—education is defined as above using two
measures, a proxy for years of education (age left full-time educa-
tion) and university educated.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 6.2. Sample means suggest
that differences between natives and especially second-generation
immigrants on a number of cultural indicators such as young marriage,
cohabitation, divorce, and partner age gaps are small or non-existent
(regardless of which sample of second-generation immigrants is
considered). For other indicators such as marriage to a foreign born
and marriage to co-nationals, although differences between natives
and second-generation immigrants remain pronounced, especially for
those with homogenous national backgrounds, these gaps are consider-
ably smaller than those found between natives and first-generation
immigrants, suggesting a pattern of integration across immigrant gen-
erations. A higher proportion of individuals marrying a foreign-born
person/co-national found for second-generation immigrants with
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homogenous backgrounds (parents from the same foreign country of
origin) in comparison to second-generation immigrants with mixed
backgrounds is consistent with theories suggesting a relatively stronger
emphasis on ethnic (or national) group belonging as a basis for partner-
ship choice in homogenous families, all else equal. This may be a
consequence of higher social and psychological costs for children who
marry outside the ethnic group in these families.
The economic indicators show that employment and income gaps
between natives and second-generation immigrants are smaller in com-
parison to the gaps between natives and first-generation immigrants.
Economic integration across immigrant generation is, however, weaker











Age left ft education 24.4 (F) 25.6 (F) 21.6 (F) 23.9 (F)
22.4 (M) 24.5 (M) 20.6 (M) 22.1 (M)
Marriage to foreign born 2.7 24.5 7.2 3.8
(5.7) (46.9) (19.9) (9.4)
Marriage to a co-national 39.7 28.7 7.3 2.7
(82.7) (55.0) (20.0) (6.7)
Young marriage 13.7 — 14.2 13.0
Cohabitation 12.1 6.9 12.3 11.1
(22.4) (12.3) (28.6) (23.8)
Divorce 10.0 17.1 7.1 10.8
Partner age gap 3.3 5.0 3.5 3.5
Female employment rate 73.2 53.8 63.0 66.8
Economic indicators:
Log income 7.35 7.06 7.09 7.23
Employment 74.8 55.4 63.8 67.7
Other characteristics:
Level of education:
Short compulsory 4.8 11.8 0.9 4.1
Compulsory 16.0 14.9 24.7 19.5
Secondary 47.6 41.2 49.4 47.6
Short tertiary 6.3 5.1 6.9 6.6
University 24.5 25.4 17.6 21.6
PhD 0.7 1.6 0.5 0.7
Female 49,0 51.2 48.7 49.0
Age 40.8 41.1 32.2 38.8
% thirty (age) 74.1 77.8 55.0 62.9
Duration of residence (years) — 18.8 — —
No. of observations 4,221,597 818,148 128,808 674,732
Note: In parentheses, percentage of those in partnerships (married, cohabitation with children in
common, registered partnerships).
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
182
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
for second-generation immigrants with homogenous national back-
grounds. Note that as mean age as well as the distribution of education
and region of origin varies by immigrant status (first or second genera-
tion), it is important to control for these differences in estimation of
cultural integration.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Within-region gender gaps in education
Gender gaps in education are estimated separately by region, immigrant
status, and age cohort (less than 30 and 30–65). Table 6.3 reports the
estimated coefficient for the female dummy variable in each of these
education equations, that is, the estimated differences in education for
females in comparison to males within each region of origin and age
group. Results show that females are more educated than men in all
groups, with the exception of first-generation immigrants stemming
from Africa (insignificant gender differences in education in both age
cohorts) and, in the sample of second-generation immigrants with
homogenous backgrounds, older second-generation immigrants from
North/Central America, South America, and Africa (insignificant gender
differences in education).11 Significantly higher years of education for
females are, however, found for all regions in the full sample of second-
generation immigrants.
Gender gaps in education are re-estimated using a second measure of
education, a dummy variable for completed university educations. Re-
sults shown in Table 6.4 largely confirm significantly higher levels of
education for women in most groups. The exceptions are first-genera-
tion African women (both age cohorts) and Asian/Middle Eastern
women (older cohort) where females are associated with significantly
lower university probabilities than men. This pattern is reversed among
second-generation immigrants. A significantly higher probability of
females being university educated in comparison to men is found for
all origin groups and both age cohorts in the full sample of second-
generation immigrants.
Both measures of education therefore suggest that females are more
highly educated than men from the same region of origin and age
11 Note that sample sizes are small for older second-generation immigrants with homo-
genous national backgrounds. Only 30 individuals with North American backgrounds are
30 years or older and have parents stemming from the same country of origin and only
80 individuals with South American backgrounds.
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Table 6.3 Within region gender gaps in age left full-time education, by region of origin and age cohort.
Age-cohort Native Nordic West European East European North/Central
America
South America Asia Africa
<30 0.433*** — — — — — — —
(0.005)
30–65 2.262 *** — — — — — — —
(0.010)
First generation
<30 — 0.760*** 0.189*** 0.501*** 0.449*** 0.386*** 0.255*** 0.048
(0.059) (0.067) (0.024) (0.098) (0.049) (0.022) (0.051)
30–65 — 2.681*** 1.501*** 1.587*** 0.494*** 0.362*** 0.123** 0.029
(0.056) (0.107) (0.068) (0.187) (0.116) (0.059) (0.136)
Second generation—parents from the same country of origin
<30 — 0.530*** 0.386*** 0.349*** 0.189*** 0.261*** 0.318*** 0.283***
(0.022) (0.110) (0.048) (0.100) (0.073) (0.032) (0.078)
30–65 — 2.125*** 1.757*** 0.934*** 2.368 0.566 1.527*** 1.174
(0.069) (0.174) (0.122) (3.059) (1.202) (0.349) (0.828)
Second generation—full sample
<30 — 0.425*** 0.399*** 0.390*** 0.337*** 0.339*** 0.285*** 0.333***
(0.017) (0.033) (0.029) (0.069) (0.046) (0.024) (0.052)
30–65 — 2.275*** 1.730*** 1.425*** 1.944*** 0.777** 1.654*** 0.862***
(0.036) (0.062) (0.070) (0.188) (0.354) (0.163) (0.256)
Reported coefficients are for a female dummy variable in separate OLS estimation, within each age cohort and region of origin, on age left full-time education. Included in
estimation are controls for age (quadratic). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.4 Within region gender gaps in university education, by region of origin and age cohort.
Age-cohort Native Nordic West European East European North/Central America South America Asia/Middle East Africa
<30 0.061*** — — — — — — —
(0.007)
30–65 0.101*** — — — — — — —
(0.001)
First generation
<30 — 0.107*** 0.060*** 0.094*** 0.071*** 0.052*** 0.035*** 0.018***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.013) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
30–65 — 0.097*** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.016* 0.045*** 0.007*** 0.076***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Second generation—parents from the same country of origin
<30 — 0.060*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.034 0.020** 0.025*** 0.036***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.006) (0.026) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010)
30–65 — 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.056*** 0.076 0.107 0.071*** 0.111*
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.204) (0.111) (0.019) (0.063)
Second generation—full sample
<30 — 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
30–65 — 0.100*** 0.085*** 0.074*** 0.096*** 0.059** 0.077*** 0.088***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.025) (0.010) (0.019)
Note: Reported coefficients are for a female dummy variable in separate estimations, for each age cohort and region of origin, on the probability of being university educated,
based on register information on highest level of completed education. Included in estimation are controls for age (quadratic). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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group. Deviations from this pattern, for example in terms of relatively
lower levels of higher education for Asian and African first-generation
females, are reversed in the second generation and approach the native
norm of positive gender gaps in education. Results therefore suggest that
a process of cultural integration in gender norms concerning education
is occurring.
6.4.2 Marriage patterns
The extent of assortativemating in society, based on immigrant status or
national background, is an interesting measure of cultural integration as
marriage markets reflect the degree of openness between social groups.
If, for example, social or economic boundaries between ethnic or
national groups are strong due to residential or workplace segregation,
a high degree of assortative mating within ethnic/national groups may
prevail, reinforcing social and economic differences between natives
and immigrants across generations. As such, marriage gaps between
natives and immigrants are analysed for a broad range of marriage
patterns (marriage to a foreign born, marriage to a co-national, young
marriage, cohabitation, divorce, and partner age gaps). Estimations of
native-immigrant differences in marriage patterns are based on indivi-
duals thirty years or older in order to mitigate censoring problems or
selection effects. With the exception of young marriage, estimations are
also based on current unions. In general, parental pressure is thought to
be lower in higher order partnerships implying, for example, that rates
of intermarriage may be larger for those in second (or higher order)
partnerships. Unfortunately, we are unable to control for this in
estimation.
6.4.3 Marriage to a foreign born
Results of linear probability models estimating the probability of marry-
ing or partnering with a foreign-born person are presented in Table 6.5.
As expected, first-generation immigrants are significantly more likely
than natives to be partnered with someone who is also born abroad.
This is partially due to the fact that spouses immigrate together. Nearly
40 per cent of immigrants that have foreign-born partners migrated to
Sweden within two years of each other, suggesting that they were
married before immigration to Sweden. First-generation immigrants
from the Nordic countries, West Europe, and North/Central America
are associated with approximately 30–45 percentage point higher prob-
abilities than natives of partnering with a foreign-born person, while
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those from Eastern Europe, North/Central America, Asia, and Africa
indicate a lower, but still positive probability at approximately 18 per-
centage points.
Differences between natives and second-generation immigrants in
the probability of marrying a foreign born are generally smaller than
those noted between natives and first-generation immigrants. This is
true for all second-generation immigrants except those with homogen-
ous national backgrounds stemming from Asian or African countries.12
Results for these groups therefore suggest a lack of cultural integration to
natives across immigrant generations as the likelihood of marrying a
foreign born does not abate across generations. Note, however, that this
result is heavily contingent on having a homogenous foreign national
background.13 When estimation is based on all second-generation








Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.315*** 0.032*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
West Europe 0.414*** 0.048*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
East Europe 0.186*** 0.101*** 0.040***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
North/Central America 0.459*** 0.025 0.007***
(0.004) (0.046) (0.002)
South America 0.234*** 0.033 0.028***
(0.002) (0.030) (0.006)
Asia 0.179*** 0.230*** 0.059***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.003)
Africa 0.188*** 0.180*** 0.028***
(0.002) (0.028) (0.005)
No. of observations 3,837,395 4,111,711
R2 0.139 0.132
Controls Age (quadratic), education, gender
Note: Linear probability model estimating the probability of marrying a foreign born. Number of
observations varies as estimation is done separately for two different samples of second generation
together with the same sample of natives and first-generation immigrants. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
12 Differences between natives and second-generation immigrants with homogenous
backgrounds stemming from South and North/Central America are insignificant, but sample
sizes are small.
13 No reduction in the propensity to marry a foreign born between first and second-
generation immigrants with homogenous backgrounds in comparison to natives is
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immigrants, a clear reduction in the propensity to marry a foreign born
is noted even for those with Asian and African backgrounds.
Results so far highlight the importance of considering not only the
selected sample of second-generation immigrants with parents from the
same country of origin, but also the majority of second-generation
immigrants with mixed backgrounds. The few indications of a lack of
cultural integration across immigrant generations found for some
groups in the sub-sample of second-generation immigrants with
homogenous backgrounds disappears when the full sample of second-
generation immigrants is considered.
6.4.4 Marriage to a co-national
Results of linear probability models estimating the probability of marry-
ing a co-national are shown in Table 6.6. As expected, due to the high
propensity of natives to partner with other natives, both first and








Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.299*** 0.426*** 0.464***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
West Europe 0.362*** 0.458*** 0.496***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
East Europe 0.088*** 0.397*** 0.469***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
North/Central America 0.439*** 0.472*** 0.503***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
South America 0.265*** 0.398*** 0.474***
(0.002) (0.035) (0.004)
Asia 0.048*** 0.252*** 0.447***
(0.001) (0.026) (0.026)
Africa 0.211*** 0.299*** 0.469***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003)
No. of observations 3,846,049 4,111,711
R2 0.139 0.094
Controls Age (quadratic), education, gender
Note: Linear probability model estimating the probability of marrying co-nationals, defined as a partner-
ship with someone from the same country of origin (own or parents). Number of observations varies as
estimation is done separately for two different samples of second generation together with the same
sample of natives and first-generation immigrants. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
consistent with theories suggesting a higher relative focus on ethnicity/nationality as a basis
for marital choice in these families compared to families with mixed backgrounds.
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second-generation immigrants are associated with significantly lower
probabilities ofmarrying co-nationals than natives. Differences between
natives and immigrants are generally larger for second-generation
immigrants in comparison to first-generation immigrants, implying a
significant decline in the propensity to marry co-nationals across immi-
grant generations. Differences between first-generation immigrants and
second-generation immigrants with homogenous foreign backgrounds
are insignificant for those stemming from North/Central America and
Africa, but become large and significant in the full sample of second-
generation immigrants. A significantly lower propensity to marry co-
nationals in the second generation suggests that the social/cultural
boundaries between ethnic groups in Sweden are declining across immi-
grant generations.
6.4.5 Young marriages
Another measure of cultural integration concerns the probability of
marrying young, that is, before (or while) the age of 25. Date of marriage
is registered only for those who change their civil status in Sweden. Date
of first marriage for first-generation immigration is therefore missing for
those that married prior to arrival in Sweden. The discussion here there-
fore focuses on differences in the propensity to marry young between
natives and second-generation immigrants only.
Results from linear probabilitymodels on youngmarriage are reported
in Table 6.7. Results for the selected sample of second-generation im-
migrants with homogenous backgrounds indicate that those with ori-
gins in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa are associated
with higher probabilities of young marriage than natives. Differences
are largest for those with Asian backgrounds, with a 15.6 percentage
point higher relative probability of young marriage in comparison to
natives. No gaps in young marriage probabilities are found between
natives and second-generation immigrants with Nordic backgrounds
and only weakly significant differences between natives and those
with South and North/Central America backgrounds.
Results of estimation on the full sample of second-generation immi-
grants show that second-generation immigrants with a background
in the Nordic countries, Western Europe, South America, and North/
Central America are associated with similar or slight lower, but signifi-
cant, youngmarriage probabilities in comparison to natives. Those with
Asian and African backgrounds continue to show significantly higher
relative probabilities of marrying young, but at considerably smaller
levels than those reported for the selected sample of second-generation
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immigrants with homogenous backgrounds. In the full sample, second-
generation immigrants with Asian backgrounds are associated with
only a 2.5 percentage point higher probability of young marriage and
those with African backgrounds with a 1.3 percentage point higher
probability.
6.4.6 Cohabitation
Cohabitation without formal marriage is a relatively common phenom-
enon in Sweden. Eleven per cent of the working age population today is
registered as cohabiting in comparison to 40 per cent who are registered
as married. Registered information on cohabitation is based on house-
hold information and available only for those cohabitants that have
children in common, meaning that we miss cohabitants without chil-
dren. Nonetheless, cohabitation is a recognized legal union for couples
that live together on a permanent basis even for those without children.
Sweden and Denmark are often seen as the forerunners of this type of
household constellation. Even in the early 1960s, cohabitation had
become socially acceptable as a type of trial marriage. By 1975, the social








Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic NA 0.002 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001)
West Europe NA 0.012*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.001)
East Europe NA 0.058*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.002)
North/Central America NA 0.087* 0.001
(0.045) (0.004)
South America NA 0.046* 0.016*
(0.028) (0.008)
Asia/Middle East NA 0.156*** 0.025***
(0.010) (0.003)
Africa NA 0.089*** 0.013**
(0.023) (0.006)
No. of observations 3,200,474 3,474,663
R2 0.058 0.057
Controls Age (quadratic), education, gender
Note: Linear probability model on youngmarriage defined as marriage before on or before the age of 25.
Number of observations varies as estimation is done separately for two different samples of second
generation together with the same sample of natives and first-generation immigrants. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
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pressure for cohabiting couples to marry was relaxed and cohabitation
became an accepted alternative to marriage. This family type is, how-
ever, less common in non-Nordic countries, especially for couples with
children, suggesting that cohabitation can be an interesting measure of
cultural integration between immigrants and natives in Sweden.
Results from linear probability models on cohabitation are shown in
Table 6.8. Differences between natives and immigrants are surprisingly
small for both first and second-generation immigrants. Among first-
generation immigrants, this is partially a reflection of higher marriage
propensities rather than cohabitation in comparison to natives.14 The
largest difference between natives and first-generation immigrants is
found for those born in an Asian country (10.4 percentage point lower








Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
West Europe 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
East Europe 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.028***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
North/Central America 0.069*** 0.133*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.037) (0.003)
South America 0.033*** 0.102*** 0.040***
(0.002) (0.039) (0.008)
Asia 0.104*** 0.110*** 0.048***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Africa 0.094*** 0.153*** 0.071***
(0.001) (0.018) (0.018)
No. of observations 3,837,395 4,111,711
R2 0.058 0.056
Controls Age (quadratic), education, gender
Note: Linear probability model on cohabitation defined for cohabitants with children in common. No. of
observations varies as estimation is done separately for two different samples of second generation
together with the same sample of natives and first-generation immigrants. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
14 See Table 6.9 for an analysis of differences inmarital status between natives and first and
second-generation immigrants. A multinomial logit model on four civil status categories is
estimated: single, married/registered partner, cohabitant, and divorced. With the exception
of first-generation immigrants from the Nordic countries, all first-generation immigrants are
more likely, in comparison to natives, to be married than single. These estimations also
confirm lower relative propensities to cohabit among first-generation immigrants.
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probability).15 Second-generation immigrants are in some cases found
to be even less likely than first-generation immigrants to cohabit (in
comparison to natives) suggesting a lack of cultural integration across
immigrant generations in this dimension. This is true for second-gen-
eration immigrants with homogenous national backgrounds stem-
ming from countries in South and North/Central America, as well as
Africa. For these two groups, lower propensities to cohabit do not stem
from higher relative marriage propensities (as shown in Table 6.9).
When estimation is based on all second-generation immigrants,
including those with mixed backgrounds, although point estimates
continue to show significantly lower likelihoods of cohabitation for all
region of origin groups in comparison to natives, coefficient estimates
are smaller than those found for first-generation immigrants (with the
exception of South Americans). Similar results are found when estima-
tion takes into account numerous civil status categories via a multi-
nomial logit analysis (see Table 6.9). Results suggest that a process of
cultural integration in terms of cohabitation is occurring across immi-
grant generations for the majority of immigrants in Sweden.
6.4.7 Divorce
Based on registered information on current civil status, the probability
of being divorced is estimated with linear probability models. Results,
reported in Table 6.10, show that both first and second-generation im-
migrants are associated with higher divorce rates than natives.16 Divorce
gaps between natives and first-generation immigrants are highest for
those stemming from countries in North/Central America and Africa
(approximately 16 percentage points higher than natives).17 Among
second-generation immigrants, divorce gaps are highest for second-gen-
eration immigrants with homogeneous backgrounds stemming from an
African country (9.7 percentage points higher). In the full sample of
second-generation immigrants, differences between regions are small; a
positive divorce gap of approximately two percentage points is found for
all regions (except North/Central America). As differences between
15 Asian first-generation immigrants also have the highest relative probability of being
married rather than single in comparison to natives (see Table 6.9).
16 Second-generation immigrants with backgrounds in a North/Central America country
do not differ from natives in divorce propensities.
17 Estimation allowing for different civil status states (see Table 6.9) confirms that first-
generation immigrants are more likely to be divorced than single in comparison to natives,
regardless of region of origin. This difference is smaller for second-generation immigrants,
with the exception of second-generation immigrants with African backgrounds who have
similar divorce propensities to first-generation immigrants stemming fromAfrican countries.
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Table 6.9 Multinomial logit estimation of marital status (single, marriage,









Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.217*** 0.236*** 0.230***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.006)
[0.061] [0.056] [0.052]
West Europe 0.220*** 0.084*** 0.171***
(0.011) (0.027) (0.010)
[0.034] [0.007] [0.033]
East Europe 0.972*** 0.006 0.181***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.011)
[0.111] [0.002] [0.032]
South America 0.296*** 0.041 0.080***
(0.023) (0.438) (0.024)
[0.017] [0.008] [0.001]
North/Central America 0.197*** 0.893*** 0.368***
(0.015) (0.291) (0.057)
[0.054] [0.210] [0.068]
Asia 1.260*** 0.504*** 0.120***
(0.008) (0.061) (0.023)
[0.160] [0.091] [0.016]




Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.211*** 0.171*** 0.158***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007)
[0.010] [0.004] [0.003]
West Europe 0.307*** 0.507*** 0.291***
(0.018) (0.040) (0.013)
[0.036] [0.033] [0.016]
East Europe 0.074*** 0.426*** 0.331***
(0.013) (0.029) (0.015)
[0.057] [0.032] [0.018]
South America 0.506*** 1.765* 0.302***
(0.037) (1.060) (0.039)
[0.052] [0.077] [0.019]
North/Central America 0.057*** 0.863*** 0.462***
(0.020) (0.333) (0.076)
[0.029] [0.034] [0.019]
Asia 0.321*** 0.848*** 0.492***
(0.013) (0.099) (0.033)
[0.074] [0.066] [0.032]
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natives and immigrants diminish across immigrant generations, results
suggest that a process of cultural integration in divorce norms is occur-
ring. See also Table 6.9.
6.4.8 Partner age gaps
On average, natives differ in age from their partners by 3.3 years, first-
generation immigrants by 5 years and second-generation immigrants by
3.5 years. Results from OLS estimation on partner age gaps controlling
for differences in age, education, and gender are shown in Table 6.11. As
expected, first-generation immigrants tend to have larger age gaps
between partners than natives, with as much as four years for those
born in an African country. In the second generation, relative differ-










Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.228*** 0.072*** 0.034***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.008)
[0.046] [0.027] [0.022]
West Europe 0.419*** 0.108*** 0.062***
(0.015) (0.041) (0.015)
[0.036] [0.024] [0.022]
East Europe 1.282*** 0.199*** 0.026
(0.010) (0.031) (0.016)
[0.076] [0.028] [0.019]
South America 0.822*** 0.323 0.068**
(0.030) (0.622) (0.033)
[0.090] [0.056] [0.001]
North/Central America 1.083*** 0.288 0.048
(0.018) (0.461) (0.096)
[0.143] [0.125] [0.025]
Asia 1.446*** 0.652*** 0.100***
(0.010) (0.090) (0.034)
[0.066] [0.042] [0.025]
Africa 1.732*** 1.131*** 0.033
(0.018) (0.230) (0.075)
[0.166] [0.188] [0.031]
No. of observations 3,837,395 4,111,584
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.070
Controls Age, education, gender
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in square brackets.
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in comparison to first-generation levels, especially when considering
the full sample of second-generation immigrants.
6.4.9 Female employment rates
As noted earlier, unlike cultural integration, the economic integration of
immigrants and natives in Sweden has been widely researched. The
consensus in this literature is that employment gaps with natives are
larger than wage gaps. Due to widespread unionization and collective
agreements that also cover non-union members, the scope for wage
discrimination in Sweden is relatively small. Another interesting fact is
that native-immigrant wage gaps are smaller among females than males
(le Grand and Szulkin, 2002). Any decline in employment gaps between
native and immigrant females across immigrant generations should be
interpreted as a sign of economic and cultural integration as female
immigrants may have different initial norms concerning the trade-off
between home and labour market production.18








Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.059*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
West Europe 0.042*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
East Europe 0.092*** 0.028*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
North/Central America 0.088*** 0.039 0.001
(0.003) (0.060) (0.003)
South America 0.163*** 0.043* 0.023***
(0.002) (0.026) (0.007)
Asia 0.077*** 0.040*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.003)
Africa 0.165*** 0.097*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.023) (0.005)
No. of observations 3,837,395 4,111,711
R2 0.039 0.039
Controls Age (quadratic), education, gender
Note: Linear probability models on divorce. Number of observations varies as estimation is done
separately for two different samples of second generation together with the same sample of natives
and first-generation immigrants. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
18 See also estimation of female, native-immigrant income gaps reported in Table 6.12.
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Results from linear probability models on employment comparing
female natives with first and second-generation female immigrants are
shown in Table 6.13. Three specifications are shown, for the entire sample
as well as for two age cohorts of immigrants (younger than 30 and 30
plus). Throughout, the reference group is working age female natives
(16–65). Results for the full sample (column 1), indicate that there is a
significant employment gap between natives and immigrants (both gen-
erations). In comparison to first-generation immigrants, employment
gaps for second-generation immigrants are significantly smaller, suggest-
ing both cultural and economic integration across immigrant genera-
tions. A comparison of the two age cohorts of female immigrants shows
that employment gaps are largest for first-generation immigrants in the
older age group.
There are a number of potential explanations for larger employment
gaps among older, female first-generation immigrants. First, older first-
generation immigrants have a higher age at immigration. In the older
age group the average age at arrival is 25 years, while in the younger age
group the average age at arrival is 13 years. Numerous studies examining
the impact of age at migration have shown that a higher age at arrival








Native with native parents Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nordic 0.391*** 0.179*** 0.198***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.010)
West Europe 1.040 *** 0.382*** 0.214***
(0.022) (0.052) (0.018)
East Europe 1.369*** 0.182*** 0.140***
(0.014) (0.035) (0.019)
North/Central America 1.254*** 1.034* 0.080**
(0.050) (0.544) (0.039)
South America 1.519*** 0.208 0.123
(0.035) (0.569) (0.108)
Asia 2.615*** 0.248*** 0.294***
(0.014) (0.091) (0.043)
Africa 4.009*** 1.306*** 0.293***
(0.040) (0.350) (0.087)
No. of observations 2,335,102 2,490,230
R2 0.054 0.051
Controls Age (quadratic), education, gender
Note: OLS estimations on partner age gaps defined as the absolute value of partner age differences.
Number of observations varies as estimation is done separately for two different samples of second
generation together with the same sample of natives and first-generation immigrants. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
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Natives with native parents (16–65) Ref. Ref. Ref.
First generation
Nordic 0.073*** 0.010 0.081***
(0.004) (0.018) (0.004)
West Europe 0.240*** 0.213*** 0.247***
(0.009) (0.025) (0.009)
East Europe 0.304*** 0.185*** 0.341***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
South America 0.367*** 0.342*** 0.377***
(0.016) (0.038) (0.018)
North/Central America 0.301*** 0.148*** 0.362***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.010)
Asia 0.499*** 0.300*** 0.593***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
Africa 0.442*** 0.271*** 0.510***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.011)
Second generation—parents from the same country of origin
Nordic 0.008 0.189*** 0.071***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.006)
West Europe 0.062*** 0.006 0.081***
(0.016) (0.041) (0.017)
East Europe 0.006 0.023 0.014
(0.016) (0.020) (0.012)
South America 0.780*** 1.068*** 0.065
(0.197) (0.247) (0.161)
North/Central America 0.310*** 0.292*** 0.077
(0.039) (0.040) (0.191)
Asia 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.038
(0.017) (0.018) (0.036)
Africa 0.317*** 0.309*** 0.168
(0.046) (0.048) (0.141)
No. of Observations 2,165,447 1,897,776 2,078,301
R2 0.326 0.360 0.312
Second generation—full sample
Nordic 0.038*** 0.089*** 0.078***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
West Europe 0.052*** 0.001 0.064***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.006)
East Europe 0.035*** 0.027** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
South America 0.095*** 0.260*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.031) (0.014)
North/Central America 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.072*
(0.020) (0.023) (0.038)
(continued )
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decreases economic and cultural integration (see, for example, Åslund
et al., 2008). Second, the older group of first-generation female immi-
grants has a higher average duration of residence. In this age group,
25 per cent immigrated before the mid-1970s in comparison to less than
one per cent in the younger group.19 Higher duration of residence
should arguably improve employment chances, but immigrants that
arrived in Sweden prior to the mid-1970s were primarily labour immi-
grants recruited to work in the booming manufacturing sector. Female
immigrants at the time had higher employment rates than natives,
which subsequently led to higher rates of early retirement due to dis-
abilities or for other health-related reasons.
6.4.10 Female education gaps
As a final measure of cultural and economic integration, female native-
immigrant gaps in education are examined and results shown in
Table 16.4.
Results for all females (Table 6.14, column 1) indicate that female first-
generation immigrants have higher years of education than female
natives. Female second-generation immigrants with homogenous
national backgrounds are associated with significantly lower years of
education than natives, regardless of region of origin. In the full sample
of second-generation immigrants, education gaps again indicate lower
years of education for those stemming from Nordic, South America, and
Asian countries, but differences are smaller than those found between






Asia 0.159*** 0.167*** 0.079***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Africa 0.181*** 0.212*** 0.031
(0.019) (0.023) (0.029)
No. of observations 2,341,251 1,954,290 2,197,591
R2 0.330 0.371 0.304
Controls Age (quadratic), Education
Note: OLS estimation on annual work income. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
19 Note that duration of residence is based on latest year of immigration, which may
underestimate duration of residence for frequent migrants.
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Natives with native parents (16–65) Ref. Ref. Ref.
First generation
Nordic 0.098*** 0.132*** 0.098***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
West Europe 0.189*** 0.208*** 0.188***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
East Europe 0.206*** 0.141*** 0.228***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
North/Central America 0.233*** 0.228*** 0.238***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
South America 0.175*** 0.115*** 0.201***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Asia 0.284*** 0.208*** 0.323***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Africa 0.264*** 0.210*** 0.291***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Second generation—parents from the same country of origin
Nordic 0.037*** 0.006 0.056***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
West Europe 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.074***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
East Europe 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.054***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
North/Central America 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.132
(0.037) (0.039) (0.101)
South America 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.080
(0.009) (0.010) (0.068)
Asia 0.091*** 0.085*** 0.074***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
Africa 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.150***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.045)
No. of observations 2,548,710 2,188,280 2,427,294
R2 0.221 0.237 0.208
Second generation—full sample
Nordic 0.035*** 0.005 0.048***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
West Europe 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
East Europe 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.048***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
North/Central America 0.034*** 0.090*** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
South America 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.063***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.015)
(continued )
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backgrounds. In the full sample of second-generation immigrants, those
stemming from countries in Western European and North/Central
American indicate higher years of education than natives, but differ-
ences are smaller than those found between natives and first-generation
immigrants. Results therefore suggest a convergence between native and
immigrant levels of education across immigrant generations. Note,
however, that these results may also reflect selection effects, that is,
the fact that second-generation immigrants today are to a large degree
the descendents of relatively unskilled labour migrants, while first-gen-
eration immigrants today are more likely to be well-educated refugees or
tied movers.
The probability of having a university degree is also estimated and
results presented in Table 6.15. Results indicate greater heterogeneity in
higher education gaps between natives and immigrants. First-genera-
tion female immigrants stemming from countries in Western Europe
and North/Central America are associated with higher probabilities of
being university educated in comparison to female natives, while first-
generation immigrants from other regions have lower relative probabil-
ities. In the full sample of second-generation immigrants, education
gaps are smaller in comparison to first-generation levels, both positive
and negative gaps are smaller. Similar to the pattern established
throughout this study on the various cultural indicators, second-
generation immigrants with homogenous backgrounds indicate a
slower process of cultural integration across immigrant generations.
Education gaps are negative and significant for all regions, often at







Asia 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.064***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Africa 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.085***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
No. of observations 2,753,867 2,259,718 2,561,013
R2 0.222 0.244 0.203
Controls Age (quadratic), Education
Note: Linear probability models on employment. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.14 Female education (dependent variable: year of education as





Natives with native parents (16–65) Ref. Ref. Ref.
First generation
Nordic 1.376*** 1.144*** 1.430***
(0.036) (0.043) (0.040)
West Europe 1.124*** 1.145*** 1.147***
(0.067) (0.056) (0.083)
East Europe 0.254*** 0.364*** 0.215***
(0.031) (0.019) (0.048)
North/Central America 1.440*** 0.660*** 1.822***
(0.102) (0.078) (0.143)
South America 0.917*** 0.048 1.533***
(0.054) (0.038) (0.085)
Asia 0.781*** 0.207*** 1.342***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.044)
Africa 1.041*** 0.299*** 2.363***
(0.061) (0.039) (0.111)
Second generation—parents from the same country of origin
Nordic 0.451*** 0.309*** 0.486***
(0.037) (0.029) (0.055)
West Europe 0.455*** 0.095 0.665***
(0.099) (0.081) (0.140)
East Europe 0.334*** 0.052 0.597***
(0.050) (0.037) (0.094)
North/Central America 0.740*** 1.024*** 0.817
(0.286) (0.187) (1.596)
South America 0.589*** 0.666*** 2.078**
(0.062) (0.059) (0.988)
Asia 0.571*** 0.618*** 0.257
(0.031) (0.024) (0.276)
Africa 0.434*** 0.610*** 1.470***
(0.073) (0.061) (0.581)
No. of Observations 1,810,550 1,644,419 1,715,209
R2 0.323 0.332 0.310
Second generation—full sample
Nordic 0.085*** 0.107*** 0.004
(0.020) (0.014) (0.030)
West Europe 0.275*** 0.341*** 0.310***
(0.032) (0.025) (0.048)
East Europe 0.013 0.171*** 0.051
(0.031) (0.023) (0.053)
North/Central America 0.183** 0.070 0.290**
(0.091) (0.055) (0.140)
(continued )
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South America 0.109** 0.267*** 0.981***
(0.046) (0.038) (0.263)
Asia 0.157*** 0.375*** 0.685***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.115)
Africa 0.097** 0.242*** 1.356***
(0.049) (0.039) (0.174)
No. of observations 1,976,128 1,713,377 1,811,829
R2 0.325 0.435 0.302
Controls Age (quadratic)
Note: OLS estimation age left full time education. Robust standard errors in parentheses.





Natives with native parents (16–65) Ref. Ref. Ref.
First generation
Nordic 0.049*** 0.154*** 0.064***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
West Europe 0.110*** 0.222*** 0.091***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
East Europe 0.015*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
North/Central America 0.190*** 0.124*** 0.213***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.007)
South America 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Asia 0.045*** 0.015*** 0.055***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Africa 0.136*** 0.096*** 0.149***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Second generation—parents from the same country of origin
Nordic 0.101*** 0.057*** 0.115***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
West Europe 0.034*** 0.004 0.044***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
East Europe 0.018*** 0.006 0.019***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
North/Central America 0.062** 0.084*** 0.089
(0.026) (0.015) (0.118)
South America 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.070
(0.006) (0.006) (0.081)
Asia 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.056***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014)
Africa 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.032
(0.008) (0.008) (0.047)
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6.4.11 Subjective values—acculturation identity
No information on subjective values is available in the register data used
in the analysis above. Data on subjective values in Sweden comes from
survey studies which tend to cover smaller, not always random, samples
of the population. One such survey is the 1995 Follow-up Surveys of Pupils
which follows a cohort of students that graduated from compulsory
school in 1988.20 The 1995 survey, conducted seven years after gradua-
tion from compulsory school, when the majority of respondents were
23 years of age, sampled the entire population of students with immi-
grant backgrounds, defined as having one or both parents born abroad
(in total 4867 individuals). These individuals were asked a number of
specific questions relating to their foreign background, including ques-
tions concerning identification to host and home cultures. Similar ques-
tions were not asked to respondents with Swedish backgrounds,
prohibiting a comparison of identity between natives and immigrants.
In addition, as the sample surveyed consists of a cohort of compulsory
school graduates, immigrants in the sample are either born in Sweden
with a foreign-born parent (second generation) or foreign born but
immigrated before the age of sixteen (middle generation). As such, a
No. of observations 2,548,710 2,188,280 2,427,294
R2 0.043 0.049 0.039
Second generation—full sample
Nordic 0.057*** 0.029*** 0.064***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
West Europe 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
East Europe 0.003 0.006** 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
North/Central America 0.043*** 0.014*** 0.070***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
South America 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.073***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018)
Asia 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Africa 0.006 0.031*** 0.104***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
No. of observations 2,753,781 2,259,695 2,560,950
R2 0.045 0.053 0.037
Controls Age (quadratic)
Note: Linear probability models on the probability of having a university degree. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
20 Previous surveys on this cohort of students were conducted in 1990 and 1992.
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comparison between first and second-generation immigrants is less
relevant as the majority of the foreign born in the sample immigrated
to Sweden before school start.
Nonetheless, this survey provides unique information on how a
cohort of students with immigrant backgrounds identify with the
majority society culture as well as background cultures. Respondents
were asked the following questions: To what degree do you feel affinity
to your original background culture? To what degree do you feel
affinity to Swedish culture? Answers to these questions are coded into
a four-level scale based on the answer options available (completely,
partially, little, not at all). Departing from the acculturation framework
developed in the cross-cultural psychology literature, individuals are
coded into one of the four following categories (Berry, 1997; Berry and
Sam, 1997; Berry et al., 2006; Phinney 1989, 1990; Phinney et al., 2001;
Martinez and Dukes, 1997). The first, integration, implies a strong sense
of belonging to the ethnic group together with a strong identification
with the majority society. Assimilation implies a strong identification to
Swedish culture but weakened ties to the culture of origin, while separa-
tion is the opposite, a strong affiliation to background cultures but weak
ties to the majority culture. Finally, marginalization implies weak ties to
















Integrated Assimilated Separated Marginalized
Figure 6.1 Distribution of acculturation identity (self-assessed), by region of
origin.
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The distribution of acculturation identity for respective region of
origin is shown in Figure 6.1.21 Within each region, the majority of
respondents self-identify as integrated. Thereafter, the next largest pro-
portion of respondents self-identify as assimilated. This implies that the
vastmajority in each region completely or partially feel an affinity to the
Swedish majority culture. Those with non-European backgrounds (Afri-
can, Asian, and South American) have the highest relative shares of
separated and marginalized, but these groups also have the highest
share of individuals born abroad. Ninety-three per cent of survey re-
spondents with non-European backgrounds were born abroad, com-
pared to approximately 30 per cent of those with Nordic or European
backgrounds.22
6.5 Conclusion
Using data on the entire working age population of Sweden in 2005, this
study has analysed differences between natives and immigrants on a
number of cultural measures: within-region gender gaps in education,
different types of marriage propensities, marriage rates at age 25, cohab-
itation, divorce, partner age gaps, female employment rates, female
education levels, and, based on a follow-up survey of students, identifi-
cation to home and host cultures. Cultural integration has throughout
(with a few exceptions) been measured by differences between natives
and immigrants across two immigrant generations from the same region
of origin.
For comparative purposes, estimation on second-generation immi-
grants was based on two samples of second-generation immigrants.
First, a selected sample of second-generation immigrants with parents
from the same country of origin was considered. This group constitutes
about 23 per cent of the population of second-generation immigrants
(defined as individuals born in Sweden with at least one foreign-born
parent). The majority of second-generation immigrants therefore have
mixed backgrounds, of which 68 per cent have one foreign-born parent
and one Swedish-born parent. A second round of estimation was
21 Note that only a few respondents to the survey had North American backgrounds. This
group is therefore not included in the comparison.
22 Separate estimation by immigration status yields largely similar results for middle and
second-generation immigrants. This is a likely consequence of the sample surveyed where
the foreign born by definition have a low age at entry.
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therefore based on the full sample of second-generation immigrants,
including those with mixed backgrounds.
Results, across the board, suggest a large degree of cultural integration
between natives and immigrants in Sweden. Estimation of within-
region gender gaps in education indicated that females tend to be
more educated than males in all groups, regardless of immigrant status,
with the exception of first-generation immigrants stemming from Afri-
can countries, where no gender differences in education were found.
Younger second-generation immigrants with African backgrounds did,
however, show a positive gender gap in education for women.
An analysis of marriage patterns (marriage to a foreign-born person,
marriage to a co-national, divorce, cohabitation, and partner age gaps),
suggests a high degree of cultural integration across immigrant genera-
tions. Deviations from this pattern, for example no reduction in the
propensity tomarry co-nationals across immigrant generations for some
groups, was highly contingent on the selected sample of second-gener-
ation immigrants with homogenous backgrounds (both parents from
the same country of origin). When estimation included the majority of
second-generation immigrants with mixed backgrounds, differences
between natives and immigrants in marriage patterns always dimin-
ished across immigrant generations.
Other indicators, such as female employment rates and female educa-
tion levels, yield similar results. Female native-immigrant employment
gaps are found to be negative and significant for both first and second-
generation immigrants, but the employment gap is smaller for second-
generation immigrants in comparison to first-generation immigrants.
In terms of education, first-generation female immigrants are found
to have higher levels of education than female natives, while second-
generation immigrants (full sample) have similar or lower levels of
education than natives.
A remaining question to answer is why cultural integration patterns
appear to be weaker for the selected (and relatively small) sample of
second-generation immigrants with homogenous national back-
grounds. Results concerning partnership patterns are in line with the-
ories stressing a higher relative emphasis on ethnic group belonging as a
basis for marital choices in families with homogenous backgrounds.
A lower degree of integration in terms of female employment rates and
female education levels among this group of second-generation immi-
grants may also be due to a higher orientation towards origin countries,
implying lower investment in host country skills and less interaction
with the majority population (as well as other ethnic groups), which
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may sustain cultural and economic boundaries between groups in soci-
ety across generations.
In conclusion, results from this study show that there is a process of
cultural integration occurring between natives and immigrants in Swe-
den. Initial differences in the numerous cultural measures used in this
analysis between natives and immigrants may be expected as it is pre-
cisely these differences which, at least partially, define the cultural
norms of the majority population. Due to subsequent adaptations in
both the majority and minority populations, initial differences are ex-
pected to diminish over time and across generations. This study pro-
vides empirical support that such a process of cultural integration is
indeed occurring across immigrant generations in Sweden.
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7
Cultural Integration in Switzerland
Pierre Kohler
7.1 Introduction
Until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, Switzerland was
mainly an emigration country. Since the end of the nineteenth century,
Switzerland and inflowing migrants have maintained a mutually bene-
ficial relationship interspersed with difficult episodes.1 Despite the
impossibility of an accepted definition of (the Swiss) national identity,
populist right-wing political parties recurrently attempt to instrumenta-
lize successive migration waves to strengthen the fear that Switzerland
may lose its identity to migrants unable to integrate culturally into
society. The recent successes of popular anti-migrant initiatives stress
the many open questions that remain concerning the handling of
cultural integration issues in Switzerland (D’Amato, 2008).
Cultural integration can be defined as the evolution of behaviours,
attitudes, daily life habits, beliefs, etc. (Wanner et al., 2002). Different
schools of thought exist in cultural integration literature. Assimilation
theory assumes that cultural differences progressively level out, whereas
multiculturalism insists on their persistence over time (Alba and Nee,
1997). Proponents of de-constructivism and system theories have criti-
cized ‘groupist’ approaches, arguing that groups are a product of social
processes or discourse and do not exist a priori. However, empirical
observation tends to hint that none of these theories are adequate and
that the relation between ethnicity, identity, behaviours, and attitudes is
a complex multi-level evolutionary phenomenon (Wimmer, 2008). As
an example, a study conducted in three migrant neighbourhoods in
1 See next section for a brief review of migration history and policy in Switzerland.
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Swiss cities shows that even if migrants do not primarily define themselves
in ethnic terms, the majority of their social interactions occur within the
group they belong to (Wimmer, 2004). Cultural integration may affect
behaviours and attitudes in different ways. Furthermore, the cultural
dimension of the integration process ofmigrant is influenced by economic
factors as well as the social and political context in which the integration
process is occurring. Wage and employment discrimination, legal incen-
tives determining access to citizenship and host society culture are some of
the factors influencing the cultural integration of migrants (Kohler, 2012).
Such evidence calls for further research on the stability of group boundaries
and their transformation, so as to better understand the evolutionary
nature of group formation and how groups insert themselves in the host
society. Qualitative studies have generated knowledge over the cultural
integration patterns of specific communities residing in Switzerland. How-
ever, only few quantitative studies have been conducted on that subject.
This chapter contributes to this debate by specifically exploring the
cultural integration paths of eight migrant groups from the first to the
second generation. It traces the evolution of selected behaviours and
attitudes, which are taken as indicative of cultural integration. Different
perspectives are proposed to deepen the analysis. First, differences across
cohorts are used to investigate change and continuity over time (Georgia-
dis and Manning, 2011) and to see if younger migrants depart from
behaviours and attitudes of older migrants.2 Second, to explore the role
of intermarriage as a factor (and not only an outcome) of integration
(Waldis, 2008), differences across individuals in endogamous and mixed
couples are examined. Can significant patterns be identified? Andwhat is
the effect of education? These are some of the questions explored in this
chapter. Special attention is given to migrant women, as they play a key
role in the transmissionof cultural traits and in the socializationprocess of
the second generation on whommost policy efforts are targeted.
The remainder of this introduction proposes a short overview ofmigra-
tion history and policy in Switzerland since themid-nineteenth century.
Section 7.2 provides a review of related quantitative studies and
Section 7.3 presents a snapshot of themigrant population in Switzerland
as well as pertinent data. Section 7.4 defines the indicators of cultural
integration and provides additional details pertaining to the common
approach used in this book to investigate the cultural integration of
migrants. Section 7.5 presents the results of the investigation of the
evolution of migrants’ behaviours by examining their performances at
2 In this text, migrants born before 1970 are labelled as ‘old’ and those born after 1970 as
‘young’.
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school (educational achievement and gender education gap) as well as
their position in the couple (marriage, intermarriage, age and education
gapbetweenpartners, earlymarriage, cohabitation, fertility, divorce), and
in the labour market (labour force participation). This section also covers
their subjective attitudes by examining their use of national languages,
their feelings towards Switzerland as well as their gender, religious and
political attitudes. The last section concludes by summarizing key find-
ings and proposes recommendations for future integration policies.
7.2 Migration history and policy: ‘Ueberfremdung’
and its shadow
For centuries, Switzerlandwas a country of emigration before becoming an
immigration country. In 1850, migrants were almost non-existent in Swit-
zerland except for the Huguenots (Henry et al., 1995). The construction of
infrastructure necessary for the unfolding Industrial Revolution created an
excess demand for manpower. At that time, foreigners were welcome and
perceived as indispensable. The Swiss government signed recruitment
agreements with neighbouring countries, granting migrants the same
rights as nationals. Two years of residence were sufficient to acquire
Swiss citizenship. Thispolicywas in linewith thebelief thatnaturalization
was themost suitableway toassimilatemigrants (Wicker, 2003). Figure 7.1
shows that the share of foreigners living in Switzerland progressively rose
and reached 15 per cent in 1910, one of the highest rates in Europe.
The outbreak of the FirstWorldWar signalled the beginning of a lasting
change in the perception of migrants as a threat to Swiss culture. Conser-
vative circles brought into the political debate the idea of Ueberfremdung,
the fear that Swiss identity will be dissolved with the inflow of too many
foreigners. In 1917, the Central Office for Aliens Police was created in
order to better monitor the migrant population. In 1931, the Federal Law
on the Settlement and Residence of Foreigners engraved in law the trans-
mutation of ‘migrants’ into ‘foreigners’ (Wicker, 2003). It also made resi-
dence and naturalization more difficult. In the 1930s, a more malleable
version of the Ueberfremdung idea, the Geistige Landesverteidigung, literally
the spiritual national defence, insisted on the duty of individuals to
defend typical Swiss values. With Nazi and fascist regimes at the border,
liberal circles progressively rallied conservatives around the flag to pro-
mote ‘Swiss’ values such as cultural diversity, democracy, or technological
progress. This episode of Swiss history is important because the national
‘culture of threat’ that developed in Switzerland and the representation of
foreigners as a danger to Swiss identity had a lasting impact on Swiss
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
212
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
collective identity and immigration policy (Riano and Wastl-Walter,
2006). During that period, the proportion ofmigrant population dropped
sharply and reached 5 per cent on the eve of the SecondWorldWar.
In the second half of the twentieth century, three successive waves of
immigration brought different types ofmigrants to Switzerland. The defen-
sive attitude inherited from the previous period still affected policy deci-
sions. While the government attempted to provide cheap labour to the
economy, it always had to pay attention to underlying xenophobic feelings
likely to burst onto the political scene. Like other countries, Switzerland
opted for aGastarbeiter system. The first recruitment agreement was signed
with Italy in 1948 and was followed by an inflow of Italian manpower.
Spaniards came soon after. Despite a quota system, immigration kept rising.
In1970, theSchwarzenbach initiative,whichproposed toexpelone thirdof
migrants and imposeharsherquotas,was rejectedonlyby54percent inone
of thehighestpoll turnouts inSwisshistory.The federal government reacted
by imposing more restrictive quotas, but it was mostly the non-renewal
of permits that drove out migrants. This was also a convenient way for
Switzerland to export its unemployment. During the economic crisis of
the 1970s, 67 per cent of the 340,000 workers who lost their jobs were
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Figure 7.1 Migrant population and right wing populist parties in Switzerland
(1850–2011).
Source: OFS and D’Amato (2008)
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1980s, the second wave of migration followed a different pattern. Portu-
guese, Yugoslav, and Turkish workers, as well as refugees from Sri Lanka,
Vietnam, and the Middle East also brought their families with them. After
a decline in the 1970s, migrant population again exceeded 15 per cent
in 1990.
Pressure from European countries for the improvement of conditions for
their nationals drove Swiss authorities to reconsider their immigration
policy. The ideas of creating a point systemor implementing a ‘three circles’
policy based on the concept of ‘cultural distance’ of migrants were debated
as ameans to satisfy Switzerland’s neighbourswithout alienating xenopho-
bic voters. In the 1990s, Switzerland started to apply a ‘three circles’ policy,
defining an inner circle andouter circles, and creating ahierarchy favouring
individuals from EU/EFTA countries over those from the US and the rest of
the world. Through bilateral agreements, EU/EFTA citizens are granted the
same living and working rights as the Swiss (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003),
while, for other countries, immigration is restricted to highly-qualified
individuals only. Beyond the pragmatism of Swiss authorities, this political
move also hints at the shift of symbolic barriers and a change in how the
Swiss define foreigners and themselves (Wicker, 2003). However, this new
policy could not prevent unwanted migrants from coming to Switzerland.
During this period, the third wave of migrants was mostly composed of
refugees from former Yugoslavia, but also from Africa, as well as highly
qualified workers, mainly from neighbouring countries (Piguet, 2009).
Despite different restrictive policies, the migrant population has kept
rising and the proportion of foreigners officially reached 22.9 per cent in
2009 (OFS).3 As it became obvious that manymigrants will never return to
their home countries, politicians could no longer escape the question of
migrant integration. Some cantons had started to use their autonomy in
matters of education, religious matters, and the attribution of local civic
rights to deal with integration-related issues, but their practices are hetero-
geneous and resources very limited. The legal basis for a coherent federal
policywas only set up in 1998when the integration ofmigrants became an
item on the Swiss political agenda and the Federal Law on the Settlement
and Residence of Foreigners was once more amended to allow the govern-
ment to subsidize the integrationof ‘foreigners’. In2001, abudgetof around
tenmillion Swiss francs was accepted and has barely increased since (OFM,
2006). Theprevious year, anorder of the government defined the objectives
of integration and the tasks of the Federal Commission for Foreigners.
The Central Office for Aliens’ Police was changed into the Federal
3 See www.bfs.admin.ch.
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Migration Office (Wicker, 2003). For a majority of the Swiss population,
Western and Southern European migrants may be considered as economic
competitors, but not as a threat to the Swiss identity. This empathy, how-
ever, does not extend to ‘non-European’ migrants. In 2005, a new Federal
Law on Foreigners was passed, defining in depth the objectives and prin-
ciples of integration policy as well as the competence of the government
(OFM, 2006). The fact that a conservative government has initiated such
changes during a period where the populist right wing has risen to become
the strongest political force in the federal parliament indicates that the
design of an integration strategy is politically costly, but indispensable
(D’Amato, 2008). As in other countries, many voters are caught between
the fear that the country they know may change and the necessity of
adapting to a globalizing economy and society.
7.3 Related literature
The findings of the few existing quantitative studies relevant for this
investigation are briefly presented below, with some of the results referred
to later, as necessary.4 Qualitative studies are not presented here, but the
results of some of them will be mentioned when interpreting the results.
Bauer and Riphahn (2005) investigated the performance of migrants at
school through the study of intergenerational patterns of educational
attainment. Fibbi et al. (2005) looked at statistical differences across
gender and between naturalized and non-naturalized second-generation
migrants. They also proposed an analysis of the probability to have a
weak education level, to be in the labour force, to be unemployed, and to
acquire Swiss citizenship, by regressing independent variables on a set of
origin dummies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and six
former Yugoslavian provinces) and other controls. Wanner et al. (2003,
2005b) prepared a comprehensive study on female labour force partici-
pation. Other reports proposed statistics only on socio-professional
and household characteristics of migrants at large (Wanner, 2004), on
migrants, the use of language and religion (OFS, 2005), or on migrant
families, highlighting their specificity and understanding their role in the
migration and integration process (Fibbi et al., 2005b).
4 International economic literature on cultural integration has rapidly grown in recent
years and it is not possible to review all of them here. In Switzerland, sociologists and
demographers were the first to conduct cultural integration studies based on larger datasets
as they became available. By contrast, economists mainly focused on the economic integra-
tion of migrants in the labour market.
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Quantitative studies on subjective attitudes of migrants are even less
numerous, as surveys containing such data are costly to implement and
usually have a small sample size. Wanner et al. (2002) investigate deter-
minants of the values and beliefs ofmigrants based on data from the first
two waves (1999 and 2000) of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). They
regressed many indicators on origin dummies (Swiss, Italian, Spanish/
Portuguese, other European Economic Community/European Free
Trade Association, other Europe, rest of the world) and controlled
whether respondents have one or two parents of foreign origin.
This study is the first to systematically examine the evolution of the
behaviours and attitudes of migrants to better understand their cultural
integration paths from the first to the second generation. Previous articles
eitheronly focusedon the secondgenerationorattributedacommonfactor
to the second generationwhen considering allmigrants. It also differs from
existing literature in the way migrant groups are defined. Although Euro-
peanmigrants form the bulk of themigrant population in Switzerland, the
focus isnotonEuropeannational communities, butona limitednumberof
broadly definedmigrant categories that are geographically more balanced.
7.4 Migrant population and data
7.4.1 Migrant groups definition and composition
Table 7.1 shows that in 2000 when the last census was conducted in
Switzerland, 29 per cent of the population was of foreign descent and
Table 7.1 Migrants living in Switzerland in 2000 by region of origin and
generation.5
Region of origin All First generation Second generation
Natives (in %) 70.78
Migrants (in %) 29.22 20.07 9.14
Of which (in %)
WE 27.34 28.12 25.65
SE 34.79 28.62 48.35
EE 21.05 24.06 14.44
AF 2.03 2.51 0.98
TMM 6.84 6.99 6.49
SA 2.82 3.44 1.47
AS 2.52 3.29 0.8
SCA 2.61 2.98 1.82
Source: Swiss census, 2000.
5 In all the regression tables, ‘R2’ stands for ‘R-squared’. When a probit estimator is used
instead of an OLS estimator, a pseudo R-squared (‘PR2’) is reported instead as well as a log
likelihood statistics (‘ll’). In all the figures, a value represents the average difference between a
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more than 20 per cent were foreigners. As mentioned earlier, these
proportions have slightly increased during the last decade. First-
generation migrants are born abroad, whereas second-generation
migrants are born in Switzerland, but are of foreign origin.6 The
proportion of second-generation compared to first-generation migrants
is a rough indicator of the length of stay of a particular group in
Switzerland.
Groups of migrants presented in Table 7.1 are based on an aggregated
United Nations typology and correspond to broad regions of origin.7
Besides natives, eight groups of migrants are formed: Western Europe
and Anglo-Saxon countries (WE), Southern Europe (SE), Eastern Europe
(EE), Africa (AF), Turkey, the Middle East and Maghreb (TMM), Latin
Amercia (LA), Asia (AS), and South and Central Asia (SCA).8 This classi-
fication is arbitrary to some extent and can be the subject of a debate. Is
it still relevant to distinguish between Southern, Western, and Central
Europe? Should Turkey be considered part of Eastern Europe as Russia is?
Should the focus be on national communities only? The implications of
defining population groups andmapping differences across them can be
problematic as it transmits information without explicitly addressing
migrant group and the natives. The dotted lines that are visible in some graphs represent
standard deviations.
6 More details on categorization issues can be found in Section 7.2.
7 The SHP sample not displayed here is similar to the census sample, with two exceptions:
(1) the sample of first-generation migrants is smaller; (2) the proportion of migrants from
Eastern Europe is smaller.
8 The categories include the following countries: (1) WE: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States;
(2) SE: Andorra, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, the Vatican; (3) EE:
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Ukraine; (4) AF: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Ivory
Coast, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Maurice, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe;
(5) TMM: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Western Sahara, Yemen; (6) LA: Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Dominique, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela;
(7) AS: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, China (Taiwan), Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Korea
(North), Korea (South), Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philip-
pines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam; (8) SCA:
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
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the assumptions that lie behind the classification (Winlow, 2006). In the
present case, the main reason for lumping national communities into
broad categories is that the Swiss political discourse is often articulated
at such an aggregate level. It is however necessary to keep in mind the
composition of the different groups when analysing results.
The first three groups are significantly larger than the five remaining
ones and represent 83 per cent of the migrant population in Switzerland.
The first group gathers Western and Northern Europeans as well as
Anglo-Saxons. Three-quarters are from neighbouring Germany (37 per
cent), France (26 per cent), and Austria (12 per cent), and are not part of
any specific wave of migration. Italians dominate the Southern European
group (65 per cent); Spaniards (19 per cent), and Portuguese (14 per cent)
are also sizeable communities. The group of Eastern Europeans is largely
dominated by former Yugoslavia (85 per cent), but remains heteroge-
neous. Migrants from this country first came as economic migrants
in the 1980s, and then massively as refugees fleeing the civil war after
1991. The largest community comes from former Serbia-Montenegro
(48 per cent), with half of them being Muslims from Kosovo. Bosnia
and Herzegovina (13 per cent), Macedonia (12 per cent), and Croatia
(9 per cent) follow in terms of size.
Immigration from Africa (excludingMaghreb) is more recent and very
diverse. The three largest communities come from Angola (13 per cent),
Congo (10 per cent), and Somalia (10 per cent). Many are political
refugees. The Middle East generated a significant number of political
refugees too, but most migrants of the sixth group are workers from
Turkey (66 per cent) or Maghreb (20 per cent). Latin Americans mostly
come from Brazil (29 per cent) and the Dominican Republic, Colombia,
and Chile (10 per cent each). The Asian group is similarly heteroge-
neous, with economic migrants from Thailand (20 per cent), the
Philippines (17 per cent), China (15 per cent), and Japan (10 per cent),
and political refugees from Vietnam (19 per cent) and Cambodia (4 per
cent). The final group of South and Central Asia is clearly dominated by
political refugees from Sri-Lanka (59 per cent). Indians (17 per cent) and
Iranians (12 per cent) are also sizeable communities.
7.4.2 The Swiss census and the Swiss Household Panel
Two surveys are used to investigate the patterns of migrant cultural
integration in Switzerland: the 2000 Swiss census and the Swiss House-
hold Panel (SHP). As mentioned in the introduction (see Table 7.1), the
census covers the seven million individuals living in Switzerland in
2000. It provides information about the country of birth of an
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individual, his first and second nationality, and whether he is Swiss by
birth or not. Individuals born in Switzerland and Swiss by birth are
defined as natives. First-generation migrants are born abroad.
A second-generation migrant is an individual born in Switzerland, but
whose first or second nationality is foreign.9
The SHP started in 1999 with 7,799 individuals answering a detailed
questionnaire. New observations from the European Survey on Income
and Living Conditions (SILC) were added in 2004 and 2005 and
increased the total number of observations by wave to 11,565. The
SHP indicates whether an individual is born in Switzerland or not, and
contains information on the first, second and even third nationality, as
well as on the first and second nationality of both parents. An individual
is defined as a second-generation migrant if he is born in Switzerland
and one of his nationalities or one of his parents’ nationalities is
foreign. If parents are both of foreign origin, the nationality of the
father prevails.
7.5 Cultural integration indicators and specifications
7.5.1 List of cultural integration indicators
The census conducted in 2000 and the SHP allow examining certain
behaviours and attitudes, which are assumed to reflect the cultural
dimension of integration. Integration processes cannot be localized
geographically or institutionally, but some units of analysis are espe-
cially relevant. School is the first place where all second-generation
migrants are exposed to natives and native culture, and school is an
important integration mechanism. Secondly, as many adults spend
most of their life in the couple (or family), it is of particular interest
to observe behaviours in the couple, especially differing patterns of
integration between individuals in endogamous couples and partners
of mixed couples, where cultural accommodations and compromises
are a necessity. Finally, the labour market is the most important
mechanism stimulating contacts between natives and migrants outside
the household. The list of selected indicators also includes information
about the main language of migrants and their attitudes with respect to
Switzerland, gender, religious, and political issues. Descriptive statistics
9 A small fraction of second-generation migrants are included in the native group as some
of them only have the Swiss nationality by birth. Those who are only Swiss, but are
naturalized and are of unknown origin, are not included in either category.
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for natives, first-generation, and second-generation migrants are
displayed in Table 7.2.
 Educational attainment: the number of years of education.10 The
sample is limited to individuals aged 25 years or more.












Educational attainment 2000 11.71 2.34 11.26 3.38 11.58 2.68
Mixed couple 2000 0.12 0.32 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.49
Marriage 2000 0.55 0.5 0.72 0.45 0.42 0.49
Age gap 2000 2.17 4.34 2.71 5.1 2.39 4.21
Education gap 2000 3.13 6.87 2.22 7.36 0.94 7.34
Cohabitation 2000 0.13 0.34 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.37
Fertility 2000 1.83 1.26 1.84 1.21 1.68 1.2
Divorce 2000 0.13 0.33 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.29
Labour force
participation
2000 0.76 0.43 0.73 0.44 0.85 0.36
Main language 2000 1 0.03 0.6 0.49 0.95 0.22
SHP
Feelings (i) 1999–2007 0.5 0 0.75 0.44 0.57 0.5
Feelings (ii) 1999 2.4 1.26 2.07 1.18 2.33 1.2
Gender (i) 2002–2007 5.52 3.38 5.61 3.44 5.52 3.35
Religion (i) 1999–2007 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48
Religion (ii) 1999–2007 0.4 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.49
Policy (i) 1999–2007 4.58 2.07 4.24 2.14 4.67 1.98
Policy (ii) 1999–2007 5.79 1.9 6 2.05 5.81 1.84
Census Men
Educational attainment 2000 12.64 2.72 11.6 3.52 11.93 2.91
Mixed couple 2000 0.16 0.36 0.24 0.43 0.46 0.5
Main language 2000 1 0.04 0.62 0.49 0.95 0.21
SHP
Feelings (i) 1999–2007 0.63 0.48 0.8 0.4 0.64 0.48
Feelings (ii) 1999 2.27 1.22 2.11 1.16 2.22 1.17
Gender (ii) 2000–2007 5.08 2.65 4.98 3.02 5.17 2.65
Religion (i) 1999–2007 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.44
Religion (ii) 1999–2007 0.24 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.42
Policy (i) 1999–2007 5.06 2.18 4.39 2.22 4.97 2.14
Policy (ii) 1999–2007 6.03 2.01 6.38 2.18 6.19 1.93
Source: Swiss census, 2000; SHP, 1999–2007.
10 In the census as well as in the SHP, the available educational variable is categorical. De
Coulon et al. (2003) proposed a scale to compute the number of years of education.
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 Marriage: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is married; the sample is
composed of all women aged 18 years ormore.Widows are excluded.
 Mixed couple: a dummy equals 1 if a Swiss individual has a partner
from a different country of origin; the sample is limited to indivi-
duals in a couple, aged 18 years or more. Mixed couples where
neither of the partners is Swiss are excluded.
 Age gap between partners: the age difference between the male and
female partners; the sample is limited to individuals in a couple,
aged 18 years or more.
 Education gap between partners: the difference in number of years
of education between the male and female partners; the sample is
limited to individuals in a couple, aged 18 years or more.
 Early marriage: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is married; the
sample is limited to women aged between 18 and 25 years. Widows
are excluded.
 Cohabitation: a dummy equals 1 if an individual lives in cohabita-
tion; the sample is limited to individuals married or living in
cohabitation.
 Fertility: the number of children of women aged 40 years or more.
 Divorce: a dummy equals 1 if an individual is divorced; the sample
is composed of married and divorced women only, aged 18 years or
more.
 Female labour force participation: a dummy equals 1 if a woman is
in the labour force; the sample is limited to women aged between 25
and 62 years.
 Main language: a dummy equals 1 if an individual uses one of the
four Swiss national languages (French, German, Italian, Romansh)
as his main language.
 Feelings towards Switzerland: (1) In favour of more equality
between Swiss and foreigners:11 a dummy equals 1 if the respon-
dent declares to be in favour of more equality. (2) In favour of
opening Swiss traditions:12 a dummy equals 1 if the respondent
declares to be in favour of opening Swiss traditions to the world.
11 Original question: Are you in favour of Switzerland offering foreigners the same oppor-
tunities as those offered to Swiss citizens, or in favour of Switzerland offering Swiss citizens
better opportunities? Possible choices: in favour of equality of opportunities, neither, in
favour of better opportunities for Swiss citizens.
12 Orignal question: Are you in favour of Switzerland opening towards other countries, or
in favour of Switzerland defending its traditions? Possible choices: opening towards other
countries, neither, defending traditions.
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 Gender attitudes: (1) Child suffers if mother is working:13 0 if the
respondent does not agree at all with the statement, 10 if she totally
agrees; the sample is limited to women. (2) Women penalized in
general:14 0 if the respondent does not agree at all with the state-
ment, 10 if he totally agrees; the sample is limited to men.
 Religious attitudes: (1) Participation in religious services:15 a
dummy equals 1 if the respondent declares she participates in
religious services at least occasionally (not only on special occa-
sions). (2) Prayers:16 a dummy equals 1 if the respondent declares
he prays at least occasionally.
 Political attitudes: (1) Political affiliation:17 0 if a respondent decl-
ares to have extreme left political views, 10 if extreme right. (2)
Satisfaction with Swiss democracy:18 0 if a respondent does not
agree at all with the statement, 10 if he totally agrees.
7.5.2 Specifications
The methodology used to investigate the evolution of migrants’ objec-
tive behaviours and subjective attitudes is common to all chapters and
presented in the introduction of this book. However, in addition to
comparing outcomes between first and second-generation migrants,
this chapter also looks at differences across birth cohorts (born before
vs. born after 1970), across types of couples (endogamous vs. mixed
couples) and across genders.
In addition to the regressors used in the specification common to all
chapters, some additional controls are included to deal with specificities
of Switzerland and of the datasets. With SHP data, the specification
includes year dummies.With census data, the specification also controls
for four linguistic regions, sixteen economic regions and four types of
13 Original question: Please tell me how far you would agree with the statements I am
going to read to you now, if 0 means ‘I completely disagree’ and 10 ‘I completely
agree’. A pre-school child suffers, if his or her mother works for pay.
14 Original question: Do you have the feeling that in Switzerland women are penalized
compared with men in certain areas, if 0 means ‘not at all penalized’ and 10 ‘strongly
penalized’?
15 Original question: How frequently do you take part in religious services? In the be-
ginning, no answer is proposed by the interviewer.
16 Original question: How frequently do you pray apart from at church or within
a religious community? In the beginning, no answer is proposed by the interviewer.
17 Original question: When they talk about politics, people mention left and right.
Personally, where do you position yourself, 0 means ‘left’ and 10 ‘right’?
18 Original question: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way in which democracy
works in our country, if 0 means ‘not at all satisfied’ and 10 ‘completely satisfied’?
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communes. In order not to truncate the sample arbitrarily when looking
at specific effects tied to intermarriage on a variable that is observable on
individuals whether they are a couple or not (fertility, labour force
participation, language), three civil status dummies are included to
keep non-married individuals in the sample.19 Finally, whereas a gender
dummy is generally included in the analysis of attitudes, most regres-
sions looking at behaviours focus strictly on women.
7.6 Results
This section first analyses how the behaviours of migrants have evolved
in comparison to those of the natives in the three units of observations
mentioned above: at school, in the couple, and in the labour market. It
then turns to the subjective attitudes of migrants.
7.6.1 Objective behaviours
Integration processes cannot be localized geographically or institution-
ally, but some units of analysis are especially relevant. School is the first
place where all second-generation migrants are exposed to natives and
native culture, and attending school is an important integration mech-
anism. Second, couples are part of the private sphere. It is therefore of
particular interest to observe differing patterns of integration between
individuals in endogamous couples and partners of mixed couples,
where cultural accommodations and compromises are a necessity.
Finally, the labour market is another mechanism stimulating contacts
between natives and migrants outside the household.
7.6.1.1 AT SCHOOL
According to recent studies, migrants fare rather well in the Swiss
educational system. Focusing on a sample of second-generation Italian
and Spanish migrants in the cantons of Geneva and Basel, Bolzman
and Fibbi (2003) observe that their educational achievements are as
good as those of natives. Using 2000 census data on 17-year-old in-
dividuals still in the parental household to analyse intergenerational
transmission of educational attainment, Bauer and Riphahn (2007)
found evidence of higher intergenerational mobility among second-
generation migrants. They also found that their achievements or
19 Married natives are the reference group.
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failures are less dependent upon the level of education of their parents.
Fibbi et al. (2005) observed that naturalized migrants are less likely to
have a low education level, but this is not the case of non-naturalized
first and second-generation migrants (except for Spaniards and Ger-
mans). How does the picture change if the scope of the analysis is
enlarged to further include non-European migrants?
Table 7.3 shows theaveragenumber of years of educationacrossmigrant
groups and the gender education gap. This table confirms the impressive
educational success of second-generation migrants from Southern
Europe that has been documented in previous studies. African women
are in a similar situation. However, results also show that the educational
achievements of ‘Secundas’ and ‘Secundos’20 are not characteristic of all
second-generation migrants. Such an outcome might be partly explained
by the fact that first-generationmigrants are self-selected among themost
motivated and capable individuals or by the lack of specific knowledge
amongmigrant parents about the Swiss education system.
Despite the observed negative trend, the gender education gap com-
mon to all first-generation groups is reverted among second-generation
migrants, with the exception of Western Europeans and Latin Ameri-
cans, who have the highest average education levels, and Southern
Table 7.3 Group averages: educational attainment and the gender education
gap (in years of education).
















Natives 11.56 12.85 1.29
WE 12.67 12.99 0.32 14.34 13.83 0.52 1.67 0.84
SE 9.63 12.03 2.40 10.23 12.70 2.47 0.59 0.66
EE 10.99 11.19 0.19 11.41 11.53 0.12 0.42 0.34
AF 11.10 12.77 1.67 12.33 13.15 0.82 1.23 0.38
TMM 10.36 11.51 1.15 11.39 11.65 0.26 1.03 0.14
SA 12.03 12.50 0.47 13.12 13.78 0.66 1.10 1.28
AS 11.62 11.24 0.38 12.59 12.28 0.30 0.97 1.04
SCA 11.17 11.26 0.10 11.14 10.62 0.52 0.02 0.64
Total 11.28 12.29 1.00 11.85 12.95 1.10 0.57 0.67
Source: Swiss census, 2000.
20 In reference to the title of the study of Bolzmann and Fibbi (2003) about second-
generation migrants from Southern Europe.
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European women, who make the largest progress from the first to the
second generation.
Results in Table 7.4 (plotted in Figure 7.2) confirm that migrant
women progress more at school than their male counterparts. It
seems that second-generation men from South and Central Asia, Tur-
key, the Middle East, and Maghreb and Eastern Europe remain in a low
education equilibrium. The better performance of Western Europeans
is not very surprising given the very high education level of the first
generation, but the impressive results of second-generation Latin
Americans, Africans, and the tremendous progress of Southern Eur-
opeans support the idea that individuals with a mother tongue close to
one of the Swiss national languages (in this case Latin languages) fare
better at school.
Table 7.5 provides more detailed information about cohort effects for
both genders (plotted in Figures 7.3 and 7.4). A striking result is that the
educational level of first-generation migrants is generally declining.
Another interesting trend is that second-generation men from Turkey,
the Middle East, and Maghreb and Eastern Europe that are born after
1970 fare better than those born before 1970.
Table 7.4 Educational attainment (I).
Origin Women Men
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.928*** 0.815*** 1.235*** 0.367***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015)
SE 2.304*** 0.255*** 2.973*** 0.856***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
EE 1.041*** 1.076*** 1.796*** 1.902***
(0.008) (0.040) (0.008) (0.040)
AF 1.266*** 0.412*** 1.304*** 0.266*
(0.024) (0.141) (0.025) (0.160)
TMM 1.855*** 0.828*** 2.036*** 1.910***
(0.015) (0.051) (0.013) (0.054)
LA 0.311*** 0.272** 0.468*** 0.473***
(0.016) (0.108) (0.026) (0.119)
AS 0.607*** 1.031*** 0.844*** 1.171***
(0.016) (0.160) (0.026) (0.202)
SCA 1.150*** 0.983*** 2.324*** 2.983***
(0.025) (0.132) (0.020) (0.147)
Observations 4,460,422
R2 0.18
Source: Swiss census, 2000; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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7.6.1.2 THE COUPLES
Previous studies (Wanner and Fibbi, 2002; Wanner et al., 2005a) have
looked at the role of the family in themigration and integration process.
They observe that compared to natives, second-generation migrants
tend to remain in the parental household for a longer period and get
married after a much shorter cohabitation period with their partner. The
overall marriage rate, however, is converging across migrant groups. In
their qualitative study on binational couples, Ossipow and Waldis
(2003) analyse the interests and strategies of both intermarried partners.
Noticing that homogamy and heterogamy exist across many dimen-
sions in any couple, they point to the existence of complementary
exchanges in each couple.
In this chapter, the analysis is extended to examine the position of
women inmixed as well as in endogamous couples. To what extent does
originmatter inmatching partners? Are women from some groupsmore
likely to contract early marriage and have many children? It is often
assumed that migrants from poorer countries are more inclined to form
traditional unions with a clear distribution of roles within the house-
hold, but to what extent are these clichés supported by facts and do such
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Figure 7.2 Educational attainment.
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Table 7.5 Educational attainment (II).
Origin Women Men
Pre-1970 Post-1970 Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.926*** 0.716*** 1.069*** 0.533*** 1.299*** 0.621*** 0.933*** 0.294***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033)
SE 2.330*** 0.424*** 2.458*** 0.555*** 2.948*** 0.621*** 2.876*** 0.801***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.023) (0.018) (0.007) (0.014) (0.025) (0.019)
EE 0.979*** 1.822*** 1.771*** 0.676*** 1.592*** 2.196*** 2.569*** 1.110***
(0.008) (0.052) (0.019) (0.062) (0.009) (0.056) (0.024) (0.073)
AF 1.274*** 0.269* 2.114*** 0.163 0.829*** 0.0861 2.279*** 0.0242
(0.025) (0.158) (0.050) (0.277) (0.029) (0.203) (0.062) (0.346)
TMM 1.905*** 0.840*** 2.424*** 1.347*** 1.820*** 2.018*** 2.516*** 1.440***
(0.016) (0.064) (0.034) (0.083) (0.015) (0.084) (0.035) (0.089)
LA 0.208*** 0.111 1.541*** 0.368* 0.0217 0.678*** 1.472*** 0.333
(0.017) (0.118) (0.037) (0.222) (0.031) (0.144) (0.067) (0.308)
AS 0.611*** 1.263*** 1.325*** 0.998*** 0.705*** 1.607*** 0.889*** 0.215
(0.017) (0.178) (0.038) (0.319) (0.030) (0.267) (0.067) (0.395)
SCA 0.948*** 0.764*** 2.444*** 2.911*** 2.032*** 2.846*** 3.172*** 3.046***
(0.027) (0.136) (0.050) (0.344) (0.023) (0.191) (0.051) (0.294)
Observations 2,255,991 2,120,707
R2 0.17 0.13
Source: Swiss census, 2000; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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Table 7.6 Marriage and divorce.
Origin Marriage Divorce
All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.0573*** 0.0218*** 0.00793*** 0.0504*** 0.0196*** 0.0301***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
SE 0.195*** 0.0825*** 0.0582*** 0.0677*** 0.0288*** 0.0342***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
EE 0.252*** 0.127*** 0.0292*** 0.0730*** 0.0530*** 0.0343***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008)
AF 0.179*** 0.102*** 0.00420 0.0601*** 0.00989 0.0859***
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.004) (0.020) (0.023)
TMM 0.253*** 0.151*** 0.0347*** 0.0608*** 0.00561 0.0101
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010)
LA 0.230*** 0.0532*** 0.0102*** 0.0567*** 0.0271 0.0469
(0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017) (0.030)
AS 0.201*** 0.0680*** 0.0232*** 0.0627*** 0.0394** 0.0722*
(0.002) (0.023) (0.002) (0.003) (0.019) (0.037)
SCA 0.274*** 0.250*** 0.0721*** 0.0988*** 0.0894*** 0.0908***
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Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women age 18 to 25 and not widow
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Figure 7.5 Marriage.
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behaviours seem more deeply rooted in specific communities, how do
women of these communities behave in mixed couples?
Marriage: Results in Table 7.6 (plotted in Figure 7.5) show the marginal
effect of origin dummies on the probability of getting married. First-
generation women are much more likely to be married than natives.
Differences among migrant groups hint at the existence of distinct
cultural patterns. Western Europeans display the lowest propensity to
be married. The decrease in the probability of second-generation
women being married compared to the level of native women points
to at least two possible hypotheses. Either cultural differences in the
decision to marry disappear or there are other strong incentives (for
example legal incentives) for first-generation migrants to get married,
which do not exist for the second generation. Looking at differences
across cohorts reveals that young first-generation migrants are more
likely to get married compared to natives, whereas the opposite is true
for the second generation. This might be due to more stringent
legal conditions for entering Switzerland happening in parallel to a
cultural trend to marry less that is not migrant-specific. This is true
even for women of Central and South Asia, who remain in a very
robust and much more traditional equilibrium characterized by a high
probability of being married for first as well as second-generation
migrants.
Mixed couples: Intermarriages differ from endogamous marriages
because, through the partner and his social network, a migrant is
exposed to the native culture in a way that is not possible in an
endogamous relationship. Table 7.7 shows the distribution of endoga-
mous and mixed couples across migrant groups. ‘Other’ couples are
composed of partners from different origins, but none of them
Swiss. First-generation women intermarry more than their male
counterparts. Only women from Turkey, the Middle East, Maghreb,
and South and Central Asia do not, and more surprisingly, this is
accentuated for second-generation women belonging to these groups.
The intermarriage rate of second-generation Western European, Latin
American, and African women also decreases a lot, but from a
very high initial level. Asian women remain in the highest equilib-
rium despite a slight decrease; Eastern and Southern European
second-generation women are the only groups which enter mixed
unions more than their mothers.
Themarginal effect of origin dummies on the probability of being in a
mixed couple reported in Table 7.8 (plotted in Figure 7.6) confirms the
intuition conveyed by statistics in Table 7.7. First-generation migrant
women from Latin America, Asia, Western Europe, and Africa are
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Table 7.7 Group averages: mixed couples (in %).
Origin Women Men
Born abroad (second–first) Born abroad (second–first)
Endo Inter Other Endo Inter Other Endo Inter Other Endo Inter Other
Natives 90.8 9.2 86.76 13.24
WE 36.6 53.6 9.8 9.6 10.6 1 49.5 39.8 10.6 2.5 0.4 2.1
SE 79.6 15.6 4.9 13.1 10 3.1 76.5 15.6 7.9 27.8 22.7 5.1
EE 82.1 12.2 5.8 2.3 1.4 0.9 87 8 5 2 1.7 0.3
AF 36.6 43.7 19.7 25.3 18.7 6.6 44.1 32.7 23.2 17.4 7.2 10.2
TMM 78.9 13.1 8 6.3 5.3 1 67 20.2 12.8 7.2 6.9 0.3
SA 19.9 57.6 22.6 18.4 17 1.4 38.8 37.4 23.8 20.2 12.3 7.9
AS 30.3 57 12.7 2.9 5.6 2.7 73.8 16.4 9.8 9.1 4.2 4.9
SCA 85.5 8.6 5.9 7.7 4 3.7 78.3 12.4 9.3 10.6 5.9 4.7
Total 61.5 30.4 8.2 70.6 20.5 8.9
Source: Swiss census, 2000.
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Table 7.8 Mixed couples.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.513*** 0.389*** 0.528*** 0.376*** 0.342*** 0.555***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
SE 0.091*** 0.176*** 0.105*** 0.010*** 0.167*** 0.179***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
EE 0.049*** 0.096*** 0.066*** 0.005** 0.078*** 0.095***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011)
AF 0.487*** 0.186*** 0.514*** 0.388*** 0.125*** 0.302***
(0.006) (0.036) (0.006) (0.012) (0.040) (0.068)
TMM 0.060*** 0.023*** 0.094*** 0.028*** 0.017 0.039***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009)
LA 0.646*** 0.423*** 0.649*** 0.622*** 0.389*** 0.521***
(0.003) (0.029) (0.003) (0.007) (0.033) (0.059)
AS 0.589*** 0.574*** 0.592*** 0.560*** 0.589*** 0.507***
(0.003) (0.035) (0.003) (0.008) (0.040) (0.074)
SCA 0.002 0.061*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.052

















































Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all in couple
Mixed = dummy 1 if mixed, 0 if endogamous couple
South and Central Asia
Figure 7.6 Mixed couples.
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around 50 per cent more likely than natives to enter a mixed union.
Asian women are more likely to choose a Swiss partner than their male
counterpart. Women originating from South and Central Asia and Tur-
key, the Middle East and Maghreb are exceptions in this regard and,
more surprisingly, the marginal effect for second-generation women of
these groups is negative. Eastern and Southern European women also
have a low probability of entering a mixed couple, but it increases
for the second generation. It is also interesting to notice that whereas
the propensity to choose a native partner rather decreases for second-
generation women, it is less the case for men.
This trend also evolves slowly over time: young second-generation
female migrants tend to have a lower probability of having a relation-
ship with a native man compared to their mothers, but this probability
is equal or higher for women born after 1970. The same is true for male
migrants, and the magnitude of the change is even higher (Figures 7.7
and 7.8). The only exceptions are, again, women originating from South
and Central Asia and Turkey, the Middle East, and Maghreb. It is
surprising to see that their probability of intermarrying decreases for
second-generation and younger migrants. This strong preference for
endogamy contrasts with trends in other groups.
Different couples—early marriage vs. cohabitation: How do couples
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Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: women in couple
Mixed = dummy 1 if mixed, 0 if endogamous couple
Wester
Europe
Figure 7.7 Women in mixed couples.
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distribution between husband and wife, whereas cohabitating couples
are supposedly more fragile, and consist of more independent partners.
Table 7.9 shows that most migrant groups (across cohorts and types
of couples) have a higher propensity for early marriage compared to
natives, especially women from Eastern Europe, Turkey, the Middle
East, Maghreb, and Central and South Asia. However, this tendency
diminishes for all second-generation groups. It seems that migrant
groups with the highest probability of getting married also do so at
a younger age.
Cohabitation is a rather recent phenomenon that has developed as
more women have started to become economically independent and
politically empowered. It is not surprising that first-generation migrants
are less likely to choose cohabitation over marriage. However, this pro-
pensity increases for the second generation, more so for women from
Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The coefficients of the post-1970
cohort in Table 7.9 also clearly indicate that there is a cohort-specific
change in behaviours concerning cohabitation. Whereas migrants born
before 1970 behave more or less alike across generations, second-gener-
ation migrants born after 1970 converge to the native baseline,
although less rapidly for women of Central and South Asia, Turkey,
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Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: men in couple
Inter-ethnic = dummy 1 if inter-ethnic, 0 if endogamous couple
Eastern Europe
Figure 7.8 Men in mixed couples.
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Table 7.9 Early marriage vs. cohabitation.
Origin Early marriage Cohabitation
All All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.124*** 0.0170*** 0.0240*** 0.00376** 0.0200*** 0.0125*** 0.0403*** 0.0375***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
SE 0.291*** 0.046*** 0.060*** 0.034*** 0.054*** 0.041*** 0.072*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EE 0.522*** 0.191*** 0.079*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.054*** 0.083*** 0.059***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.002)
AF 0.273*** 0.123*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.052***
(0.011) (0.039) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.012)
TMM 0.532*** 0.232*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.082*** 0.076***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.001)
LA 0.403*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.045*** 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.075*** 0.052***
(0.009) (0.024) (0.0006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010) (0.0006) (0.010)
AS 0.250*** 0.020 0.062*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.011
(0.009) (0.023) (0.0007) (0.009) (0.001) (0.006) (0.0007) (0.024)
SCA 0.432*** 0.313*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.076***
(0.012) (0.057) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0008) (0.003) (0.0004) (0.003)
Education 0.018*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0002) (9.92e-05) (9.97e-05)
Observations 281,477 1,531,937 1,531,937
PR2 0.30 0.13 0.13
ll 79,229 454,518 452,617
Source: Swiss census, 2000; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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cohabit than endogamous couples (Figure 7.9). This supports the
hypothesis that individuals living as mixed couples may bemore liberal,
but that legal incentives for first-generation migrants to improve their
conditions of stay (or that of their partner) are strong enough to influ-
ence the decision to get married.
Partners’ differences—age and education gap: Waldis (2008) stresses that
heterogamy/homogamy in the couple is not limited to its ethnic dimen-
sion, and that complementary/symmetric exchanges happen at differ-
ent levels in any couple. Table 7.10 shows three clear trends in relation
to the role of age and education as matching factors in the couple. First,
there seems to be a difference between European women, who are
usually slightly younger than their partner, and non-European
women, who display larger age gaps. More striking is the fact that
non-European first-generation women born after 1970 are significantly
younger than their partner (Figure 7.10). Age gaps might be explained
by the fact that men who migrated alone only find a partner later on
in their life. Some of them return home to choose a younger partner
and then bring them back to Switzerland (Wanner et al., 2005a). The
age asymmetry is stronger among migrants born after 1970. However,
age gaps in mixed couples are even larger for non-EU first-generation
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Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women age 18+ with partner
Cohabitation = dummy 1 if cohabiting, 0 if married
Figure 7.9 Cohabitation.
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Table 7.10 Age gap between partners.
Origin All Endo Inter
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.070*** 0.101*** 0.152*** 0.123** 0.073*** 0.254***
(0.015) (0.038) (0.024) (0.055) (0.020) (0.057)
SE 0.118*** 0.444*** 0.060*** 0.238*** 0.695*** 0.740***
(0.017) (0.026) (0.019) (0.031) (0.039) (0.049)
EE 0.424*** 0.301*** 0.026 0.321*** 2.102*** 0.235
(0.018) (0.092) (0.020) (0.108) (0.048) (0.221)
AF 2.645*** 0.174 2.280*** 1.465*** 3.648*** 3.991***
(0.058) (0.366) (0.100) (0.471) (0.086) (0.729)
TMM 1.174*** 0.099 0.797*** 0.335*** 2.618*** 1.410***
(0.034) (0.116) (0.039) (0.126) (0.090) (0.396)
LA 1.334*** 0.676** 0.115 0.380 1.734*** 0.892**
(0.039) (0.275) (0.087) (0.440) (0.050) (0.432)
AS 1.799*** 1.547*** 0.704*** 0.223 2.457*** 1.866***
(0.039) (0.380) (0.072) (0.695) (0.051) (0.510)
SCA 1.559*** 1.485*** 1.597*** 1.662*** 1.359*** 1.578
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Figure 7.10 Age gap between partners.
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citizenship might be part of complementary exchanges happening in
mixed couples (Ossipow and Waldis, 2003).
However, the age asymmetry observed in mixed couples is bal-
anced by the fact that partners have almost the same education level.
Whereas education only seems to have a small impact on the prob-
ability of intermarrying, women who intermarry least (from South and
Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East, and Maghreb) also have the high-
est education gaps in endogamous couples. One likely reason for them
to intermarry could be to live with a partner that has a similar level of
education. In any case, it seems that having similar education
levels is a factor in matching partners of different origins, and that
education represents an important common ground between individuals
coming from different horizons (Table 7.11 and Figure 7.11).
Fertility: Table 7.12 reports the marginal effect of origin dummies on
fertility. Migrant women generally have more children than natives.
Differences tend to be smaller for the second generation. Women
from Switzerland, Western and Southern Europe, Latin America,
and Asia have lower fertility rates than Eastern European women,
Table 7.11 Education gap between partners.
Origin Pre-1970 Post-1970 Endo
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.213*** 0.260*** 0.100*** 0.062* 0.728*** 0.381***
(0.007) (0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.011) (0.024)
SE 1.481*** 0.870*** 1.421*** 0.889*** 1.941*** 1.285***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.008) (0.014)
EE 0.960*** 1.079*** 1.030*** 0.888*** 1.133*** 1.312***
(0.009) (0.057) (0.016) (0.059) (0.009) (0.047)
AF 0.076** 0.027 0.105** 1.138*** 0.223*** 0.514**
(0.030) (0.196) (0.050) (0.295) (0.044) (0.209)
TMM 1.066*** 0.938*** 1.042*** 1.166*** 1.405*** 1.220***
(0.018) (0.073) (0.029) (0.072) (0.017) (0.056)
LA 0.077*** 0.054 0.293*** 0.007 0.355*** 0.086
(0.020) (0.142) (0.034) (0.246) (0.038) (0.195)
AS 0.034* 0.443** 0.307*** 0.025 0.669*** 1.070***
(0.019) (0.199) (0.038) (0.325) (0.032) (0.308)
SCA 0.968*** 0.005 1.572*** 1.135*** 1.467*** 0.301**





Source: Swiss census, 2000; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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Figure 7.11 Education gap between partners.
Table 7.12 Completed fertility rate.
Origin All Endo Inter
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.122*** 0.056*** 0.180*** 0.074*** 0.195*** 0.047*
(0.003) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.025)
SE 0.076*** 0.061*** 0.012** 0.026** 0.189*** 0.070**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.027)
EE 0.200*** 0.226*** 0.273*** 0.189*** 0.443*** 0.202
(0.006) (0.042) (0.007) (0.046) (0.016) (0.137)
AF 0.396*** 0.325*** 0.862*** 0.219 0.093*** 0.354
(0.020) (0.126) (0.042) (0.173) (0.031) (0.356)
TMM 0.560*** 0.339*** 0.702*** 0.242*** 0.173*** 0.077
(0.012) (0.054) (0.015) (0.061) (0.031) (0.252)
LA 0.167*** 0.088 0.271*** 0.038 0.200*** 0.091
(0.013) (0.085) (0.032) (0.136) (0.019) (0.175)
AS 0.031** 0.183 0.375*** 0.022 0.417*** 0.432*
(0.013) (0.154) (0.025) (0.283) (0.019) (0.225)
SCA 0.410*** 0.300*** 0.351*** 0.026 0.193*** 0.372





Source: Swiss census, 2000; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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and women from Turkey, the Middle East, Maghreb, Africa, or South
and Central Asia have the highest fertility rate. The coefficient of
second-generation Asian women is not significant, but they seem to
have a fertility pattern that is different from other non-European
migrant groups. Second-generation women from the Middle East,
Maghreb, and Turkey still display the largest differential, but the
drop in their fertility rate is also the largest. As expected, the number
of years of education has a negative and significant effect on the
completed fertility rate.
Although coefficients of the second generation are not significant,
columns 3–6 in Table 7.12 (Figure 7.12) indicate that the fertility rate of
women in mixed couples is similar to that of natives. In endogamous
couples, first-generation migrants from Africa, Turkey, the Middle East,
and Maghreb have the most children.
Divorce: Differences in the probability of getting divorced vary across
migrant groups, but the groups that tend to be more traditional in
marriage also divorce less. Second-generation migrants have a higher
divorce rate, but as was observed in cohabitation, it seems that the
cultural trend facilitating divorce is not origin specific, but cohort spe-












































Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women age 40+
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Figure 7.12 Completed fertility rate.
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7.6.1.3 IN THE LABOUR MARKET
Wanner et al. (2003) conducted a thorough analysis of factors impacting
female labour force participation. They noticed that three factors specif-
ically influence migrant women’s behaviour in this regard: gender roles
imported from the origin country, household income, and the fact that
some permits are related to a pre-existing work contract. Although
they are more likely to be active in the labour market compared to
native women, migrant women originating from some countries display
a significantly lower labour force participation rate. Fibbi et al. (2005)
also propose an analysis of the probability of being out of the labour
force, focusing on individuals aged 23–34 years. They do not find
evidence of lower labour force participation of migrants compared to
natives. Their results do not support the hypothesis that women
from ‘culturally distant’ populations have a lower propensity to parti-
cipate in the labour force. As mentioned before, their report focuses
on European migrants, but how does the picture change when the
scope of the analysis is enlarged to include non-European migrant
women?
Table 7.13 shows that although there may be cultural differences
among first-generation women that lead to varying labour force partici-








































Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: married and divorced women age 18+
Divorced = dummy 1 if divorced, 0 if not
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Figure 7.13 Divorce.
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Migrants from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East, and
Maghreb as well as Asia, remain least likely to be active in the labour
market, sticking to a more traditional gender role distribution.
Looking at cohorts reveals that women originating from Western
and Southern Europe are more likely to enter the labour force, espe-
cially women born after 1970. This is partly due to the combination
of better qualifications and lower fertility rates that were observed
earlier. Regression results also show that first-generation women in
mixed couples behave like natives in this regard (Table 7.14 and
Figure 7.14).
7.6.2 Subjective attitudes
Besides influencing behaviours, integration processes also affect the daily
habits, attitudes, values, and beliefs of migrants. This section explores the
evolution of migrants’ use of national languages, of their feelings towards
Switzerland, and of their attitudes concerning gender, religious, and politi-
cal issues. The SHP data (except for language) is used to investigate cultural
integration paths in these subjective dimensions. The smaller sample size
reduces the significance of the results obtained. The analysis is therefore
mostly limited to the evolution from the first to the second generation.
Gender differences are considered only when examining gender attitudes.
Language: Knowledge of one of the four national languages is funda-
mental not only to succeed at school and in the labourmarket, but also to
understandnative culture anddevelop enriching relationships in the host
society. It is therefore not surprising that a substantial part of the federal
budget devoted to cultural integration was spent on subsidizing organiza-
tions offering language courses for migrants (OFM, 2006), that mastering
one of the national languages is often viewed as a prerequisite for natura-
lization, or that partners in mixed couples often consider it as a funda-
mental external signof successful integration (OssipowandWaldis, 2003).
Table 7.13 Group averages: female labour force participation (in %).
Natives WE SE EE AF TMM SA AS SCA Total
Born in Switzerland 75.4 81.9 84.1 82.1 82.6 82.9 78.3 71.4 77.5 76
Married 67 73.3 76.7 76.5 78.5 77.3 70.4 66 76.9 67.6
Single 88.7 90.6 93.3 90.9 89.1 90.8 88.2 78.7 81.3 89
Foreign born 72.1 74.6 74.8 75.1 69.3 70.6 68.8 70.3 73
Married 65.2 72.4 73 73.4 67.3 67.4 64.6 68.8 69.6
Single 86.1 83.2 83.2 78.8 78.1 82.1 83.2 77.5 83.8
Source: Swiss census, 2000.
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Table 7.14 Female labour force participation.
Origin Pre-1970 Post-1970 Endo Inter
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.041*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.040*** 0.086*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
SE 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.008** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
EE 0.007*** 0.008 0.043*** 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.088*** 0.013*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.019)
AF 0.009** 0.036 0.055*** 0.031 0.048*** 0.080*** 0.013* 0.138*
(0.004) (0.028) (0.008) (0.043) (0.006) (0.029) (0.006) (0.071)
TMM 0.078*** 0.003 0.075*** 0.030*** 0.001 0.062*** 0.030*** 0.046
(0.003) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.031)
LA 0.088*** 0.006 0.143*** 0.026 0.004 0.012 0.095*** 0.040
(0.003) (0.022) (0.006) (0.032) (0.006) (0.034) (0.004) (0.036)
AS 0.095*** 0.127*** 0.187*** 0.124** 0.011** 0.006 0.107*** 0.108**
(0.003) (0.036) (0.007) (0.048) (0.005) (0.053) (0.004) (0.046)
SCA 0.076*** 0.011 0.151*** 0.008 0.011** 0.043** 0.091*** 0.033






Source: Swiss census, 2000; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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Results in Table 7.15 (plotted in Figure 7.15) show that second-
generation migrants are much more likely to declare one of the national
languages as their main language. Surprisingly, young second-generation
migrants do so more than those born before 1970, whereas no such trend
is detectable among first-generation migrants. Different hypotheses could
explain this. It might be that themethods to teach languages that are used
at Swiss schools have become more effective or that younger second-
generation migrants are more willing to adopt a national language as
their own.
As expected, differences across migrant groups remain. Western and
Southern Europeans are always more likely to adopt a national language
of Switzerland as their own; Asians and South and Central Asians display
lower probabilities to do so, but it is striking to observe a similarly low
probability for Latin Americans, who seem to be muchmore attached to
their mother tongue than Latin migrants from Southern Europe.21
First-generation migrants with a Swiss partner have a slightly higher



















Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women aged 20–62
Labour force participation = dummy 1 if in labour force, 0 if not
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Figure 7.14 Female labour force participation.
21 As Italian is a national language, the author tested this by keeping migrants of Italian
origin out of the sample. Results are available upon request.
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Table 7.15 Main language.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970 Endo Inter
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.29*** 0.06*** 0.24*** 0.071 0.34*** 0.046*** 0.10*** 0.017*** 0.068*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
SE 0.41*** 0.05*** 0.33*** 0.05*** 0.52*** 0.04*** 0.24*** 0.01*** 0.13*** 0.03***
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.0004)
EE 0.73*** 0.34*** 0.70*** 0.49*** 0.70*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.28*** 0.44*** 0.017**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.0004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)
AF 0.61*** 0.23*** 0.54*** 0.28*** 0.57*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.04** 0.38*** 0.16***
(0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.027) (0.005) (0.022) (0.001) (0.019) (0.006) (0.044)
TMM 0.72*** 0.30*** 0.65*** 0.39*** 0.68*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.41*** 0.08***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.0007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.016)
LA 0.84*** 0.35*** 0.80*** 0.45*** 0.78*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.75*** 0.34***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003) (0.017) (0.001) (0.022) (0.003) (0.033)
AS 0.84*** 0.37*** 0.80*** 0.60*** 0.77*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.74*** 0.43***
(0.001) (0.020) (0.002) (0.029) (0.003) (0.022) (0.001) (0.048) (0.003) (0.045)
SCA 0.83*** 0.45*** 0.78*** 0.49*** 0.78*** 0.37*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.60*** 0.19**
(0.001) (0.018) (0.002) (0.023) (0.004) (0.028) (0.001) (0.023) (0.009) (0.0756)
Education 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.004***
(8.30e06) (1.7e05) (3.25e-05)
Obs 4,942,902 4,942,902 4,942,902
PR2 0.53 0.53 0.33
ll 671,042 668,672 950,499
Source: Swiss census, 2000; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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endogamous couples. However, the picture is more blurred for second-
generation migrants, as African and Latin American migrants are visibly
rather keen to keep their mother tongue.
Feelings towards Switzerland: One could assume that in a non-discrimi-
natory society, no one would request more equality between natives and
foreigners. Table 7.16 shows that all migrants living in Switzerland are in
favour of more equality compared to natives. This trend is stronger
among first-generation than among second-generationmigrants, except
for those likely to have darker skin colour or those likely to be identified
as Muslims (South and Central Asians, Africans and individuals origi-
nating from Turkey, the Middle East, and Maghreb), who feel that more
could be done to facilitate their integration into Swiss society. Interest-
ingly, migrants of the younger cohort have a more pronounced opinion
than those born before 1970. When asked whether they are in favour
of opening Swiss traditions to world influence, results look similar
(Table 7.17 and Figure 7.16).
Gender attitudes: In relation to gender attitudes, it appears that more
conservative behaviours of first-generation migrants are in line with
their more conservative subjective attitudes. Results in Table 7.18 show
how women internalize the traditional role of mothers. Compared to
natives, migrant women are likely to believe children suffer when the
mother is working. Western European women are the only exception. It
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Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all age 18+
National language = 1 if one of four national languages,0 if not
Eastern Europe
Latin America
Figure 7.15 Main language.
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Table 7.16 In favour of more equality between Swiss and foreigners.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.153*** 0.055*** 0.155*** 0.036*** 0.136*** 0.086***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016)
SE 0.207*** 0.103*** 0.206*** 0.103*** 0.199*** 0.102***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) (0.015)
EE 0.104*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.014 0.133*** 0.165***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.024) (0.044) (0.030) (0.037)
AF 0.023 0.069 0.075 0.052 0.221*** 0.107
(0.053) (0.086) (0.068) (0.104) (0.065) (0.153)
TMM 0.005 0.137*** 0.023 0.099** 0.060 0.174***
(0.037) (0.030) (0.047) (0.045) (0.060) (0.039)
LA 0.186*** 0.031 0.193*** 0.036 0.171*** 0.022
(0.027) (0.054) (0.032) (0.068) (0.047) (0.091)
AS 0.050 0.212* 0.011 0.217* 0.130 0.202
(0.062) (0.111) (0.079) (0.128) (0.099) (0.225)
SCA 0.027 0.104 0.044 0.065 0.003 0.182



















































Opening or defending Swiss traditions
Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women/men
Dummies = 1 if in favour of equality between Swiss and foreigners/in favour of
opening swiss traditions, 0 if not
Latin America
Africa South and Central Asia
Figure 7.16 Feelings towards Switzerland.
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Table 7.17 In favour of opening Swiss traditions.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.137*** 0.063*** 0.266*** 0.032 0.350*** 0.125*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.045) (0.056) (0.103) (0.071)
SE 0.170*** 0.096*** 0.073 0.043 0.665*** 0.214***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.053) (0.056) (0.117) (0.069)
EE 0.067*** 0.109*** 0.964*** 0.095 0.975*** 0.473***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.107) (0.177) (0.144) (0.183)
AF 0.011 0.043 0.953*** 0.246 0.343 1.330**
(0.053) (0.093) (0.258) (0.438) (0.343) (0.636)
TMM 0.037 0.131*** 1.188*** 0.057 0.516** 0.519***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.188) (0.201) (0.249) (0.195)
LA 0.155*** 0.0002 0.309* 0.549** 0.559** 0.041
(0.028) (0.055) (0.171) (0.276) (0.249) (0.390)
AS 0.033 0.101 0.656** 0.141 0.489 0.460
(0.063) (0.109) (0.323) (0.477) (0.510) (0.854)
SCA 0.014 0.042 1.300*** 0.047 0.955** 1.029
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Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women/men
Both variables = 0 (does not agree at all) to 10 scales
South and Central Asia
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Figure 7.17 Gender attitudes.
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Table 7.18 Child suffers from working mother.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.215* 0.189 0.302** 0.054 0.333 0.367*
(0.113) (0.122) (0.121) (0.158) (0.295) (0.189)
SE 0.768*** 0.126 0.681*** 0.129 1.104*** 0.111
(0.142) (0.119) (0.159) (0.153) (0.315) (0.186)
EE 0.805*** 0.238 0.773*** 1.195** 0.872** 0.796
(0.223) (0.394) (0.280) (0.544) (0.365) (0.569)
AF 0.981* 1.392 1.551** 0.998 0.355 1.850
(0.559) (0.982) (0.768) (1.329) (0.816) (1.456)
TMM 2.495*** 0.421 2.364*** 0.807 2.719*** 0.101
(0.492) (0.333) (0.627) (0.498) (0.791) (0.446)
LA 1.019*** 0.0389 0.324 0.950 2.280*** 1.041
(0.336) (0.617) (0.418) (0.871) (0.560) (0.872)
AS 1.686** 1.254 1.909*** 1.031 0.561 1.490
(0.665) (1.329) (0.729) (1.879) (1.627) (1.879)
SCA 3.307*** 1.094 3.342*** 1.504 3.250** 0.670





Source: SHP, 1999–2007; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
Table 7.19 Women penalized in general.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.405*** 0.258*** 0.454*** 0.121 0.314* 0.006
(0.091) (0.097) (0.075) (0.108) (0.179) (0.127)
SE 0.162 0.017 0.121 0.393*** 0.037 0.284**
(0.101) (0.092) (0.099) (0.103) (0.209) (0.119)
EE 1.145*** 0.346 0.581*** 0.564 0.682*** 0.008
(0.190) (0.261) (0.185) (0.395) (0.239) (0.386)
AF 0.982** 0.565 0.989* 1.196 0.191 1.370
(0.434) (0.761) (0.505) (1.029) (0.565) (1.030)
TMM 0.996*** 0.183 0.423 0.034 0.026 0.513
(0.249) (0.370) (0.415) (0.344) (0.505) (0.315)
LA 0.192 0.869* 0.148 0.456 0.176 0.981
(0.359) (0.459) (0.246) (0.674) (0.305) (0.613)
AS 0.818 0.562 0.693 1.479 1.113 2.900**
(0.590) (1.076) (0.461) (1.456) (1.128) (1.456)
SCA 1.282*** 1.402* 0.372 0.795 0.015 0.015





Source: SHP, 1999–2007; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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conditions, they feel strongly that working would harm their children
(e.g. because they cannot afford to leave their children in a private day
nursery). Results in Table 7.19 (plotted in Figure 7.17) show how sensi-
tive men are to the specific discriminations women are suffering from.
Male migrants from Western, Southern Europe, and Latin America are
the only ones to be more sensitive to this issue than native men. Look-
ing at the second generation, it is difficult to identify meaningful differ-
ences. It might be that attitudes of second-generation migrants
concerning gender issues converge relatively fast with the Swiss average,
while behaviours need more time to change.22
Religious attitudes: Religious attitudes are also losing their intensity
over time. Table 7.20 shows that first-generation migrants are more
likely to visit places of worship than natives. More assiduous attendance
of religious offices could be explained by the fact that it is a social act
Table 7.20 Probability of participating in religious offices more than for special
occasions.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.110*** 0.031*** 0.086*** 0.012 0.194*** 0.073***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
SE 0.042*** 0.023* 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.014 0.006
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.030) (0.017)
EE 0.079*** 0.033 0.036 0.032 0.123*** 0.051
(0.024) (0.033) (0.028) (0.045) (0.037) (0.044)
AF 0.176*** 0.006 0.224*** 0.059 0.064 0.239
(0.054) (0.096) (0.063) (0.111) (0.079) (0.151)
TMM 0.033 0.145*** 0.102** 0.116*** 0.146*** 0.139***
(0.039) (0.029) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.038)
LA 0.112*** 0.0135 0.158*** 0.079 0.101* 0.196***
(0.038) (0.063) (0.044) (0.078) (0.060) (0.073)
AS 0.084 0.023 0.138* 0.068 0.002
(0.071) (0.108) (0.080) (0.136) (0.110)
SCA 0.261*** 0.044 0.328*** 0.041 0.171* 0.018






Source: SHP, 1999–2007; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
22 See results on behaviours in the couple, and the findings of Wimmer (2004) that were
cited above.
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Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all women/men




Figure 7.18 Religious attitudes.
Table 7.21 Probability of praying at least occasionally.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.123*** 0.041*** 0.088*** 0.031** 0.197*** 0.064***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015)
SE 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.084*** 0.060***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013)
EE 0.021 0.068** 0.012 0.035 0.063** 0.103**
(0.019) (0.031) (0.022) (0.044) (0.026) (0.043)
AF 0.138*** 0.153 0.182*** 0.244** 0.084 0.011
(0.036) (0.097) (0.038) (0.118) (0.058) (0.137)
TMM 0.052 0.052 0.072* 0.010 0.067 0.029
(0.035) (0.034) (0.042) (0.048) (0.056) (0.042)
LA 0.098*** 0.112*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.123*** 0.065
(0.028) (0.042) (0.029) (0.053) (0.040) (0.070)
AS 0.011 0.070 0.018 0.028 0.106 0.216
(0.059) (0.105) (0.072) (0.113) (0.071) (0.179)
SCA 0.131*** 0.100 0.161*** 0.040 0.069 0.170*






Source: SHP, 1999–2007; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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strengthening the cohesion of communities. The hypothesis that reli-
gion fulfils a social rather than a spiritual function in migrant commu-
nities is supported by the fact that migrants are not more inclined
to pray than natives (Table 7.21 and Figure 7.18), and that second-
generation migrants are not more religious than natives. Interestingly,
migrants from Turkey, the Middle East, and Maghreb are very close to
natives in terms of their propensity to attend religious offices or to pray.
The qualitative study of Gianni et al. (2005) on Muslims in Switzerland
draws similar conclusions.
Political attitudes: Finally, the analysis of political attitudes shows that all
migrants are more leaning to the left than the more conservative Swiss
majority, except for second-generation Asian and African migrants
(Table 7.22). Their coefficients, however, arenot significant. It also appears
that migrants from countries with democratic traditions (Western and
Southern Europeans, Latin Americans) are less likely to express satisfac-
tion with the Swiss democracy than migrants coming from regions were
political regimes are mostly undemocratic (Table 7.23 and Figure 7.19).
Natives seem to be the most critical of their own political system.
Table 7.22 Political affiliation.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.541*** 0.215*** 0.244*** 0.199*** 0.408*** 0.261***
(0.073) (0.078) (0.048) (0.063) (0.107) (0.079)
SE 2.080*** 0.826*** 0.699*** 0.311*** 0.236 0.696***
(0.086) (0.078) (0.065) (0.064) (0.149) (0.076)
EE 1.875*** 0.281 0.040 0.246 0.859*** 0.766***
(0.153) (0.226) (0.129) (0.204) (0.174) (0.207)
AF 2.546*** 0.622 1.400*** 0.003 1.421*** 0.067
(0.366) (0.641) (0.310) (0.496) (0.448) (0.665)
TMM 1.193*** 0.584** 0.023 0.098 1.091*** 0.841***
(0.266) (0.248) (0.206) (0.228) (0.263) (0.229)
LA 1.716*** 0.830** 0.868*** 0.450 0.411 1.206***
(0.250) (0.400) (0.187) (0.307) (0.257) (0.421)
AS 1.212** 0.396 0.290 0.0140 1.118** 0.600
(0.484) (0.740) (0.355) (0.543) (0.510) (0.940)
SCA 2.182*** 0.298 0.394 0.068 0.257 1.721**





Source: SHP, 1999–2007; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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7.7 Discussion
The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
 The evolution of selected indicators from the first to the second
generation clearly shows that cultural integration processes are at
work in all migrant communities. However, significant differences
remain between behaviours and attitudes across migrant groups:
∘ At school, men from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle
East, Maghreb, and Eastern Europe seem stuck in a low educa-
tional equilibrium. Young second-generation migrants, however,
have improved their performances and the gender gap is declin-
ing, due to the progresses made by second-generation women.
Differences across groups are especially obvious when looking at
the position of women in the couple. Migrant women from South
and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East, and Maghreb are least
likely to intermarry, even less than their male counterparts, and
they display more traditional behaviours in most of the indica-
tors examined. In the labour market, migrant women are slightly
Table 7.23 Satisfaction with Swiss democracy.
Origin All Pre-1970 Post-1970
First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen. First gen. Second gen.
WE 0.168*** 0.017 0.266*** 0.032 0.350*** 0.125*
(0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.056) (0.103) (0.071)
SE 0.053 0.102** 0.073 0.043 0.665*** 0.214***
(0.048) (0.044) (0.053) (0.056) (0.117) (0.069)
EE 0.975*** 0.293** 0.964*** 0.095 0.975*** 0.473***
(0.086) (0.127) (0.107) (0.177) (0.144) (0.183)
AF 0.744*** 0.598* 0.953*** 0.246 0.343 1.330**
(0.206) (0.361) (0.258) (0.438) (0.343) (0.636)
TMM 0.950*** 0.257* 1.188*** 0.057 0.516** 0.519***
(0.150) (0.140) (0.188) (0.201) (0.249) (0.195)
LA 0.038 0.390* 0.309* 0.549** 0.559** 0.041
(0.141) (0.226) (0.171) (0.276) (0.249) (0.390)
AS 0.608** 0.212 0.656** 0.141 0.489 0.460
(0.273) (0.417) (0.323) (0.477) (0.510) (0.854)
SCA 1.192*** 0.348 1.300*** 0.047 0.955** 1.029





Source: SHP, 1999–2007; standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
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less likely to be active, but this difference disappears in the second
generation, except for Asian migrants.
∘ Patterns of migrants’ subjective attitudes are more difficult to
identify. Results show ‘linguistically distant’ migrants are less
likely to declare one of the four national languages as their
main language. Migrants’ feelings toward Switzerland show that
they perceive discriminations more strongly in comparison to
natives, particularly migrants likely to have darker skin colour
or those likely to be identified as Muslims. The more conservative
behaviours of first-generation migrants in the couple are in line
with their more conservative subjective gender attitudes. It might
be that attitudes evolvemore rapidly in a new social environment
than behaviours do. Minor differences in religious attitudes van-
ish at the second generation, which supports the hypothesis that
religious office attendance fulfils a social (and to some extent an
economic) function rather than a spiritual function. Concerning
political attitudes, migrants seem to be more satisfied with Swiss
democracy, and they lean more to the left than natives.
 The general convergence pattern observed from the first to the
second generation has no match across cohorts. Only a few











































Overall satisfaction with democracy
Data: Swiss census, 2000; sample: all
Both variables = 0 (extreme left/does not agree at all) to 10 scales
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Figure 7.19 Political attitudes.
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cohabitation and divorce). It is therefore not possible to claim that
younger migrants integrate better or worse than migrants born
before 1970.
 Convergence is particularly at work in mixed couples, where first-
generation women of all origins already adopt native behaviours
(including women from South and Central Asia, from Turkey, the
Middle East, and Maghreb), stressing the weakness of the ‘cultural
distance’ argument. First and second-generation migrants in endo-
gamous couples reproducemore traditional behaviours. Although it
is not possible to capture individual traits that impact on the part-
ner choice, this analysis leads to the conclusion that the interplay
between household members, given the characteristics of indivi-
duals, of the household and of their social environment (‘house-
hold dynamics’) has an important role in integration processes.
 Education always has the expected significant effect on examined
indicators. Its impact is non-negligible on fertility, but it is modest
for most other indicators.
The review of the selected indicators reveals that cultural integration
processes, which are at work in various ways in the different groups,
contribute to overall convergence. The most striking and lasting dif-
ferences that are observed across groups do not pertain to educational
achievement, religious, or political attitudes, but to gender-related
attitudes and even more to gender-related behaviours. Differences are
more pronounced in endogamous couples in general, specifically for
women from South and Central Asia, Turkey, the Middle East, and
Maghreb.
As such, the decision to marry at an early age or to live in cohabita-
tion, age and education gaps between partners, the preferred number of
children, and opinions on gender issues are private matters. However,
they also influence the position women have in the household and in
society. Previous studies focused less on individuals inmigration studies,
and more on families, as they are key in socializing second-generation
migrants on whom most policy efforts are targeted (Wanner and Fibbi,
2002). Others observed that some migrant groups are more inclined to
reproduce traditional family structures and relationships (Moret et al.,
2007) and have very pronounced gender attitudes that may be exacer-
bated by the destabilizing effect of migration on families (Gianni et al.,
2005).
The findings presented in this chapter lead to the recommendation to
take more account of migration-related gender issues and migration-
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specific ‘household dynamics’ in the design of future cultural integration
policies. The term ‘household dynamics’ is used deliberately as it is pre-
ferred over ‘family’. First, the term ‘family’ evokes the image of married
couples with children, whereas a household is not associated with any
particular structure (traditional or otherwise). Second, implicitly or
explicitly insisting on the unity and intergenerational solidarity existing
in (migrant) families conceals the fact that migrant households may be
confronted by specific problems. Constraints imposed by migration
require specific household arrangements, which facilitate the division of
labour among household members and a clearer distribution of gender
roles within the couple. Those constraints can intensify gender issues,
which also exist, although to a different degree, among native couples.
Education, labour market, and other policies can and should be used to
influence the integration of migrants in Swiss society, but more targeted
programmes (next to existing language courses, civic, and other pro-
grammes) and policies could be designed to address gender issues,
which arise out of or are exacerbated bymigration andmigration-specific
dynamics developing in migrant households.
Such programmes should not so much aim at informing migrants
about what is considered to conform with Swiss values concerning
gender or family, but about informing them of their individual rights.
Moreover, programmes should support associations and organizations,
which contribute to empower migrants in general (when confronted by
the precariousness of their legal situation, the diminished job security,
discrimination, etc.) and migrant women in particular (when con-
fronted by situations of domestic violence, forced marriage, etc.) to
exercise their rights. Given the ease with which extremist parties exploit
such problems and the disproportionate emphasis cultural integration
issues are given in the public debate, it is important that lawmakers
grant decent financial support to actors involved in such work. Finally,
the challenging situation that some migrant women face should not
conceal that, although gender equality is claimed to be a fundamental
value of Western societies, it is a relatively recent ‘acquis’, particularly in
Switzerland,23 and that much remains to be done.
23 The emancipation of women is particularly recent in Switzerland. The fact that Switzer-
land was not militarily involved in either of the World Wars of the last century delayed the
entry of women in the labour market and their access to economic independence compared
to other industrialized countries. This and other factors in turn slowed down the acquisition
of the voting rights for women, who obtained this political right only in 1971 at the federal
level. In 1990, the Swiss federal court finally ruled that the exclusion of women in cantonal
polls in Appenzell Inner Rhodes was unconstitutional.
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De Coulon, A., Falter, J.-M., Flückiger, Y., and Ramirez, J. (2003) Analyses
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Marché du Travail. Bern, OFAS.
Wanner, P., Mathias, L., and Fibbi, R. (2005a) Familles et Migration: le Rôle de la
Famille sur les Flux Migratoires. Neuchâtel, OFS.
Wanner, P., Neubauer, A., and Moret, J. (2002) Caractéristiques de Vie et d’intégra-
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Travail. In: W. Haug et al. (ed.) Migrants et Marché du Travail: Compétences et
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8
Cultural Integration in the United Kingdom
Alan Manning and Andreas Georgiadis1
8.1 Introduction
The UK has had a much longer history of large-scale immigration than
many other European countries. For a long time there was a certain
smug satisfaction that its generally tolerant and accommodating
approach to cultural diversity had been relatively successful, although
there is no doubt that problems of racism persisted. But this self-
satisfaction has, in many quarters, now turned to alarm that some
immigrant groups are not following the stereotypical immigrant path
of economic and cultural integration into mainstream society. But,
while views on this topic are often very strongly held, the evidence
base is often weaker than one would like. That is what we seek to address
in this chapter.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. The next section summarizes
very briefly the history of immigration into the UK since 1945, the
policy towards integration and the voluminous existing literature on
the economic and social circumstances of ethnic minorities in Britain.
The third section provides details about the data used in our analysis
and presents some descriptive statistics as background for our findings
in subsequent sections. The fourth section studies fertility, the fifth
marriage and divorce, the sixth the gender gap in educational attain-
ment, the seventh female employment, and the eighth values like
national identity, religiosity, and language.
All in all, we find considerable heterogeneity across ethnic minority
communities along the outcomes considered. However, we also find
1 The authors would like to thank Andrew Clark (PSE) for his helpful comments.
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evidence of a marked change in all these areas and this change is always
in the direction of the behaviour of the indigenous British.
8.2 A brief history of immigration and integration policy
in the UK since 1945
8.2.1 Immigration
Compared to many other European countries, the UK began to experi-
ence sizeable immigration much earlier, starting fairly soon after 1945.
In the 1950s immigrants from the Caribbean and in the 1960s from the
Indian sub-continent arrived, primarily as workers to help alleviate
labour shortages. As the economy worsened in the 1970s, there were
fewer economic migrants, though there was a steady trickle through
family reunification and the 72,000 Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi
Amin. However, as the economy improved again in the 1990s, there
was a return of economic migration, with sizeable inflows from Eastern
Europe (especially after the enlargement of the EU) and from Sub-
Saharan Africa. In addition, the 1990s saw sizeable inflows of refugees.
The proportion of immigrants in the UK population is now at its highest
level since 1945 and the immigrant population is very diverse—for a
summary of the ethnic minority population see Peach (1996).
8.2.2 Integration policy
By European standards, the UK began to wrestle with the question of
how best to incorporate immigrant populations into society very early.
What emerged as the dominant idea (essentially a form of ‘multicultur-
alism’) is well-summarized by the following quotation from the Home
Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966:
I do not regard [integration] asmeaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own
national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this
country a ‘melting pot’, which will turn everybody out in a common
mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of
the stereotyped Englishman . . . I define integration, therefore, not as a flat-
tening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by
cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.
This led to early (by European standards), legislation against discrimina-
tion (the first law being the 1965 Race relations Act) and a generally
sympathetic attitude to allowing cultural and religious exemptions to
laws and practices, for example allowing Sikh motorcyclists to wear
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turbans instead of helmets and Muslim policewomen to wear the hijab
on duty. There was a belief that if natives were hospitable to immigrants,
the minorities would, in return, come to feel part of the wider commu-
nity—just one big happy family. The reality was often far from this rosy
picture, as there were riots in many British cities in the early 1980s and
various organizations, notably the police, have been widely criticized for
institutional racism.
But more recently there has been a feeling that this strategy of multi-
culturalism has failed to create a common core of values, primarily
because it offered minorities more than it asked from them in return
and that some communities chose not to integrate into the wider soci-
ety. Events like the London bombings of 2005 have shocked people into
thinking something has gone badly wrong. For example, the chairman
of the Commission for Racial Equality (a non-departmental public body
aimed to tackle racial discrimination and promote social equality, cur-
rently merged into the new Equality and Human Rights Commission)
argued in a TV interview that multiculturalism was leading to segrega-
tion, saying that ‘too many public authorities particularly [are] taking
diversity to a point where they [are] saying, “actually we’re going to
reward you for being different, we are going to give you a community
centre only if you are Pakistani or African Caribbean and so on, but
we’re not going to encourage you to be part of the community of our
town”’. The reaction has included not just a wringing of hands but also
substantive changes to policy—immigrants becoming citizens now
have to pass a test on language, culture, and history designed to
mould their values into those deemed appropriate.
8.2.3 Existing literature on immigrants and ethnic minorities
There is a vast amount of research on the ways in which the economic
and social circumstances of ethnic minorities in Britain differs from that
of the indigenous white population.2 The earliest papers on economic
outcomes (most commonly measured as earnings, employment, and
unemployment) were probably Chiswick (1980) and Stewart (1983).
Since then, there have been many studies, considering diversity in the
ethnic minority experience (see Blackaby et al., 1997; Modood et al.,
1997; Clark and Drinkwater, 2007; Elliott and Lindley, 2008 inter alia),
the difference between first and second-generation immigrants (e.g.
2 There is also an enormous literature, which we do not seek to summarize here, on other
countries—see Adsera and Chiswick (2007) for an interesting comparison of European
countries.
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Blackaby et al., 2002, 2005), the importance of language fluency (Leslie
and Lindley, 2001; Lindley, 2002a; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003), rates of
integration (Bell, 1997; Clark and Lindley, 2006), the role of religion as
opposed to ethnicity (Lindley, 2002b), and differences in time-use (Zai-
ceva and Zimmermann, 2007). These studies have given us excellent
snapshots of the position of different ethnic minorities. In particular,
earnings and employment penalties are typically found to be largest for
the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who are among the most economically
disadvantaged groups in British society.
But, there is much less in the way of research into how this is
changing over time. This is probably due to the fact that many ethnic
minority populations in Britain are of relatively recent origin so that,
until very recently, it has been hard to say anything very precise about
trends. But there are a number of recent studies that do explicitly
address the question of changes over time. Lindley et al. (2006) inves-
tigate how women’s employment rates among ethnic minorities have
been changing, paying particular attention to the changing role of
education. Clark and Drinkwater (2007) compare data from the 1991
and 2001 censuses, looking at the way in which employment and
unemployment rates have changed for different ethnic minorities.
They find little change in the gap between the employment rates for
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis on the one hand and whites on the other.
Similar persistence in employment disadvantage is found in Berthoud
and Blekesaune (2007) using General Household Survey data from
1974 to 2003 and in Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010), who,
however, report more pronounced inter-generational improvements
on educational achievement for ethnic minorities compared to white
natives. Georgiadis and Manning (2011) look at how the behaviour of
ethnic minority communities is changing over time, taking an
approach somewhat similar to that used here but with a narrower
range of variables.
The main contribution of our study is that we complement and
extend the existing literature in two ways: (1) we present evidence on
the differences between white natives and each of the main UK ethnic
minorities for a wide range of outcomes, some of which haven’t been
considered by other studies and (2) we document patterns of change in
the behaviour of ethnic minorities over time by comparing the out-
comes for the foreign and UK born, with the evidence suggesting con-
vergence of behaviour of all ethnic minorities towards that of white
natives.
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8.3 Data and background
The main data used in this chapter comes from the Labour Force Survey
(LFS) for the years 2000–2008 inclusive. This is the main UK household
survey for the collection of information on economic activity. It is an
address-based household sample, with each household being inter-
viewed for five successive quarters and one-fifth being replaced each
quarter. The LFS contains information on country of birth but no infor-
mation on country of parental birth for the UK born. Thismeans that we
cannot, strictly speaking, identify first-generation Britons, that is, the
children of immigrants. This is different from every other chapter in this
book. The standard practice in UK research, which we follow here, is to
use self-defined ethnicity as a measure of being a first-generation Briton.
Therefore, the analysis of the descendants of immigrants is restricted to
ethnic minorities. For the sample period under analysis it is reasonable
to assume that almost all of the non-white UK born have at least one
immigrant parent, though this assumption will become less true in
future years.3
Table 8.1 reports the sample proportions for natives, first-generation
immigrants, and second-generation immigrants for the UK, using the
current standard classification of ethnicity in UK surveys.4 First-genera-
tion immigrants represent around 8.6 per cent of the sample, of which
half (49.4 per cent) are of white ethnicity, 11 per cent are from India, 7.6
per cent Black African, and 6.5 per cent from Pakistan. The share of
second-generation immigrants (those who are UK born but their ethnic-
ity is notWhite British) in the sample is 6.6 per cent, of which the largest
groups are ‘other white’ (27.4 per cent), Indian (14 per cent), Pakistani
(13.2 per cent), and Black Caribbean (10.8 per cent).
The differences in the fraction of the ethnic minority communities
who are UK born largely reflect the fact that they arrived in the UK at
different times. Black Caribbean immigration into the UK began earliest
(in the 1950s), followedby Pakistanis and Indians,5 whobegan to arrive in
3 Information on parental country of birth can be identified in the LFS for individuals who
live in the same household as their parents. This is the case only for 40 per cent of adults
(aged 16 and above), UK-born non-whites in the LFS 2000–2008 inclusive. However, among
individuals in the latter group with information on parental country of birth, 80 per cent
have at least one parent born outside the UK.
4 There are 15 categories after 2001 and 13 beforehand, the extra two groups being
two extra mixed ethnicity categories. Table 8.1 reports the 13 categories of the earlier
classification.
5 This is the case for adults only, whereas if one also considers children then Bangladeshis
have the third highest proportion of UK-born.
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large numbers in the 1960s. The Bangladeshi and Chinese communities
are more recent, so have the lowest proportion of UK born among adults.
In the analysis that follows, we exclude some ethnic groups because
the sample sizes are too small or because the groups are too heteroge-
neous for analysis to be reliable. We exclude the two mixed categories
(that are mostly UK born), and the four ‘other’ categories (other white,
other Asian, other black and other) as they are very heterogeneous. This
leaves us with seven groups for our analysis—white natives, Indian,
Pakistani, Black African, Black Caribbean, Bangladeshi, and Chinese.
8.4 Specifications








ykBirthCohortik þ X0iaþ ɛi
Note that this specification assumes that birth cohort and other regres-
sors (typically age and education) have the same effect on the outcome
for all ethnicity and nativity groups. We do have evidence from other
research (Georgiadis and Manning, 2009) that this is not true but we
want to have a consistent specification across all country chapters.
Table 8.1 Ethnicity and place of birth composition of the Labour Force Survey
2000–2008.
Ethnic origin Foreign born UK born
White native 0 84.8
Other 8.6 6.6
of which (%)
Other white 49.4 27.4
Black Caribbean 4 10.8
Black African 7.6 6.5
Other Black 0.3 1.5




Other Asian 4.8 2.4
Chinese 2.8 1.7
Other mixed 1.1 6.1
Other 8.7 4.1
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008. Proportions are computed using
individual sampling weights. The other white category also includes foreign-born white British.
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Because white natives are the vast majority of all samples, the coeffi-
cients on birth cohort and other regressors are going to be mostly
influenced by the white native coefficients. The coefficients on the
ethnicity and nativity dummies will then be close to what one would
get from an Oaxaca decomposition assuming white native coefficients.
8.5 Fertility and marriage
8.5.1 Fertility and age at first child
In this section we consider the two outcomes related to fertility—the
number of children and age at first birth. The LFS is not ideal for
investigating fertility, as it does not ask retrospective questions about
the number of children a woman has had. The best we can do is to
exploit its household-based structure to see the number of dependent
children who are living with a woman. As children will tend to leave the
family home at some point, older women will be seen to be living with
fewer children just because their children are older. So, we restrict our
sample to women aged between 18 and 40, to capture the youngest ages
at which women are likely to have children and an age when few
women’s children will have left home. To capture the fact that, for
many women in this age group, fertility will not be completed fertility,
we include a polynomial in the age of the woman as explanatory vari-
ables (these coefficients are not reported). We also control for education
(which has a negative effect on fertility). We include dummy variables
for each of our ethnic groups, interacted with whether the individual is
UK or foreign born. The results in Table 8.2 are reported relative to white
UK-born women.
All ethnic minority groups, with the exception of the Chinese, have
higher fertility rates than white native women. But it is also striking
that, for all ethnic groups, fertility rates are lower among the UK born
compared to the foreign born. For example, foreign-born Pakistani
women have 0.83 more children than white natives but UK-born Pakis-
tani women have 0.45 more. For Bangladeshis, the foreign born have
0.98 more children, but the gap falls to 0.31 for the UK born. For Black
Africans, the foreign born have 0.4 more children but the gap falls to
0.18 for the UK born. For Indians, fertility among the UK born is not
significantly different from the white natives.
Table 8.3 now considers age at first birth, which we compute by taking
the current age of the woman minus the age of their oldest child in
the household. There are similar problems with this measure as with
our measure of number of children but it probably gives the right
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Table 8.3 Estimates of the age of the mother at first birth by ethnicity and place
of birth.








Black Caribbean 1.01** 1.01***
(0.4) (0.2)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all women aged between
18 and 40 inclusive. A censored regression model is estimated, controls include age, age squared, and
education, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** signifi-
cant at 5%.
Table 8.2 OLS estimates of the number of dependent children for females by
ethnicity and place of birth.








Black Caribbean 0.013 0.020
(0.056) (0.027)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all women aged between
18 and 40 inclusive. Dependent children are all children below 16. Controls include age, age squared,
and education, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%.
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impression.6 Table 8.3 reports the estimates and one sees a similar pat-
tern to that seen in Table 8.2. With the exception of the Chinese, ethnic
minority women are younger at first birth than white native women,
but the difference is smaller for the UK born. On both these measures,
fertility seems to be moving towards the white native pattern.
8.5.2 Marriage and divorce rates
We next consider marriage patterns (see Berthoud, 2005, for an existing
analysis). In Table 8.4 we report estimates for the probability for cur-
rently being married or cohabiting. Our sample is women aged between
18 and 40 so our models can be thought of as estimating the difference
in marriage rates across women in these age groups. We control, as
before, for age and education. For the foreign born, Table 8.4 shows
that all those from South Asian communities are very much more likely
to be married than white native women. However, this gap falls dramat-
ically for the UK born, even becoming negative for UK-born Indians and
only remaining significantly positive for Pakistanis. Black Caribbean
Table 8.4 Estimates of the probability of marriage/cohabitation for women by
ethnicity and place of birth.








Black Caribbean 0.110** 0.229***
(0.047) (0.017)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all women aged between
18 and 40 inclusive. A linear probability model is estimated, controls include age, age squared, and
education, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** signifi-
cant at 5%.
6 One could use a censored regression model for those women who, when observed, have
not given birth.
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women are less likely to bemarried thanwhite women, especially for the
UK born, where the differential is 23 per cent. One also notes that UK-
born Black African women have much lower marriage rates than white
natives.
These differences inmarriage rates may indicate different propensities
to marry (or cohabit) in the first place, or differences in divorce and
separation rates. To investigate the latter, Table 8.5 considers the frac-
tion of ever-married women who are currently divorced or separated. As
the married category includes those who have divorced and remarried,
this will be an under-estimate of those who have ever divorced but
probably gives the right picture. For the foreign born, those from the
South Asian communities are significantly less likely to be divorced,
whereas the Chinese are as likely to be divorced as white natives. But
Black Caribbeans and Black Africans are significantly more likely to be
divorced, by more than 15 percentage points for both ethnic groups.
However, among the UK born significant differences in divorce/separa-
tion rate appear for the Pakistanis, Black Caribbeans, and Black Africans,
who are more likely than white women to be divorced. The observation
for Pakistanis is particularly interesting but does chime with some who
have written that the practice of taking a spouse from Pakistan—which
remains very common—results in marriages that do not last.
Table 8.5 Estimates of the probability of divorce/separation for women by
ethnicity and place of birth.








Black Caribbean 0.167*** 0.129***
(0.015) (0.016)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all non-single women aged
between 18 and 40 inclusive. A linear probability model is estimated, controls include age, age squared,
and education, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, **
significant at 5%.
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These marriage patterns suggest, in line with other evidence, that the
South Asian communities are relatively conservative in their marital
patterns, with women typically marrying relatively young and divorce
being relatively rare, while Black Caribbeans have been much less con-
servative. One would also see this pattern if one differentiated between
cohabitation and marriage—cohabitation would be rare among South
Asians and much more common among Black Caribbeans. However, as
for fertility, there is a clear indication that differences in behaviour are
falling.
8.5.3 Inter-ethnic marriage
Perhaps the most striking way in which communities can converge
culturally is by marrying outside their own ethnic group (see also Cole-
man, 1994). Table 8.6 reports the fraction of each community that is
married to someone of a different ethnicity. We also report the fraction
of individuals who are married to white natives. We report exogamy
rates separately for men and women as there are some interesting
differences.
















White native 0 3.6 3.6 0 3 3
Foreign born
Indian 5.4 4.6 10 4.7 4.7 9.4
Pakistani 3.4 4 7.4 2.3 3.8 6.1
Bangladeshi 1.7 3.4 5.1 1 3.4 4.4
Black Caribbean 22.8 10.1 32.9 14.7 9.7 24.4
Black African 10 12.8 22.8 9 8 17
Chinese 9.8 6.2 16 28.6 8.8 37.4
UK born
Indian 14.4 5.8 20.2 15.7 7.2 22.9
Pakistani 7.8 7.3 15.1 3.7 6.8 10.5
Bangladeshi 8.3 20.8 29.1 6.7 1.7 7.4
Black Caribbean 46.7 15.8 62.5 30.4 14 44.4
Black African 22.5 16 38.5 10.6 19 29.6
Chinese 53.6 13.1 66.7 70.4 7.6 78
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008. Proportions are computed using
individual sampling weights.
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Exogamy rates are lowest for white natives (about 3 per cent), but
vary very considerably across ethnic minority communities. Among the
foreign born, exogamy rates are lowest for the South Asian commu-
nities, but extremely high among the Black groups and the Chinese.
For all groups, exogamy rates are much higher among the UK born.
Among the South Asians, there is some indication that exogamy with
white natives is higher for Indians than the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis
(where religion may be more of an obstacle). Exogamy rates for some
groups are extremely high—78 per cent of UK-born Chinese women are
exogamous, as are 66.7 per cent of UK-born Chinese men, and 62.5 per
cent of UK-born Black Caribbean men.
There is a lot of information in Table 8.6 which also does not control
for age and education. Table 8.7 reports regression estimates—the pat-
terns are very similar to those reported for Table 8.6.
8.5.4 Spousal age gaps
Table 8.8a reports estimates for the age gap between wives and their
husbands, which could perhaps be interpreted as a measure of gender
relations, with a larger age gap reflecting greater gender inequality.
For the foreign born, all ethnic minority groups have a significantly
Table 8.7 Estimates of probability of exogamy by ethnicity and gender.
Ethnicity Men Women
Foreign born UK born Foreign born UK born
White native Reference Reference
Indian 0.0105* 0.0826*** 0.0191*** 0.117***
(0.00438) (0.0124) (0.00477) (0.0127)
Pakistani 0.000780 0.0500*** 0.000671 0.0177
(0.00530) (0.0128) (0.00573) (0.00982)
Bangladeshi 0.0169* 0.165** 0.0198** 0.00777
(0.00721) (0.0555) (0.00723) (0.0243)
Black Caribbean 0.362*** 0.556*** 0.253*** 0.372***
(0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0221)
Black African 0.103*** 0.255*** 0.0598*** 0.149***
(0.0105) (0.0376) (0.00944) (0.0326)
Chinese 0.0595*** 0.545*** 0.253*** 0.634***
(0.0138) (0.0591) (0.0173) (0.0535)
R2 0.053 0.052
Observations 834,571 817,757
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all married individuals.
A probit model is estimated, estimates presented are marginal effects, controls include education, age,
and age squared, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%.
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Table 8.8a OLS estimates of the age gap between husband and wife for all
individuals by ethnicity and place of birth.








Black Caribbean 1.703*** 0.762***
(0.328) (0.202)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all non-single women aged
between 18 and 40 inclusive. Controls include age, age squared, and education, clustered standard
errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
Table 8.8b OLS estimates of the age gap between husband and wife for
endogamous and exogamous individuals by ethnicity and place of birth.
Ethnicity Endogamous Exogamous
Foreign born UK born Foreign born UK born
White native Reference Reference
Indian 1.430*** 0.374*** 1.423*** 0.471
(0.078) (0.122) (0.354) (0.432)
Pakistani 1.560*** 0.275 2.886*** 0.494
(0.127) (0.148) (0.582) (0.516)
Bangladeshi 4.281*** 2.019*** 4.128*** 1.304
(0.207) (0.400) (1.223) (1.460)
Black Caribbean 2.333*** 0.468 0.994 0.832**
(0.403) (0.252) (0.630) (0.344)
Black African 2.841*** 0.435 5.415*** 0.347
(0.185) (0.322) (0.680) (0.912)
Chinese 0.993*** 0.229 1.761*** 0.612
(0.228) (0.548) (0.426) (0.577)
R2 0.022 0.016
Observations 751,708 724,190
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all married individuals.
Controls include age, age squared, and education, clustered standard errors at the individual level in
parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
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greater spousal age gap than white native women, it being largest
among Bangladeshis (4.2 years) and Black Africans (3.2 years), and
smallest among the Chinese (1.3 years). However, it is striking that,
among the UK born it is only for the Bangladeshis who have a signifi-
cantly different spousal age gap and even that is much reduced. UK-born
Black Caribbeans have a significantly lower spousal age gap than white
native women.
One possibility is that this is driven by the higher rates of exogamy
among the UK born that we saw in Table 8.6. However, Table 8.8b shows
that this is generally not the case. In Table 8.8b we estimate separate
spousal age gap equations for endogamous and exogamous groups with
the reference group, in both cases, being all white native women.
Although there are some significant differences in spousal age gaps
between exogamous and endogamous couples (though sample sizes
are small for the exogamous group), it is clear that the declining gaps
are present among endogamous couples.
8.6 Educational attainment and the gender
gap in education
It is of very considerable interest how the level of education of ethnic
minorities compares with that of natives (see Briggs et al., 2005; Mod-
ood, 2005, for other research on the educational attainment of ethnic
minorities). The gender gap in education is also a good way of looking
for evidence of gender equality. Table 8.9 shows the average age left full-
Table 8.9 Average age left continuous full-time education and proportion left
full-time education by the age of thirteen for men and women by ethnicity.
Ethnicity Average age left full-
time education
Proportion of people who left continuous
full-time education by the age of thirteen
Men Women Men Women
White native 17.2 17.1 0.19 0.15
Indian 19.6 18.6 2.14 4.46
Pakistani 18.3 16.2 4.68 15.2
Bangladeshi 17.5 15.7 8.4 19
Black Caribbean 17.2 17.5 1.5 0.7
Black African 20.6 19 1.8 5.8
Chinese 20 19.4 3.7 4
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008. Proportions are computed using
individual sampling weights.
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time education for different ethnic groups. This measure of education is
not ideal as a given age left full-time educationmay reflect very different
types and quality of education, especially when comparing the foreign
and UK born. But, unfortunately, the UK LFS does not adequately code
foreign qualifications so the measure we use here is the best available.
Table 8.9 shows that, for men, it is white natives who, on average, left
full-time education at the youngest age. The Black Africans, Chinese,
and Indians are the best-educated. Among women, Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis have lower levels of education than white natives, clearly
indicating a gender gap in education for these groups. A smaller gender
gap is found among the Indians and Chinese.
However, these figures on average age left full-time education hide a
lot of variation. The last two columns look at the fraction of commu-
nities who left full-time education by the age of 13, that is, who have a
very low level of education. This should be impossible for those born
and brought up in the UK and one sees essentially zero rates among
white natives. The fractions are higher for all ethnic minority commu-
nities—and very high for some groups. Most strikingly, 19 per cent of
Bangladeshi women and 15.2 per cent of Pakistani women have com-
pleted education by the age of 13, so levels of education are low for these
groups.
Table 8.10 OLS estimates of the gender gap in age left continuous full-time
education by ethnicity, place of birth, and birth cohort.






Born before 1970 0.760*** 1.277*** 3.198 0.181 0.497 1.089**
(0.203) (0.331) (1.713) (0.102) (0.364) (0.549)
Born after 1970 0.546*** 0.875*** 0.951 0.139 0.065 0.337
(0.156) (0.207) (0.572) (0.203) (0.393) (0.456)
Foreign born
Born before 1970 1.382*** 2.907*** 2.422*** 0.294** 2.084*** 0.799***
(0.099) (0.171) (0.300) (0.120) (0.166) (0.250)
Born after 1970 0.903*** 1.719*** 1.457*** 0.452 1.278*** 0.814**
(0.162) (0.207) (0.247) (0.325) (0.199) (0.369)
R2 0.075 0.116 0.100 0.034 0.037 0.073
Observations 38,202 21,614 7,145 19,709 18,163 7,245
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all individuals aged 26 and
above. Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%.
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Table 8.10 reports regression estimates for the gender gap in educa-
tion. In these regressions we also interact the ethnicity and foreign-born
dummies with a cohort dummy for whether the respondent was born
before or after 1970. The reported coefficients are gender gaps. For all the
foreign-born groups except the Black Caribbeans there is a significantly
larger gender gap in education than among white natives. However, this
gender gap is smaller for later birth cohorts. Among the UK born, the
gender gaps are lower and, within this group, lower for those born after
1970 (although small sample sizes make it hard to draw precise conclu-
sions on this).
To summarize: the gender gap in educational attainment is larger
among Pakistani and Banglasdeshi communities than for the other
main ethnic minorities. In large part, this is the result of enormous
past differences in the educational attainment of men and women in
the countries of origin. But there is marked change, driven in part by
changes among both the UK and foreign born,7 and in part because of
the change in the share of the communities who are UK born. Our
conclusions here are consistent with those of more qualitative studies
(e.g. Ahmad et al., 2003) who conclude that cultures often portrayed as
opposed to the education and employment of women seem to be pro-
ducing growing cohorts of highly motivated young women.
8.7 Female employment
We now turn to an analysis of female employment. For white natives
the last 60 years have seen a large growth in female employment rates,
though there is some evidence that the growth is now slowing or even
stopping. But many of the ethnic minorities come from cultures in
which female employment is lower, so female employment is an inter-
esting indicator of cultural change. It may, of course, also reflect eco-
nomic opportunities.
Table 8.11 reports female employment rates, by ethnicity, place of
birth and—because it is so important—marital status and the presence
of dependent children. The first row reports employment rates for all
women. These are highest for white natives, though Black Caribbeans
are only slightly behind. However, the exceedingly low rates for Pakis-
tani (25 per cent) and Bangladeshi (17 per cent) women are quite
7 Changes among the foreign born might be the result of the changes in the source
countries discussed above, but another factor that might be important is the changing
selection of immigrants into the UK.
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Table 8.12 Estimates of employment probability for women by ethnicity and
place of birth.








Black Caribbean 0.0543*** 0.0619***
(0.0134) (0.0115)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all women aged between
25 and 59 inclusive. A probit model is estimated, estimates presented are marginal effects, controls
include education, age, and age squared, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses,
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
Table 8.11 Female employment rates by ethnicity, place of birth, marital status,
and presence of dependent children.
White
Native





All Women 0.74 0.64 0.25 0.17 0.71 0.59 0.63
UK born
All 0.74 0.75 0.45 0.46 0.73 0.73 0.77
Single 0.7 0.81 0.72 0.7 0.67 0.7 0.78




0.74 0.68 0.33 0.31 0.76 0.71 0.73
Foreign born
All 0.61 0.18 0.14 0.7 0.56 0.6
Single 0.76 0.3 0.54 0.66 0.54 0.64





0.6 0.15 0.11 0.7 0.53 0.57
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2000–2008, the sample is all women aged between
25 and 59 inclusive.
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striking. This is well known (see, for example, Cabinet Office, 2003,
Berthoud and Blekesaune (2007) and Clark and Drinkwater (2007)).
The Equalities Review went so far as to say that the gap in employment
rates between Pakistani/Bangladeshi and white women would never be
eliminated (Cabinet Office, 2007). However, one can also see in
Table 8.11 that there is a very large difference in employment rates
between the foreign and UK born. For example, UK-born Pakistani
women have an employment rate of 45 per cent—still low, but much
higher than the rate of 18 per cent for foreign-born Pakistani women.
For Bangladeshi women, the figures are 46 per cent and 14 per cent,
respectively. There is also some indication that UK-born women from
these communities are no longer stopping employment onmarriage but
waiting until they have children.
The employment rates of Table 8.11 do not control for age or educa-
tion. Table 8.12 reports estimates from specifications that control for
education. For the foreign born, women from all ethnic minorities are
significantly less likely to be in employment than white native women,
with the largest gaps being for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. But, these
gaps are much reduced among the UK born.
Again, we see evidence of convergence in behaviour. The quantitative
conclusions we have drawn here mesh well with the more qualitative
studies of Ahmad et al. (2003) and Aston et al. (2007).
8.8 Values and beliefs
8.8.1 National identity
Since spring 2001 the LFS has asked about the national identity of respon-
dents (though not in Northern Ireland), a questionmotivated by concern
that some immigrant groups did not think of themselves as British. The
specific question asked is ‘What do you consider your national identity to
be? Please choose as many or as few as apply’. There are six possible
responses: British, English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, and Other. The order
inwhich these responses are listed depends on the country of residence so
English is the first option in England, Scottish in Scotland and Welsh in
Wales. For the purposes of this chapter we group British, English, Scottish
andWelsh into a single ‘British’ category and we will use the term British
to refer to any of these answers in what follows.
Table 8.13 reports estimates from a probit equation—the coefficients
are differences fromwhite natives. In line withManning and Roy (2010),
and Georgiadis and Manning (2009) we find that all ethnic minorities
are less likely to report a British national identity than white natives but
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the gap is very much smaller for the UK born (in the 5–10 percentage
point range) than among the foreign born (where it is in the 30–60
percentage point range). In line with other studies, it is worth pointing
out that the Muslim groups (the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) whose
loyalty to Britain is often questioned are the ethnic minorities who are
most likely to report a British national identity.
8.8.2 Religion
Since 2002, the Labour Force Survey has collected data on religion and
Table 8.14 documents the proportions of different ethnicities describing
themselves as of different religions. We also report the fraction with no
religion and the fraction who report that they are practising their reli-
gion. The groups from the Indian sub-continent and Black Africans
remain very religious, as very few report having no religion compared,
for example, to the 56.6 per cent share of individuals reporting no
religion among the Chinese. The most religious are the Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis who are overwhelmingly Muslim.8 These groups are also
much more likely to be practising their religion.
Table 8.13 Estimates of the probability of reporting British national identity by
ethnicity and place of birth.








Black Caribbean 0.374*** 0.0764***
(0.0108) (0.00512)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2001–2008, the sample is all individuals aged 16 and
above. A probit model is estimated, estimates presented are marginal effects, controls include education,
age, and age squared, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at
1%, ** significant at 5%.
8 It is hard to know from this data whether the non-Muslims have converted or were
brought up that way, as there are small religious minorities in both countries.
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Table 8.15 reports estimates for the differences in the proportions who
are practising their religion. In line with Table 8.14, all the South Asian
and Black groups are more religious than white natives, with the Pakis-
tanis and Bangladeshis standing out as being themost religious. There is
evidence of less religiosity among the UK born than the foreign born,
although the decline is noticeably less marked for Pakistanis.
What this suggests is that, while there is some evidence of a trend
towards lower rates of religiosity among all the ethnicminorities studied
here, the trend is less marked for Pakistanis than for other groups. This is
perhaps consistent with the evidence in Bisin et al. (2007) that Muslims
are more serious about their faith than adherents to other religions,
although the Muslim Bangladeshis do show a marked decline in religi-
osity for the UK born.
8.8.3 Language
If one has problems with the English language, it is likely to be very hard
to assimilate into British culture and one is very likely to remain eco-
nomically disadvantaged. The LFS asks9 whether English is the first
language at home and, if some other language other than English,
Welsh, Gaelic, or Ullans is spoken, whether the respondent has language
difficulties with work and education.We code an individual as reporting
Table 8.14 Reported religion and whether practising religion by ethnicity.
Religion White
Native





Christian 82.5 7.9 1.3 0.24 84 76.7 25.4
Buddhist 0.14 0.3 0.02 0.05 0.2 0.1 14.5
Hindu 0.01 46.1 0.18 1.07 0.24 0.27 0.17
Jewish 0.43 0.1 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.04 0
Muslim 0.07 13.3 96.5 97 0.62 18 0.2
Sikh 0.01 27.6 0.11 0.1 0.01 0.04 0
Other religion 0.7 1.95 1.22 0.28 2.3 0.93 3
No religion 16.2 2.6 0.66 1.21 12.5 3.9 56.6
% practising
religion
17 64 80 82 33 65 6
Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2002–2008 for religious denomination and LFS
2002–03 for whether practising religion, the sample is all individuals aged 16 and above.
9 This is only for one quarter every three years, so sample sizes are much reduced for the
analysis that follows.
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language difficulties if they report problems with either work or
education.
In our analysis we assume that no white natives have language pro-
blems.10 We also assume the same for Black Caribbeans, the vast major-
ity of whom come from English-speaking islands. Table 8.16 reports
rates of using English at home for the other groups. Only 11 per cent
of foreign-born Bangladeshis and 19 per cent of foreign-born Pakistanis
use English at home, compared to 30 per cent of foreign-born Indians
and Chinese and 47 per cent of Black Africans. For all ethnic minorities
the proportions rise very markedly for the UK born, though a sizeable
minority continue to use a language other than English at home.
Table 8.17 presents estimates of the proportions reporting difficulties
with English. Among the foreign born, 22 per cent of Bangladeshis, 16
per cent of Pakistanis, 15 per cent of Chinese, and 10 per cent of Indians
and Black Africans report difficulties. In many ways these differences
reflect differences in educational attainment reported earlier in the
chapter in Table 8.9. Among the UK born these proportions become
Table 8.15 Estimates of the probability of whether practising religion by
ethnicity and place of birth.








Black Caribbean 0.266*** 0.161***
(0.0201) (0.0147)






Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2002–2003, the sample is all individuals aged 16 and
above. A probit model is estimated, estimates presented are marginal effects, controls include a dummy
for whether the individual is female, education, age, and age squared, clustered standard errors at the
individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
10 In doing this we ignore the fact that a non-negligible fraction of the white native
population do have literacy problems. However, we have little choice as the LFS does not
ask the language difficulty question to those who report using English, Welsh, Gaelic, or
Ullans at home.
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Table 8.17 Estimates of the proportion reporting that English language
difficulties are causing problems in finding a job or in education.













Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2002 second quarter, 2003 second quarter, and 2006
third quarter, the sample is all individuals aged 16 and above who are not white natives or Black
Caribbeans, as all individuals with either ethnicity speak English at home. A linear probability model is
estimated, the constant term is not included in estimation, controls include education, age, and
age squared, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%.
Table 8.16 Estimates of the proportion with English as the first language at
home by ethnicity and place of birth.













Note: Data source is the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2002 second quarter, 2003 second quarter, and 2006
third quarter, the sample is all individuals aged 16 or above who are not white natives or Black
Caribbeans, as all individuals with either ethnicity speak English at home. A linear probability model
is estimated, the constant term is not included in estimation, controls include education, age, and
age squared, clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses, *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%.
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dramatically smaller, even though, as Table 8.16 shows, a large fraction
do not use English as a first language at home. However, this perhaps
comes as no surprise given that education is in English.
8.9 Conclusion
This chapter has compared the behaviours of the largest ethnic mino-
rities in Britain with white natives across a wide, though not exhaustive,
range of indicators. In all these dimensions there are significant differ-
ences across ethnic minorities some of which are well-established in the
literature, as, for example, the strikingly low employment rates for
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women but there are other differences less
well-documented. An example of the latter is the finding that the Mus-
lim minorities (the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) are more likely to
report a British National identity compared to other ethnic minority
communities both among the foreign and UK born. Moreover, another
striking common pattern that emerges is the extent to which differences
in behaviours between ethnic minorities and white natives tend to be
less pronounced for the UK than the foreign born. This indicates a
general pattern of cultural integration, something perhaps not
surprising to those who study the topic but not the impression one
might gain from public discourse on the subject. The rate of cultural
integration is faster for some variables than others—it is probably reli-
gion that shows the slowest rate. This has the implication that within
religions, behaviours are changing so that what it means to be a good
Christian or Muslim or Hindu is changing over time.
It is an important question whether, in future years, this process of
convergence will continue until behaviours are the same or whether
permanent differences will remain. Statistical analysis of data inevitably
can only tell us about the past. But it is clear that there are very powerful
forces that are acting to change the behaviour of immigrant commu-
nities once they are in the UK and it is not unreasonable to guess that
these will continue into the future.
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9
Cultural Integration in the United States
Jacob Vigdor
9.1 Introduction
Immigration figures prominently in the social and political history of
the United States. At the time of the nation’s founding in the late
eighteenth century, concerns about the cultural integration of foreign-
born aliens were already widespread. Writing in 1751, a quarter of a
century before the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin
wrote a treatise expressing grave concerns about the presence of non-
Anglo-Saxon residents. A hundred years later, the rapid arrival of Cath-
olic immigrants from Germany and Ireland inspired the brief but
intense ‘Know-nothing’ movement, which soon divided itself over the
issue of slavery in the lead-up to the nation’s civil war. Half a century
after that, a new wave of immigration from the nations of Southern and
Eastern Europe inspired a series of legislative interventions intended to
preserve the nation’s dominant culture against perceived threats—first
by encouraging immigrants to assimilate, later by excluding them from
the nation entirely.
Between the 1920s and the 1960s, legal restrictions on immigration
all but eliminated the flow of permanent settlers into the nation. Since
1965, a partial relaxation of those restrictions has led to a new wave of
immigration in the United States, this time composed predominantly of
migrants from Asia and Latin America. Recently, roughly one million
new immigrants have legally entered the United States every year, while
hundreds of thousands more enter without legal authorization to reside
or work in the country. In a nation of some 300 million residents,
40 million are foreign born. While the density of immigrants in the
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population was higher in the early twentieth century, the sheer number
of foreign-born residents in the United States is unprecedented.
The post-1965 wave of immigration has inspired a litany of concerns.
It has coincided with a prolonged period of stagnation or decline in the
earnings of low-skilled workers; the work of George Borjas has argued
that these two coincident trends are in fact causally linked (Borjas,
2003). In more recent years, immigration has been viewed as a national
security issue, and the loyalty of foreign-born residents to their host
nation is a common subject of concern. Beyond these issues, just as in
earlier eras, there are frequently-voiced concerns that new immigrants
are failing to integrate into the native culture. Unlike earlier eras, where
immigrants came frommany nations and spoke a number of languages,
one-third of contemporary immigrants come from a single country,
Mexico, and about half are native Spanish speakers. Thus, while the
lessons of earlier eras would indicate that linguistic minorities quickly
disperse into the mainstream population, there are credible reasons to
think that this migration wave is substantively different.
This chapter will review the evidence of the cultural integration of
immigrants in the United States, both past and present. Two methods
of measuring cultural integration will be reviewed. First, a number of
individual indicators will be combined into a univariate measure. Sec-
ond, individual indicators of cultural integration, including the ability
to speak English, residential location, and intermarriage will be re-
viewed. Using both measures, a common story emerges. In all, the rate
of cultural integration among modern immigrants to the United States
is quite similar to the rate observed a century ago, during the last great
wave of European immigration. The overall rate, however, masks impor-
tant forms of heterogeneity across immigrant groups. In particular,
immigrants from Mexico and nearby parts of Latin America exhibit
slow rates of cultural integration over time. Immigrants from other
regions of the world, by contrast, are integrating quite rapidly by histor-
ical standards.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the factors that might
explain the substantial heterogeneity in the experiences of modern
immigrants. The lack of legal status, which influences an immigrant’s
incentive to invest in cultural capital, is a clear impediment to assimila-
tion. Proximity between host and origin countries is also a factor; the
greater the likelihood of return to one’s home country, the weaker the
incentive to invest in cultural capital. Finally, advances in communica-
tion technology have increased the ability of even relatively small lin-
guistic minorities to function in a host society.
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9.2 An index measure of integration in the United States
9.2.1 Methodology
Vigdor (2008) describes a method of deriving a unidimensional index
measure of immigrant assimilation from multidimensional data on the
characteristics of native and foreign-born residents of a nation. Using a
dataset with an equal number of observations in each group, the
method begins by estimating a probit regression, with nativity status
serving as the dependent variable. A series of characteristics, including
economic, cultural, and civic indicators, serve as predictors. Intuitively,
the degree of assimilation or integration increases as the probit model’s
predictive power decreases. In the limit, when the distribution of pre-
dictive characteristics is identical in both groups, they can be considered
fully integrated with one another.
To quantitatively express the degree of integration between groups,
the probit regressionmodel is used to compute a predicted probability of
foreign nativity for each member of the sample, based on the observed
characteristics included on the right hand side.1 Because the probit
model is estimated on a sample divided evenly between foreign and
native born, when no characteristics predict nativity all sample mem-
bers will be assigned a 50 per cent likelihood of being foreign born. At
the other extreme, a perfectly predictive model (which is in fact not
estimable in a maximum-likelihood framework, but should be consid-
ered as a theoretical possibility) would yield predicted likelihoods of 100
per cent for the foreign-born and 0 per cent for the native born. As a
summary measure, then, the mean predicted probability p can be com-
puted for the entire foreign-born population, or subsets thereof, and
converted to an index according to the formula:
(1) index = 2*(100p),
which returns a value of 100 when p is 50 per cent, and converges to 0 as
p approaches 100 per cent. On occasion, when computed for a subset of
the immigrant population, the index may exceed 100 per cent. This
occurs when a particular subset of immigrants, such as those born in a
neighbouring country, exhibit characteristics that are in fact more typi-
cally associated with natives than immigrants. In such cases, the index is
truncated to the value of 100.
1 Probit regression results are not reported in this chapter. Sample results for various years
can be found in Vigdor (2008).
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9.2.2 Data
In the United States, detailed individual-level data identifying birthplace
as well as social characteristics including language ability, household
structure, and residential location has been collected systematically
since the Census of 1900. Given the paucity of newly arrived immigrants
in the years between 1920 and 1965, the assimilation index is most
meaningfully computed using data from the Census enumerations of
1900 through 1930, and then again from 1980 to the present. In the
years since 2000, annual information of comparable quality andquantity
has been collected through the American Community Survey (ACS).
These data can be used to generate four predictive indicators to be used
to form a consistent measure of cultural integration from 1900 to 2007,
the most recent years’ worth of data.
Ability to speak English: Although the United States does not have an
official language, the rate at which immigrants acquire the ability to
speak English has typically been a widely monitored indicator of cul-
tural integration. In the early twentieth century, English ability was
assessed using a simple binary coding by in-person enumerators who
canvassed each residential address nationwide. In later years, respon-
dents have self-reported their English-speaking ability using a multi-
valued scale. For purposes of analysis, this variable is recoded as a binary
indicator, separating those who have any English ability whatsoever
from those who have none. Even with this recoding, however, it
remains possible that observed changes in English ability over long
periods of time might reflect changes in reporting rather than an
actual difference in mastery. This caveat should be kept in mind for
the duration of the analysis below.
Marital status: Marital status is coded consistently throughout the
sample period, with the exception that the category ‘separated’ was
not an option in the early years. Individuals who report being separated
in later years are recoded as ‘married, spouse absent’ for purposes of
consistency.
Intermarriage: Data permit the identification of spouse’s birthplace in
those situations where both husband and wife reside at the same
address. The actual indicator used to code intermarriage is not whether
a respondent’s spouse belongs to a different nativity group. Given ran-
dom mating in the population, such a measure would indicate higher
rates of intermarriage among members of rarer groups. Instead, the
intermarriage measure indicates whether a respondent’s spouse is native
born. In a situation of random mating, all groups should have an equal
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probability of having a native born spouse, regardless of the representa-
tion of natives in the population.
Number of children present in the household: The Census and ACS pro-
vide a complete record of individuals residing at a given address, as well
as their relationship to other individuals living in the same household.
Residential location: The Census records detailed geographic location
information for each household. This information is not consistently
available in the public use microdata records used to compute the
assimilation index, however. As such, this factor will not be incor-
porated into the index. Trends in the residential integration of the
native and foreign born will be examined in the section on supplemen-
tal analyses below.
9.2.3 Other dimensions of assimilation
Beyond measuring cultural integration, this methodology can also be
used to examine the degree of distinction between immigrants and
natives along more purely economic dimensions, or along civic indica-
tors, including citizenship and military service. This task is complicated
in earlier Census samples by the absence of many economic and civic
indicators. In addition to the cultural assimilation index, this chapter
will report information on a more comprehensive assimilation index
that incorporates information on citizenship, home ownership, labour
force participation, and a basic socio-economic status indicator based on
respondents’ reported occupations and the average earnings of indivi-
duals employed in those occupations in 1950.
9.2.4 Results
Table 9.1 presents two versions of the assimilation index: one focusing
purely on cultural factors, the other incorporating some economic and
civic indicators as well, for selected years between 1900 and 2007.
Cultural integration, as measured by the index, varies only slightly
across these dates, from a low value of 59 in 1910 to a high value of 67
in 1980. The indices are not reported for the years between 1930 and
1980, when the flow of new migrants to the United States was minimal
and most foreign-born residents had lived in the country for several
decades. Presumably during this interval the assimilation index was
relatively high.
There are two periods of noteworthy decline in cultural assimilation:
between 1900 and 1910, and again between 1980 and 1990. The earlier
period coincides with a decade of rapid arrival rates for non-English
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speaking migrants in the United States. As assimilation is a process that
takes time, the assimilation index will naturally decline as the ratio of
newly arrived immigrants to longer-term foreign-born residents rises.
In light of this, it is perhaps surprising that the cultural assimilation
index fails to decline in the period after 1990, when rapid immigration
to the United States continued. This pattern will be explored in greater
depth.
The composite assimilation index is generally lower than the cultural
version, as any algorithm for distinguishing two groups of people will
make more accurate predictions when it considers more information.
The index begins at a relatively high value of 54 in 1900, then declines
through 1920, before ticking upwards as immigration nearly halted in
the 1920s. Between 1930 and 1980, there is virtually no change in the
index. Like the cultural version, the composite index declines in the
1980s before stabilizing over the past two decades.
As noted above, the assimilation index can be computed for subsets of
the immigrant population. Table 9.2 exploits this feature to illustrate the
process of assimilation over time, as well as variation in assimilation
across groups. The table focuses on immigrants of three nationalities
drawn from three time periods. The first two rows examine the experi-
ence of Italian immigrants who arrived in the United States between
1906 and 1910, around the peak of immigration from that origin coun-
try. Observed shortly after arrival, this group is very close to perfectly
distinct from the native population when civic and economic factors
are considered alongside cultural ones. Along the cultural dimension
alone, the index stands at 19, substantially below the overall average for
that year.
Table 9.1 Assimilation indices for the United States, 1900–2007.









Source: US Census (1900–2000) and American Community Survey (2007), author’s calculations. The
cultural assimilation index summarizes the distinctiveness between the native and foreign-born popula-
tion on the basis of ability to speak English, marital status, likelihood of marriage to a native-born spouse,
and number of children present in the household. The composite index adds information on citizenship,
labour force participation, and an occupation-based measure of imputed income.
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Twenty years later, this cohort of Italian immigrants had exhibited
substantial progress. The cultural assimilation index had increased from
19 to 43, reflecting a combination of English language learning and
other factors, including intermarriage. The composite index had
increased to 29, thanks to these processes as well as economic advances
and naturalization. Even after 20 or more years in the United States,
though, Italian immigarnts were far below the overall average in terms
of cultural and overall integration. In the early twentieth century, a
substantial proportion of immigrants were from nations such as the
United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Canada. With fewer cultural
and ethnic barriers to cross, these groups undoubtedly experienced
more instantaneous assimilation along many dimensions.
In more recent years, Mexico and Vietnam have been two of the most
prominent origin countries. Table 9.2 shows that since 1980, recently
arrived immigrants from these nations have been poorly assimilated
overall, though not as noteworthy in the cultural dimension. Cultural
assimilation upon arrival ranges from 39 amongMexican immigrants in
1980 to 48 among Vietnamese immigrants in that same year. This
reflects a combination of better language skills and, for Mexican immi-
grants at least, a higher likelihood of intermarriage, as defined for pur-
poses of the assimilation index. The overall assimilation index,
measured shortly after arrival, is in the single digits for all groups,
dragged down in particular by low rates of naturalization.
Cohorts arriving in the late 1970s had posted substantial improve-
ments in integration by 2007. The improvements are most noteworthy
among Mexican immigrants, who close two-thirds of the initial gap
with the Vietnamese. As in an earlier era, cultural integration is achieved
primarily through improvements in English skills and intermarriage. As
will be documented below, intermarriage is a relatively important part of
the story for Mexican immigrants, but also a controversial one. The vast
Table 9.2 Assimilation of specific immigrant cohorts at varying points in time.
Country of birth Arrival in USA Year observed Cultural Composite
Italy 1906–1910 1910 19 4
1930 43 29
Mexico 1975–1980 1980 39 8
2007 55 28
Vietnam 1975–1980 1980 48 6
2007 58 56
Mexico 2001–2007 2007 43 3
Vietnam 2001–2007 2007 44 8
Source: US Census (1910–1980), American Community Survey (2007), author’s calculations.
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majority of marriages pairing a Mexican and American-born spouse
involve individuals of Mexican heritage.
In terms of composite assimilation, the progress evinced by Vietnam-
ese immigrants far outstrips that of their Mexican counterparts. This in
large part reflects important background differences between the
groups. Mexican immigrants, who come from an adjacent country,
migrate primarily for economic reasons. Many lack legal status, which
prohibits them from taking important steps toward assimilation. Viet-
namese immigrants, by contrast, come from a distant country, with
more political motives for migration. As such, both their incentives
and opportunities to assimilate are stronger. This theme will be
extended in the concluding discussion below.
9.3 Examining individual indicators of integration
The assimilation index is a useful summary measure of the degree of
similarity between two groups; however, by necessity it has the poten-
tial to obscure important details regarding specific attributes. For exam-
ple, the seeming improvement in cultural assimilation among Mexican
immigrants might lead one to believe that this group enjoys substantial
improvements in language skills; in actuality intermarriage explains a
large portion of the increase. This section summarizes some of the
findings of Vigdor (2009), who more closely examines three attributes:
immigrants’ English-speaking ability, their proclivity to intermarry, and
their residential integration with the native-born population.
9.3.1 English ability
Table 9.3 shows the trends in the English language ability of non-Anglo-
phone immigrants in the United States between 1980 and 2007.2 There
is very little trend in English ability over time. Over this period of nearly
three decades, the proportion of immigrants speaking no English re-
mained steady at around 10 per cent. The proportion of immigrants
speaking English either exclusively or ‘very well’ held steady around 50
per cent. To the extent that any trend exists, it occurred during the
1980s, when English language skills declined somewhat in the immi-
grant population overall. This is consistent with the trends present in
2 Non-anglophone immigrants are here defined as those born in a country where fewer
than half of US immigrants report speaking exclusively English at home. The excluded
nations include the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, various former British possessions
in the Caribbean, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.
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index data above, which also show a decline in assimilation during the
1980s.
Table 9.4 presents comparable information drawn from the period
between 1900 and 1930. Recall that in this earlier era, Census
enumerators coded only whether a respondent could or could not
speak English. The proportion of non-English speakers in this earlier
era is consistently at or above more recent levels; at the peak of immi-
gration in 1910 about three in ten foreign-born residents of the United
States could not speak English. As the flow of newly arrived immigrants
slowed after 1920, the recorded English ability of the foreign-born
population improved.
Stratifying immigrants in each year by their point of arrival, it be-
comes clear that the English skills of newly arrived immigrants in the
United States, as recorded in the Census, were very poor in the early
twentieth century, and had improved substantially by the latter part of
the century. Defining newly arrived immigrants as those arriving in the
five years immediately before a Census enumeration, Table 9.5 shows
that the proportion of new arrivals who could not speak English stood at
levels between 50 and 63 per cent in the first part of the twentieth
century, but had declined to levels around 20 per cent by the century’s
end. The general improvement in English ability in the immigrant
population, then, can be attributed largely to increased ability upon
Table 9.4 Immigrant English ability, 1900–1930.





Source: US Census, author’s calculations.












1980 8.7 16.6 24.9 31.0 18.8
1990 9.7 19.6 24.0 35.3 11.4
2000 8.7 19.2 24.3 37.1 10.8
2007 10.7 20.1 23.8 35.8 9.7
Source: US Census (1980–2000), American Community Survey (2007), author’s calculations.
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arrival, rather than any increased rate of language acquisition among
non-speakers.3
Just as the degree of overall assimilation varies by immigrant group,
English speaking ability differs substantially. Fully one-third of newly
arrived Mexican immigrants in 2007, for example, report speaking no
English; another third report speaking English ‘not well’. By contrast,
among newly arrived Vietnamese immigrants in 2007, only 16 per cent
reported not speaking English at all. A more substantial 42 per cent of
this group reported speaking ‘not well’.
The high rate of cultural assimilation exhibited by Mexican immi-
grants in Table 9.2, visible as the increase in the assimilation index for
individuals arriving in the late 1970s when evaluated in 1980 and 2007,
might lead one to believe that English languages skills improve rapidly
for this group. In fact, the rate of progress is modest. In 1980, Mexican
immigrants arriving in the previous five years had a one-third chance of
speaking no English, and another one-third chance of speaking English
‘not well’—a pattern identical to that exhibited by their counterparts
arriving two decades later. By 2007, 15 per cent of this cohort continued
to report speaking no English, and another 28 per cent reported
speaking ‘not well’. Assuming no selective return migration, the likeli-
hood of transitioning from poor English skills to a higher level of
English skills was only 36 per cent over this 27-year period.4
Vietnamese immigrants arriving in the same time period had better
language skills to begin with: while one-third spoke English ‘not well’,
Table 9.5 English ability of newly arrived immigrants.
Year Proportion of immigrants from non-Anglophone nations arriving in








Source: US Census (1900–2000), American Community Survey (2007), author’s calculations.
3 In fact, Vigdor (2009) shows that the rate of English language learning for non-speakers
actually declines over the course of the twentieth century.
4 Espinosa and Massey (1997) use a unique data source to assess whether selective return
migration yields a skewed picture of linguistic progress among Mexican immigrants in the
United States. They conclude that real linguistic progress does occur. The effect of return
migration should be more modest in the Vietnamese and Italian immigrant populations.
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only 9 per cent reported no English ability in 1980. By 2007, the
proportion of this cohort with no English skills had dropped to 3 per
cent, and the proportion with poor English skills stood at 19 per cent.
Again, assuming no selective return migration, the transition probabil-
ity to a higher level of English skills among those who started at a low
level was closer to 50 per cent.
For the purposes of historical comparison, about three-quarters of
newly arrived Italian immigrants in 1910 were coded as speaking no
English. By 1930, this proportion had dropped to 14 per cent. Making
the same assumption about return migration, the likelihood of English
skill improvement in this group was over 80 per cent. This rapid lan-
guage acquisition explains why the cultural assimilation index for this
group rises so rapidly compared to more recent cohorts.
If Mexican immigrants exhibit only a modest tendency to improve
their English skills over time, by historical and contemporary standards,
why does their cultural assimilation index rise so much more than that
of, say, Vietnamese immigrants? Intermarriage patterns explainmuch of
the difference.
9.3.2 Intermarriage
First-generation immigrants have traditionally intermarried at extre-
mely low rates. An early study based on marriages in New York City
between 1908 and 1912 showed that even among immigrant men who
elected to marry after arrival in the United States, fewer than one in ten
married a woman born in the United States to native-born parents
(Drachsler, 1920). More recent work examining both historical and
contemporary records confirms these findings (Pagnini and Morgan,
1990; Qian and Lichter, 2001). In more recent years, however, the
tendency toward homogamy has not been universal. Among immi-
grants from developed countries, in particular, tendencies toward inter-
marriage are quite strong by historical comparison.
Table 9.6 summarizes the marital patterns for immigrants of specific
nationalities at varying points in time. Data on spouse nativity is avail-
able in the US Census for years predating 1900, so information on Irish
immigrants in 1880 appears on the list as well. For this group, as well as
for Italian immigrants in 1910, marriage to a native-born spouse of
native parentage was very uncommon: 1 in 25 adult males born in
Ireland had intermarried in 1880, and only 1 in 100 Italians had done
so in 1910.
In later years, the distinction across immigrant groups is summarized
in the comparison between immigrants from Vietnam and Canada. The
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marital patterns of Vietnamese men are quite similar to their predeces-
sors, with roughly one in 40 adults married to a native-born spouse. This
statistic likely overstates the amount of intermarriage, as in recent data
parental birthplace is no longer recorded systematically. Among Cana-
dian immigrants, by contrast, the rate of intermarriage is significantly
higher. For every Canadian-born adult male married to another Cana-
dian, there are more than two married to an American-born spouse.
Not depicted here are statistics for the nation’s largest single immi-
grant group. Intermarriage statistics for Mexican-born adults are skewed
by the presence of co-ethnic spouses of second or higher generation.
Vigdor (2009) reports that 94.3 per cent of native-born spouses of Mexi-
can-born adults claim Mexican ancestry; another 3.4 per cent claim
non-Mexican but Hispanic ancestry. Thus, even restricting attention to
those Mexican immigrants married to native-born spouses, only 2.3 per
cent have married outside their broad ethnic category.
9.3.3 Residential integration
Residential segregation is typically measured using segregation indices,
which describe the distribution of a group across neighbourhoods on a
scale from perfect integration (where the group forms an equal share of
the population in all neighbourhoods) to perfect segregation (where the
group is restricted to a subset of neighbourhoods where they are the
only residents).5 Using these measures, the segregation of immigrants

















1880 Ireland 36.4% 48.9% 2.8% 8.0% 3.9%
1910 Italy 55.3% 40.0% 1.4% 2.4% 0.9%
2007 Vietnam 36.7% 55.5% 5.0% 2.7%**
2007 Canada 32.2% 19.1% 6.3% 42.4%**
* In 1880 and 1910, the ‘different foreign country’ category includes native-born spouses with parents
born abroad in a different country. ** In 2007, parents’ birthplace is not reported.
5 The dissimilarity and isolation indices vary in their treatment of intermediate levels of
segregation. Dissimilarity tends to be high when a group is found in only a handful of
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from the native majority declined over the first half of the twentieth
century, as immigration itself waned, then rose again in the period after
1965 (Cutler et al., 2008).
Segregation tends to track the arrival of new immigrants because
newly arrived migrants are generally the most likely to live in ethnic
enclaves. Table 9.7 presents summary statistics of the average neigh-
bourhood-level, foreign-born concentration experienced by four sepa-
rate immigrant arrival cohorts, from the end of the ninetheenth
century to the end of the twentieth. The table shows both the average
concentration experienced by a cohort after 0–5 years in the United
States and after 10–15 years in the United States. Several patterns are
apparent here. As asserted above, immigrants find themselves in
increasingly integrated neighbourhoods as they spend more time in
the United States. The exception to this pattern occurs in more recent
data; immigrants arriving in the late 1980s were more segregated in
2000 than they were in 1990—in 2000, they were in fact more
segregated than the typical immigrant of the late 1990s. Note also
that neighbourhood concentration is lower in more recent data. This
trend is observed in spite of the fact that the Census definition of
‘neighbourhood’ became a geographically more compact area at mid-
century.6 Immigrants are thus more integrated upon arrival now than
they were a century ago, but show less evidence of increasing integration
Table 9.7 Residential isolation of immigrants, 1900–2000.
Arrival cohort Average per cent foreign born in neighbourhood after:





Note: Neighbourhood is defined as a city ward for the first two cohorts, and as a census tract for the
last two.
Source: US Census (1900–2000), author’s calculations.
neighbourhoods, even if it forms only a small proportion of the population in those
neighbourhoods. Isolation, by contrast, tends to be high when a group forms a high share
of the population in the neighbourhoods it occupies. For a complete discussion of segrega-
tion indices and their properties, see Massey and Denton (1988) and Cutler et al. (1999).
6 In the early data, city wards are used as neighbourhoods. These are political subdivisions
of cities that contain varying numbers of people. In later data, the census tract becomes the
neighbourhood construct of reference. Tracts are defined consistently across cities, and tend
to be smaller than wards. For a more complete discussion of census geography and its
implications for the measurement of segregation, see Cutler et al. (1999).
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over time. This pattern is entirely consistent with the language patterns
described above, which are in turn consistent with a bifurcated view of
the immigrant population: one subset of immigrants is highly integrated
even upon entry, the second shows very little sign of integrating even
after a decade or more.
9.4 Discussion: what explains the variation in integration?
On a very basic level, there has been little change in cultural immigra-
tion over the past century, as measured by the cultural assimilation
index. The index takes the exact same value in 1930 and 2007, and
never deviates by more than five points from that value. The composite
index, which incorporates a wider array of information, shows a sub-
stantial change in only two decades: the 1900s and the 1980s, both
decades of relatively rapid migration to the United States.
Beneath this seemingly placid surface, however, more important
changes over time, and differences across groups, emerge. Members of
the largest single immigrant group of the early twentieth century, those
born in Italy, in general were much less assimilated upon arrival than
members of the largest group of the early twenty-first century, those
born in Mexico. Whereas one-third of newly arrived Mexicans spoke no
English in the early twenty-first century, nearly three-quarters of newly
arrived Italians could not speak English in 1910. The rate of cultural
integration over time has declined, however. Moreover, conclusions
about the integration of Mexican immigrants are sensitive to the defini-
tion of intermarriage. Not every modern group shares the trajectory of
Mexican immigrants, however; migrants from Vietnam show signs of
assimilating rapidly along multiple dimensions.
While several factors can potentially explain the differences in immi-
grant experiences over time and across groups, legal status is almost
certainly the most important. In the early twentieth century, the con-
cept of an ‘illegal immigrant’, or at least an illegal European immigrant,
did not exist.7 The combination of restrictions on the number of im-
migrants legally permitted in the country, coupled with the relative ease
of entry—whether through illegal border crossings or overstayed legal
visas—created a substantial disconnect between policy and reality. Ille-
gal immigrants are prohibited from integrating into the mainstream in
some respects: many employers will not hire them; they ordinarily have
7 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and subsequent legislation placed restrictions on
immigration from Asia.
Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe
298
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
no hope of becoming citizens. Along other dimensions, their incentive
to invest in cultural capital is weakened by the prospect of deportation.
The decision to learn English, for example, is an investment where up-
front costs must be balanced against anticipated future returns. These
anticipated returns are necessarily lower under a threat of removal from
the host society.
The rise of illegal immigration is not the only explanation for across-
group and time period variation in cultural integration. Immigrants’
initial motivation for migrating and cost of return migration matter as
well. Migrants from Italy and Mexico share a common underlying
narrative: they moved from nations with low living standards to high
living standards to exploit earnings differentials. Migrants from Viet-
nam are distinct. Although an economic incentive to move existed for
this group, in many cases their decisions flowed directly from the mid-
1970s regime change in South Vietnam, in the aftermath of war. Politi-
cally motivated migrants often face grave consequences upon return to
their origin country. Without a viable return option, these groups face
strong incentives to invest in cultural capital. Immigrants with the
easiest return options, particularly those facing only a brief and inex-
pensive journey to their origin country, are at the other end of the
spectrum.
The experience of the United States, in summary, illustrates that the
goal of ensuring cultural integration is not always best pursued by a
policy of limited immigration. The immigrants who inspired the na-
tion’s most restrictive immigration policy moved rapidly toward the
mainstream, and by the second or third generation had blended seam-
lessly into society. Cultural integration, like many fundamentally eco-
nomic processes, is governed by incentives, and the fault of restrictive
immigration policy, when combined with porous borders, is to weaken
the incentives that many immigrants face to take strides toward the
mainstream in their host country.
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10
Conclusion: Cultural Integration
of Immigrants in Europe
Yann Algan and Mariya Aleksynska
10.1 Introduction
While European countries are witnessing an especially vivid debate
about immigrants’ assimilation and integration into receiving societies,
this book has provided an analysis of multiple dimensions of integra-
tion processes in a selection of European countries. It has offered a quite
unique exercise of applying the same unified methodology to studying
the same, or similar, questions related to immigrants’ integration in
some most important European immigration countries.
Against this background, the purpose of this concluding chapter is to
summarize the very rich analysis and the main findings of the country-
specific chapters. Despite the very different datasets and sampling techni-
ques and sometimes different phrasing of the questions and measures,
most of the country-specific researchers do find similar tendencies of im-
migrants’ assimilation. In many cases the immigrants’ values converge to
the local context within a generation. We highlight these similarities, as
well as themost interesting and strikingdifferences found across countries.
Besides, with the aim of overcoming the cross-country data compara-
bility problem, and also with the aim of providing a formal cross-country
analysis and a robustness check, we repeat the exercise within the same
framework using a unified database: the cumulative European Social
Survey (ESS) from 2001 to 2009. While each country chapter gave an
account of differences between various origin groups, we further offer an
overview of differences across European destination countries. The
value added of the survey is to provide the same variable definition for
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economic and cultural outcomes across the different countries. The
survey reports information on different dimensions of integration of
immigrants that are broadly consistent with the list of outcomes of the
previous country chapters. Also, the same questions of the survey are
asked to all individuals in all participating countries, with a particular
effort made to ensure the cross-country comparability of questions and
concepts (Card et al., 2005).We contrast the aggregate results from using
these data with the finer findings of specific country chapters. We also
note in passing the aggregate results of assimilation processes in other
countries, and on some other dimensions that have remained beyond
the scope of this book.
10.2 Country-specific analysis of immigrants’
assimilation: what have we learned?
The country-specific chapters offered an in-depth analysis of the eco-
nomic and cultural assimilation patterns of immigrants from various
origins, various cohorts, and generations. One of the striking results is
that, despite the tremendous differences between migration histories
and patterns across studied countries, despite large differences in col-
lected data and sometimes different framing of the questions, but per-
haps thanks to the same methodology used, we can speak about some
universal patterns that emerge.
The most common and universal feature concerns the language pro-
gress and the general secularization among immigrants. Despite popular
perceptions, second-generation immigrants of all backgrounds do have a
higher propensity to speak a destination country’s language at home, or
to report a better use of language, as compared to the first-generation
immigrants. It is important to recognize this process, as it suggests the
success of assimilation. However, it is also true that in many countries
differences with the native born still remain, and equally important ques-
tions for further research are why this is the case, how to further reduce
these differences, and in which instances such reduction is desirable.
In all countries, second-generation immigrants report a lower religi-
osity, measured by the frequency of praying and/or of church attend-
ance. This happens for immigrants of all religious backgrounds,
although the speed of secularization may vary. Among first-generation
immigrants, usually Asian and Black (African or Caribbean) groups
report a higher religiosity, and not Maghrebis. The latter group, how-
ever, has the slowest convergence rate to the religiosity of the native
born in several destination countries.
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Another common pattern concerns the civic incorporation of immi-
grants. In some countries we can observe even an overshooting of
behaviours. That is, there is a higher political incorporation of some
second-generation immigrant groups as compared to the first-genera-
tion immigrants and to the native born. For example, this is the case of
MENA (Maghreb and North Africa) immigrants in Switzerland. Also, a
lower satisfaction with democracy of Western Europeans or Latin Amer-
icans, that is, individuals from countries with democratic traditions, is
reported, as compared to Asians or Africans.
As the author of Chapter 7, on Switzerland, suggests, most important
differences remain, however, in gender-related attitudes, not religious or
political outcomes. Indeed, on the side of the differences, perhaps the
largest variation is observed across marital arrangements, education, and
employment patterns across the studies countries. These differences are
especially pronounced when examined separately for the two genders.
In termsofmarriage outcomes, inmost of the countries, first-generation
immigrants have a higher incidence ofmarriage than the native born, and
usually a lower age at first marriage. The most-speaking examples include
Turkishmales inGermany, amongwhich up to 76 per cent report being in
a formal relationship, versus 50 per cent of the native bornmen. In terms
of age of marriage, Maghreb, Eastern European, and Southern European
women show a general pattern of early marriages across the studied
countries. These differences, however, almost universally disappear for
second-generation immigrants. Thus, on these dimensions, immigrants’
outcomes converge to those of the native born within a generation.
With very few exceptions, such as women of Italian, Spanish, or Turkish
origin in Germany, second-generation women do not have significantly
different rates of marriage than the native-born women. Some groups
even report a reversal of these patterns. Notably, UK-born Black African
womenhave lowermarriage rates thannative-bornwomen. Also, second-
generation Maghreb-origin women in France actually report later mar-
riages as compared to the native born.
Overall employment rates for first-generation immigrants are higher
than for the native born in Spain, although at the expense of the worse
jobs. Female labour force participation is higher among immigrants
than among natives in Italy and in Germany (except for Turkish
women), and a full convergance in the participation rates of the
native-born women is observed for second-generation immigrant
women. In contrast, immigrant female employment is lower than
among natives in Sweden, France, Switzerland (except Southern Euro-
pean women), and the UK (although the authors consider only Asian
and Black females). These differences, however, attenuate, when
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conditioned on the number of children, or on marital status. At the
same time, in these countries, too, the catch-up is observed across the
board. In general, female employment depends strongly on the origin.
In most of the receiving countries, females from Eastern Europe have
highest employment rates.
In terms of education outcomes, education of first-generation women
is higher than that of the native-born women and of first-generation
men in Sweden and in Italy. In Sweden, women’s education drops to the
level of the native-bornwomenwithin a generation. In contrast, in Italy,
second-generation women have even more schooling, especially Asian
and African women.
Overall schooling is lower among first-generation immigrants than
among the native born in Spain, Germany, and France. It improves
significantly across generations in Spain, especially for Moroccans, and
in Germany, where second-generation women also have more school-
ing than men. For France, education outcomes of second-generation
men actually worsen. They, however, improve for women, especially
within groups that were particularly disadvantaged in the first genera-
tion, such as Asians, Maghreb, and South European.
Finally, some of the country-specific data allowed for the analysis of
self-reported national identity, in countries like Great Britain, Germany,
or France. In these three countries, an impressive convergence of beha-
viours is reported, as second-generation immigrants report a much
higher degree of self-identification with their residence country than
the first-generation immigrants. Remarkably, in Britain, Muslim groups
(the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) whose loyalty to Britain is often ques-
tioned, are the ethnic minorities who are most likely to report a British
national identity. Even more strikingly, in France, second-generation
immigrants of Maghreb origin feel no less likely ‘French’ than the native
born. In France, it is actually second-generation immigrants from South-
ern Europe who have the highest maintenance of their own national
identity. In Germany, especially Poles and Russians show a great com-
mitment to Germany, whereas Turks and Greeks still feel closely bound
to their country of origin.
10.3 Unified cross-country analysis of immigrants’
assimilation in Europe
In what follows, we use the European Social Survey to provide a further
summary of assimilation processes based on the unified cross-country
dataset. This also allows checking the robustness of the country chapter
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results. First, we can control for country of residence fixed effects that
could drive the cultural and economic integration processes. Second,
the information given by the country of origin fixed effects allows us to
control partly for the sample composition of immigrants. Let’s say, for
instance, that we are interested in comparing the cultural integration of
immigrants of Maghreb origin across European countries. This analysis
is likely to be biased by the fact that all Maghreb immigrants do not
come from the same country of origin, and the inherited specificities
from the home country could determine the economic and cultural
integration process of immigrants in their destination country. The
cross-country dataset allows mitigating such biases.
Our analysis covers most of the European countries and most of the
outcomes considered in country chapters of the book. Furthermore, we
also enlarge the analysis to a wider set of Western European countries
covered by the ESS: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. Unfortunately, data on immi-
grants are not available for Italy. We also explore the richness of the
data to include a few other outcomes of immigrants that remained
beyond the scope of the country chapters, such as various measures
of trust, perceived discrimination, and preferences for redistribution.
These outcomes have been shown as particularly rooted in cultural heri-
tage (Algan et al., 2011; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Putnam, 1993; Guiso
et al., 2006).We also group the studied outcomes slightly differently from
the rest of the book, speaking about economic, cultural, and civic dimen-
sions. Full sample description and variables description is available in
Appendices I–IV.
10.3.1 Methodological setting
In line with the country specific chapters, we are interested inmeasuring
the gaps between native-born and various subgroups of immigrants in
various outcomes. Wider gaps are informative of bigger differences in
behaviours, and if these gaps diminish from one generation to another,
or for the same generation over time, such tendencies are usually taken
as signs of assimilation. For example, if the assimilation process is
perfect, for second-generation immigrants there should be little differ-
ences in the outcomes as compared to the native born. The existence of
the gaps signals the persistence of original traits, which can be taken as
the lack of assimilation, especially when this concerns economic and
civic outcomes. Such a view is coherent if the goal is to achieve the
convergence of outcomes of immigrants and native-born. The persis-
tence of the gaps may, however, also be taken as evidence in favour of
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integration, especially when it concerns cultural outcomes, if integra-
tion is viewed as the right to preserve and freely exercise own features.
To compute these gaps, we estimate the following specification:
Outcomeijko ¼ b1FirstGenImmLess20 þ b2FirstGenImmOver20þ
þb3SecondGenImm þ Xi’aþDj’gþ rk’rþ om’fþ eijko ð1Þ
where Outcomeijko is one of the economic, cultural, or social outcomes of
interest, of an individual i, living in country j, in year k, and of origin o;
b1, b2, and b3 measure the impact of being a first-generation immigrant
with less than 20 years of residence, a first-generation immigrant with
more than 20 years of residence,1 or a second-generation immigrant (an
individual who has both parents born abroad), as compared to native-
born individuals with parents who are both native born. FirstGenImm-
Less20, FirstGenImmOver20, and SecondGenImm are dummies equal to 1
if an individual belongs to a corresponding group, and 0 otherwise. The
comparison between coefficients b1, b2,and b3 allows an understanding
of whether there are differences in gaps between these immigrant
groups as opposed to the native born.
As we work with the pooled ESS data over a relatively short period of
time, the estimations provide a rather static picture of differences in
gaps that exists in the early twenty-first century. Different immigrant
generations today may, however, be quite different from each other,
both in the composition of their origins, in sorting across destination
countries, and in migration reasons. We partly correct for the migration
cohorts by including the fixed effects for the survey year, rk (which,
controlling for the years since migration, is analogous to controlling
for the year of entry) and a cohort dummy equal to 1 for younger
generations (individuals aged less than 30).
In each estimation, we also control for a set of individual-specific
parameters, Xi, which include age, gender, education (except the educa-
tion equations), and fathers’ education. The latter is an exogenous proxy
for individual’s potential socio-economic predisposition that helps to
control for intentionally omitted income variable, which we use as one
of the outcomes. All regressions also include dummy variables for one of
the six origin groups, om,
2 and a set of host country dummies Dj.
1 Splitting first-generation immigrants in these two subgroups by duration at destination
has the convenience of splitting them in two almost equal parts.
2 These are Maghreb and North Africa (MENA); Africa; Asia; South America; developed
OECD countries; as well as Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, and Former Yugoslavia. See
Appendix IV for the list of countries that constitutes each subgroup.
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As a second step, we repeat similar regressions in a pooled sample of
the native born and first-generation immigrants only, taking all Euro-
pean countries as a unique destination, and focusing on the impact of
immigrants belonging to a specific origin group. In these regressions, we





þYearsOfResidence*FirstGenImm þ Xi’aþDj’gþ rk’rþ eijk ð2Þ
Small numbers of second-generation immigrants reporting the birth
country of their ancestors precludes from doing a similar analysis for
second-generation immigrants.
10.3.2 Cultural integration
We start by analysing the various dimensions of cultural outcomes of
immigrants. These are family arrangements, such as the marital status
and the age gap between spouses, but also the language spoken at
home, the frequency of praying, and the frequency of socialization.3
Table 10.1a reports gaps in these outcomes based on estimating (1) for
various sub-types of immigrants as opposed to the native-born, in all
European countries grouped together. Table 10.1b further distinguishes
gaps for first-generation immigrants from different origins, and is based
on estimating equation (2).
From Table 10.1a, first-generation immigrants have a higher probabil-
ity of being married, as compared to the native-born of the same age.
This is a result that corresponds to the findings of country-specific
chapters. Table 10.1b further shows that higher marriage rates among
first-generation immigrants are mostly due to higher marriage rates
among immigrants from MENA and Asia. Back to Table 10.1a, second-
generation immigrants actually have lower marriage rates than the
native born. This result has occurred only in some specific instances
through country-specific chapters, and only for some specific origin
groups.
In terms of age gap between spouses, there is little overall difference
between first-generation immigrants and the native born, although
differences actually appear among origin groups: MENA, African,
and Asian couples have higher age gap than native-born couples.
3 The ESS does not report the country of origin or the years of education of the spouse, and
we cannot compute the interethnic marriage rates or education gaps, contrary to the differ-
ent chapters.
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Table 10.1a Average gaps in cultural outcomes between immigrants and the native born in the EU.
Variables
First-generation immigrants
with >20 years of residence
First-generation





Married 0.101*** (0.015) 0.027* (0.015) 0.069*** (0.018) 101,749 0.150
Age gap between spouses 0,174 (0,182) 0,081 (0.177) 0.386** (0.191) 70,633 0.016
Language of the country spoken at home 0.330*** (0.014) 0.130*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.013) 101,749 0.197
Frequency of praying (days a year) 44,625*** (4522) 28,767*** (4633) 18,364*** (5320) 100,622 0.150
Frequency of taking part in social activities 0.174*** (0.030) 0.018 (0.030) 0.045 (0.039) 100,362 0.039
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Table 10.1b Average gaps in cultural outcomes between first-generation immigrants, by origin, and native born.





Married 0.102* (0.044) 0.019 (0.048) 0.115* (0.047) 0.051 (0.047) 0.010 (0.040) 0.036 (0.042) 95,093 0.144
Age gap between
spouses




0.281** (0.050) 0.128* (0.053) 0.357** (0.053) 0.089 (0.049) 0.094* (0.046) 0.199** (0.049) 95,093 0.213
Frequency of
praying (days a year)
109.299** (15.544) 151.549** (16.727) 120.797** (17.449) 72.706** (16.406) 17.718 (14.174) 23.206 (14.749) 94,024 0.156
Social activities 0.051 (0.087) 0.160 (0.097) 0.190 (0.098) 0.129 (0.096) 0.056 (0.080) 0.204* (0.081) 93,789 0.534
Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns’ headings define the independent variables of interest. All regressions
additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, destination country. and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey design and population
weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Regrettably, though, we do not have any information on the nationality
of the spouse, which could have enabled more insight into this ques-
tion. For second-generation immigrants, the age gap is smaller than for
the native born.
Much larger cross-generational differences are observed for the lan-
guage outcome. Language is measured in a dichotomous way, where 1 is
assigned to individuals who report any official language of a country as
first-mentioned language spoken at home, and 0 otherwise (data on
official country languages come from CIA fact book).4 Speaking the
language is among the most important outcomes for immigrants, as it
not only reflects assimilation, but it also, in its turn, affects the speed of
assimilation along other dimensions (Chiswick, 1991; Dustmann,
1994). The gaps in language spoken at home are significant and initially
large for all types of non-native-born individuals. In a notable way, for
this outcome, the gaps between any immigrant group and the native
born never disappear completely. This, in itself, is not necessarily a
negative phenomenon, as those individuals who report a non-official
country’s language as the first language spoken at home may still be
fluent in an official country’s language; and simply be multilingual.
What is interesting, however, is a particularly strong ‘closing’ of these
gaps, the nearer we get to the ‘native born with both native-born
parents’ status. First-generation immigrants with less than 20 years of
residence have a 33 percentage point lower probability of speaking the
official language of a country when at home, as compared to native-
born. This gap is still statistically significant for second generation, but
the magnitude drops dramatically to six percentage points, and to
significant three percentage points for individuals with one foreign-
born parent. This result also confirms the previous country-specific
findings.
Figure 10.1 plots the gaps in probability of speaking the country’s
official language at home as the first mentioned language, for first and
second-generation immigrants, by destination country. We observe a
similar pattern for all destination countries: second-generation immi-
grants have lower gaps in speaking the language of the country than the
first-generation immigrants (all effects are placed below the 45 line). In
some countries, like Greece or Portugal, the progress between genera-
tions is particularly strong.
4 We use the term ‘probability’ of speaking the language by immigrants, rather than ‘per
cent’ of people who speak another language at home; as even among native-born indivi-
duals, 2 per cent report a language other than official as their first language spoken at home.
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Figure 10.1 Gaps in speaking the destination country’s language at home among












LU CH SE GB FR GR DE ES BE AT
MENA African Asian South american OECD Eastern european, FSU, FY
Figure 10.2 Gaps in the probability of speaking the language (first and second
generation).
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Figure 10.2 also shows differences in language gaps by destination and
origin pair, suggesting a large variation in outcomes.5 Not surprisingly,
first-generation South-Americans in Spain have no language gaps as
compared to the native born, while the highest gap is observed for
Africans in Austria. More generally, immigrants from MENA and Asian
countries have relatively high language gaps regardless of the destina-
tion. But there is also a large heterogeneity across the destination
countries. Take the situation of immigrants from Maghreb. The gap in
the probability of speaking a different language at home ranges from 22
percentage points in France, 42 percentage points in Germany, to 80
percentage points in Austria. By and large, there is more heterogeneity
in these gaps across the destination counties than within the same
country of destination between the different immigrants. This result
may be due to several reasons, such as the existence of several languages
spoken in a country, difficulty of learning a particular language for any
of the origin groups, or a different sorting across countries. To the extent
that we obtain these estimates by controlling for country of origin fixed
effects, they seem to reflect, in a large part, genuine specificities in the
integration process of each destination country.
We now turn to religiosity, considered to be perhaps the most persist-
ing cultural trait. We measure religiosity as the frequency of praying,
relating it to answers to the question: ‘Apart from when you are at
religious services, how often if at all do you pray?’ The answer takes on
values of 1 for every day, 2 for more than once a week, 3 for once a week,
4 for at least once a month, 5 for only on special holidays, 6 for less
often, and 7 for never; and we convert them into days per year.
Table 10.1a first shows a much higher frequency of praying among
first-generation immigrants relative to natives, although it drops signifi-
cantly between newcomers and those with over 20 years at destination.
Table 10.1b also shows that the frequency of praying is significantly
higher among immigrants from Africa and Asia, and to a lesser extent
fromMENA and South America, relative to the native born. There are no
differences in religiosity among OECD, Eastern European, former Yugo-
slavia, and former Soviet Union immigrants. Besides, the overall gap
persists among second-generation immigrants. However, it further
drops significantly: second-generation immigrants report praying
almost three times less than newly-arrived first-generation immigrants.
This result also confirms previous country-specific findings, despite
5 Reported gaps are computed by estimating equation such as (1), by destination country,
for a sub-sample of ten largest immigration countries. First-generation immigrants are
pooled together.
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common perceptions of high persistency of religiosity traits. In fact,
higher praying may serve as a source of strength and the search of
answers to profound questions, which may be particularly important
at the time of big life changes (Lehrer, 2010), such as immigration and
settlement in a new country; it may thus diminish once more stability
and familiarity with new conditions is acquired. Also, immigrants may
become more secularized when being exposed to more secularized
societies.
Figure 10.3 further shows heterogeneity of changes along this dimen-
sion across destinations, suggesting that not only differences between
first and second-generation immigrants may go in different direction
depending on the destination country in question, but also that in some
countries, such as Ireland, both first and second-generation immigrants
actually pray less than the native born.
10.3.3 Integration in civic life and feeling of discrimination
In a similar fashion, this section offers insight into gaps in civic out-
comes, such as being naturalized, the probability of being civically
involved into various types of activities, expressing various types of




































Figure 10.3 Gaps in religiosity among first and second-generation immigrants.
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particular preferences for redistribution. We also address the question of
perceived discrimination.
Becoming a citizen of a destination country can—albeit arguably—be
considered as one of the most ultimate outcomes for immigrants. It is
framed by the policies of the destination countries, as much as by the
migration reasons and migration intentions. While naturalization
means acquiring equal rights of a citizen and thus opening ways to
further assimilation on many economic, cultural, and civic dimensions,
it may also be considered by itself as a civic act, a conscious step towards
becoming a full member of the hosting society (Gropas, 2008; Chiswick
and Miller, 2009a). As such, it can be viewed as a behavioural civic
outcome in its own right. In this chapter, the outcome citizen is
measured on a 0–1 scale, with 1 representing having the citizenship of
the country of current residence.
Tables 10.2a and 10.2b show that among all types of non-natives, as
well as first-generation immigrants of all origins, there are significantly
high percentages of non-citizens. But as with language, the closing of
the gap on this dimension is rather pronounced. The probability of
being a citizen for second-generation immigrants is twice as high as
for first-generation immigrants with more than 20 years at destination.
However, it is still 20 percentage points lower than that of the native-
born, for whom the probability is 100 per cent. This finding raises
particular concerns, as it signifies either a lack of assimilation on the
part of immigrants along this dimension, or a lack of opportunities
provided by receiving countries for gaining citizenship for second-gen-
eration immigrants born in the country, or both.
Figure 10.4 shows that second-generation immigrants are at a disad-
vantage compared to the native born in a sizeable number of countries.
The gap in naturalization among second-generation immigrants almost
disappears in Great Britain, Ireland, Greece, and France; however, it
remains statistically significant in all other countries of the sample,
and is especially high in Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Germany.
A closely related measure of belonging to a ‘polity’ is a notion of
immigrants’ civic participation. We measure it with the help of a
dummy variable equal to 1 if a respondent reports doing in the last
year at least one of the following: being a member or volunteering for a
political party, a trade union, or another organization or association;
taking part in a legal demonstration; signing a petition; or wearing a
badge. Table 10.2a shows that there is an 18.3 percentage point lower
probability of being involved in civic life among first-generation immi-
grants with less than twenty years at destination, and it is attributable to
all origin groups (Table 10.2b). However, this gap vanishes quickly, and
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Table 10.2a Average gaps in civic outcomes between immigrants and the native born in the EU.
Variables First-generation immigrants with
>20 years of residence
First-generation immigrants with




Citizen 0.709*** (0.013) 0.400*** (0.014) 0.204*** (0.012) 101,723 0.458
Civic participation 0.183*** (0.016) 0.023 (0.016) 0.011 (0.020) 101,749 0.118
General. trust (1–10) 0.037 (0.074) 0.191** (0.074) 0.319*** (0.090) 101,505 0.096
Trust in police 0.400*** (0.077) 0.001 (0.075) 0.238** (0.095) 101,063 0.062
Trust in country’s parliament 0.503*** (0.080) 0.111 (0.079) 0.191* (0.097) 98,933 0.069
Trust in politicians 0.461*** (0.076) 0.053 (0.076) 0.188** (0.092) 100,207 0.078
Trust in the Eur. parliament 0.788*** (0.082) 0.374*** (0.082) 0.243** (0.096) 91,559 0.075
Satisfaction with democracy 0.130*** (0.014) 0.049*** (0.015) 0.027 (0.019) 101,749 0.052
Preferences for redistribution 0.032** (0.016) 0.006 (0.015) 0.007 (0.018) 101,749 0.071
Perceived discrimination 0.071*** (0.012) 0.013 (0.010) 0.092*** (0.016) 101,283 0.058
Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns’ headings define the independent variables of interest. All
regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, origin fixed effects, destination country, and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting
for the survey design and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.
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Table 10.2b Average gaps in civic outcomes between first-generation immigrants, by origin, and native-born.





Citizen 0.457** (0.054) 0.316** (0.056) 0.284** (0.058) 0.370** (0.054) 0.605** (0.051) 0.266** (0.053) 95,072 0.534
Civic participation 0.150** (0.043) 0.166** (0.050) 0.267** (0.047) 0.156** (0.046) 0.155** (0.041) 0.275** (0.041) 95,093 0.120
Gen. trust (1–10) 0.213 (0.207) 0.086 (0.219) 0.266 (0.217) 0.123 (0.215) 0.331 (0.181) 0.466* (0.189) 94,861 0.096
Trust in police 0.443 (0.228) 0.321 (0.250) 0.563* (0.248) 0.058 (0.240) 0.324 (0.207) 0.427* (0.216) 94,442 0.062
Trust in country’s
Parliament
0.535** (0.207) 0.605** (0.234) 0.874** (0.219) 0.201 (0.220) 0.006 (0.188) 0.305 (0.193) 92,473 0.069
Trust in politicians 0.898** (0.212) 0.828** (0.228) 1.084** (0.232) 0.513* (0.233) 0.347 (0.189) 0.648** (0.199) 93,660 0.079
Trust in the Eur.
Parliament
0.766** (0.206) 0.784** (0.219) 0.953** (0.218) 0.238 (0.230) 0.500** (0.187) 0.476* (0.195) 85,532 0.076
Satisfaction with
democracy
0.176** (0.034) 0.184** (0.039) 0.221** (0.034) 0.093* (0.036) 0.119** (0.032) 0.140** (0.032) 95,093 0.053
Preferences for
redistribution
0.015 (0.043) 0.055 (0.049) 0.014 (0.049) 0.063 (0.045) 0.026 (0.041) 0.013 (0.043) 95,093 0.072
Perceived
discrimination
0.132** (0.037) 0.129** (0.043) 0.001 (0.036) 0.039 (0.039) 0.075* (0.032) 0.023 (0.034) 94,662 0.048
Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns’ headings define the independent variables of interest. All
regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, destination country, and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey design
and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.
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within one generation immigrant outcomes fully converge to those of
the native born.
We further turn to various measures of social capital and attitudes,
such as trust in others, trust in a country’s police, parliament, politi-
cians, and in the European parliament. The analysis of these outcomes
was not possible in all country-specific chapters due to data limitations.
Table 10.2a shows that newly arriving first-generation immigrants actu-
ally are no different in trusting people in general, as compared to the
native born. However, first-generation immigrants with longer stay, and
also second-generation immigrants both have significantly lower pro-
pensity for trusting, with the gap reaching 31.9 percentage points for
the latter group. Even more pronounced reversals are observed in other
measures of trust: while newly arriving immigrants tend to trust more
than the native born in the police, the parliament, the politicians of the
receiving countries, this trend is fully reversed for second generation. In
a similar way, satisfaction with democracy is higher among immigrants
of first generation regardless of their origin, but not among second-
generation immigrants.
Figure 10.5 shows that the gap in distrustwidens for second-generation





































Figure 10.4 Gaps in citizenship among first and second-generation immigrants.
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Figure 10.6 Gaps in trust in the police among first and second-generation
immigrants.
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Denmark. FromFigure 10.6, thewidening gaps indistrust in the police are
observed almost universally, except Denmark and Greece. Second-gener-
ation immigrants distrust the police significantly more than the native
born and the first-generation immigrants.
The obtained results on trust are rather alarming. Newly arriving
immigrants tend to have a significantly more positive outlook than
others, and hence more trust, both because they are self-selected, and
because they have high hopes associated with migration decisions. The
fact that this positive outlook vanishes quickly is, inevitably, due to
disillusions that immigrants encounter. It may also, however, signal
potential problems with the acceptance and integration policies of the
receiving countries.
This latter idea is partly explored by analysing the question on per-
ceived discrimination: ‘Would you describe yourself as being a member
of a group that is discriminated against in this country on grounds:
nationality, religion, colour and race, language, ethnicity, and gender?’
The answer takes on the value of 1 for yes and 0 for no. In a descriptive
way, Figure 10.7 shows the variation in the grounds for perceived dis-
crimination for immigrants in all destinations grouped together. First-
generation immigrants feel in general discriminated against more than
any other group, and are followed by second-generation immigrants
in this perception. The main reason for perceived discrimination is








































First-generation immigrants Second-generation immigrants Native-born
Figure 10.7 The dimensions of discrimination.
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preoccupation for first-generation immigrants, while the discrimination
for colour, religion, or ethnic origin is more prevalent among second-
generation immigrants.
For a selection of countries, Figure 10.8 also reports where immigrants
feel the most discriminated against, all grounds for discrimination
grouped together. It shows that the feeling of discrimination is spread
out in a different way among immigrants depending on the destination
country. Immigrants fromMENA feel themost discriminated in Spain (40
per cent), Germany (29 per cent), France (26 per cent), and Sweden (24
per cent). They feel much less discriminated in Switzerland (15 per cent)
and Great Britain (11 per cent). Africans feel the most discriminated in
Germany (40 per cent), followed by France (34 per cent). All, including
other-OECD immigrants, report significant degrees of discrimination.
Table 10.2a reports the corresponding estimates of gaps in perceived
discrimination. Newly arriving first-generation immigrants have a seven
percentage point higher probability of feeling discriminated compared
to the native born, while this probability is nine percentage points
for second-generation immigrants. Table 10.2b shows that immigrants
from MENA and Africa display the highest perceived discrimination,
which is higher by 13.2 and 12.9 percentage points than the perceived
discrimination of natives, respectively.
From Figure 10.9, in almost two-thirds of the sampled countries,

















Figure 10.8 Who feels discriminated, and where?
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against as opposed to the first-generation immigrants. Interestingly,
countries where second-generation immigrants feel least discriminated
are also the same countries where they have more trust in the police
(Greece and Luxembourg). In other countries, the finding of increased
feelings of discrimination, coupled with the finding on widening
gaps in trust, once again raises concerns about the success of inte-
gration processes of immigrants. Since the perceived discrimination
reflects immigrants’ experiences with the attitudes and behaviours of
native born (potentially also of the police, administration, and politi-
cians) in the receiving societies, this finding hints at the failure of
immigrants’ acceptance. ‘Culture clash’ or ‘culture club’ (Manning and
Roy, 2010) is a two-way process; and pure willingness to assimilate
on the part of immigrants may not enough: it is also the receiving
societies that may have to accomplish the work of accepting and inte-
grating them.
Finally, the last line of Table 10.2a reports differences in preferences
for redistribution.We find a significantly lower redistribution preference






































Figure 10.9 Gaps in perceived discrimination first and second-generation
immigrants.
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10.3.4 Economic integration
This section turns to immigrants’ economic assimilation. We estimate
the gaps in outcomes such as probability of being unemployed or inac-
tive, probability of being employed in a low-skilled job, as well as gaps in
incomes.
Tables 10.3a and 3b suggests that both recent and second-genera-
tion immigrants have a significantly higher propensity of being
unemployed. The unemployment gap, although slightly lower for
second-generation immigrants, is actually rather persistent. Among
first-generation, the highest employment penalty is observed for im-
migrants from MENA (5.6 percentage points), Asia (5.3), and Eastern
Europe (5.5). There is also a cross-country heterogeneity in the evolution
of the employment penalty across types of immigrants. Figure 10.10
shows that the persisting—and widening—unemployment gap seems
to be mostly driven by France, Switzerland, and Belgium, where second-
generation immigrants have particularly higher probability of being






































Figure 10.10 Gaps in unemployment among first and second-generation
immigrants.
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Table 10.3a Gaps in economic outcomes between immigrants and the native born in the EU.
Variables First-generation immigrants with
>20 years of residence
First-generation immigrants with




Unemployed 0.026*** (0.008) 0.000 (0.007) 0.021* (0.011) 101,749 0.020
Inactive 0.011** (0.005) 0.008* (0.005) 0.003 (0.008) 101,749 0.005
Occupation: low skilled 0.049*** (0.010) 0.009 (0.010) 0.011 (0.011) 101,749 0.051
Individual income (log) 0.158*** (0.029) 0.052** (0.025) 0.043 (0.034) 81,931 0.217
Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns’ headings define the independent variables of interest. All
regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, origin fixed effects, destination country, and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting
for the survey design and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.
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Table 10.3b Gaps in economic outcomes between first-generation immigrants, by origin, and native-born.





Unemployed 0.056* (0.025) 0.051 (0.027) 0.053* (0.026) 0.047 (0.027) 0.031 (0.022) 0.055* (0.025) 95,093 0.018
Inactive 0.007 (0.021) 0.016 (0.021) 0.031 (0.020) 0.018 (0.022) 0.026 (0.019) 0.020 (0.020) 95,093 0.006
Occupation: low
skilled
0.014 (0.032) 0.027 (0.035) 0.019 (0.037) 0.081* (0.036) 0.015 (0.029) 0.055* (0.021) 95,093 0.053
Individual income
(log)
0.293** (0.083) 0.273** (0.097) 0.287** (0.087) 0.103 (0.089) 0.057 (0.076) 0.208* (0.083) 76,582 0.224
Each line represents a separate regression, where the first column defines the dependent variable, and other columns’ headings define the independent variables of interest. All
regressions additionally include age, gender, education, parental education, destination country, and survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey
design and population weights. Reported coefficients represent the gaps in outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.
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For those who are employed, the distribution of jobs across type of
skill is of interest.We consider gaps in probabilities of being employed in
low-skilled, elementary occupations (ISCO classification codes 9), versus
all other jobs. Recent first-generation immigrants have a significantly
higher probability of performing these jobs, regardless of their poten-
tially higher level of education. This result is mostly driven by South
American and Eastern European immigrants. The literature suggests
various reasons for this, such as the potential mismatch of occupations
and qualifications (Chiswick and Miller, 2009b), or different valuation
and non-recognitions of diplomas at destination (Dumont and Monso,
2007). Remarkably, however, the biggest progress towards assimilation
along the economic dimension is observed in occupation distribution.
Figure 10.11 shows that for all destination countries, second-generation
immigrants have a significantly lower probability of performing an
elementary job, as opposed to first-generation immigrants and, in the
majority of countries also, as opposed to the native born (except Spain,
Greece, and Germany).
Finally, we also consider differences in incomes. Unfortunately, the
European Social Survey does not contain information on earnings, or on
individual incomes. Thus, we use the household income and divide it by


































Figure 10.11 Gaps in probability of occupying a low-skilled job.
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number of children is not available either, we are not able to apply
equivalence scales and treat each member of the household as an
adult. Hence, our measure of gaps in individual incomes is rather
crude, and also reflects the differences in the compositions of native
and immigrant families. Results of the regression analysis show that
immigrants’ initial individual incomes are much lower than of the
native born, but that the catch-up is strong, and that immigrants with
over 20 years at destination actually have higher incomes than native
born. In contrast, second-generation immigrants are no different from
the native born across this dimension.
10.3.5 Gender differences along selected outcomes
Country-specific chapters paid particular attention to differences in out-
comes between males and females, especially in what concerns marital
status and labour market outcomes. Thus, as a very last step, for most
important gender-sensitive outcomes we repeat some of the estimations
such as (1). We pool together first-generation immigrants with various
durations of stay and interact both types of immigrant dummies with a
‘female’ variable. This variable equals 1 for female respondents, and
0 otherwise.
Table 10.4 summarizes the results. Indeed, there is a considerable
degree of heterogeneity in outcomes across genders, albeit our aggregate
results only partly support country-specific findings. Specifically, both
first-generation and second-generation females have a higher probabil-
ity of being married than males of the corresponding generation and
than the native-born females. Second-generation men, however, have
lower marriage rates. In terms of education, first-generation males and
females do not seem to be significantly different either from each other,
or from the natives. The diverging pattern in education, however, is
confirmed for second generation: while men have less schooling than
the native born, women have more schooling than the native-born
women and than the second-generation men. Individual income of
immigrant females tends to be higher than that of males. These regres-
sions, however, do not condition on the nationality of the spouse,
which may be driving the result if, say, immigrant women are more
frequently married to native-born richer men. In terms of unemploy-
ment, there is little evidence of a particular penalty for women. In
contrast, first-generation females have a higher tendency to be employed
in low-skilled jobs than both first-generation men and native-born
women.
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10.4 Discussion
All in all, the aggregate results of the cross-country analysis go hand in
hand with general findings of country-specific chapters, despite differ-
ence in samples and questions. This is very reassuring. While assimila-
tion patterns are highly heterogeneous, and vary across destination,
origin, and generation of immigrants, in the majority of cases, conver-
gences of immigrants’ behaviours to those of the native born are
observed. This is the success of assimilation that is worth highlighting.
At the same time, a concern remains as to why, given the same birth
country and language of schooling (although maybe not the same
schools), the outcomes of some second-generation immigrants are actu-
ally still different from those of the native born. Some outcomes may be
persisting. For example, country studies stressed low schooling out-
comes for Turks in Germany, lower female employment rates of both
immigrant generations in Sweden and (among some origin groups) in
the UK. Some other outcomes may even diverge. For example, from








0.093*** 0.235 0.150*** 0.014* 0.015
(0.015) (0.148) (0.030) (0.008) (0.010)
Female 0.040*** 0.430*** 0.121*** 0.002 0.025***




0.033** 0.002 0.057* 0.002 0.045***
(0.016) (0.154) (0.029) (0.009) (0.012)
Second gen.
immigrant
0.075*** 0.638*** 0.049 0.020 0.010




0.096*** 0.644*** 0.122** 0.024 0.013
(0.027) (0.228) (0.056) (0.019) (0.017)
No. obs 95,093 101,751 90,465 101,749 101,749
R2 0.139 0.168 0.112 0.018 0.016
Each column represents a separate regression, where column headings define the dependent variable. All
regressions additionally include age, parental education, origin fixed effects, destination country, and
survey round fixed effects, and are estimated accounting for the survey design and population weights.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 5%, ** 1%.
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Chapter 2 on France, there is a worsening of education outcomes of
second-generation men in France. In our turn, we reported persisting
cross-generational unemployment gaps in France, Switzerland, and
Belgium, as well as diverging patterns of trust, or a disillusion effect,
for numerous countries.
Undoubtedly, the appropriateness of convergence in cultural dimen-
sions is open to debate. However, its desirability in economic terms
and in terms of equal opportunities for males and females is rather
uncontestable.
Potentially, some of the problematic areas may be linked to the apt
inclusion of all immigrant groups, especially families and women, into
the life of the receiving society, and to the proper exposure to local
practices. In part, better inclusion may be linked to the naturalization
laws, as acquiring the citizenship of the country of residence gives a
sense of security of status, and a sense of belonging. However, non-
naturalization rates among second-generation immigrants may be as
high as 30 per cent in Switzerland, or 25 per cent in Germany. In part,
better inclusion may also be linked to attitudes towards immigrants on
the part of the native born. For example, in Spain, Great Britain, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium, second-generation immi-
grants report a lower trust in the police and a higher degree of perceived
discrimination than the first-generation immigrants. Future research
should look at the interaction between country specific policies and
those assimilation patterns. Besides, it is not impossible that immi-
grants’ assimilation is interdependent with the perception of the secu-
rity of their status, and with the acceptance of immigrants on the part of
the native born. Successful integration may imply a two-way process.
While such analysis has been beyond the scope of this book, clearly,
more research into the direction of inter-linkages and interactions
between immigrant outcomes, perceptions of the native born, and
specific country conditions is needed.
One of the questions that consistently came out of this research is also
the question of a benchmark with respect to which the convergence of
behaviours should be measured. In the majority of cases, we analysed
the progress of immigrants as compared to the native born in specific
countries. Further research may also be enriched by stepping away from
the use of an ‘average’ native born as a benchmark for immigrants, and
encompass a more regional or ethnical perspective. Lastly, a question
that we leave for further research is to what extent the native born, in
their turn, adopt certain values and attitudes of immigrants. Is there a
convergence of all individuals to some medium, universal values?
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AT 83.2 7.3 53.3 9.5 6,862
BE 83.0 7.5 47.9 9.6 7,099
CH 69.0 18.4 48.0 12.6 7,717
DE 85.9 7.3 64.7 6.9 11,316
DK 90.2 4.7 57.2 5.1 6,012
ES 91.7 6.6 91.2 1.8 7,763
FI 96.8 1.4 85.2 1.7 7,983
FR 81.0 7.9 33.3 11.1 7,265
GB 84.5 8.2 52.4 7.3 8,531
GR 83.8 8.0 82.6 8.1 4,810
IE 90.4 6.0 72.5 3.7 5,924
LU 51.6 29.4 57.8 19.0 3,129
NL 86.6 7.3 47.3 6.2 6,056
NO 90.2 5.5 66.5 4.3 6,938
PT 94.2 3.9 67.0 2.0 7,939
SE 81.7 10.0 46.2 8.3 7,634
Appendix II First-generation immigrants by origin, as percentage of total
number of first-generation immigrants, by destination.
Destination/
Origin






Austria 11.13 1.39 3.38 0.80 48.51 34.79 10,000
Belgium 19.92 8.83 5.83 1.70 7.70 56.01 10,000
Switzerland 5.56 4.24 5.21 4.71 14.99 65.29 10,000
Germany 17.05 2.43 5.72 0.85 59.68 14.26 10,000
Denmark 12.98 5.26 21.75 1.05 16.49 42.46 10,000
Spain 18.86 3.54 3.73 42.83 15.52 15.52 10,000
Finland 2.61 3.48 13.04 0.87 59.13 20.87 10,000
France 36.43 13.13 3.85 5.25 6.48 34.85 10,000
The UK 2.87 21.38 29.27 6.31 5.88 34.29 10,000
Greece 13.21 3.63 3.37 3.11 67.10 9.59 10,000
Ireland 1.42 6.23 7.37 0.85 15.01 69.12 10,000
Luxembourg 0.54 5.10 2.28 1.09 8.79 82.19 10,000
The Netherlands 19.52 6.28 20.88 15.79 8.32 29.20 10,000
Norway 3.14 3.40 25.13 3.40 17.54 47.38 10,000
Portugal 0.32 51.46 2.27 27.83 11.65 6.47 10,000
Sweden 8.83 3.69 14.36 4.87 19.37 48.88 10,000
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Appendix IV List of countries in immigrants’ origin subgroups.
MENA: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, Arab Emirates
East European, FSU, FY: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Russia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan,Mol-
dova, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina

















Years of education 12.74 11.82 12.63 12.07
Unemployed 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.04
Inactive 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Occupation: low-skilled 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.09
Cultural indicators:
Married 0.57 0.63 0.42 0.55
Age gap between spouses 2.73 2.38 2.23 2.28
Speaking an official language of
a country as first language
at home
0.61 0.80 0.86 0.98
Frequency of praying (converted
into days per year)
12.900 13.557 97.90 82.57
Perceived discrimination 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.05
Frequency of socialization
(on the scale from 1 to 7)
5.01 4.88 5.21 4.96
Generalized trust (1–10) 4.99 4.74 4.42 4.82
Trust in police 6.51 6.20 5.69 6.02
Trust in country’s parliament 5.32 4.77 4.29 4.37
Trust in legislation 5.95 5.30 5.01 5.00
Trust in politicians 4.19 3.69 3.41 3.42
Trust in the European parliament 5.29 4.53 4.54 4.43
Trust in the United Nations 5.42 5.02 4.95 5.18
Civic indicators:
Citizen 0.42 0.69 0.89 1.00
Civic participation 0.33 0.47 0.50 0.46
Satisfaction with democracy 0.82 0.71 0.66 0.65
In favour of redistribution 0.65 0.70 0.72 0.69
Note: Tabulations are done accounting for survey design and population weights.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ESS.
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African: Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Central African Republic,
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Uganda, Gambia, Kenya,
Cameroon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Malawi, Nami-
bia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad, Togo, Tanzania,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Asian: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, China, Hong Kong, India, Iran,
Iraq, Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Macao, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Vietnam
South American: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Belize, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Surinam, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay
OECD: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany,
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Iceland, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Portugal,
Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Japan, Luxembourg, the USA, Sweden
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